WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE
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ULRICH TIMME KRAGH

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A Study of *Karmaphalasambandha*

Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā, Verses 17.1-20

ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN

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Contents

Abbreviations, Sigla and Editorial Signs

α	archetype alfa
β	archetype beta
γ	archetype gamma
δ	archetype delta
ε	archetype epsilon
χ	autograph ksi
a	folio recto or first *pāda* in verse.
AK	*Abhidharmakośa*
AKBh	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*
AN	*Aṅguttanikāya* PTS edition
b	verso folio or second *pāda* in verse
c	third *pāda* in verse.
C	*Co ne bstan 'gyur*
Chin.	Chinese
CŚ	*Catuḥśataka* by Āryadeva
CŚV	**Catuḥśatakavṛtti* by Candrakīrti.
d	fourth *pāda* in verse.
D	*sde dge bstan 'gyur;* numbers according to catalogue by UI *et al.* (1934)
DN	*Dīghanikāya* (in the Tibetan edition DN, however, stands for D and N separately)
fn.	footnote
G	dga' ldan or "Golden Manuscript" *bstan 'gyur*
LVP	Louis de LA VALLEE POUSSIN
Mav	*Madhyamakāvatāra*
MavBh	*Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*
Mmk	*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*
MN	*Majjhimanikāya*, PTS edition
ms	manuscript
mss	manuscripts
N	*snar thaṅ bstan 'gyur;* catelogued by MIBU (1967).
N^k	*snar thaṅ Mmk*
NGMPP	Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project
o	orthographic variant
o1	gemination
o2	external *anusvāra* in lieu of homorganic nasal
o3	internal *anusvāra* in lieu of homorganic nasal
o4	alternative orthography
Q	Peking edition of *bstan 'gyur;* facsimile-print by SUZUKI (1955-1961).
p	punctuation variants
p1	ekadaṇḍa in lieu of dvidaṇḍa
p2	dvidaṇḍa in lieu of ekadaṇḍa
p3	no punctuation in lieu of any form of daṇḍa

p4	insertion of daṇḍa
p5	any punctation other than double dvidaṇḍa with circle
p6	ardhadaṇḍa
Pras	*Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*
PTS	The Pali Text Society
s	solecism
s1	bad nominal case-ending
s2	corruption partly or fully due to change of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras*
s3	corruption partly or fully due to insertion of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras*
s4	corruption partly or fully due to omission of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras*
s5	corruption partly or fully due to transposition of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras*
s6	non-application of *sandhi*
s7	bad verbal-form
s8	complete variant solecism
SN	*Saṃyuttanikāya*, PTS edition.
ŚSV	*Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti* by Candrakīrti.
stand.	standardisation of spelling into Sanskrit form.
T	Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō
Tib	Tibetan
transl.	translation
V	the vulgate edition of Pras referring to LVP's Sanskrit edition (1903-1913).
v	significant variant reading
v1	variant in verbal form
v2	variant in nominal negation
v3	variant in upasarga
v4	variant caused by omission of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras*
v5	variant caused by changes of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras*
v6	variant caused by change of nominal case-ending
v7	omission of word(s)
v8	complete variant reading
v9	interpolation or insertion
v10	variant sandhi due to differences in punctuation
v11	transposition
प	Sanskrit Pras-ms प, Bodleian Palm-leaf ms.
द्	Sanskrit Pras-ms द्, NGMPP C 19/8
ब	Sanskrit Pras-ms ब, NGMPP E 1294/3
ज	Sanskrit Pras-ms ज, Tokyo University Library no. 251
ल	Sanskrit Pras-ms ल, Cambridge University Library add. 1483.
[ ]	Brackets indicate lacuna in ms or words inserted into

the translation. When the size of a lacuna is estimated, the approximate number of missing syllables is indicated by a digit, e.g., [7] means lacuna having the size of seven *akṣaras*.

⌊ ⌋ half-brackets indicate syllables, which are partly damaged but still reasonably legible.

{ } braces indicate readings not attested either by the Sanskrit edition or by the Tibetan edition.

Ω omega represents all manuscripts.

* reconstruction.

· a dot in the middle-height of the line indicates end of folio in the text-editions.

→ arrow indicates transformation

] lemma-sign, indicates that the word preceding the sign is the reading adopted in the critical edition.

A Note on Textual References to Pras and other Works

All references to the Sanskrit text of Pras refer to the edition by LA VALLÉE POUSSIN (1903-1913), here called the *vulgate edition* (V). Following the system used in the Pras-indices by YAMAGUCHI (1974), references are to page- and line-numbers; e.g., Pras 302_3 is a reference to *Prasannapadā,* V-edition, p. 302, line 3. V's pagination is indicated in the critical editions in this volume for the sake of easy reference.

References to the Tibetan edition are given in accordance with the pagination of D; e.g., D3860.100b_4 is a reference to *Prasannapadā* of the *sDe dge bstan 'gyur* (listed as text no. 3860 in UI's catalogue), folio-number 100b, line-number 4. Similarly, other references to Tibetan texts are provided with text-number in D, folio- and line-number; e.g., D3862.253a_6 is a reference to MavBh (text no. 3862 in D), folio 253a, line 6. In case of texts covering more than one volume, the volume number is given with Roman numerals; e.g., D3859.III.18$b_{3\text{-}4}$ is a reference to *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (text no. 3859 in D), vol. three (vol. *za pa*), folio 18b, lines three to four.

References to Chinese texts are given to the *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* edition with text-, page- and line-number; e.g., T1564.21c_6 is a reference to *Chung lun* (text no. 1564), page 21, section c, line 6. In case of Chinese texts only rarely referred to in this thesis, the *Taishō* volume-number is also indicated; e.g., T310.11.417$c_{12\text{-}13}$ is a reference to *Āryapitā-putrasamāgamasūtra* (text no. 310), volume 11, page 417, section c, lines 12-13.

All references to Pāli-texts are to the PTS-editions; e.g., DN 1.21 is a reference to Dīghanikāya, PTS-edition, vol. 1, page 21.

General Introduction

The Buddhist theory of action and result (*karmaphala*) is fundamental to much of Buddhist doctrine, because it provides a coherent model of the functioning of the world and its beings, which in turn forms the doctrinal basis for the Buddhist explanations of the path of liberation from the world and its result, *nirvāṇa*. It is essentially postulated in this doctrine that every sentient being is reborn repeatedly in the various states of *saṃsāra* as a result (*phala*) of its actions (*karman*), although the underlying cause of this process is taken to be craving or ignorance.[1]

This doctrine is expressed in its rudimentary form already in the earliest Buddhist sources, which in all likelihood is a reflection of earlier non-Buddhist east Indian beliefs, of which we only know very little. At the time when Buddhism first appeared in Northern India and during the following centuries when it thrived in the Gangetic plain, there was a medley of religious beliefs concerning the afterlife and how actions may or may not effect this. While primitive rebirth-eschatologies had been expressed already in the *Ṛgveda* and onwards (KEITH, 1925:406-415; OBEYESEKERE, 1980: 156-158; WITZEL, 1983), it was first at the time of the early *Upaniṣads* and the simultaneous rise of the heterodox *Śramaṇa*-traditions, viz. Jainism, Buddhism and Ājīvikaism, that the afterlife came to be seen as governed by ethical action (*karman*) and not strictly by religious ritualistic behaviour (also called *karman*). OBEYESEKERE (1980:138ff.) has referred to this cultural change as an 'ethicisation' of the rebirth-model, in which mundane morality became united with a religious code of behaviour.

Some (e.g., VETTER, 1988:51) have suggested that the concept of *karmaphala* originated in Jainism, because it is so very central a concept to

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[1] I prefer the full Sanskrit compound *karmaphala* to refer to the concept of 'action and result' (corresponding to Tib. *las daṅ 'bras bu* and Chin. *yeh-kuo* 業果). Many scholars, such as DONIGER O'FLAHERTY (1980) or KRISHAN (1997), have referred to this concept simply as 'the *karma* theory', but I feel that the simple designation *karma* is imprecise as a name for the whole model, because *karma* strictly speaking only refers actions without including their results. Hence, I consider the compound *karmaphala* more precise. The compound form is attested several times in Pras (Pras 302_3, 321_1, 355_1, 360_4 376_6 and 495_6), which is the main textual source for the present study.

this doctrine. Others (e.g., BHATTACHARYA, 1954; DEODIKAR, 1992; KRISHAN, 1997: 29-35; OLIVELLE, 1998:3) have suggested that it first developed in the Brāhmaṇical tradition with the argument that reference is made to *karmaphala* in the early *Upaniṣads*, which are thought to predate Jainism and Buddhism. Yet others (OBEYESEKERE, 1980:160-162; JAINI, 1980:218) have conjectured that the concept was inherited from an unknown indigenous animistic tradition in the Ganges plain from which the various *Śramaṇa*-traditions arose. At present, it is simply not possible to prove any of those hypotheses beyond reasonable doubt. It can only be generally observed that an ethical shift took place in Indian culture around this time, which involved the notion of *karmaphala*.

This new doctrine was by no means restricted to any single religious tradition or community, but was rather a thread in the general fabric of the east Indian religious communities of the time, and we therefore find the doctrine expressed in the scriptures of all the traditions of which texts are still extant. Its possibly earliest attestation is found in seven passages in three of the earliest *Upaniṣads*.[2] These *Upaniṣads* possibly predate the emer-gence of Jainism and Buddhism, as argued by NAKAMURA (1983:10-42) and OLIVELLE (1998:12-13), but there are also several convincing arguments for these *Upaniṣads* rather dating from the period shortly after the death of Buddha.[3] The word action (*karman*) has been interpreted as having an ethical sense in these passages, because it occurs together with words for wholesome (*sādhu, puṇya, kalyāṇa*) and unwholesome (*pāpa, pāpma, pāpaka, asādhu*). Nevertheless, these words for wholesome and unwhole-some also occur in ritual contexts,[4] and it is, therefore, uncertain whether *karman* here should be understood in the ethical sense of the later *karmaphala* doctrine or in some earlier sense related to Brāhmaṇic ritual, given that *karman* also can mean 'ritual action' rather than 'ethical action'. Elsewhere,

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[2] The seven passages are *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.2.12, 4.4.5-6 and 4.4.22-23; *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 4.14.3; and *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 1.2, 3.1 and 3.9.2. For Sanskrit text and English translation, cf. OLIVELLE (1998:80-81, 120-121, 124-127, 224-225, 326-327, 346-347, 354-355). For general reference to these passages, cf. LVP (1917:59-66), MCDERMOTT (1984:1), VETTER (1988:78) and KRISHAN (1997:17-28).

[3] The argumentation has been presented in detail by BRONKHORST (1986:113-121). In addition, it is not given that the texts existed in their present form already at that time.

[4] Cf. KRISHAN (1997:4-11) and OLIVELLE (1998:20-21).

the same *Upaniṣads* also speak of *karman* as ritual and of ritual as the cause of good rebirth.[5] The ethical interpretation of the words for wholesome and unwholesome in the early *Upaniṣads* is weakened by the fact that one does not find any specification of wholesome and unwholesome actions in an ethical sense in these texts, which would, for example, be comparable to the lists of the (ten) wholesome and unwholesome actions found in the early Buddhist canon.

While these early Brāhmaṇical attestations thus may or may not refer to an ethical doctrine of *karmaphala,* such a doctrine is certainly directly or indirectly attested in the extant early scriptures of the *Śramaṇa*-traditions of northeastern India, viz. Jainism, Buddhism and Āvījikaism. The Jainists and Buddhists must have asserted such a doctrine early on, whereas the followers of the ascetic Ājīvika tradition seem to have denied *karma-phala* (and thus still referred to it negatively) and instead taught a doctrine of determinism (*niyativāda*), according to which beings are reborn in a fixed manner independently of how they act until eventually becoming liberated.[6] Nevertheless, this view did not prevent the Ājivikas from practically engaging in religious asceticism,[7] which could indicate a very rigid interpretation of *karmaphala*, according to which *karmaphala* was not denied but was also not associated with human will. This is the view of BASHAM (1951:225), who writes: "This absolute determinism did not preclude a belief in *karma*, but for Makkhali Gosāla the doctrine had lost its moral force.

[5] Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 1.4.15, 1.4.17, 1.5.2, 1.5.16, 4.3.33, and 6.4.24; *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 5.2.8-9, 7.3.1, 7.4.1, 7.4.2, 7.5.1, 7.14.1, and 7.26.1. For Sanskrit text and English translation, cf. OLIVELLE (1998: 50-53, 56-57, 116-117, 160-161, 232-233, 260-261, 268-269 and 272-273).

[6] For a detailed study of the Ājīvika-tradition, cf. BASHAM (1951). The *locus classicus* for a description of their doctrine is a brief statement attributed to the Ājīvika-teacher Makkhali Gosāla found in the Buddhist *Sāmaññaphalasutta* (DN I.53-54; English translation by RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:71-73; for a slightly different paraphrase, cf. BASHAM, 1951:13-14). In this regard, the Ājīvika-doctrine is perhaps somewhat similar to the modern anthroposophical view of Rudolf Steiner that the soul must evolve from the lowest form of existence to the highest and that the person's behaviour cannot cause any setback but can only delay the given evolution. To explain the Ājīvika-view, BASHAM (1951:245-246) writes: "It may be concluded that the Ājīvika believed that the soul must transmigrate through all the *abhijātis* before its release from *saṃsāra*. Even the most highly developed soul must have spent part of its long existence among the basest and wickedest of mankind."

[7] Cf. the description of the life of Makkhali Gosāla given by BASHAM (1951:34-79) and BASHAM's (op.cit.: 109-115) description of Ājīvika-asceticism.

Karma was unaffected by virtuous conduct, by vows, by penances, or by chastity, but it was not denied."

Whereas the *karmaphala* doctrine thus was either peripheral or denied in Ājīvikaism, it held a much more central place in the doctrines of Jainism. Like the Ājīvikas, the Jaina mendicants were practitioners of asceticism, and it is indeed explanations on asceticism that stand in the foreground in the *Aṅgas,* viz. the early Jaina scriptures. The Jaina ascetic would practise non-violence, fasting, chastity and various other forms of physical restraint,[8] in order to purge his soul (*jīva*) from actions (*karman*) performed in this and all earlier rebirths, whereby he would attain liberation from *saṃsāra.* The underlying view was that actions fetter the soul, as if covering and holding it down, and actions thus bind the soul in the misery of *saṃsāra.* Although *karmaphala* is an important underlying concept in the early Jaina scriptures, it is by no means elaborately explained in the *Aṅgas,* being the oldest part of the *Siddhānta,* the Jaina canon.[9] In the *Aṅgas,* explanations on asceticism stand in the foreground, whereas the concept of *karmaphala* and its concrete functioning are mostly only vaguely implied. It is first in the later literature, such as the *karmagrantha*-texts, that a more elaborate theory of *karmaphala* became systematised.[10]

In that regard, the development of the concept of *karmaphala* in Jainism is similar to that of Buddhism, where *karmaphala* likewise only is a vaguely defined theory in the early canonical texts, the *suttas* of the *Nikāyas* or *Āgamas,* and first came to be elaborated in the later *Abhidharma*-literature. In the *Nikāya* Pāli *suttas,* only the basic principles of the *karmaphala* doctrine are laid out, viz. that different kinds of wholesome action bring good results in the form of good rebirths and that different kinds of

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[8] For a summary of an ideal form of Jaina asceticism, cf. *Sūyagaḍaṃga* (2.2.72-73), translated by JACOBI (1895:379-380).

[9] JAINI (1980:223-229) has though argued that one finds certain conceptual remnants in Jainism, which may indicate that the *karmaphala*-doctrine does not represent the earliest form of Jainism.

[10] For a study of the *Karmagrantha-literature,* cf. GLASENAPP (1915), whose study is based on the six *Karmagrantha*-texts, *Pañcasaṃgraha* and *Karmaprakṛti.* For a systematic summary of different types of *karman,* see also the first *Mūlasūtra, Uttarādhyayana,* lecture 33.

unwholesome action bring bad results in the form of bad rebirths,[11] and various kinds of wholesome and unwholesome actions are listed, mostly providing ten of each kind.[12] Further, in some *suttas* of the MN, knowledge of how sentient beings are reborn in various ways due to their former actions became associated with the Buddha's enlightenment under the Bodhi-tree, constituting one of the three kinds of knowledge that the Buddha attained.[13]

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[11] The *suttas* that provide explanations on *karmaphala* are: *Pāyāsisuttanta* (DN II.316-357, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1910:349-374), *Sāleyyakasutta* (MN I.285-290, transl. HORNER, 1954:343-349; having a parallel in *Verañjakasutta*, MN I.290-291, transl. HORNER, 1954:349-350), *Cūḷadhammasamādānasutta* (MN I.305-309, transl. HORNER, 1954:368-371), *Mahādhammasamādānasutta* (MN I.309-317, transl. HORNER, 1954:372-378), *Apaṇṇakasutta* (MN I.401-410, transl. HORNER, 1957.II:70-79), and *Vāseṭṭhasutta* (MN I.454-461 and *Suttanipāta*, p. 122, verses 649-654, transl. HORNER, 1957.II:384-385). *Suttas* dividing actions by different kinds of result are: *Saṅgītisuttanta* (DN III.217, transl RHYS DAVIDS, 1921:210; and DN III.230, transl RHYS DAVIDS, 1921:221) and *Kukkuravatikasutta* (MN I.389-391, transl. HORNER, 1957.II:57-58).

[12] The *suttas* that speak on the wholesome and unwholesome actions are: *Brahmajālasutta* (DN I, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:3-6; parallels in *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*, DN II, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:79, and *Ambaṭṭhasutta*, DN III, chapter II, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:123), *Cūḷahatthipadopamasutta* (MN I.179-180, transl. HORNER, 1954:224-225), *Kandarakasutta* (MN I.345, transl. HORNER, 1957:9-10), *Bāhitikasutta* (MN II.114, transl. HORNER, 1957.II:298), *Potaliyasutta* (MN I.360-363, transl. HORNER, 1957:26-27), *Kūṭadantasutta* (DN V, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:179), *Aggaññasuttanta* (DN III.82, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1921:79), *Saṅgīti-suttanta* (DN III.269, transl RHYS DAVIDS, 1921:247), *Dasuttarasuttanta* (DN III.290, transl RHYS DAVIDS, 1921:264), *Mahāvacchagottasutta* (MN I.489-490, transl. HORNER, 1957.II:168), *Assalāyanasutta* (MN II.149-150, transl. HORNER, 1957.II:342-343), and *Esukārisutta* (MN II.181-182, transl. HORNER, 1957.II:370).

[13] Cf. *Bhayabheravasutta* (MN I.22-23, transl. by HORNER, 1954:28-29), *Dvedhāvitakkasutta* (MN I.117, transl. HORNER, 1954:151), *Cūḷahatthipadopamasutta* (MN I.183, transl. HORNER, 1954:229), *Mahāsaccakasutta* (MN I.248, transl. HORNER, 1954:302-303), *Kandarakasutta* (MN I.348, transl. HORNER, 1957:13), *Sekhasutta* (MN I.358, transl. HORNER, 1957:24), *Potaliyasutta* (MN I.367, transl. HORNER, 1957:31), *Bhaddālisutta* (MN I.442, transl. HORNER, 1957.II:113), *Tevijja-Vacchagottasutta* (MN I.482, transl. HORNER, 1957.II:160), *Mahāvacchagottasutta* (MN I.496, transl. HORNER, 1957.II:174), *Saṅgāravasutta* (MN II.212, transl. HORNER, 1957.II:401). In DN, on the other hand, the same vision is not associated with the Buddha's enlightenment but belongs to a recluse in general; cf. *Sāmaññaphalasutta* (DN II, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:91-92), *Ambaṭṭhasutta* (DN III, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:125), *Soṇadaṇḍasutta* (DN IV, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:157), *Kūṭadantasutta* (DN V, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:183), *Kassapasīhanādasutta* (DN VIII, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:236), *Lohiccasutta* (DN XII, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:296), *Udumbarikā sīhanādasuttanta* (DN III.20,52) and *Sampasādaniyasuttanta* (DN III.111-112, transl RHYS DAVIDS, 1921:105-106). A shorter version, which only mentions the simile of watching a house in a single sentence, occurs at *Mahāssapurasutta* (MN I.278-279, transl. HORNER, 1954:332-333), *Mahāsakuludāyisutta* (MN II.21, transl. Horner, 1957.II:220-221). Cf. also the

Rebirth in heaven, hell or as an animal is explained as the result of action, and their results are in some instances systematised as the five courses of rebirth (*gati*).[14]

VETTER (1988) has questioned that the concept of *karmaphala* belonged to the earliest form of Buddhism as anything but a secondary and very rudimentary concept. His main argument (1988:51-52) is that action (*karman*) is not postulated as the cause of rebirth in the core doctrines of early Buddhism, i.e., the four truths of the noble ones (*caturāryasatya*) and the twelve links of dependent arising (*dvādaśāṅga pratītyasamutpāda*). Instead, in *suttas* speaking on the four truths, craving (*tṛṣṇā*) is said to be the cause of rebirth and suffering, whereas in *suttas* speaking on the twelve links of dependent arising, ignorance (*avidyā*) is the first cause of rebirth and suffering. It is only in the later *Sūtra* and *Abhidharma* commentarial tradition that certain elements of the four truths and dependent arising are interpreted as referring to action. Thus, in the early sources on the four truths, the concept of *karmaphala* is delegated to a peripheral position, since it is only explicitly mentioned as an aspect of right view (*saṃyaksaṃ dṛṣṭi*) within the eightfold path. As shown, e.g., in the studies of SCHMITHAUSEN (1981) and BRONKHORST (1986), different textual layers reflecting chronological strata can be uncovered in the Pāli canon, which generally indicates that certain doctrines only gradually were absorbed and developed in Buddhism, and it is VETTER's view that the doctrine of *karmaphala* was only gradually introduced into Buddhism.[15] Whether that is the case or not, it

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reminiscent passage in the Jaina *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.1.13: "Here in the East, West, North, and South many men have been born according to their merit, as inhabitants of this our world, viz. some as Āryas, some as non-Āryas, some in noble families, some in low families, some as big men, some as small men, some of good complexion, some of bad complexion, some as handsome men, some as ugly men." (Transl. by JACOBI, 1895:339).

[14] The *suttas* speaking on the results of actions are primarily: *Sāmaññaphalasutta* (DN II, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:68-69), *Lohiccasutta* (DN XII, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1899:291; repeated again in *Lohiccasutta* (DN XII, transl. Rhys Davids, 1899:292 & 293), *Saṅgīti-suttanta* (DN III.234, transl RHYS DAVIDS, 1921:225), and *Mahāparinibbānasuttanta* (DN II.84, transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1910:90-91),

[15] As a side-remark, I may here note that this point clearly brings out the difference between the traditional Buddhist commentator and the modern scholar of Buddhism. While Buddhist commentators foremost try to create doctrinal coherency between various inconsistencies in the canon by means of their exegesis in order to establish a coherent doctrine suitable for its practice, the modern scholar attempts to bring out and underline these very

may at least be observed in general that *karmaphala* only is presented as a very simple doctrine in the early sources of Buddhism, in which no further theory is presented regarding its actual functioning.

The *karmaphala* doctrine first became a coherent system with the systematisations and interpretations set forth in the *Abhidharma*-literature, which appeared after and partly alongside the earliest compilation of the Pāli *suttas* and *vinaya*-texts. The rather extensive *Abhidharma* literature thus provides numerous divisions of different types of actions and presentations of the various kinds of results they yield.[16] Most of the extant *Abhidharma* literature belongs to the *Theravāda* and *Sarvāstivāda* traditions, and it seems that these two traditions were not particularly active in attempting to formulate more developed theories of the actual workings of *karmaphala.* Right from the earliest Buddhist literature, the notion of *karmaphala* involves the concept that actions done in the present life yield results in the form of rebirths in specific conditions, as a particular kind of sentient beings, or as specific outer or social conditions within a given rebirth. While the different types of actions and their results are greatly systematised in the *Abhidharma*-literature of the *Theravāda* and *Sarvāstivāda* traditions, we do not find strong attempts to explain how more concretely this process at all is possible. Thus, it is really first in the early *Yogācāra*-literature that we find one or more theories of the workings of *karmaphala* expressed as the own view of the school(s) to which the texts in question belong. Nevertheless, there seems to have been several earlier attempts to formulate theories of the inner workings of *karmaphala* by Buddhists not belonging to the

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same inconsistencies in order to formulate theories about which idea has formed a basis for other, later ideas, thus creating a chronological, doctrinal history of ideas.

[16] The texts of the Pāli *Abhidharma*-tradition containing explanations on *kammaphala* are *Kathāvatthu* and section 1.7 of *Paṭisambhidāmagga.* The relevant *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma* works are: *Saṃgītiparyāya,* the **Karmaprajñapti*-chapter of *Prajñaptiśāstra,* chapter 4 of *Jñānaprasthāna,* chapter 4 of the *Vibhāṣā*-texts (viz. *Vibhāṣāśāstra, Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra* and *Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra*), chapter 3 of *Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* and its two commentaries *Abhidharmahṛdayasūtra* and *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra, Abhidharmāmṛtarasa, Abhidharmāvatāra, Sārasamuccayanāmābhidharmāvatāraṭīkā,* chapter 4 of *Abhidharmakośa* and its various commentaries, *Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā* and its two commentaries *Abhidharmadīpa* and *Vibhāśaprabhāvṛtti,* and *Abhidharmanyāyānusāraśāstra.* For a general outline of these works and references to scholarship, editions and translations, cf. KRAGH (2002).

Theravāda or *Sarvāstivāda* traditions, whose own writings or oral theories have not been preserved but whose views are referred to in writings of other traditions. It is these early theories of *karmaphala,* predating the *Yogācāra*-tradition, that are the topic of this monograph.

The *Yogācāra*-tradition formulated a theory of *karmaphala,* which I below refer to as the *bīja*-theory. In brief, it postulates that each action plants a seed (*bīja*) within the mind of the person performing the action, and it is this seed that in the distant future ripens into a result in the form of a concrete rebirth. This notion, of course, is closely linked with the *Yogācāra* concept of the base-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), in which the seeds of actions are stored, and which therefore also is referred to as the 'holder of all seeds' (*sarvabījaka*). Yet, we also know of at least two other major theories of *karmaphala* predating this *bīja*-theory of the *Yogācāras.* One theory is the *avipraṇāśa*-theory postulating that each action generates an imperishable phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*), which clings to the person who performs the action, and which, like a promissory note ensures the repay-ment of a debt, guarantees the result of the action in the distant future. This theory seems to have belonged to the *Saṃmatīya*-school and is in some sources said to be identical to a similar theory held by the *Mahāsaṅghika*-school, where the word 'accumulation' (*upacaya*) was used instead of 'imperishable phenomenon' (*avipraṇāśa*). The other theory is the *santāna*-theory, according to which an action generates a continuum (*santāna*), apparently identical with the performer's continuum of mind, which ensures the future ripening of the result. This theory seems to have been associated with the early *Sautrāntika* school and may have been a precursor for the later *Yogācāra bīja*-theory.

The problems we face when attempting to study these early theories of *karmaphala* are, however, numerous, for we have almost no textual sources belonging to the *Saṃmatīya, Mahāsaṅghika* and early *Sautrāntika* schools, in which these theories are described. It remains uncertain whether written sources rather than oral exegesis ever existed or whether written sources simply were not preserved for posterity. Nevertheless, we possess a few sources belonging to other traditions, in which these early theories are briefly presented, and it is therefore possible to describe these theories indirectly based on these texts. Given the great importance of the notion of

karmaphala in the doctrines of Buddhism, I consider a study of these theories worthwhile, even though it is flawed by the uncertainty that relying on secondary literature involves.

There are two main sources for the description of these pre-*Yogācāra* theories of *karmaphala.* The earliest source is chapter 17 entitled *karmaphalaparīkṣā* of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (Mmk, 2nd to 3rd century CE), a.k.a. *Madhyamakaśāstra,* along with its six extant Indic commentaries, viz. the anonymous **Akutobhayā,* * *Vimalākṣa's *Madhyamakavṛtti* (*Chung lun*), Buddhapālita's **Madhyamakavṛtti,* Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa,* Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* and Avalokitavrata's *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā.*[17] The other source is Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (4th to 5th century CE) with Sumatiśīla's commentary *Karmasiddhiṭīkā.* Of these texts, only Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* is still extant in Sanskrit and this commentary also includes the Sanskrit root-verses of Nāgārjuna's text. All the other sources are only extant in Chinese and/or Tibetan translations, even though some parts other than the first half of the 17th chapter of Buddhapālita's **Madhyamakavṛtti* recently have been found in an incomplete Sanskrit manuscript from Tibet.[18]

In 1936, Étienne LAMOTTE published the first and only major study of these sources in his article "Le Traité de l'Acte de Vasubandhu: Karmasiddhiprakaraõa" in *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques.*[19] LAMOTTE's work centres on Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa,* which is extant in two

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[17] *Akutobhayā* is only extant in Tibetan (edition by HUNTINGTON, 1986; transl. by WALLESER, 1911-1912). *Chung lun* (**Madhyamakavṛtti*) is by *Ching-mu* (**Vimalākṣa*?), who possibly was the *Vinaya*-master of its Chinese translator Kumārajīva (BOCKING, 1995:395-405; only extant in Chinese; transl. by WALLESER, 1911-1912 and BOCKING, 1995). Buddhapālita's *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* is only extant in Tibetan (edition by WALLESER, 1913, and SAITO, 1984.II; transl. of chapters 1-16 by SAITO, 1984.I). Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* is extant in Tibetan and Chinese (Tib. edition and transl. of six chapters, incl. the 17th chapter, by AMES, 1986, and transl. of chapter 13 by NIETUPSKI, 1996). Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* is extant in Sanskrit and Tibetan (for editions and translations, see below). Avalokitavrata's *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā,* which is a sub-commentary to Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa,* is only extant in Tibetan (no critical edition or translation available).

[18] The recently found manuscript in 14 folios, belonging to Lhasa's Tibet Museum, was presented in a paper entitled *A Sanskrit Manuscript of Madhyamaka-kārikā and Buddhapālita's Commentary from Tibet* by Ye Shaoyong, Beijing University, at the XIVth IABS conference, London 2005.

[19] For the non-French reader, an English translation has been published by Leo PRUDEN (1987).

Chinese and one Tibetan translations (T1608, T1609 and D4062). His work begins with a thorough introduction summarising the various theories mainly based on *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* and then provides an edition of the Tibetan text of *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* and a facsimile reproduction of the Taishō edition of the two Chinese translations.[20] He then goes on to give an annotated French translation of *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa,* adding an unannotated French translation of the 17th chapter of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* as an appendix.

The problem of understanding these early theories of *karmaphala* has thus so far been approached primarily from the point of via of Vasubandhu's work, while paying less attention to Nāgārjuna's text and its commentaries, which after all is the earlier of the two main sources describing these theories. It is therefore my task in the present publication to present a thorough survey of these theories as presented in Nāgārjuna's Mmk through a study of the 17th chapter of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* in comparison with the other Mmk-commentaries predating Candrakīrti's text, given that Candrakīrti's text is the only of the commentaries still extant in Sanskrit and therefore philologically superior.

Nāgārjuna's verses of the 17th chapter *Karmaphalaparīkṣā* begin with a general presentation of *karmaphala* (verses 17.1-5) by presenting several different types of action, including some brief references to their results. The commentaries, of course, lay out the text, explaining these divisions in more details. In verse 17.6, Nāgārjuna then raises the problem of how *karmaphala* actually can work, given the separation in time of the action and its future result. This problem is in the commentaries referred to as the problem of *karmaphalasaṃbandha,* meaning 'the connection between the action and the result'. Two different theories postulating different kinds of *karmaphalasaṃbandha* are then summarised by Nāgārjuna. The first theory, presented in verses 17.7-11, is the theory of the mind-continuum (*cittasantāna*) acting as the necessary connection between the action and its result. This theory is rejected in verse 17.12 as having logical flaws. The second theory, presented in verses 17.13-20, is the theory of an imperishable phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*) constituting the *karmaphalasaṃbandha.* Al-

[20] A full edition of the Tibetan text has since been published by MUROJI (1985).

though the commentaries explicitly reject this theory just before introducing verse 17.21, Nāgārjuna himself does actually not give any explicit rejection thereof in his root-verses. The remainder of the chapter (verses 17.21-33) does not contain any further information on the early theories of *karmaphala,* and has therefore not been included in the present study. Those verses provide a *Madhyamaka* analysis of *karmaphala,* generally arguing that *karmaphala* can only function if it is accepted that neither the action nor the result possesses any independent own-nature (*svabhāva*).

As the only of the Mmk-texts still extant in Sanskrit, this study takes as its point of departure the Mmk-commentary *Prasannapadā* by the north Indian Buddhist scholar Candrakīrti (c. 600-650 CE).[21] The Sanskrit text was

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[21] It may here be noted that there is very little biographical information on Candrakīrti. Based on Tibetan sources, SCHERRER-SCHAUB (1991:xxxi, 97, 312-313) has argued that he was born in Samataṭa, located at the mouth of the Ganges river in eastern Bengal. Tibetan sources further agree that Candrakīrti functioned as a scholar at the Buddhist University of Nālanda (SCHERRER-SCHAUB, 1991:xxxii), which was located in North India, 90 km southeast of Patna in present day Bihar. His dates are tentatively set as c. 600-650 CE (cf. RUEGG, 1981:71; 1982:513-514, who rejects the earlier dates 530-600 CE proposed by LINDTNER, 1979:91). The authorship of Candrakīrti includes seven works (cf. TILLEMANS, 1990:14), namely:

(1) *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Mav) and its *bhāṣya* (MavBh); *Madhyamaka*-works only extant in Tibetan (D3861 & D3862, MavBh-edition by LVP, 1907-1912; partial MavBh Sanskrit re-translation by ŚĀSTRĪ, 1929-1933; partial MavBh-index by KISHINE, 2002ab; partial MavBh transl. by LVP (1907-1911) and TAUSCHER, 1981; text-critical article by TAUSCHER, 1983; verse-index of Mav by TAUSCHER, 1989; transl. of Mav by RABTEN & BATCHELOR, 1983, HUNTINGTON, 1989, and FENNER, 1990).

(2) *Prasannapadā Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* (Pras); *Madhyamaka*-work, extant in Sanskrit and Tibetan (D3860, Sanskrit edition by LVP, 1903-1913; for translations, see chart below). Its concluding verses, referred to as *Madhyamakaśāstrastuti,* have been separately edited and translated by DE JONG (1962).

(3) *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti* (ŚSV); *Madhyamaka*-work, only extant in Tibetan (D3867, edition and transl. of verses 1-14 by ERB, 1997).

(4) *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti; Madhyamaka*-work, only extant in Tibetan (D3864, edition and transl. by SCHERRER-SCHAUB, 1991).

(5) *Catuḥśatakavṛtti* (CŚV); *Madhyamaka*-work, only extant in Tibetan (D3865, transl. of chapter 9 by MAY, 1980-1984; edition and transl. of chapters 12-13 by TILLEMANS, 1990; many references in LANG, 1986, and transl. of some passages in SONAM, 1994).

(6) *Triśaraṇasaptati;* work on the qualities of the three jewels, only extant in Tibetan (D3971; edition and translation by SORENSEN, 1986).

published by Louis de LA VALLÉE POUSSIN in the years 1903-1913, to which I refer as the *vulgate edition* (abbreviated as V) given that it is the only edition used by all modern scholars. LA VALLÉE POUSIN's edition was based on three Sanskrit manuscripts collected in Kathmandu by Brian Houghton HODGSON (here referred to as mss म and न) and Daniel WRIGHT (ms ल) and the Tibetan translation.[22] Before publishing this full edition, LA VALLÉE POUSSIN (1896) published a separate edition only of the 24th chapter of Mmk, which he extracted from the Pras-mss म and ल. An earlier edition of Pras was published by Śaraccandra ŚĀSTRĪ (1897), perhaps only based on ms न, but apparently, his edition was full of misprints (SINGH, 1977:4).[23]

A new ms (द) was discovered by Giuseppe TUCCI (DE JONG, 1979a:26). Comparing this ms with LA VALLÉE POUSSIN's edition, DE JONG published a revised Sanskrit edition of Mmk (1977) and two articles with text-critical notes to Pras (1978ab). Given the stemmatic importance of ms द (cf. below), DE JONG's notes improved the text in numerous instances. Nevertheless, more new mss have since then become available. In an article

(7) *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa; Abhidharma-work*, only extant in Tibetan (D3866, edition by LINDTNER, 1979).

The attribution of *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* is somewhat doubtful, given that it is purely a *Sarvāstivāda-Abhidharma*-work, although LINDTNER (1979:91-92) argues for its authenticity. Two texts attributed to Candrakīrti are not accepted as authentic works written by the author of Mav and Pras (cf. TILLEMANS, 1990:13): **Madhyamakaprajñāvatāra* and the *Guhyasamājatantra*-commentary *Pradīpoddyotana.*

[22] HODGSON was the British resident in Nepal and stayed in Kathmandu 1820-1843. A great number of Sanskrit and Tibetan mss were bought by him or copied by his private staff of scribes (HUNTER, 1896:84), which he donated to various learned societies (HUNTER, 1896:266-268 & 337-361). Ms म was given to the Société Asiatique in Paris in 1837 (HUNTER, 1896:267) and ms न was given to the Asiatic Society of Bengal (now the Asiatic Society) in Calcutta some time in the period 1827-1845 (HUNTER, 1896:352). For information on HODGSON, cf. his biography written by HUNTER (1896). Eugène BURNOUF (1876:498ff.) used ms म to write the first Western summary of the contents of Pras. Ms ल was bought for Cambridge University Library by Daniel WRIGHT, who was the surgeon to the British Residency in Kathmandu in the period 1873-1876 (WRIGHT, 1877; Bendall, 1883:vii). An important reference-tool to LA VALLÉE POUSSIN's edition is the Sanskrit-Tibetan and Tibetan-Sanskrit indices published by YAMAGUCHI (1974). LA VALLÉE POUSSIN's edition is repeated almost verbatim in VAIDYA's edition (1960; reprinted by TRIPATHI, 1987, with a different pagination) with a few new notes (e.g., only one emendation for the 17th chapter) and completely verbatim without annotations in PANDEYA's edition (1988), which further contains Sanskrit re-translations of *Akutobhayā,* Buddhapālita's **Madhyamakavṛtti* and *Prajñāpradīpa.*

[23] ŚĀSTRĪ's edition has not been available to me.

from 1984, Akira SAITO introduced five new mss and proposed eight new emendations of Mmk.[24] Further, in a bibliography of Buddhist Sanskrit mss, TSUKAMOTO, MATSUNAGA and ISODA (1990:237-239) listed thirteen of the presently fifteen available Pras-mss, including seven new mss.[25]

LA VALLÉE POUSSIN's edition can therefore be considerably improved based on the new available mss, particularly the 13th-century palm-leaf ms (प), which stemmatically is the most significant ms and which predates all the other manuscripts by circa 500 years. In fact, ms प has been available from the Bodleian Library since 1900, but remained unnoticed until TSUKAMOTO, MATSUNAGA and ISODA's publication (1990). Among the presently fifteen extant Sanskrit mss, Anne MACDONALD (2003a) has established that ten mss, including two of the three mss used by LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, can be rejected as apographs, whereas five mss, including ms ल used by LA VALLÉE POUSSIN and ms द् used by DE JONG, are significant: mss ब, द्, ज, ल and प. Based on these new Sanskrit manuscripts, new partial editions of *Prasannapadā* have begun to appear, which improve the reading of the text as compared to that given by LA VALLÉE POUSSIN. Most importantly, a new edition and full collation of the first chapter of the text has been produced by Anne MACDONALD (2003a), and KISHINE Toshiyuki (2001-2002) has likewise produced a new edition of the 24th chapter using eleven mss.[26] Given the possibility to improve our reading of the text with these new available manuscripts, I am here also providing a new Sanskrit edition of verses 17.1-20 of *Prasannapadā* along with the first edition of the Tibetan translation of this part of the text. My edition has in some instances improved the readings of LA VALLÉE POUSSIN's vulgate edition, but has more importantly provided an exhaustive collation of the five significant manuscripts, whereas the vulgate edition does not contain a thorough collation. Chapter one of the present book gives an introduction to these editions, while chapter two contains the Sanskrit and Tibetan editions.

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[24] These are three mss (ज, ह and इ) from Tokyo University Library and two mss (ग and क) from The Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions (IASWR). SAITO's (1984) emendations concern Mmk-verses 1.12, 2.13, 6.6, 20.24, 21.3, 22.3, 24.3 and 24.9.

[25] These include five new paper mss (अ, ब, च, ए and फ) from NGMPP and a palm-leaf ms (प) from the Bodleian Library.

[26] KISHINE used mss अ, ब, ए, फ, ग, ह, इ, ज, ल, म and न, but unfortunately not the two most important mss द् and प.

My study also includes an English translation of the 17th chapter of *Prasannapadā,* which has been incorporated into chapter 3. As mentioned above, LAMOTTE (1936) appended an unannotated French translation of this chapter to his article on *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa,* which has since been translated from French into English (PRUDEN, 1987).[27] Further, in 1937, a partial Japanese translation of *Prasannapadā* by Unrai WOGIHARA was published posthumously, which only includes about half of the 17th chapter (including until p. 333 in the vulgate Sanskrit edition). Other earlier translations of the Mmk-verses of this chapter without its commentary are given by STRENG (1967), INADA (1970), LINDTNER (1982, 1986), KALUPAHANA (1986), GARFIELD (1995) and OETKE (2001, containing a discussion of Mmk 17.31-32). My translation is given interspersed into my analysis of its contents and has been written in a larger type than my own comments. Since this book is intended more for the specialist than the general reader, I consider my readers capable of reading either the Sanskrit or Tibetan texts directly and my translation therefore serves mainly clearly to demonstrate my own reading of the Sanskrit text, thus indicating the basis for my analysis. I have therefore chosen to give a translation that is as literal as possible, in many cases choosing a style of English that lies much closer to the syntax and wording of the Sanskrit text than of proper English usage. Surely, this calls for the patience of the English reader, but I believe it gives the Sanskrit reader a faster and easier access to the original text. In order to facilitate further the use of my translation as a quick reference back to the Sanskrit text, I have supplied the Sanskrit words in brackets after each word or phrase of the English translation. Again, this has been done with the Sanskrit reader in mind, hopefully facilitating ease in jumping between the texts, although it will surely is a nuisance for the English reader. I beg the patience of any reader not wishing or able to read the Sanskrit text and hope some benefit may still be derived from my work, although I recognize its inconvenience for the general reader.

Besides the translation, the third chapter also contains my study of *karmaphala* as presented in Nāgārjuna's Mmk and Candrakīrti's commentary. The analysis centres around three foci. The first focus is merely

[27] Based on LAMOTTE's work, the contents of the 17th chapter have also been summarised by SILBURN (1955:249-254) and SHARMA (1993).

exegetical, viz. to lay out and explain the text of the root-verses and the commentary whenever an explanation is called for. In general, Candrakīrti's writing is, as indicated by the title of his work, quite clear (*prasanna*) and straightforward, but this is only true for a reader of the kind Candrakīrti had in mind. He is clearly an author writing for a specialised reader, namely educated Buddhist monks well familiar with the basic Buddhists tenets, definitions and categories and in many cases presupposes training in Pāṇinian Sanskrit grammar. In other words, his writings presuppose a thorough education in the Buddhist *Abhidharma* and *Mahāyāna* philosophical literature and Sanskrit grammatical theory. For the modern reader, his explanations may not always be as lucid as they possibly were for the Buddhist monks for whom Candrakīrti's text originally was intended, and I therefore often found it necessary to provide the text with a general exegesis, explaining its various arguments and laying out the references it makes to the categories and definitions of *Abhidharma.*

The second focus of my analysis has been to compare Candrakīrti's explanations with those found in the other commentaries on these verses of Mmk. This has foremost been necessary given that Nāgārjuna's verses are our earliest source describing these theories in more detail and I have, therefore, tried to cull out any information I could find in all the commentaries as to how we are to understand Nāgārjuna's verses. I often compare the different explanations of all the six extant Indic Mmk-commentaries and discuss how they concur or differ. Yet, this aspect of my analysis has also brought forth another interesting issue in the study of the Indian *Madhyamaka* tradition. As demonstrated by Clair W. HUNTINGTON Jr. in his Ph.D. on *Akutobhayā* (1986), a comparison of the two earliest extant Mmk-commentaries, viz. *Akutobhayā* and *Chung lun,* reveals that many passages are shared in common by both texts. These parallels indicate that we are here dealing with a commentarial tradition, in which the author of a commentary often relied on the earlier existing commentaries on his root-text in writing his own text and often lifted passages verbatim from the earlier commentaries. Being intrigued by HUNTINGTON's important observation, I wanted to see how this principle might apply to *Prasannapadā* when compared to all the five Mmk-commentaries predating it. I therefore carefully compared each sentence of the text to the earlier commentaries

and found numerous parallels in *Prasannapadā,* from the level of single words to whole sentences, which clearly had been adopted from the earlier commentaries. These parallels have been marked with red in the Sanskrit edition and are listed in its critical apparatus, and are discussed throughout my analysis of the text. Analysing the parallels, I found it uncertain whether Candrakīrti was familiar with *Akutobhayā* and *Chung lun* given that there only are very insignificant cases of parallels directly between *Prasannapadā* and these two texts, which are also not attested by the later commentaries by Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka. Indeed, it is possible that *Chung lun* was a Central Asian text written based on *Akutobhayā,* which never became known in India. Instead, I establish with certainty that Candrakīrti had access to Buddhapālita's **Madhyamakavṛtti* and Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* (as also mentioned by Candrakīrti himself in the concluding verses to his text), because I demonstrate a very high number of parallels with these texts. In particular, Candrakīrti has relied extensively on Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa,* often borrowing sentences directly from this text, which may be surprising given the well-known critique that Candrakīrti levels against Bhāvaviveka's exegetical method in the first chapter of his text. In fact, my observation may call for a reconsideration of the extent to which Candrakīrti really was critical of Bhāvaviveka and whether their difference may not have been exaggerated by the later doxographical tradition believing Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti as belonging to the entirely separate **svatāntrika* and **prasaṅgika* traditions.

The fact that Candrakīrti adopted so many phrases, examples, quotations and sometimes even whole sentences from the earlier commentaries, indeed amounting to about a third of all the sentences of his 17th chapter, should not be seen as plagiarism in the modern sense of the word, because the notion of plagiarism is based on the modern notion of 'author' as an independent, creative writer developed in renaissance Europe. Rather, it shows the Indian religious tradition to be a tradition of classicism, in which certain early works are considered as classics, which cannot be surpassed by the later commentarial works, and earlier commentaries are considered testaments of their exegetical tradition, which may be woven together (Latin *texere*) to produce new text. This is fully comparable to Medieval European religious writing, when religious texts likewise were written on the basis of

the early classics and produced by putting together (*com-posing*) similar writing from later sources. In other words, Candrakīrti's method of writing is typical of a tradition of *classicism*. He must have considered the works of Nāgārjuna as classics having scriptural authority and the earlier Mmk-commentaries as representing a transmission of oral and written commentary, which was to be respected unless there was good reason to introduce a new interpretation of a verse.

Finally, the third focus of my analysis has been source critical. Attempting to reconstruct the early theories of *karmaphala* based on the Mmk and its commentaries has involved searching extensively for the possible sources that were used to produce these verses of Mmk and the exegesis of its commentaries. In some cases, this search has been successful and I point to a number of sources pre-dating Mmk possibly serving as scriptural authority for Nāgārjuna, but in several cases, no source could be found. Also, I now and again discuss the possible sectarian affiliations of the views, examples and definitions presented in the text, and although it is possible to establish possible sectarian affiliations of the views relatively narrowly, I repeatedly point out that most doxographical references in the form of concrete names of sects only are found in rather late sub-commentaries, such as the commentaries on *Kathāvatthu* or *Abhidharmakośa.* Most of the early doxographical literature mentions particular views and positions without giving the names of the sects that held them. Hence, precise sectarian labels should be treated with suspicion and may rather reflect later attempts to systematise the earlier profusion of views into neatly defined sectarian compartments, such as *Saṃmitīya, Sautrāntika,* etc.

My research has involved sources in a number of languages. I have used and quoted primary sources in Sanskrit, Pāli, Chinese and Tibetan. As for secondary literature, I have consulted and quoted sources in English, French and German. When writing this study, I was not yet familiar with Japanese, and Japanese scholarship has therefore not been consulted sufficiently and has only been referred to cursorily. I realise that the polyglot quotations facing the reader in this volume may be unduly demanding for some readers and I have therefore chosen to supply all my quotations with English translations, thus hopefully making this volume more reader-

friendly. The reader familiar with the language in question, of course, may skip these added English translations.

This book constitutes the revised version of my Ph.D. dissertation submitted at the University of Copenhagen in June 2003. My two Ph.D. advisors were Professor Kenneth G. Zysk (University of Copenhagen) and Professor Lambert Schmithausen (University of Hamburg). The Ph.D. committee for the oral defence in November 2003 consisted of Professor Claus Oetke, Professor Jens-Uwe Hartmann and Professor Tom J.F. Tillemans. The dissertation, which is available from the Danish Royal Library (www.kb.dk), further contains Sanskrit and Tibetan editions and an unannotated English translation of the remaining part of the 17th chapter of *Prasannapadā,* which have not been included in the present volume given their rather peripheral nature to the subject of my study.

I wish to thank my Ph.D. advisors Kenneth G. ZYSK and Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN, who both provided excellent guidance and served as role models for my scholarship. Professor Zysk guided me in my efforts to become a scholar, led me into the world of Indology in its entire breadth, and particularly advised me on the thoroughness with which I have made my critical editions. Professor Schmithausen offered a veritable fountain of knowledge on Indian Buddhism, introduced me to its study in its various sub-fields and my study in Hamburg with him and his doctoral students was very inspiring and greatly raised my standards for philological scholarship. Both scholars have read parts of my dissertation and offered numerous suggestions improving my work. In this regard, I also owe special thanks for Claus OETKE, who served as the chair of my Ph.D. committee, for supplying me with his notes to my dissertation providing much constructive feedback allowing me to enhance many points.

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scripts and answered numerous questions. I am very grateful for all her help, which saved me much precious time. The other is Harunaga ISAACSON, who at the time was teaching Sanskrit at Hamburg University and with whom I took several Sanskrit courses. Professor ISAACSON patiently answered so many of my questions regarding Sanskrit grammar, syntax and textual criticism, and his excellence in Sanskrit and textual criticism never fails to impress me.

I also wish to think the many others, who have been of help to me in this project (here listed in alphabetical order): Diwakar ACHARYA, Achim BAYER, Hartmut BUESCHER, Anne BURCHARDI, José Ignacio CABEZÓN, George CARDONA, Florin DELEANU, Aleksa DOKIC, Roberto DONATONI, Akimichi EDA, Rolf GIEBEL, Jost GIPPERT, Michael HAHN, Kengo HARIMOTO, R. C. JAMIESON, Birgit KELLNER, Robert KRITZER, Hanna LEBRECHT, Tim LIGHTISER, Susan M. MEINHEIT, Charles MULLER, Ayako NAKAMURA, Dorris NICHOLSON, Ulrich PAGEL, Burkhard QUESSEL, Stig T. RASMUSSEN, Akira SAITO, Alexander SCHILLER, Sabine SHARMA, Masahiro SHIMODA, Jonathan SILK, Peter SKILLING, Frits STAAL, Ven. Mynak TULKU and the staff at the National Library of Bhutan, P.C. VERHAGEN, Joseph WALSER, Dorji WANGCHUK, Akira YUYAMA and Michael ZIMMERMANN.

On the following page is a table showing the Western translations of *Prasannapadā*.[28]

[28] The chart does not include SPRUNG's (1979) partial translation of Pras, which is more of a paraphrase of the text intended for a wider audience.

Chapter	Kārikās	V pp.	Other Skt. ed.	D Tib.	Tib. edition	Western translations
1. pratyayaparīkṣa	14	1-91	MacDonald (2003a)	1b-30b	MacDonald (2003a), Kyoshitsu (2001)	Stcherbatsky (1927), Ruegg (2002), MacDonald (2003a)
2. gatāgataparīkṣa	25	92-112		30b-38a	May (1959)	May (1959)
3. cakṣuradīndriyaparīkṣa	9	113-122		38a-41a	May (1959)	May (1959)
4. skandhaparīkṣa	9	123-128		41a-43b	May (1959)	May (1959)
5. dhātuparīkṣa	8	129-136		43b-46a		Schayer (1931)
6. rāgaraktaparīkṣa	10	137-144		46a-48b	May (1959)	May (1959)
7. saṃskṛtaparīkṣa	34	145-179		48b-60b	May (1959)	May (1959)
8. karmakārakaparīkṣa	13	180-191		60b-65a	May (1959)	May (1959)
9. pūrvaparīkṣa	12	192-201		65a-68b	May (1959)	May (1959)
10. agnīndhanaparīkṣa	16	202-217		68b-75a		Schayer (1931a)
11. pūrvāparakoṭiparīkṣa	8	218-226		75a-78a	May (1959)	May (1959)
12. duḥkhaparīkṣa	10	227-236		78a-80b		Schayer (1931)
13. saṃskāraparīkṣa	8	237-249		80b-84a		Schayer (1931)
14. saṃsargaparīkṣa	8	250-258		84a-87b		Schayer (1931)
15. svabhāvaparīkṣa	11	259-279		87b-94a		Schayer (1931)
16. bandhanamokṣaparīkṣa	10	280-301		94a-100b		Schayer (1931)
17. karmaphalaparīkṣa	33	302-339	Kragh (2006)	100b-110b	Kragh (2003)	Lamotte (1936), Kragh (2006)
18. ātmaparīkṣa	12	340-381		110b-123b	de Jong (1949)	de Jong (1949)
19. kālaparīkṣa	6	382-389		123b-126a	de Jong (1949)	de Jong (1949)
20. sāmagrīparīkṣa	24	390-409		126a-133b	de Jong (1949)	de Jong (1949)
21. saṃbhavavibhavaparīkṣa	21	410-430		133b-140b	de Jong (1949)	de Jong (1949)
22. tathāgataparīkṣa	16	431-450		140b-147b	de Jong (1949)	de Jong (1949)
23. viparyāsaparīkṣa	25	451-474		147b-156b	May (1959)	May (1959)
24. āryasatyaparīkṣa	40	475-518	Kishine (2001-2002)	156b-173a	May (1959)	May (1959)
25. nirvāṇaparīkṣa	24	519-541		173a-182a		Stcherbatsky (1927)
26. dvādaśāṅgaparīkṣa	12	542-570		182a-190a	May (1959)	May (1959)
27. dṛṣṭiparīkṣa	30	571-594		190a-198b	May (1959)	May (1959)

Japanese translations	Chapter
WOGIHARA (1938), YAMAGUCHI (1947), OKUZUMI (1988), TANJI (1988), HONDA (1988), Tōhō Gakuin (2001)	1. pratyayaparīkṣa
WOGIHARA (1938), YAMAGUCHI (1949), OKUZUMI (1988), HONDA (1988)	2. gatāgataparīkṣa
	3. cakṣuradīndriyaparīkṣa
	4. skandhaparīkṣa
	5. dhātuparīkṣa
	6. rāgaraktaparīkṣa
	7. saṃskṛtaparīkṣa
	8. karmakārakaparīkṣa
	9. pūrvaparīkṣa
	10. agnīndhanaparīkṣa
	11. pūrvāparakoṭiparīkṣa
WOGIHARA (1938), OKUZUMI (1988), HONDA (1988)	12. duḥkhaparīkṣa
	13. saṃskāraparīkṣa
	14. saṃsargaparīkṣa
WOGIHARA (1938), NAGAO (1967), OKUZUMI (1988), HONDA (1988)	15. svabhāvaparīkṣa
WOGIHARA (1938), OKUZUMI (1988), HONDA (1988)	16. bandhanamokṣaparīkṣa
	17. karmaphalaparīkṣa
OKUZUMI (1988), HONDA (1988)	18. ātmaparīkṣa
KANAKURA (1960), OKUZUMI (1988), HONDA (1988)	19. kālaparīkṣa
OKUZUMI (1988), HONDA (1988)	20. sāmagrīparīkṣa
	21. saṃbhavavibhavaparīkṣa
	22. tathāgataparīkṣa
	23. viparyāsaparīkṣa
	24. āryasatyaparīkṣa
	25. nirvāṇaparīkṣa
	26. dvādaśāṅgaparīkṣa
	27. dṛṣṭiparīkṣa

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Critical Editions of Pras

1.1 Aim and Limitations for the Critical Editions

The Sanskrit text of Pras is extant in five significant mss as well as ten apographs, i.e. mss that are direct copies from the five significant mss. All fifteen mss belong to the Nepalese recension of the text or, more precisely, to the Nevārī-recension of the text. The five significant mss have here been used to produce a critical edition of the 17th chapter of Pras, and the ten apographs have been eliminated, since they as apographs do not contribute new significant readings.

As a *critical* edition, its aim is to reconstruct the best possible reading of the text reflecting a textual historical understanding, namely an understanding of the text at the earliest possible date.[29] This means that a critical edition does not aim at reflecting the text as it is transmitted in any particular ms, although the readings of the individual mss are meticulously noted in a critical apparatus. The edition is rather a *reconstruction* of the text made by evaluating the individual readings of each ms in an attempt to establish the best possible reading in each case. Traditionally, the ultimate aim of textual criticism has been to reconstruct the autograph of a given text, namely the author's originally intended text, which in the present case would be the text of Pras as it existed in Northern India in the seventh century, perhaps written by Candrakīrti's own hand. This is, however, not the objective aimed for in the present edition. As is the case with many editions of ancient texts, and certainly the case with practically all classical Indian works, we do not possess any actual autographs or manuscripts early enough to be considered very close to the supposed autograph. In the case of Pras, the earliest extant Sanskrit ms, viz. ms प, belongs to the 13th century, and there is thus a gap of ca. six centuries between the supposed autograph and

[29] For a discussion of the types and aims of scholarly editing, see TANSELLE (1995).

the earliest Sanskrit witness, and the text undoubtedly underwent certain changes in its readings over the course of this period. The objective of the present edition can therefore not be to establish the author's originally intended text, but a collation and examination of the five significant Sanskrit mss thus can only result in an edition of the text that reflects the state of the text shortly before the earliest witness, thus yielding what would correspond to a 13th century edition of the text belonging to the Nevārī-recension.

The Sanskrit mss are, nevertheless, predated by yet another witness, namely the Tibetan translation of Pras by Pa tshab Lo tsā ba Ñi ma Grags (ca. 1055-1140 CE) made in the late 11th century. Ñi ma Grags based his translation on two Sanskrit mss belonging to different recensions. He first translated the text on the basis of a ms from Kaśmīra (Tib. *kha che*) and later corrected his translation on the basis of a ms from eastern Aparānta in Magadha (Tib. *ñi 'og śar phyogs*),[30] and his translation therefore reflects both these recensions. In terms of working with the original Sanskrit text, the Tibetan translation serves two purposes. First, it reflects how Ñi ma Grags in collaboration with his Indian teachers interpreted uncertain phrases in the Sanskrit text and, in this way, can help the modern reader to interpret such passages. Secondly, the reading of the Tibetan text can be used as a witness when examining the substantive readings of the Sanskrit mss, which often helps to establish the correct Sanskrit reading.

Ñi ma Grags' Tibetan translation is, however, likewise not extant in its original form, but is only preserved within the five 18th-century *bstan 'gyur* editions. Hence, it is also necessary to produce a critical edition of the Tibetan text to obtain its best possible reading. It should be noted that there are fewer variant readings in the Tibetan mss when compared to the large number of variant readings in the extant Sanskrit mss, which may point to a more stable transmission through the Tibetan translation but could also indicate that heavy editing was exercised at the time when carving the xylographs for the first Tibetan printed *bstan-'gyur*-editions in the 18th century.[31] Although the Sanskrit mss belong to the Nevārī-recension of the

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[30] On the identification of Tib. *ñi 'og śar phyogs* with eastern Aparānta in Magadha, cf. ERB, 1997:114, fn. 125.

[31] While the critical Tibetan edition is thus helpful for establishing the critical edition of the Sanskrit text, it must be cautioned that the Sanskrit critical edition also is relied on when

text and the Tibetan translation combines the Kaśmīrian and the East Indian recensions, there are not many differences between the substantive readings of the Sanskrit and Tibetan editions. Differences between the two have been marked by braces {} in both editions.

As the original Tibetan translation predates the earliest Sanskrit ms by approximately two centuries, it may with the help of the Tibetan translation be possible to establish a reading of the Sanskrit text, which reflects the state of the Sanskrit text in the early 11th century. However, this is only true in terms of substantive readings, since the Tibetan text cannot be used to determine Sanskrit variants of orthography and punctuation. For latter type of readings, the Sanskrit edition cannot reflect a stage earlier than that attested by the earliest Sanskrit witness, namely ms प. The reader must therefore be aware of these limitations of the Sanskrit edition that have now been described.

1.2 Description of the Significant Sanskrit Manuscripts

The five significant Sanskrit mss, which have been adopted for the critical Sanskrit edition, will now be described in chronological order. A thorough description of all of the extant manuscripts has been given by Anne MACDONALD in her dissertation on the first chapter of Pras (MACDONALD,

examining the substantive readings of the Tibetan mss. In other words, it is often on the basis of the Sanskrit text that the correct Tibetan reading can be adopted. This inevitably leads to a somewhat circular examination when working with an original text and its translation: the translation is used for determining uncertain readings in the original text and the original text is used for determining uncertain readings in the translation. Regarding this circularity, Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN (personal communication, May 2003) has remarked: "For practical purposes, it should be kept in mind that this circularity to a large extent is an abstraction. In most instances, the Sanskrit text will help to settle the Tibetan text, where it poses no problems of its own and vice-versa; true circularity would obtain only in such cases, where both versions present problems (variants, corruptions, etc.) in one and the same passage." In conclusion, this circularity does not pose a problem in most cases, but would only be truly problematic in the rare case, where either the same word or phrase is corrupt in both the Sanskrit and Tibetan editions, which in any case would call for an emendation by the editor, or else where both the Sanskrit and Tibetan editions have equally possible substantive variants for the same word or phrase, in which case the original Sanskrit reading would have to be given priority with a clear indication in the apparatus of the possible variant attested by the Tibetan translation.

2003a, publication forthcoming), and my present description only adds little of new significance but mainly summarizes MACDONALD's description.[32]

To avoid unnecessary confusion by introducing new sigla, the sigla used in the present edition of the Sanskrit mss are those given by MACDONALD. The sigla used for the Tibetan mss are those given as a standard by HARRISON and EIMER (1987). To avoid any overlap between these two groups of sigla, the sigla for the Sanskrit mss have been written in Devanāgarī script, so that MACDONALD's ms D, for example, is designated as ms द् and so forth in the present edition. In the following headings for each ms-description, MACDONALD's siglum written in Latin script is given in parenthesis after the Devanāgarī siglum used in this edition.

प (P), *Sanskrit manuscript no. 1440, Bodleian Library*

The oldest extant Sanskrit ms of Pras is palm-leaf ms प. This ms was brought to Europe from an unknown location in India or Nepal by Dr. A. F. Rudolf HOERNLE, who was a government official and philological secretary of the Asiatic Society of Bengal stationed in Calcutta until his retirement in 1899.[33] Following Dr. HOERNLE's return to Great Britain, the ms was bought by the Bodleian Library in 1900 (WINTERNITZ & KEITH, 1905: entry 1440). Although this ms has thus been generally available since 1900, it was neither used in the critical edition produced by LVP in the years 1903-1913 nor in the text-critical notes published by DE JONG in 1978, since they were unaware of its existence.

Ms प consists of 77 palm-leaf folios measuring 56 x 5 cm.[34] Originally, it probably consisted of 113 folios, so that 36 folios are missing (MACDONALD, 2000:168). Many of the extant folios are quite damaged. There are seven lines of Nevārī script on each side of the folio written in three blocks of text on each page. Each block is separated by an empty space measuring 2,5 cm with a hole in the middle for a tying-cord (WINTERNITZ & KEITH, 1905: entry 1440). The ms is beautifully written in an old type of

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[32] Dr. MACDONALD provided me with a pre-publication draft of her description of the Sanskrit mss of Pras, which has in part formed the basis for my description.

[33] Cf. the foreword in HOERNLE (1893-1912).

[34] For a general description of the production and usage of palm leaf-mss, cf. MURTHY (1996:25-31, 49-50 & plates 32-35 at the end of the book).

Nevārī script, which BENDALL (1883:vi, xviiff.) calls *Nepalese hooked writing*, since most characters carry a small hook in the upper right corner, somewhat reminiscent of the superfixed r-letter (*repha*) of the Devanāgarī script. Other names for the same writing-style are *vartula, kuṭila, early Śarada, Bhujimol* and *early hooked Nepalese* (BUESCHER, 2002.II:38, note 14). Letter-numerals are written in the left margin of verso-folios.[35] On the basis of the script and the letter-numerals, MACDONALD (2003a, 2003b:217) estimates that the ms was written in Nepal in the late 12th or 13th century. The ms is generally quite reliable and is characterised by having been proofread by a competent reader, although it still contains some evident errors. The proof-reading can occasionally be seen in the form of corrections written in the margin by another hand, which have been corrected in the text of the manuscript in the scribe's own hand.[36]

ज (J), *Sanskrit manuscript no. 251, Tokyo University Library*

Ms ज consists of 241 folios of Nepalese paper measuring 36 x 9 cm. There are six lines of regular Nevārī script on each side of the folio. The word *vineya* is written in the left margin of verso-folios, under which the page-number is written with digits.[37] The page-number is repeated in the middle of the right margin of verso-folios. The ms is dated in the colophon as Nepalese *samvat* 851, which corresponds to 1731 CE.[38] It has not been possible to ascertain when and how this ms was acquired by Tokyo University Library.

[35] For a chart of letter-numerals, cf. BENDALL (1883, last chart at the end of the book).

[36] Cf. MACDONALD (2000:168-169; 2003a).

[37] The purpose of the word *vineya* (lit. 'pupil') remains uncertain. It is attested by mss बज and partly by mss एफह. It may thus be attributed to sub-archetype γ. According to the Nepalese scholar Diwakar ACHARYA (private communication, 27.05.2003), it seems likely that it constitutes a title-abbreviation, given that it is written in the left margins. *Vineya* is perhaps a corruption of *vinaya* (attested by the later mss इकलन and partly by mss एफह), indicating that the text wrongly was identified in γ as a *vinaya*-work. This is supported by ms म, which has *vi.sū* in the left margins, probably an abbreviation for *Vinayasūtra*, and by ms ग, which has *vinaya* in the left margins and *sūtra* in the right margins. Ms ञ has *mā.śā.vyā* in the left margins, probably an abbreviation for *Mādhyamikaśāstravyākhyā.*

[38] For a copy of the colophon and regarding the identification of the date, cf. MACDONALD (2003a).

ल (L), *Sanskrit manuscript add. 1483, Cambridge University Library*

Ms ल consists of 178 folios of Nepalese paper measuring 35,5 x 11,5 cm. It has nine lines of Devanāgarī script on each side of the folio. The word *vineya* is written in the upper left margin of verso-folios. The word *guru* is written in the lower right margin of verso-folios, under which the page-number is written with digits.[39] The ms is dated in a colophon as Nepalese *samvat* 901 (reproduced by BENDALL, 1883:116), corresponding to 1781 CE (BENDALL, 1883:114). It was acquired in Nepal by Daniel WRIGHT, who was the surgeon to the British Residency in Kathmandu from February 1873 to May 1876 (BENDALL, 1883:vii). However, WRIGHT (1877:316-320) does not list the ms in the list of acquired mss given in his *History of Nepal.* It was used by LVP for his edition of Pras, who refers to it as the *Cambridge manuscript* (abbreviated in his notes to *Cambr.*).

ब (B), reel-no. E 1294/3, NGMPP

Ms ब belongs to the private collection of Āśa Kājī Vajrācārya in Patan, Nepal, and was filmed by NGMPP in 1981. It consists of 207 folios of Nepalese paper measuring 32 x 12,5 cm. It has 9-10 lines of Devanāgarī script on each side of the folio. The word *vineya* is written in the upper left margin of verso-folios, under which the page-number is written with digits. The word *guruḥ* is written in the lower right margin of verso-folios, under which the page-number is written again. The ms is dated in a colophon as Nepalese *samvat* 959 (1839 CE).[40]

द् (D), reel-no. C 19/8, NGMPP

Ms द् belongs to the Keshar Library in Kathmandu (catalogue no. 9-182), and was filmed by NGMPP in 1975. The title on its front page is given as *Sakalapravacanārthasaṃgraha*, but on the recto-side of the folio (1b) it is

[39] The word *guruḥ* is attested in the right margins of mss अबद्एम; the form *guru* is attested by mss हद्ल. According to the Nepalese scholar Diwakar ACHARYA (private commu-nication, 27.05.2003), *guru* is one of the auspicious words written in Nepalese mss together with the page-number at the time of counting the pages; other such words are *śrī, rāma* and *hari.* Ms फ attests *rāmaḥ* on some of its folios.

[40] For a copy of the colophon and regarding the identification of the date, cf. MACDONALD (2003a).

given as *Prajñāpāramitāṭīkā.* Folios 112-113 contain Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakaśāstrastuti,* which currently is the only extant Sanskrit source for Candrakīrti's concluding verses to Pras.

The ms consists of 111 folios of Nepalese paper measuring 39 x 16 cm, having 13 lines of late Nevārī script on each side of the folio. The word *guru* is written in the middle of the right margin of verso-folios, under which the page-number is written with digits. The ms is not dated but is written in a form of Nevārī script, which seems to be later than the script found in the 18th-19th century mss ज (1731), च (undated) and म (acquired by HODGSON in the 1830'ties), since it bears a strong resemblance to Devanāgarī and is in this regard closest to the Nevārī script attested by ms ग. Ms ग is, unfortunately, also undated but belongs to the latest level in the stemma codicum worked out by MACDONALD (2003a). It still displays characteristic Nevārī-characters for the akṣaras *pha, ra* and so forth, which are not used in ms द्,where these characters instead resemble the corresponding Deva-nāgarī characters. If the principle is accepted that earlier Nevārī-mss have a script less resembling Devanāgarī than later Nevārī-mss, it may be concluded that ms द् is a late ms, possibly belonging to the late 19th or 20th century. Stemmatically, the ms belongs to a transmission other than that attested by mss बजल, and ms द् often agrees with readings otherwise only attested by ms प. With regard to orthography and punctuation, on the other hand, ms द् agrees with the later mss and not with ms प.

The ms was discovered by Giuseppe TUCCI, who made a facsimile copy. DE JONG later used TUCCI's copy to produce a new edition of Mmk (1977) and extensive text-critical notes on Pras (1978ab). DE JONG refers to the ms with the siglum R.

1.3 Rejected Sanskrit Mss

In her study of the first chapter of Pras, MACDONALD (2003a) establishes ten of the extant Sanskrit mss of Pras as apographs, i.e., direct copies of the existing mss-family बजल. The ten mss are:[41]

[41] For a description of these mss, cf. MACDONALD (2003a).

- Ms अ (A), reel-no. A 916/5, NGMPP, Devanāgarī script, undated.
- Ms च (C), reel-no. B 90/3, NGMPP, Nevārī script, undated.
- Ms ए (E), reel-no. B 88/6, NGMPP, Devanāgarī script, undated.
- Ms फ (F), reel-no. A 916/6-917/1, NGMPP, Devanāgarī script, date not identified.
- Ms ग (G), reel-no. E 1478/2, NGMPP, and microfilm no. MBB-1971-62, Institute for the Advanced Study of World Religions (IASWR), Nevārī script, undated.
- Ms ह (H), Sanskrit ms no. 250, Tokyo University Library, Devanāgarī script, undated.
- Ms इ (I), Sanskrit ms. no. 252, Tokyo University Library, Nevārī script, undated.
- Ms क (K), microfilm no. MBB-1973-117, IASWR, Nevārī script, undated.
- Ms म (M), Sanskrit ms no. 8, Société Asiatique, Devanāgarī script, undated but donated by HODGSON to the society in 1837.
- Ms न (N), Sanskrit ms no. B 2, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta, Nevārī script, undated, but donated to the society by HODGSON probably in 1827.

To fully establish that these ten mss were copied in their entirety from mss बजल, it is a desiratum to collate their readings for a second passage of the text other than the first chapter already collated by MACDONALD. Nevertheless, this time-consuming task has not been undertaken in the present study, as I have chosen to ignore these manuscripts here.

1.4 Substantives and Accidentals in the Sanskrit Mss

When examining the significant mss, it is possible to distinguish between substantives and accidentals. This distinction was first proposed by Sir Walter GREG (1950), who worked on editions of English literature. GREG (1950:376) defined *substantives* as the significant readings of a text, which "affect the author's meaning or the essence of his expression," and *accidentals* as the non-significant readings, such as "spelling, punctuation, word-division, and the like, affecting mainly its formal presentation." In

other words, GREG's distinction is an attempt to separate significant variants from variants of less importance. The distinction rests on the supposition that an editor or copyist is less likely consciously to introduce changes into the text that would alter the author's meaning, but is more likely to do so when it comes to changes that only affect its formal presentation, such as altering the punctuation, correcting spelling-mistakes, modernizing the text by removing archaisms, etc.

This supposition carries a strong consequence for how to apply the genealogical method of textual criticism. It means that an editor or copyist will try to copy the substantives as faithfully as possible, unless he detects an error and tries to emend the text. All undetected errors would be copied into the new text, which will therefore attest cumulative errors. The analysis of these cumulative errors is the bedrock of the genealogical method, because it is through the analysis of these are transmitted in the different manuscripts that it is possible to establish the manuscripts' genealogical or stemmatic relationships.[42] Further, GREG supposes that an editor or copyist is less concerned with faithfully reproducing the accidentals of his original, such as punctuation and spelling, and may tend to follow his own habits or inclination regarding these (GREG, 1950:377). If this is so, successive copies of a text will thus become increasingly divergent from the earliest copy, particularly as regards punctuation and spelling, not merely through carelessness but through the natural tendency of scribes or editors to utilize their own habitual forms (TANSELLE, 1987:14).[43] This means essentially that different features of the texts, namely the substantives and the accidentals, thereby are accorded different treatment (TANSELLE, 1987:81). Consequently, the genealogical method cannot be applied securely to accidentals, because errors may not be copied cumulatively but coincidentally, given that editors and copyists rely less on their originals than on their own inclinations. For this reason, I have clearly separated substantive and accidental readings in the critical apparatus of my editions in this publication, and have only discussed the substantives in my genealogical analysis given below.

[42] For a general introduction to these principles of textual criticism, cf. the standard manuals by WEST (1973) or MAAS (1950).

[43] TANSELLE (1972, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1995) has written extensively in the defence of GREG's method.

If the genealogical method cannot be applied to accidentals, it follows that another approach must be used with regard to variants of punctuation and spelling. One approach often seen in editions of Sanskrit works is to standardise orthography and punctuation, whereby wherein the editor chooses to standardise all or most homorganic nasals to *anusvāra*, remove all gemination and so forth. Such an approach generally agrees with the treatment of accidentals found in more recent or modern Sanskrit mss, which tend to use *anusvāra* in place of homorganic nasals, etc. However, such a standardised text does not reflect the inconsistency in spelling and punctuation found in practically every hand-written Sanskrit ms. A standardised (or modernised) text allows for an easy and consistent reading, which, of course, has many advantages, but does not reflect the oldest possible ms-tradition. Rather, as concerns accidentals, it becomes an edition removed as far as possible from the oldest mss, wherein the usage of *anusvāra* is less frequent and so forth. A standardised critical edition thus becomes a hybrid-text: on the one hand, the edition attempts to re-establish the earliest substantive readings, but, on the other hand, attempts to modernise all accidentals through standardisation.

Instead of standardising the accidentals, the modern editor can also choose to follow the treatment of accidentals attested by the oldest available witness. This is the approach suggested by GREG (1950:381-382), who proposes to choose one ms as a 'copy-text', which should govern generally in the matter of accidentals. In this manner, the critical edition will at least reflect the treatment of accidentals used by the particular editor or copyist, who produced the earliest manuscript, without modernising or standardising the text. This necessarily leads to a somewhat inconsistent usage of accidentals in the critical edition, since practically every hand-written Sanskrit manuscript treats accidentals inconsistently. This approach thus has the disadvantage that the reader, at least to some extent, is forced to deal with multiple spellings for the same word, but there is the advantage that the edition, as far as is desirable, reflects the treatment of accidentals in the ms-tradition at the stage of the copy-text.[44]

[44] Obviously, the disadvantage of this approach would be even greater for the production of electronic text editions, because it would make electronic word-searches more unreliable. Nevertheless, I do believe that the approach is preferable for printed editions, since it allows

This latter approach has been chosen for the present edition of the Sanskrit text, and ms प has been chosen as the copy-text, because this ms is currently the oldest available Sanskrit witness of Pras. It must therefore be underscored that the critical edition in its treatment of accidentals thus reflects ms प, i.e., a 13th-century Nevārī ms. Since the autograph or an early ms of Pras is not extant, it would be practically impossible or at least highly speculative to attempt to create an edition that would reflect Candrakīrti's own treatment of accidentals or their treatment in North Indian mss of the 7th century. The treatment of accidentals in the critical edition should therefore not be assumed to be that of Candrakīrti himself but only to reflect that of ms प.

With ms प as copy-text, all accidentals have been treated in the critical edition as found in ms प to the extent that this is desirable. Some exceptions have been made to this principle. In particular, Nepalese spellings of certain words have been standardised to Sanskrit spellings to avoid an edition with words, which cannot be found in Sanskrit dictionaries. Further, the critical edition deviates from the copy-text, whenever an accidental in ms प is found to disturb the author's meaning, particularly in the case of punctuation.[45] In the critical apparatus, accidentals are listed

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the reader insight into the complexity of accidentals in the manuscript-tradition and displays the text in a historically accurate manner without oversimplifying the text through standardisation.

[45] This point, of course, shows the fundamental weakness of GREG's method applied here, namely that some accidentals indeed do affect the author's meaning and therefore, in a sense, are 'substantives'. Other studies of textual criticism have demonstrated cases, in which accidentals affect the author's meaning, particularly MCKENZIE's (1981 and 1999, especially pp. 18-23) study of the English dramatist Congreve (1670-1729) as well as the theories on the history and significance of the uses of spaces between words in occidental literature presented by SAENGER (1997) and the influence on reading by the history of the occidental book presented by CAVALLO & CHARTIER (2003). The problem, however, mainly concerns GREG's definition of substantives and accidentals and less his observation that editors and scribes tend to take more freedom in changing punctuation and spelling than other parts of the text and that Lachmann's genealogical method therefore is less applicable to accidentals than to substantives. Hence, I still maintain that GREG's method is fundamentally applicable at least to editions of classical texts, for which there exists no autograph or very early manuscript, and that it can be useful particularly when creating editions of manuscripts containing numerous corruptions, such as those of the later Nepalese Sanskrit tradition, which often are so corrupt that one wonders how anyone could read and understand them without access to earlier manuscripts of better quality or access to the Chinese or Tibetan translations, as we have today. Nevertheless, I concede that much more serious consideration ought to be given also

separately to allow for an easier overview of the readings. Accidentals have been collated and noted exhaustively.

Moreover, I apply a detailed taxonomy to all mss-readings listed in the apparatus. I do not apply this to the readings of LVP's earlier edition of Pras, even though these readings also have been included in the apparatus for the sake of reference to the vulgate edition. This taxonomy allows the reader to understand my interpretation of every variant and also is used in this introduction to analyse the readings of each ms stemmatically. All readings in the mss are reduced to just four kinds, which in the apparatus is indicated by a one-letter abbreviation as here given in the parentheses:[46]

1. punctuation variants (p),
2. orthographic variants (o),
3. significant variant readings (v),
4. solecisms (s).

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within our discipline of oriental text criticism to McKenzie's (1981) thorough argumentation that books must be appreciated as being meaningful in their entirety, including their typography, lay-out, use of space, etc., which implies a rejection of Greg's me-thod, and that we have to consider what consequences McKenzie's view has for the editions we produce.

[46] To illustrate the mechanics of the apparatus and the use of taxonomy codes with an example, the apparatus may, for example, look like this: "°paramparayā 】 प Tib: °parasparayor बजल (γδ)(v5, v6): °parasparayā द (v5): °paraṃparayā V." In this example, the edition reads *°paramparayā* as indicated by the lemma-sign 】. The lemma-sign is followed by "प Tib" signifying that the reading of the edition is attested by ms प and supported by the corresponding Tibetan translation (Tib). This is followed by a colon, since colons are used in the apparatus as a separator of readings, and thus signifies that a variant reading now follows. The first variant reading is *°parasparayor* attested by mss बजल. Since these manuscripts form a stemmatic family derived from archetypes γ and δ (to be discussed below), the archetypes γδ are mentioned as also attesting the given variant reading, given the text critical rule that readings shared by two or more related mss is to be ascribed to their common ancestor prototype. Following the parenthesis giving the archetype-letters is another parenthesis with the taxonomy codes "v5, v6". These codes indicate that I consider the reading of mss बजल to be a "significant variant reading" as indicated by the code v and among the different subtypes of significant variant readings (to be discussed below), this reading is of subtypes 5 and 6. Again, a colon is used to separate readings, for now follows another variant reading attested by manuscript द, i.e., *°parasparayā,* which again is indicated by the taxonomy code v5 to be a significant variant reading of subtype 5. Finally, the reading of LVP's vulgate edition indicated by the capital V follows, this being °paraṃparayā, and, as mentioned above, taxonomy codes have not been applied to the readings of LVP's V edition.

Punctuation variants and orthographic variants are accidentals, whereas substantive variant readings and solecisms are substantives. This taxonomy will now be explained and analysed in detail.

1.5 Accidentals in the Sanskrit Mss: Punctuation

For punctuation, the Sanskrit mss use the vertical stroke called *daṇḍa*, which occurs in four different forms in the mss:

- a single vertical stroke (*ekadaṇḍa*), which is indicated in the critical edition with the sign: |
- a double vertical stroke (*dvidaṇḍa*), which is indicated with the sign: ||
- a combination of two *dvidaṇḍas* with a circle in the middle, which is attested only by ms प before the first *pāda* of a *mūla*-verse as an indicator of the root-text and twice in the 17th chapter as an indicator of change of passage. All instances of this type of *daṇḍa* attested by the copy-text, ms प, have been adopted in the critical edition. This *daṇḍa*-combination is indicated in the critical edition with the sign: || ∘ ||
- a half-sized vertical stroke or a dot in the middle of the line (*ardhadaṇḍa*), which is not employed in the critical edition, but is referred to in the apparatus as *ardhadaṇḍa*.

The punctuation readings adopted in the critical edition are mostly those attested by the copy-text, ms प. If the readings adopted by the critical edition are taken as the basis for an analysis, six variant readings are possible:

- a ms has a *daṇḍa*, where a *dvidaṇḍa* has been adopted in the critical edition; such readings are given the code p1 in the apparatus.
- a ms has a *dvidaṇḍa*, where a *daṇḍa* has been adopted in the critical edition; such readings are given the code p2 in the apparatus.
- a ms has no punctuation, where a *daṇḍa* or *dvidaṇḍa* has been adopted in the critical edition; such readings are given the code p3.
- a ms inserts a *daṇḍa* or *dvidaṇḍa*, where no punctuation has been adopted in the critical edition; such readings are given the code p4.

- a ms has no punctuation, a *daṇḍa* or *dvidaṇḍa*, where a double-*dvidaṇḍa* with a circle in the middle has been adopted in the critical edition; such readings are given the code p5.
- a ms has or inserts an *ardhadaṇḍa*, where a *daṇḍa*, double-*dvidaṇḍa* with a circle in the middle or no punctuation has been adopted in the critical edition (*ardhadaṇḍa* in lieu of an adopted *dvidaṇḍa* is not attested); such readings are given the code p6.

If presented in a schematic form, the following statistic of punctuation variants may then be given on the basis of this taxonomy:

ms or ms-combination	p1	p2	p3	p4	p5	p6
प	-	-	5	5	-	-
ज	-	6	11	5	-	-
ल	3	22	3	6	-	6
ब	5	1	10	3	-	-
द्	-	9	8	8	-	-
जप	-	-	1	-	-	-
बप	-	-	1	-	-	-
द्प	-	-	1	3	-	-
जल	-	30	4	4	-	-
बज	1	-	3	1	-	-
द्ज	-	-	-	1	-	-
बल	-	6	-	3	-	2
द्ल	-	20	1	-	-	-
बद्	-	-	-	-	-	-
बजल	-	13	9	11	-	-
द्जल	-	51	-	3	-	-
बद्ज	-	1	1	1	-	-
बद्ल	-	3	2	3	-	-
द्जलप	-	-	-	1	-	-
बद्जल	-	16	19	13	20	-
Ω	-	1	4	4	-	-
Total	9	179	82	75	20	8

If the different usages of *ekadaṇḍa* (p1) and *dvidaṇḍa* (p2) should be considered first, the above chart shows that the punctuation-treatment of ms प has been adopted in all cases except one, where Ω attested a *dvidaṇḍa* (p2) but a *daṇḍa* has been adopted. This case occurs at Pras 323_8, where a verse from the earlier part of the chapter is quoted again with a *dvidaṇḍa* in a place, where ms प formerly attested a *daṇḍa.* Generally speaking, ms प always uses *daṇḍa* as its sign of punctuation. *Dvidaṇḍas* are only used in ms प in two cases: (1) in four instances, ms प uses a *dvidaṇḍa* to indicate the end of the commentary on a verse (Pras 313_{12}, 313_{12}, 314_7 and 322_9); and (2) in another case, ms प uses a *dvidaṇḍa* at the end of a *mūla*-verse (Pras 317_2). Thus, *dvidaṇḍa* is only used in ms प to indicate a clear change in the text, such as the end of a passage.

Such a consistent *daṇḍa*-usage is not found in the later mss, which tend to use *dvidaṇḍa* much more frequently than ms प, as indicated by the high number of p2-variants, particularly in the case of mss द्जल (ज, ल, द्, जल, द्ल and especially द्जल). This indicates that, in the case of these Nepalese mss, the *dvidaṇḍa* gradually comes to be used as a simple punctuation-sign with no particular sense of emphasis or change of subject. Ms ब is partially an exception to this tendency, since it in a number of cases uses *daṇḍa*, where mss द्जल attest *dvidaṇḍa.*

Moreover, regarding the placement of *daṇḍa*, ms प tends to insert *daṇḍa* only at the end of sentences, like a full stop, but tends not to use *daṇḍa* after the individual clauses of a sentence, like a comma. This means that longer sentences having relative and correlative clauses often are not divided by a *daṇḍa* between the clauses in ms प. In the later mss, the insertion of *daṇḍa* or *dvidaṇḍa* after clauses becomes more frequent, which is indicated by the relatively high number of inserted *daṇḍa* (p4). The usage of *daṇḍa* thus seems to change over the centuries, in that *daṇḍa* in ms प tends to be used more like a full-stop, while it in the later mss tends to be used both as a comma as well as a full-stop (with no particular distinction between *daṇḍa* and *dvidaṇḍa* for these functions). Nevertheless, the rather widespread frequency of omitted and inserted *daṇḍas* in the individual mss indicates that there is little general consensus among scribes as to where *daṇḍa* or *dvidaṇḍa* should be placed in the sentence. This is an indication of

how the individual scribe must have taken liberty to insert or omit *daṇḍas* according to his own liking, which again underscores the purpose of distinguishing accidentals from substantives. The only general tendency that can be observed in the statistic of p3- and p4-variants is that mss ब, ज and बजल often deviate from ms प, द् and द्प as regards their placement of *daṇḍa*. This would generally agree with the stemmatic relationships of the mss to be explained below. Moreover, mss बद्जल often deviate from ms प in the placement of *daṇḍa*, which to some extent indicates the change, which the text has undergone as regards accidentals in the five to six centuries between ms प and mss बद्जल.

The half-*daṇḍa* (*ardhadaṇḍa*), which LVP uses throughout his edition of Pras as a comma, is only attested by mss ल and ब. Ms ब does not attest *ardhadaṇḍa* independently of ल, which probably indicates that the *ardhadaṇḍa* was introduced by their common ancestor. The *ardhadaṇḍa* is written as a dot in the middle of the line · and seems to function somewhat like a comma by indicating a change of clause, but not a full stop. The *ardhadaṇḍa* is, however, only used very infrequently, and is merely attested in eight instances in the analysed passage (i.e., Pras 302_3-323_{10}). In three instances, ms ल alone attests an *ardhadaṇḍa*, where ms प attests a *daṇḍa* (Pras 313_8, 314_2 and 320_1). In three instances, ms ल alone inserts an *ardhadaṇḍa*, where ms प does not attest a *daṇḍa* (Pras 313_3, 313_5 and 321_7), and in two instances, mss बल jointly insert an *ardhadaṇḍa*, where ms प does not attest a *daṇḍa* (Pras 312_{11} and 318_3).

1.6 Accidentals in the Sanskrit Mss: Gemination

The other kind of accidental readings is orthographic variants (o), which occur in four sub-types. The first is *gemination*, which has been designated with the code o1 in the apparatus. In the mss, gemination occurs as an optional reduplication of a consonant after the letter *r* (*repha*), when the r-letter is preceded by a vowel (cf. *Aṣṭhādhyāyī* 8.4.47; WHITNEY, 1879:§228), e.g., karmma instead of karma. The following table presents gemination statistically:

	प	ब	ल	द्ज	Ω
instances of gemination	47	13	4	1	16
% of possible instances	22%	6%	2%	0,5 %	7%

All the mss attest gemination occasionally, but mss प and ब are most frequent in their application of it. The critical edition, which on this point exclusively reflects ms प, has 47 instances of gemination out of 215 possible instances, where gemination could have been applied according to the grammatical rule. This corresponds to an application-rate of 22% in ms प. Ms प tends to use germination more frequently than the other mss.[47] This seems to indicate that gemination was generally used more frequently at the time of ms प than at the time when the later mss were written. This generalisation, however, cannot be firmly established merely on the basis of the present material, since it could also just indicate a particular style employed by the scribe of ms प not attested by other contemporary mss, and so these findings would have to be compared with other Nepalese manuscripts, particularly manuscripts of the 13th century like ms प.

Words derived from the verbal-root *vṛt* especially tend to be geminated. Thus, Ω attests geminated forms of such words in 11 instances,[48] whereas other instances attested by Ω are less consistent.[49]

Ms ब employs gemination more often than the other late mss. It only does so jointly with ms प in a single instance at Pras 314_{14} (*dharmma*) and, of course, in the 16 instances, where Ω attest gemination. Yet, ms ब also

47 Ms प attest gemination against mss बद्जल in the following instances: Pras 302_5 (*karmma*), 310_4 (*tatkarttṛṇāṃ*), 311_8 (*karmma*), 311_{17} (*karmma*), 313_2 (*purvva°*), 314_5 (*karmma*), 313_8 (*karmma°*), 314_9 (*dharmmasya*), 315_2 (*°karmma°*), 315_4 (*karmma°*), 318_8 (*karmmaṇām*), 320_{11} (*pūrvva°*), 321_7 (*sarvva°*), 321_{12} (*sarvva°*) and 323_7 (*purvvam*). Shared gemination by mss जप is attested at Pras 313_6 (*'nuvarṇṇita*). Shared gemination is attested by mss बप at Pras 314_4 (*dharmma*). Shared gemination by mss द्प is attested at Pras 312_1 (*varṇṇayanti*). Shared gemination by mss द्जप is attested at Pras 315_{16} (*varṇṇayanta*), 316_{13} (*°varṇṇa°*), 317_2 (*cānuvarṇṇitāṃ*), 317_4 (*tatharṇṇam*) and 323_{10} (*upavarṇṇita°*).

48 Pras 307_2, 308_8, 312_9, 312_{11}, 313_5, 313_7, 313_8, 313_9, 313_{12}, 314_3 and 316_5.

49 Pras 306_4 (*parikīrtti*), 306_9 (*nirddhāraṇa*), 314_5 (*karmma*), 314_8 (*karmma*) and 318_2 (*karttā*).

often employs gemination in instances, where none or few of the other mss geminate.[50] Nevertheless, when the employment of gemination in ms ब is compared with that of ms प, it becomes apparent that gemination in ms प is of a different nature than that of ms ब. On the one hand, a wide variety of words are geminated in ms प, thus indicating that the scribe regularly exercises the option of gemination in cases, where this rule may be applied. On the other hand, almost all the cases, where ms ब attests gemination independently of the other mss and thus probably independently of the text from which is has been copied, are instances of gemination of the same two words: *karmma* and *dharmma*. It therefore seems that the scribe of ms ब simply had the habit of often writing these two words in their geminated form rather than applying gemination to a variety of cases, where it could be applied orthographically. The more numerous instances of gemination attested by ms ब do therefore not contradict the observation that gemination is more frequent in the older ms प than in the later mss बद्जल. Ms द्जल rarely employ gemination.[51] As may generally be observed from the cited examples, the letter-combinations *rt*, *rm*, and *rv* are particularly prone to gemination.

1.7 Accidentals in the Sanskrit Mss: Nasals

The second and third sub-type of orthographic variants (o) concern the use of nasals. Nasals within words may either be written as the homorganic nasal depending on the preceding letter or as *anusvāra;* the internal use of *anusvāra* within words has been designated with the code o2 in the apparatus. Likewise, externally at word-endings, a nasal may be written as the homorganic nasal or *anusvāra*, and the latter is designated with the code o3.

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[50] Ms ब alone attest gemination against द्जलप in 13 instances at Pras 304_{7} (*dharmmacārī*), 304_{8} (*dharmma°*), 305_{4} (*dharmma*), 305_{11} (*dharmmaṃ*), 307_{2} (*karmmety*) , 307_{4} (*karmma*), 307_{9} (*karmmā°*), 311_{1} (*°karmma°*), 311_{5} (*karmmā°*), 314_{4} (*karmma*), 314_{8} (*dharmmasya*), 314_{12} (*dharmma°*) and 315_{4} (*karmma°*). Mss बल attest joint gemination in three instances at Pras 307_{5} (*karmmaṇo*), 317_{8} (*karttuḥ*) and 318_{4} (*karttuḥ*).

[51] Ms ल alone attests gemination in four instances at Pras 307_{9} (*dharmmāḥ*), 308_{6} (*°karmmā°*), 317_{9} (*dharmma*), and 318_{5} (*karttuṃ*). Mss द्ज attest joint gemination at Pras 315_{12} (*varṇṇite*).

Also in this regard, the critical edition reflects its copy-text, ms प, except in passages having lacunae in this ms.

The analysed passage (i.e., Pras 302_3-323_{10}) of ms प attests homorganic nasals in 119 instances of internal *sandhi* (o2) out of 162 possible instances, i.e., in 74% of the instances. This is distributed as follows: the nasal ṅ is attested in 57% of the possible cases (17 out of 30), the nasal ñ in 19% (4 out of 17), the nasal ṇ in 100% (1 out of 1), and the nasal n in 96% (97 out of 101). As regards external *sandhi* (o3), a homorganic nasal is attested in 82 instances out of 264 possible instances, i.e., in 31% of the possible instances. This is distributed as follows: the nasal ṅ is attested in 15% of possible cases (4 out of 26), the nasal ñ in 67% (18 out of 37), the nasal n in 59% (41 out of 70), and the nasal ṇ is, of course, not possible in external *sandhi*. Thus, ms प tends in most cases to use homorganic nasals in internal sandhi, particularly in cases of dental sandhi (*dantya*) involving the nasal *n,* and often uses homorganic nasal in external sandhi, particularly in cases of palatal (*tālavya*) and dental (*dantya*) sandhi.

The later mss do not employ homorganic nasals as often as ms प. In fact, there are no cases, where mss बद्जल jointly or independently attest a homorganic nasal, which is not attested by ms प. The following chart gives a statistic for the instances, in which the mss बद्जल use *anusvāra* in lieu of a homorganic nasal adopted in the critical edition on the basis of its copy-text, ms प. Instances of *anusvāra* in internal (o2) and external *sandhi* (o3) are here distinguished.

ms	ज	ल	ब	द	जल	बज	बल	दल	बद	बदज	दजल	बदज	बदल	बदजल	Total
o2	2	3	23	2	3	-	4	3	6	4	5	-	5	20	80
o3	-	-	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	3	2	1	5	42	59

The chart shows that mss बद्जल also often use homorganic nasals in cases of internal sandhi, but less frequently than ms प. If considering the instances attested jointly by the later mss बद्जल, the adaptation-frequency of homorganic nasals is only 61% of the total amount possible, as compared to the 74% attested by ms प. Ms ब is particularly prone to use *anusvāra* in cases of internal sandhi to the extent that it only uses homorganic nasals in 35% of the possible instances.

In terms of external *sandhi*, the individual mss only rarely deviate from the style of ms प. When combined, however, they deviate from ms प in 42 instances, which means that mss बद्जल jointly used homorganic nasals in external *sandhi* in 15% of the possible instances against the 31% of ms प. In other words, where ms प sometimes uses homorganic nasals in external *sandhi*, mss बद्जल only rarely use these. This may indicate a general development showing increased frequency in the usage of *anusvāra* in the later mss, but the basis of comparison is again too small to establish such a general conclusion, since it also could simply reflect a particular inclination of the scribe of ms प. This finding must therefore be tested against other 13th century Nepalese mss, before any theory of scribal practices can be formulated.

1.8 Accidentals in the Sanskrit Mss: Alternative Orthography

The fourth and final sub-type of orthographic variants (o) in the Sanskrit mss is cases of alternative orthography, which is designated with the code o4 in the apparatus. Two generally accepted spelling-variants are attested by some of the mss. Thus, ms ल attests the optional form *vijñāpayanti*, where the other mss attest *vijñapayanti* (Pras 309_1), and mss बजल differ once in their spelling of the word *pudgala* (Pras 303_7), in that ms ब attests the spelling *puṅgala* and mss जल have the spelling *puṃgala*.[52]

[52] According to EDGERTON (1953.II:347, s.v. *pudgala*), the spelling *puṅgala* occurs often in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit and could have been influenced by the Pāli-form *puggala*.

Some of these variants are generally typical for Sanskrit mss. Double consonants are often written as single consonants.[53] *Avagraha* is often omitted.[54] *Avagraha* is inserted in three instances to distinguish word-separation in case of vowel-*sandhi* of two a's.[55] In the single case of n-l-*sandhi*, the mss differ slightly in their *sandhi*-application.[56]

Other cases of alternative orthography (o4) are typical for Nepalese Sanskrit mss. Thus, all the mss consistently use the letter v instead of b, as is typical throughout north-western India.[57] Since Nevārī- and Nepalese-speakers do not distinguish retroflex, palatal and dental sibilants, there is frequent replacement of s for ś.[58] Replacements of s for ṣ and ś for s also occur, but are more rare.[59]

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[53] In the following notes, the lemma-sign 】 indicates the reading of the critical edition. Colon : indicates separation of variants. Single t instead of tt: Pras 302_3 pravṛttyā】 pravṛtyā प. 305_3 sattveṣu】 satveṣu Ω. 310_3 sattvā】 satvā बद्जल. 312_1 utpatty°】 utpaty° प. 312_8 °pattrādy°】 °patrādy° बद्जल: patrā° प. 313_4 °pravṛtty°】 °pravṛty° बप: °pravṛty ज. Single dh instead of ddh: 305_{10} boddhavyaṃ】 vodhavyaṃ ज. Single n instead of nn: 321_6 bhinna°】 bhina° प.

[54] *Avagraha* is omitted by Ω in 13 required cases of the analysed passage, twice by mss द्प, once by ms प alone, twice by mss बजल and once by ms ल. An a-vowel is inserted instead of *avagraha* in the following cases: Pras 303_6 'haṃmāno】 ahaṃmāno Ω. 308_{10} tadyathā 'dya°】 tadyathā adya° ज. 310_1 'nugamo】 anugamo ज.

[55] *Avagraha* is inserted once by mss बद्ल and twice by ms ब to distinguish double *a*-vowel *sandhi*.

[56] Pras 304_7: °āsmiṃl loke】 'smiṃl loke बद्ल: 'smiṃ loke बज.

[57] There are 54 such instances in the analysed passage.

[58] Pras 305_6 śāly°】 sāly° Ω. 311_{15} °vināśitvam】 °vināsitvam जलप. 312_1 °vināśitvāt】 °vināsitvāt प. 313_2 śāśvataṃ】 śāsvataṃ ब. 313_5 chāśvata°】 chāsvata° जप. 314_5 śāśvataṃ】 śāsvataṃ प. 314_6 °śāśvata°】 śāstvata° प. 316_5 śāli°】 sāli° प. 317_4 yathā 'vipraṇāśas】 yathāvipraṇāsas ब: yathā 'vipraṇāsas द्जलप. 317_7 'vipra-ṇāśakhyo】 'vipraṇāsakhyā द्: 'vipraṇāsakhyo प. 317_8 'vipraṇāśas】 'vipraṇāsas Ω. 317_9 avipraṇāśākhyo】 avipraṇāsākhyo बद्प: avipraṇāṇāsākhyo जल. dhananāśo】 dhananāso प. 318_1 avipraṇāśākhya°】 apipraṇāsākhya° ज: avipraṇāsākhya° प. 318_4 avipraṇāśo】 avipraṇāso प. 318_6 avipraṇāśo】 avipraṇāso प. 318_8 °āvipraṇāśaḥ】 °āvipraṇāsaḥ Ω. 319_2 avipraṇāśaḥ】 avipraṇāsaḥ बजल. 319_3 avipraṇāśas】 avipraṇāsas प. 320_5 asyāvipraṇāśasya】 asyāvipraṇāsasya द्. 321_2 avipraṇāśasya】 avipraṇāsasya प. 322_2 'vipraṇāśa】 'vipraṇāsa द्. 322_{11} 'vipraṇāśaś】 'vipraṇāsaś ज: vipraṇāsaś ल. 323_6 cāvipraṇāśo】 cāvipraṇāso प. 323_6 'vipraṇāśa°】 'vipraṇāsa° प.

[59] The dental sibilant s replaces ṣ four instances of the same word: 307_6 viṣpando】 vispando Ω. 307_{10} viṣpandaḥ】 vispandaḥ प. 308_2 viṣpandaḥ】 vispandaḥ प. 315_5 viṣpando】 vispando बद्जल (प lacuna). The palatal sibilant ś replaces s in two instances: 321_4 visabhāgānāṃ】 viśabhāgānāṃ बजल. 322_1 sāśravānāśrava°】 sāśravānāsrava° ल.

1.9 Substantives in the Sanskrit Mss: Significant Variant Readings

The expression *significant variant reading* is here used in the particular sense of a different reading attested by one or more ms, which is grammatically and semantically possible in the given sentence, but which has not been adopted in the critical edition. There are 202 such readings in the analysed passage, which have been marked with the code v in the apparatus. Among these, eleven sub-types are distinguished:

- v1: variants in verbal form (8 instances)[60]
- v2: variants in nominal negations (6 instances)[61]
- v3: variants in *upasarga* (1 instance)[62]
- v4: variants caused by the omission of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras* (29 instances)[63]
- v5: variants caused by changes of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras* (24 instances; cf. below)
- v6: variants caused by changes of nominal case-endings (46 instances; cf. below)
- v7: omissions of whole words (33 instances)[64]

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[60] Pras 304$_{6}$, 311$_{10}$, 311$_{15}$, 313$_{3}$, 314$_{4}$, 314$_{11}$, 315$_{4}$ and 320$_{10}$.

[61] Pras 307$_{10}$, 308$_{1}$, 308$_{5}$, 315$_{6}$, 317$_{10}$ and 323$_{5}$.

[62] Pras 321$_{7}$ karmopamardana】 karmāpamardana ल.

[63] Pras 302$_{5}$ yathopavarṇṇita】 yathāpaṇḍita ब: yathāpaṇḍitaḥ ज: yathāpaṇḍite ल. 303$_{1}$ karmaṇāṃ】 karmaṇā द. 303$_{1}$ phalasambandho】 phalasavandho द. 304$_{3}$ vyavasthāpitaḥ】 vyavasthitaḥ ज. 304$_{8}$ nirvāṇaṃ dharma ity ucyate】 nirvāṇam ucyate Ω. 305$_{1}$ nirdiṣṭo】 nidiṣṭo जल. 306$_{3}$ dvividhaṅ】 vividhaṃ बजल. 306$_{9}$ °saṃprayuktaiva】 °saṃyukta° प. 307$_{1}$ caivañ】 caiva द. 307$_{4}$ etad】 tad बल. 307$_{4}$ bhidyamānaṃ】 bhidyamāna° ज. 307$_{5}$ evan】 eva ज. 312$_{7}$ svajātīya°】 sajātīya° प. 312$_{8}$ °pattrādy°】 °patrā° प. 313$_{4}$ °kārya°】 °kāya° द. 313$_{11}$ °cittāt tu】 °cittā° बद्जल. 314$_{4}$ anupagamya】 upagamya ज. 317$_{7}$ tadaiva tasya】 tadaitasya बजल. 311$_{1}$ °lakṣaṇā】 °kṣaṇā बज. 312$_{11}$ evaṃ】 eva ब. 312$_{12}$ evaṃ】 eva ब. 316$_{13}$ °vaicitryaṃ】 °vaicitraṃ बजलप. 320$_{6}$ °bhāvena】 bhāve प. 321$_{8}$ sadhātūnāṃ】 dhātūnāṃ बद्जल. 322$_{1}$ dviprakāra°】 viprakāra° बजल. 323$_{2}$ caivaṃ】 caiva द्जप. 323$_{4}$ °sādharmya°】 sadharma द. 323$_{5}$ vicitraḥ】 vicitra° द. 323$_{10}$ nyāyyeti】 nyāyeti ज.

[64] Pras 302$_{6}$ tu】 *om.* प. 302$_{6}$ ca】 *om.* द. 303$_{7}$ upacinoti】 *om.* बद्जल. 303$_{7}$ ca】 (*em.*): *om.* बद्जल (प has lacuna). 304$_{4}$ 1st vidhāraṇārthena】 vidhāraṇārthe ल. 304$_{7}$ hy】 *om.* Ω. 304$_{9}$ vidhāraṇā】 vidharaṇā ज. 304$_{10}$ nety】 ity बद्जल. 304$_{10}$-305$_{1}$ maitrañ ca yac ca ceto】 *om.* ज. 305$_{3}$ ātmānugrāhakam】 *om.* Ω. 305$_{7}$ eva tat】 etat बद्जल. 306$_{9}$ °saṃprayuktaiva】 °saṃyukta° प. 307$_{1}$ 3rd ca】 *om.* बद्ज. 307$_{3}$ ca】 *om.* ज. 308$_{7}$ 'pi】 *om.* द. 309$_{1}$ tā】 *om.* बद्जल. 309$_{1}$ evaṃ】 *om.* बद्जल. 309$_{2}$-310$_{1}$ *om.* ज *but partly inserted by the same hand.* 311$_{2}$ karma】 *om.* प. 311$_{7}$ 'tha】 *om.* द. 311$_{8}$ tan】 *om.* द. 311$_{17}$-312$_{2}$ naiva…anityatvadoṣas]*om.* ज. 312$_{7}$ sat】 *om.* प. 313$_{11}$ tac】 *om.* बद्जल. 314$_{10}$ kaḥ】 *om.* ल. 316$_{11}$ manuṣyacittān】 *om.* 316$_{11}$ °preta°】 *om.* बजल.

- v8: complete variant readings (25 instances)[65]
- v9: interpolations or insertions (16 instances)[66]
- v10: variant sandhi due to differences in punctuation (14 instances)[67]
- v11: transpositions (1 instance)[68]

Regarding variants caused by changes of *akṣaras* (v5), vowels are occasionally altered due to omission or insertion of a stroke.[69] The conjunct *kv* is twice misread as *kṣ*, since these conjuncts may appear similar in the Nevārī script.[70] The other consonant-transformations (v5) are irregular and infrequent.[71]

Changes of nominal case-endings (v6) occur sometimes due to minor changes of the vowel-strokes and the strokes for *anusvāra* and *visarga*.[72] The insertion of a *visarga* or vowel-stroke often causes a change from a compounded form to a nominal case-ending.[73] Conversely, the

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प. 316_{13} ca】 *om.* ज. 318_3 1st vā】 *om.* प. 318_4 'vidyamāno vā】 *om.* बजल. 318_5 punar api vipākasambandhaṃ kartum】 *om.* ब. 322_9 tatra】 *om.* बजल. 323_7 buddhena】 *om.* बद्जल.

[65] Pras 302_6, 303_4, 303_8, 305_3, 305_4, 305_9, 306_1, 306_7, 307_3, 308_9, 308_9, 312_1, 312_2, 312_4, 313_3, 313_4, 314_{11}, 315_1, 315_3, 316_1, 316_{13}, 316_{14}, 317_1, 317_5 and 321_8.

[66] Pras 305_1, 306_1, 307_1, 307_4, 311_{14}, 311_{15}, 312_{10}, 313_6, 316_7, 316_9, 316_9, 317_4, 317_8 and 323_6.

[67] Pras 304_{10}, 305_5, 305_7, 305_7, 308_{10}, 311_{11}, 311_{13}, 312_3, 313_1, 313_6, 313_{12}, 315_4, 316_1 and 322_{11}.

[68] Pras 308_{12} ity ucyante】 ucyaṃte iti ब.

[69] Pras 304_4 saṃsāragamana】 saṃsārāgamana बजल (a→ā; the arrow indicates a transformation). 305_3 mitram】 maitram बद्जल (i→ai). 307_9 saptaite】 sapteti ब (ai→e). 308_2 °lakṣaṇāvijñapti°】 °lakṣaṇo vijñapti° Ω (ā→o). 308_6 cauraṅ】 cāryaṃ ब (au→ā). 322_1 karmaṇa】 karmeṇa बजल (a→e).

[70] Pras 321_{11} vipakve】 vipakṣe बद्जल. 322_2 vipakve】 vipakṣe बद्जल.

[71] Thus, ty→py 312_8 aty°】 apy बजल. dh→v 305_1 dharmaḥ】 varṣaḥ ज: vardhaḥ ल. n→v 316_6 nimba°】 vimva° बद्ल. n→r 313_{10} °nidhānā°】 °nidhārād जल. nd→ddh 302_3 sambandhā】 saṃvaddhā बल. m→s 302_4 paramparayā】 parasparayor बजल: parasparayā द. y→v 305_2 bhayaparitrāṇa°】 bhavaparitrāṇa° Ω. r→n 308_{12} viratilakṣaṇā】 vinatilakṣaṇā द. r→l 306_1 °ākāratayā】 °ākālatayā ज. rṇṇ→rtt 307_5 'nuvarṇṇitaḥ】 'nuvarttitaḥ बद्ज; 313_6 'nuvarṇṇita】 'nuvarttita द. rṇṇ→ṇḍ: 302_5 yathopavarṇṇita】 yathāpaṇḍita ब: yathāpaṇḍitaḥ ज: yathāpaṇḍite ल. v→n: 307_{10} vispandaḥ】 niṣpandaḥ बज: aniṣpandaḥ ल. ṣ→k: 308_4 caiṣa】 caika बल. sy→th: 303_8 tasyaiva】 tathaiva ब.

[72] a→ā: 302_7 sambandhābhāva】 samvandhābhāvā प. a→e: 308_4 bheda】 bhede बजल. aṃ→aḥ: 305_4 nirdiṣṭaṃ】 nirdiṣṭaḥ प. aṃ→ād: 311_6 āvipākakālam】 āvipākakālād द: ovipākakārād बजल. aṃ→e: 303_5 maitraṃ】 maitre द; 306_6 smṛtaṃ】 smṛte बजल. āṃ→ā: 316_{12} kurvatāṃ】 kurvatā बजल. ā→or: 302_5 paramparayā】 parasparayor बजल. āc→ā: 306_1 °gamanāc】 °gamanā बज. o→ā: 303_1 virodhito】 virodhitā बजल; 314_{11} dharmo】 dharmā बजल. e→o: 306_9 nirddhāraṇe】 nirddhārano ल. e→ena: 316_5 °dṛṣṭānte】 °dṛṣṭāntena बद्जल.

[73] Pras 302_5 yathopavarṇṇita°】 yathopavarṇṇitaḥ द्प: yathāpaṇḍitaḥ ज: yathāpaṇḍite ल. 304_4 saṃsāragamana°】 saṃsāragamane द. 311_{14} nityatvadoṣaḥ *em.*】 nityatve doṣaḥ Ω. 312_{10}

omission of a *visarga* or *anusvāra* often causes a word with a nominal case ending to become compounded.[74] Such changes often cause alterations of syntax, especially in mss बजल, which can be rejected on the basis of the stemmatically earlier mss दप and/or the Tibetan translation.

1.10 Substantives in the Sanskrit Mss: Solecisms

A *solecism,* marked with the code s in the apparatus, is a reading that conflicts with rules of grammar, syntax or the general sense of the sentence. There are 342 such instances in the analysed passage. These readings have here been divided into eight sub-types:

- s1: bad nominal case-ending (25 instances)[75]
- s2: corruption partly or fully due to change of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras* (92 instances, see below)
- s3: corruption partly or fully due to insertion of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras* (71 instances)[76]
- s4: corruption partly or fully due to omission of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras* (111 instances)[77]

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vipula°】vipulaḥ प. 313_3 °virodhi°】viradhaḥ बजल. 313_{10} °kāraṇa°】°kāraṇaṃ द. 313_{10} °saṃnidhānā°】°saṃnidhānād ब: °sannidhārād जल. 314_3 °phala°】°phalaṃ द. 315_1 dharmaśabda°】dharmaśabdaḥ ज. 316_8 °āvyākṛta°】°āvyākṛtaṃ बजल.

[74] Pras 303_1 saṃsāraḥ】saṃsāra° बजल. 303_5 sa dharmas】saddharmas बदजल. 303_5 bījaṃ】vīja° बजल. 303_6 prajñapyamānaḥ】prajñapyamāna° द. 303_8 cetaḥ】ceta° बजल. 304_5 sāśravā anāśravāś】sāśravānāśravāś बजल. 304_8 dharmaṃ śaraṇaṃ】dharmmaśaraṇaṃ ब: dharmaśaraṇaṃ दज. 305_2 parānugrāhakaṃ】parānugrāhaka° जल. 305_3 mitre bhavam】mitrabhavam ज. 305_3 maitraṃ cetaḥ】matraicetaḥ बजल. 305_4 trividhaṃ】trividha° जप. 305_7 trividhaṃ】trividha° प. 307_{10} kuśalā ’kuśalā】kuśalākuśalā ब. 311_{12} pūrvam】pūrva° दज. 312_{11} tadbhāve】tadbhāvi बजल: tadbhāva दप. 313_9 °santānas】°santāna° जल. 313_3 bhāvinaś】bhāvina° बजल. 314_{11} °vyatirikto】°vyatirikta° द. 315_{10} cādṛṣṭe】cādṛṣṭa° द. 315_{12} apare】apara° जल. 316_3 °santāne】°saṃtāna° ल. 317_{10} kālāntare】kālāntara° द.





[75] This type of solecism is particularly rampant in ms द, which alone accounts for 12 instances (48% of the total number). The other mss attest such solecisms less frequently: ms प (2 instances), ms ज (4), mss जल (2), mss बजल (2), बदज (1), mss बदजल (2).

[76] Again, ms द (19) has the biggest amount of such corruptions. The amount is less in the other mss: प (9), ज (7), ल (8), ब (6), जप (1), दप (1), जल (4), बजल (9), दजल (1), बदजल (5), दल (1).

[77] Ms द (27) also has the highest frequency of this type of corruption. The other mss have: प (6), ज (21), ल (11), ब (7), जप (1), दप (2), बजलप (2), दजलप (2), Ω (1), जल (13), बजल (11), दजल (3), बदजल (3), बल (1).

- s5: corruption partly or fully due to transposition of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras* (6 instances)[78]
- s6: non-application of *sandhi* (29 instances)[79]
- s7: bad verbal-form (3 instances)[80]
- s8: complete variant solecism (5 instances)[81]

Regarding corruptions caused by a change of *akṣaras* or parts of *akṣaras* (s2), many corruptions are caused by the insertion or omission of a vowel-stroke, as was also the case with the variant readings (v5) discussed above.[82] Among consonants, the following transformations are most commonly observed (in alphabetical order with Nevārī-illustrations taken from ms ज):

- c→v  (7 cases, Pras 303_5, 304_8, 313_{10}, 317_3, 322_{10}, 322_{10}, 323_2)[83]
- t→d  (4 cases, Pras 304_2, 308_{10}, 308_{10}, 320_1)[84]
- t→n  (4 cases, Pras 306_2, 307_1, 312_9, 316_6)[85]
- p→y  (6 cases, Pras 302_6, 313_{10}, 315_{12}, 315_{12}, 317_8, 323_3)[86]
- bhy→ty  (6 cases, Pras 311_{14}, 311_{15}, 318_2, 318_3, 321_2, 323_5)[87]

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[78] Pras 303_5 ceha] vahe द. 305_1 nirdiṣṭo: nidirṣṭo द. 307_6 'viratayo] 'vitarayo ज. 311_{12} vinaśena] vinaśenaṃ ज. 311_{15} karmaṇām] kamarṇām ब. 315_9 yathoditasya dharmasya] yathoditadha syarmasya ब.

[79] The distribution is as follows: प (2), ज (6), ब (4), द (1), बजल (5), दजल (1), बजलप (2), बदजप (1), बदलप (1), बदजल (3) and Ω (3).

[80] Two instances in प and one instance in द.

[81] The distribution is as follows: जल (1), ल (1), बजल (2) and बदजल (1).

[82] The observed changes are: a→ā (8 cases, Pras 307_8, 308_{10}, 308_{11}, 311_{15}, 313_3, 314_{12}, 315_6, 320_4); a→ī (Pras 312_1); a→u (305_1); a→e (7 cases, Pras 303_3, 308_5, 308_7, 315_{12}, 315_{12}, 316_6, 322_3); ā→a (10 cases; Pras 307_4, 308_1, 307_2, 308_6, 311_{14}, 313_3, 313_8, 318_6, 322_6, 323_2); ā→i (Pras 308_{10}); ā→ī (Pras 314_8, 317_1); ā→o (8 cases, Pras 302_6, 306_8, 311_6, 311_{13}, 312_6, 317_1, 321_{12}, 323_6); i→a (Pras 308_9); i→ī (Pras 317_{10}); ī→i (Pras 316_8); ṝ→ṛ (Pras 310_4); o→ā (11 cases, Pras 305_4, 307_5, 312_5, 312_{12}, 313_2, 313_6, 314_2, 314_4, 314_{10}, 319_1, 323_2); o→e (Pras 316_{12}); au→o (Pras 308_6); e→a (12 cases, Pras 302_6, 305_9, 305_9, 307_2, 307_2, 309_2, 311_6, 314_9, 314_9, 315_7, 321_5, 321_9); e→ā (Pras 307_1); e→i (Pras 312_3); e→o (Pras 306_2); e→ai (Pras 308_4, 308_4); e→c (Pras 304_{10}); ai→a (Pras 311_6); ai→o (Pras 315_{12}); ai→e (3 cases, Pras 307_9, 316_2, 316_{13}). Thus, the vowel-changes a→ā, a→e, ā→a, ā→o, o→ā and e→a are particularly common.

[83] The confusion of c→v is confirmed as a common feature in another Nevārī manuscript studied by Michael HAHN (1980:147), who lists four such cases in his study of two Nepalese manuscripts (written in Nevārī and Devanāgarī scripts) of Gopadatta's *Kapīśvarajātaka*.

[84] The confusion of t→d does not occur in HAHN's study (ibid.).

[85] The confusion of t→n occurs three times (ibid.).

[86] The confusion of p→y occurs twice in HAHN's mss (ibid.).

- r→n र→न (4 cases, Pras 302_{6}, 308_{12}, 315_{12}, 316_{9})[88]
- r→l र→ल (7 cases, Pras 305_{6}, 312_{5}, 312_{9}, 314_{3}, 313_{3}, 316_{5}, 316_{6}), probably due to phonetic rather than graphic similarity.[89]
- l→r ल→र (3 cases, Pras 304_{5}, 311_{6}, 317_{10}), probably also due to phonetic similarity.[90]
- ṣṭh→ṣṭ ष्ठ→ष्ट (4 cases, Pras 306_{8}, 307_{3}, 310_{3}, 311_{7})[91]

Other *akṣara*-transformations are more rare, many of which probably cannot reasonably be explained as occurring due to graphic or phonetic similarity.[92]

1.11 Stemma Codicum for the Sanskrit Mss

In order to determine which readings are to be selected in a critical edition, the relationships between the manuscripts must be determined in the form of a stemma codicum, as prescribed by the standard method of textual criticism. As discussed above, accidentals cannot be used in a stemmatic analysis, given the editors' and copyists' tendency to follow their own inclinations in punctuation and orthography. Instead, the analysis must focus on the substantive variants and, particularly, concern divergent readings of secondary origin in the form of the significant substantive variants (v) and solecisms (s); it cannot be an analysis of agreement in true readings (i.e., the readings adopted in the critical edition), since manuscripts may share cor-

[87] The confusion of bhy→ty does not occur in HAHN's study (ibid.).

[88] The confusion of r→n occurs twice in HAHN's study (ibid.).

[89] The confusion of r→l occurs 3 times in HAHN's study (ibid.).

[90] No case of l→r is listed by HAHN (ibid.).

[91] No case of ṣṭh→ṣṭ is listed by HAHN (ibid.).

[92] *Akṣara*-transformations with number of cases in parenthesis listed in alphabetical order (without reference for the sake brevity): khy→kṣ (1), khy→vy (1), g→m (1), g→vā (1), c→r (2), jy→hy (1), ṇḍ→ṇu (1), t→ṃ (1), t→g (1), t→v (2), t→s (1), tt→ty (1), tt→st (1), ty→bhy (1), tr→tu (1), th→y (1), d→h (1), dhy→ddh (1), n→t (2), n→m (2), n→r (2), n→s (1), n→pt (1), ny→nn (1), nv→tv (1), p→v (2), bh→t (1), bh→l (1), m→n (1), m→p (1), m→l (1), m→s (1), yo→dhā (1), y→c (1), y→t (1), y→d (1), y→m (1), y→v (1), r→c (1), r→d (1), r→v (1), l→n (1), lo→lya (1), v→c (2), v→n (1), v→p (2), v→y (1), v→r (1), ṣ→t (1), ṣṭh→sth (1), ś→ṇ (1), s→ṃ (1), s→t (1), s→m (1), sā→sm (1), sā→sya (1), s→ś (1), sm→sy (1), sy→sv (1), h→d (1) *avagraha*→ch (1), *daṇḍa*→ *visarga* (1). When compared to the study of HAHN (ibid.), only one notable difference occurs among these minor corruptions: HAHN lists three occurrances of s→m, where only one such occurrence is found in the present study.

rect readings in a number of instances due to emendations made by an editor rather than by having copied the same ancestor manuscript.[93]

When analysing the substantives stemmatically, four different categories need to be employed. Substantives may either be "unique" to a single manuscript or "shared" by one or more manuscripts. Shared substantives may either be "cumulative," i.e., copied into two or more manuscripts from a common ancestor, or "coincidentally convergent variants," i.e., not copied from a common ancestor but occurring in two or more manuscripts coincidentally in that the scribes happened by chance to make the same copying mistake. Further, some cumulative shared substantives can easily be "verified," whereas others remain "problematic" and have to be accounted for. These possibilities add up to four distinct stemmatic categories of substantives: (1) unique substantives, (2) verified cumulative substantives, (3) problematic cumulative substantives, and (4) coincident convergent variants.

A stemma codicum can be established, when a hypothesis of the relationships of the manuscripts is reached, wherein the greatest number of shared readings fall in the categories of "unique substantives" and "verified cumulative readings," and the smallest number of shared readings have to be assigned to the categories of "problematic cumulative readings" and "coincident convergent variants." In other words, one can establish a stemma codicum, when one's hypothesis of the copying process can account for the greatest number of shared readings, with as few readings as possible falling into the less accountable categories of "problematic cumulative readings" and "coincident convergent variants." If this analytic structure now is applied to the substantives of the analysed passage of Pras, the following four groups of substantives can be presented, consisting in total of 24 clusters (here abbreviated to "c"). The listed distribution of readings reflects the stemma codicum proposed below.

Group 1: unique substantives

- c1: 53 unique substantives in ms प
- c2: 76 unique substantives in ms ज
- c3: 70 unique substantives in ms ल

[93] For this text critical rule, cf. WEST (1973:32).

- c4: 56 unique substantives in ms ब
- c5: 139 unique substantives in ms द्

Group 2: verified cumulative substantives

- c6: 17 shared substantives in mss Ω
- c7: 40 shared substantives in mss बद्जल[94]
- c8: 96 shared substantives in mss बजल[95]
- c9: 41 shared substantives in mss जल[96]

Group 3: problematic cumulative substantives

- c10: 7 shared substantives in mss द्प[97]
- c11: 6 shared substantives in mss बज[98]
- c12: 7 shared substantives in mss बल[99]
- c13: 4 shared substantives in mss बद्ल[100]
- c14: 3 shared substantives in mss जप[101]
- c15: 5 shared substantives in mss द्जल[102]

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[94] Pras 303_5, 303_7, 304_4, 304_{10}, 305_3, 305_7, 306_1, 306_8, 307_4, 308_4, 309_1, 309_1, 311_{11}, 311_{14}, 311_{15}, 312_9, 313_3, 313_4, 313_4, 313_6, 313_{11}, 313_{11}, 313_{12}, 315_5, 315_7, 315_7, 315_9, 315_{12}, 316_1, 316_5, 316_{13}, 317_{10}, 318_3, 318_6, 320_{11}, 321_8, 321_{11}, 322_1, 322_2, 323_7.

[95] Pras 302_4, 302_5, 302_6, 302_6, 303_1, 303_1, 303_5, 303_5, 303_8, 304_4, 304_5, 305_1, 305_3, 305_4, 305_4, 305_5, 305_6, 305_9, 305_{12}, 305_{12}, 306_1, $306_{1\text{-}2}$, 306_3, 306_6, 306_6, 307_5, 308_4, 308_9, 308_9, 308_{12}, 311_6, 311_6, 311_{14}, 312_3, 312_3, 312_5, 312_5, 312_8, 312_{11}, 312_{12}, 313_3, 313_7, 313_{10}, 314_3, 314_3, 314_3, 314_{11}, 314_{11}, 314_{11}, 314_{12}, 315_2, 315_2, 315_6, 315_6, 315_{12}, 315_{12}, 316_1, 316_1, 316_2, 316_3, 316_5, 316_6, 316_6, 316_8, 316_{11}, 316_{12}, 316_{14}, 317_1, 317_1, 317_6, 317_7, 317_7, 317_7, 317_8, 317_{10}, 317_{10}, 318_1, 318_1, 318_4, 318_7, 318_8, 318_{10}, 319_1, 319_1, 319_3, 320_4, 321_2, 321_8, 321_{12}, 322_1, 322_1, 322_5, 322_5, 322_9, 323_3, 323_6.

[96] Pras 302_6, 305_2, 305_4, 305_5, 305_5, 305_9, 306_2, 306_3, 306_4, 307_1, 307_1, 307_2, 307_6, 307_9, 308_8, 308_{10}, 308_{12}, 311_7, 311_{15}, 312_5, 313_9, 313_9, 313_{10}, 313_{11}, 314_8, 315_2, 315_{10}, 315_{12}, 316_1, 316_7, 316_{13}, 317_1, 317_8, 317_8, 317_9, 317_9, 318_2, 321_6, 322_2, 322_3, 323_7.

[97] Pras 302_5 yathopavarṇṇita°】 yathopavarṇṇitaḥ द्प. 303_8 cetaḥ】 cetaś द्प. 312_{11} tadbhāve】 tadbhāva द्प. 316_9 kuśalā°】 daśakuśalā° द्प. 319_{11} °anya°】 °anyac द्प. 305_7 °ābhinirvṛttau】 °ābhinivṛttau द्प. 316_8 °cittād】 °cittā द्प.

[98] Pras 304_{10} eva ekaṃ】 eva kaṃ बज. 304_{10} dharmaḥ】 dharma बज. 307_{10} vispandaḥ】 niṣpandaḥ बज. 306_7 kāyika°】 kāyikaṃ बज. 311_1 °lakṣaṇā】 °kṣaṇā बज. 315_4 iti】 ity बज. 323_5 °ānavasthānābhy°】 °āvasthānābhy° बज.

[99] Pras 302_3 sambandhā】 saṃvaddhā बल. 307_4 etad】 tad बल. 308_1 vijñapti°】 avijñapti° बल. 308_4 caiṣa】 caika बल. 312_{10} cāṅkurādi°】 cāṃkurā hi बल. 315_{12} udbhāvyānyathā°】 udbhāvyanyayā° बल. 321_2 prahāṇataḥ】 pradānataḥ ब: pradāṇataḥ ल.

[100] Pras 308_1 sarvaiva ज】 tarvaiva बद्ल. 308_{10} avijñaptayaḥ】 avijñāptayas बद्ल. 308_{10} avijñaptayaḥ】 avijñāptayas बद्ल. 312_1 atraike】 tatraike बद्ल.

[101] Pras 305_4 trividhaṃ】 trividha° जप. 307_{10} śarīraceṣṭā】 śarīraceṣṭāḥ जप. 312_9 °prabhṛtir】 °prabhṛti जप.

Group 4: coincident convergent variants

- c16: 1 shared substantives in mss बद्जप[103]
- c17: 2 shared substantives in mss द्जलप[104]
- c18: 3 shared substantives in mss बद्लप[105]
- c19: 1 shared substantives in mss द्जप[106]
- c20: 2 shared substantives in mss बजलप[107]
- c21: 1 shared substantives in mss द्ज[108]
- c22: 4 shared substantives in mss बद्ज[109]
- c23: 1 shared substantives in mss बद्[110]
- c24: 3 shared substantives in mss द्ल[111]

Category c6 above states that all the manuscripts (Ω) share substantive variants in 17 cases. This indicates that all five adopted manuscripts belong to the same recension, which may be labelled the Nevārī-recension. Given that we have no extant manuscripts belonging to other recensions, it is not possible to determine to which extent this Nevārī-recension differs from other Indian recensions that may have existed earlier. The Tibetan translation, which, as mentioned above, is a translation of two manuscripts from Kaśmīra and eastern Aparānta in Magadha, deviates in the analysed passage in 19 instances from the critical edition of the Nevārī-recension. This could, on the one hand, reflect differences that can be attributed to either of the Kaśmīra- and Magadha-recensions, but could, on the other hand, also be

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[102] Pras 304_{10} ceto】 cetaḥ द्जल. 311_{12} sambandhābhāvāt】 savandhābhāvāt द्जल. 313_{3} jvālāṅgārādi°】 jvālaṃgārādi° द्जल. 315_{3} prakrānte】 prakānte द्जल. 316_{9} kāmarūpā°】 kāmarūpyā° द्जल.

[103] Pras 309_{1} vijñapayantīty】 vijñapayantīti बद्जप.

[104] Pras 312_{10} hetor】 heto द्जलप. 316_{12} °ādiḥ】 °ādi द्जलप.

[105] Pras 307_{2} pravarttiṣya】 pravarttiṣye बद्लप. 317_{6} sad】 sat बद्लप. 316_{7} °jātīyatvān】 °jātīyatvāt बद्लप.

[106] Pras 323_{2} caivaṃ】 caiva द्जप.

[107] Pras 316_{13} °vaicitryaṃ】 °vaicitraṃ बजलप. 305_{5} abhinirvṛttau】 abhinivṛttau बजलप.

[108] Pras 311_{12} pūrvam】 pūrva° द्ज.

[109] Pras 304_{8} dharmaṃ śaraṇaṃ】 dharmmaśaraṇaṃ ब: dharmaśaraṇaṃ द्ज. Pras 307_{1} 3rd ca】 *om.* बद्ज. 307_{3} niṣṭhā°】 niṣṭā° बद्ज. 311_{2} kuśalākuśalo】 kuśalākuśalā बद्ज.

[110] 314_{9} pretya】 pratya बद्.

[111] Pras 307_{2} karmety】 karmaty द्ल. 311_{7} tiṣṭhati】 tiṣṭati द्ल. 320_{10} °mārgeṇa】 °mārgeṇar द्ल.

ascribed to the transmission of the Tibetan text. It is therefore not possible to determine the Nevārī-recension in relation to other non-extant Indian recensions, but it is possible to conclude that all five adopted manuscripts must belong to a single recension.

Secondly, the high number of unique substantives in each manuscript listed in group 1 above indicates that none of these five manuscripts are apographs of each other. For a manuscript to be an apograph, i.e., a direct copy, it must attest all the substantives of its original (discounting possible emendations and miscopied substantives) and attest new substantives of its own (WEST, 1973:12, 33). Each of the adopted manuscripts attests many unique substantives not shared by any other of the adopted manuscripts. Therefore, none of these five manuscripts are apographs. Although ms प is much older than mss बद्जल, the latter manuscripts do no derive directly from ms प, because they do not attest the 53 unique substantives of ms प. In other words, ms प cannot be posited as the common archetype for the other mss, but instead it is necessary to posit a hypothetical common Nevārī- or Nepalese archetype as the common ancestor of this recension, which may be designated as ancestor α.

Besides the 17 substantives shared by all manuscripts (c6), which as discussed above indicates that the manuscripts belong to a single recension, the other substantive clusters of high frequency (c7-c7) may be taken as cumulative and therefore reflecting the genetic textual transmission of the manuscripts. Thus, the 40 shared substantives of mss बद्जल listed in c7 indicate that these mss belong to a common hyp-archetype, which can be labeled β. Further, the 96 shared substantives of mss बजल (c8) indicate that these three manuscripts also share a common subsidiary sub-archetype, which may be labeled γ. Finally, the 41 shared substantives of mss जल (c9) indicate that these two manuscripts share a common subsidiary sub-archetype, which may be labeled δ. If these preliminary conclusions are now put in the form of an illustration, the stemma codicum would look like this:




Figure 1: basic stemma codicum

This stemma agrees entirely with the stemma codicum established by MACDONALD (2003a) based on her examination of the first chapter of Pras,[112] and the high frequency clusters of substantive readings from the analysed passage of the 17th chapter therefore confirms that the genetic relationship of these five manuscripts basically is the same for the 1st chapter and the 17th chapter of the text.

Nevertheless, there still remain 15 clusters of substantives (c10-24) in the analysed passage, which are problematic in light of the above stemma and therefore need to be accounted for. It must, however, be underlined that

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[112] Dr. MACDONALD made her stemma codicum avaible to me before I made my own analysis of the readings from the 17th chapter and her work has therefore formed a conceptual basis for my analysis.

all 15 clusters are of very low frequency, having a maximum of seven readings, when compared with the high frequency found in the unique and verified cumulative substantives (c1-9) used to establish the above stemma.

The first problem is encountered with the seven substantive variants shared by mss द्प (c10), but which were not transmitted further to sub-archetype γ, since they are not attested by mss बजल. There are three possibilities that may be used to account for such non-transmission. First, a variant reading may have been emended in a later ms and therefore not have been transmitted further. Secondly, a variant reading may have been miscopied in a later ms and therefore not have been transmitted further. Thirdly, a variant reading may not have been a transmitted reading to begin with but may have occurred coincidentally in the two mss that attest it. In other words, the same writing mistake may in this case have been made in ms प and द् coincidentally, but this mistake was never found in archetypes α and β and therefore also not transmitted to sub-archetype γ. That is to say, if an error can happen once in one manuscript, it can also happen twice in another manuscript. KANE and DONALDSON (1988) have coined the term 'coincident convergent variants' to refer to such variants.

In the case of the seven substantives of c10, six of these can reasonably be explained as coincident convergent variants, because they all consist of very minor orthographic changes or corruptions. In the seventh substantive, namely «Pras 316_{9} kuśalā°] daśakuśalā° द्प», the insertion of the word *daśa°* is, however, probably too serious simply to be taken as coincident convergent variants. Instead, this reading must be ascribed to archetypes α and β, and its non-transmission in sub-archetype γ must then be explained as being due to emendation (given that, e.g., the Tibetan translation does not attest this word) or miscopying.

The second problem is encountered with all the clusters of substantives, in which one or two of mss बजल share readings with ms द् but where these readings are never shared by all four mss बद्जल, viz. c13, c15, c21, c22, c23 and c24. Given the high number of substantives shared by mss बजल (c8), a common sub-archetype γ was posited for these three mss. Readings attested by ms द् and only one or two of mss बजल therefore logically ought to be ascribed to their common archetypes β and γ, and so one must explain how come these readings were not transmitted to the one or two mss among

बजल that are not attesting these readings. The fourteen readings of c15 plus c21-24 are all of such relatively minor nature that they can reasonably be explained as coincident convergent variants. In other words, if the above stemma is accepted, these readings are most likely not to be seen as genetic substantives transmitted from archetypes β and γ but ought to be taken as corruptions occurring independently in the given mss. I must though remark that the substantives of c15 are more uncertain as coincident convergent variants than the substantives of c21-24. The substantives of c13 are difficult to account for as coincident convergent variants, but a modification of the stemma will be attempted below, which could account for these readings. Further, from group 4, the clusters c16, c17, c18, c19 and c20 would also be problematic, if they are to be explained as genetic, cumulative substantives. Yet, none of these clusters consists of substantives, which cannot be accepted as coincident convergent variants, since all these substantives have occurred due to minor orthographic changes.

The third problem is related to the introduction of sub-archetype δ being the common archetype for mss जल. This archetype is warranted by the 41 cumulative substantives shared by mss जल (c9), but is contradicted by the 6 substantives shared by mss बज but not shared with ल (c11) and the 7 substantives shared by mss बल but not shared with ज (c12). Again, if these substantives are taken as genetic, cumulative readings, they must be ascribed to sub-archetype γ, because they are shared by two of the three mss stemming from this archetype. In that case, the fact that these substantives are not found in mss ल and ज respectively can only be explained as being due to emendation or further corruption. However, the majority of these readings can easily be explained away as coincidental convergent variants due to minor graphic or orthographic changes and must therefore not be taken as cumulative readings. Nevertheless, some of them remain difficult to account for.

Looking first at the substantives of c11, «Pras 304_{10} eva ekaṃ] दप: eva ca kaṃ ल: eva kaṃ बज» is difficult to accept as a coincident convergent variant, because the ca-*akṣara* in ms ल clearly seems to be a corruption of the e-*akṣara* attested by mss दप. If the present stemma is accepted, the only possible explanation is that the scribe of ms ल (or the scribe of one of its ancestors, succeeding δ) interpolated the ca. But this seems strange, given

that the kaṃ-syllable has not been emended. In «Pras 304_{10} dharmaḥ】 द्लप: dharma बज», the visarga attested by ल could perhaps be explained as an emendation, given that this word occurs just before a *daṇḍa;* otherwise, the shared reading in mss बज is a coincident convergent variant, which is also possible. «Pras 307_{10} viṣpandaḥ】 द: niṣpandaḥ बज: aniṣpandaḥ ल: vispandaḥ प» is easily explained. Since the preceding *daṇḍa* is omitted in mss बजल, the variant in ms ल simply occurs due to the missing *virāma* of the preceding word *vāk.* «Pras 306_7 kāyika°】 द्लप: kāyikaṃ बज» is perhaps a coincident omission of the *anusvāra* in ms ल, or else a coincident convergent variant in ms बज. «Pras 311_1 °karmalakṣaṇā】 द्प: °karmakṣaṇā बज: °karmanakṣaṇā ल» is difficult to account for within the present stemma. The reading of ms ल can only be a corruption of the correct reading attested by ms द्प, which forces one to attribute the correct reading °karmalakṣaṇā or the corrupted reading °karmanakṣaṇā to archetypes γ and δ. In either case, the shared substantive of mss बज must – given the present stemma – be a coincident attempt to emendate or a coincident convergent variant, where mss बज agree in omitting the la- or na-syllable. «Pras 315_4 iti】 लप: ity बज: itiḥ द» is grammatically justified by the fact that mss बज agree in omitting the succeeding *daṇḍa,* which is attested by mss द्लप. Thus, it could be explained as a sandhi-variant being a coincident change of accidentals in ms बज. The final shared substantive in c11, «Pras 323_5 svarūpeṇānavasthānābhy°】 द्प: svarūpeṇāvasthānābhy° बज: svarūpeṇānavasthānāty° ल», is perhaps a coincident convergent variant in mss बज, being an omission caused by the repeated nasal-syllables, which for a Nepalese speaker are phonetically but not graphically similar. Thus, the shared substantives in c11 can be accounted for, but only with some difficulty.

Likewise, the seven shared substantives of c12 pose certain problems. In «Pras 302_3 °sambandhā°】 *stand.*: °saṃvaddhā° बल: °samvadhā° द: °samvandhā° जप», the shared substantive of mss बल can perhaps be accepted as a coincident convergent variant, or the correct reading of ms ज is an emendation or contamination. In «Pras 307_4 etad】 द्जप: tad बल», the shared substantive of mss बल is again a coincident convergent variant, or the correct reading of ms ज is an emendation or contamination. «Pras 308_1 °lakṣaṇāvijñapti°】 द्जप: °lakṣaṇā avijñapti° बल» is difficult to accept as a coincident convergent variant in mss बल. The a-vowel, which is inserted in

these mss, is an interpolation serving to separate the wrongly assumed word-separation. It seems not so likely that the same mistaken interpolation would have been made coincidently in mss बल. The other possible explanation is that the correct reading in ms ज is an emendation or contamination. «Pras 308_4 caiṣa] दप: caika बल: caita ज» may have been caused by a badly written k-character in δ, which is further corrupted to t in ज, in which case the shared reading by बल is genetic. In «Pras 312_{10} sa cāṅkurādi°] प: sa cāṃkurā hi बल: sa cāṃkurādi° द: saṃcākurād dhi ज», it seems impossible to accept the shared reading of mss बल as coincident. Hence, the reading of ज must be contaminated or further corrupted, although the latter is difficult to explain graphically or otherwise. In «Pras 315_{12} udbhāvyānyathā°] दप: udbhāvyanyayā° बल: udbhāvyayā° », the reading of ms ज is easily explained as a corruption of the reading attested by बल caused by omission. In «Pras 321_2 prahāṇataḥ] दजप: pradānataḥ ब: pradāṇataḥ ल», the shared substantive of mss बल (with a minor orthographic variant) may be a coincident convergent variant, or the reading of ms ज is an emendation (given that the word *prahāṇataḥ* stems from the earlier quoted *mūla*-verse) or contamination.

If the shared substantives of c11 and c12 are not to be accounted for in this way, it is necessary to propose a slightly different stemma. First, it is possible to posit that ms ब is contaminated with readings from both mss जल. This would, however, require that ms ब should be based on readings of at least of three separate mss: archetype γ, ms ज and ms ब. This is not impossible, but seems unlikely.

Instead, it may be suggested that ms ज is contaminated with readings from another archetype, which shall here be called ε. Such an archetype could account for the shared substantives of c12, c13 and c14, but cannot account for the shared substantives of c11. In that case, the stemma would be as follows:




Figure 2: enlarged stemma codicum

The only difference between this stemma and the basic stemma given in figure 1 is that archetype ε is inserted to account for possible contamination of readings in ms ज. Ms ज generally agrees with mss बद्ल, particularly ms ल, as indicated by c7, c8 and c9. This shows that ms ज had archetype δ as its primary ancestor. It is possible that ms ज is contaminated with only some readings from archetype ε. Given that the number of readings from ε in ms ज is not very big, this contamination is not likely to have occurred in the way that the scribe of ms ज actually used ε as a second original. Rather, the small number of contaminated readings in ms ज could indicate that ms ज has preserved some readings from archetype ε in the form of marginalia, which at some point in the copying-process were incorporated into the text itself of

ms ज. To indicate that only some readings were transmitted from archetype ε to ms ज, the line connecting these in the above figure is dotted.

If it is accepted that ms ज contains contaminated readings, this could account for the problematic clusters of shared substantives c12, c13 and c14. The substantives of c12 shared by ms बल would then be substantives contained in archetype γ and δ, but not adopted by ms ज, which in these cases would have adopted a reading from archetype ε instead. The substantives of c13 shared by mss बद्ल would similarly be derived from archetypes β, γ and δ, where ms ज again would have adopted readings from archetype ε. The substantives of c14 shared by mss जप could then be attributed to archetype ε. Although this model would make it possible to account for three of the clusters of the problematic cumulative substantives, it still cannot account for the problematic clusters c10 (ms द्प), c11 (mss बज) and c15 (mss द्जल). These shared substantives would still have to be explained away as coincident convergent variants or the like. Nevertheless, the introduction of archetype ε into the stemma would, at least, make it possible to explain some of the problematic shared substantives.

Besides attempting to improve the basic stemma codicum, this discussion of problematic readings has also underlined a basic problem encountered in Lachmann's method of text criticism. While the majority of variant readings can be accounted for by means of a stemma codicum, there almost invariably remain a small number of unaccounted readings, which as demonstrated must be explained as emendations, further corruptions or by asserting readings as being coincident convergent variants. If a strategy of arguing for contamination of a given manuscript is employed, it then generally becomes necessary to conceive of such contamination only in the form of the incorporation of marginalia into the text rather than by a copying process actually entailing two ancestor manuscripts, because the number of problematic readings generally will be very small. Nevertheless, the conception of contamination by means of marginalia is actually a way to criticize the basic concept of fixed ancestors and thereby becomes a general critique of Lachmann's method of text criticism relying on a genetic stemma codicum. In other words, if a manuscript is not necessarily limited to being a copy of its ancestor only involving new corruptions of its own and eventually a few emendations but may also incorporate any number of readings from other

sources in the form of marginalia adopted into the text itself, manuscripts cannot be seen as the fixed entities required for the simplicity of Lachmann's method to fully work. This discussion has therefore underlined a certain weakness in the general method of textual criticism, even if the analysis has shown that the majority of readings may be accounted for by a regular stemma codicum as given above in figure 1.

1.12 Ñi ma Grags and the Tibetan Translation of Pras

A Tibetan translation of Pras was made by sPa tshab Lo tsā ba Ñi ma Grags (c. 1055-1140). Since the secondary literature provides only very sparse information on his person, a brief account of his life and activity now follows based on *Deb ther sÑon po* (ROERICH, 1949:341-344), NAUDOU (1980) and the *dkar chags* of the *sde dge bstan 'gyur* (D4569).[113]

Ñi ma Grags was born in Tibet in 1055 CE, in the upper part (*stod*) of sPa tshab (or *pa tshab*) in the district *'phen yul*. When young, he travelled to Kaśmīra, where for 23 years he studied the Buddhist doctrine with various scholars. He focused his work on translating *Madhyamaka*-texts, but also translated a small number of tantric texts.

In Kaśmīra, Ñi ma Grags came to study and engaged in translations with some of the greatest Indian *paṇḍitas* of the time. He thus studied with Sūkṣmajana, who belonged to the famous family of *jana-paṇḍitas* (NAUDOU, 1980:168-171). With him, he translated Āryadeva's *Madhyamaka*-work CŚ (D3846, 18 folios) and Candrakīrti's commentary to it, CŚV (D3865, 210 folios). Ñi ma Grags also studied with Bhavyarāja, with whom he translated Dharmottara's *Paralokasiddhi* (D4251, 4 folios). Bhāvyarāja was a student of Parahita, who had studied with Sūkṣmajana's grandfather, Ratnavajra, and had written a *vṛtti* to Nāgārjuna's ŚS. Another student of Parahita, Mahāsumati (NAUDOU, 1980:230; ROERICH, 1949:344), co-operated with Ñi ma Grags in the Ratnaguptavihāra. Together they translated Pras (D3860, 200 folios) on the basis of a manuscript from Kaśmīra.

Ñi ma Grags formed a close bond especially with two *paṇḍitas* named Tilakakalaśa (*thig le bum pa*) and Kanakavarman. Together with

[113] For another brief account of his life and works, cf. ERB (1997:29-30).

Tilakakalaśa in the Ratnaguptavihāra, Ñi ma Grags revised an earlier translation of Candrakīrti's Mav (D3861, 19 folios) made by Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita and Lo tsā ba Tshul khrims rgyal ba[114] and translated Candrakīrti's large commentary to it, MavBh (D3862, 128 folios). Working with Tilakakalaśa, Ñi ma Grags also translated Nāgabodhi's *Guhyasamāja*-work entitled **Śrīguhyasamājamaṇḍalaviṃśatividhi.*[115]

When years later (probably in the late 1090'ties), Ñi ma Grags returned to Tibet, he was accompanied by Tilakakalaśa and Kanakavarman. First, they went to Ñi ma Grags' native area, *'phan yul* in Central Tibet, where Ñi ma Grags received many students from dGe bśes Śar ba pa, to whom he taught the *Madhyamaka*-doctrines. Having been requested by the monks of *spu hraṅs* monastery (ROERICH, 1949:342), Ñi ma Grags and Kanakavarman translated the large AK-commentary by Pūrṇavardhana entitled **Abhidharmakośaṭīkā Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* (D4093 and D4096, 172 folios).

Later Ñi ma Grags accompanied by the two *paṇḍitas* travelled to Lha sa, where they visited the Ra mo che temple, which contained a large collection of Indian Sanskrit mss. Working with these, they translated several texts. With Kanakavarman, Ñi ma Grags revised his translation of Pras using a ms from eastern Aparānta in Magadha (*ñi 'og śar phyogs*).[116] In collaboration with the *paṇḍita*s Hasumati and Kanakavarman, he also revised the earlier translation of Nāgārjuna's Mmk made by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro kLu'i rGyal mtshan (D3824, 19 folios). With Kanakavarman, he revised the earlier translation of Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka*-work, *Rājaparikathā Ratnāvalī* (D4158, 20 folios), also made by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro kLu'i rGyal mtshan, and further translated Nāgārjunagarbha's *Ratnāsūkoṣa*

[114] The earlier translation of Mav by Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita and Lo tsā ba Tshul khrims rgyal ba is still preserved in its unrevised form in the Peking bstan 'gyur (Q5261).

[115] *Dpal gsaṅ ba 'dus pa'i dkyil 'khor gyi cho ga ñi śu pa* (D1810, 15 folios). According to *Deb ther sÑon po* (ROERICH, 1949:342-343), Ñi ma Grags also revised Candrakīrti's large *Guhyasamāja*-commentary *Pradīpodyotananāmaṭīkā* (D1785), which had been translated earlier by Śraddhakavarman and Rin chen bZaṅ po. This is, however, not confirmed by the colophon of the text or the *dkar chags* of the *sde dge bstan 'gyur.*

[116] Although the Tibetan term *ñi 'og śar phyogs* may be taken as signifying 'eastern Aparānta' (cf. ERB, 1997: 114, fn. 125), it might also be taken in the general sense of 'eastern India'. *Ñi 'og* is both a general name for India as well as a word meaning 'border' (ZHANG, 1984:950). If *ñi 'og* is interpreted as 'India', the phrase *ñi 'og śar phyogs* could simply means 'eastern India', which would seem to be the most straightforward interpretation.

(D3839, 2 folios). They also revised Ñi ma Grags' earlier translation of Candrakīrti's MavBh on the basis of a ms from eastern Aparānta (*ñi 'og śar phyogs;* D3862), which Ñi ma Grags had translated under Tilakakalaśa in Kaśmīra. Kanakavarman and Ñi ma Grags then revised the earlier translation of the tantric Nāgārjuna's **Bodhicittavivaraṇa* (D1800, 5 folios) made by Guṇākara and Rab źi bŚes gñen and the earlier translation of **Bodhicittavivaraṇaṭīkā* (D1829, 26 folios). They also translated the tantric work **Pratiṣṭhāvidhisaṃkṣipta* (D2546, 3 folios) by Śraddhākara. In collaboration, with another Indian *paṇḍita,* named Muditaśrī, Ñi ma Grags further revised the first two *bam po* of Abhayākara's and Dharma Grags' translation of Nāgārjuna's ŚS (D3825, 3 folios) with Candrakīrti's ŚSV (D3867, 70 folios). Together with Muditaśrī, Ñi ma Grags' also translated Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikākārikā* (D3825, 3 folios) and Candrakīrti's commentary *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* (D3864, 30 folios).

In Lha sa, Ñi ma Grags further translated eleven hymns and praises. Thus, working with Tilakakalaśa he translated Nāgārjuna's *Acintyastava* (D1128, 4 folios), *Stutyatītastava* (D1129, 1 folio), *Niruttarastava* (D1130, 2 folios), **Āryabhaṭṭārakamañjuśrīparamārthastuti* (D1131, 1 folio), **Āryamañjuśrībhaṭṭārakakaruṇāstotra* (D1132, 2 folios), **Aṣṭamahāsthānacaityastotra* (D1133, 2 folios), **Dvādaśakāranāmanayastotra* (D1134, 1 folio), **Vandanāstotra* (D1136,1 folio) and **Narakoddhāra* (D1137, 2 folios). With Kanakavarman, he translated Sarvajñānamitra's **Sragdhara-stotra* (D1691, 5 folios), a praise to the goddess Tārā, which later was revised by Maṇikaśrījñāna and Chos rje dpal. With the *paṇḍita* Muditaśrījñāna, he translated Candra's **Āryajambalastotra* (D3748, 1 folio).

After his translation-activity in Lha sa, Ñi ma Grags travelled to Yar kluṅs in southern Tibet, where he gave teachings on *Madhyamaka* and *Guhyasamāja.* In *Deb ther sŃon po* (ROERICH, 1949:297), it is said that brTson 'grus gŹon nu (born 1123) received his monk-ordination from Ñi ma Grags at the age of 18, i.e., in 1140 (considering that Tibetans include the birth-year when calculating a person's age).[117] If this is so, the life of Ñi ma Grags is probably from 1055 to ca. 1140 CE (NAUDOU, 1980:213).

[117] ERB (1997 :30) here calculates the age in the occidental manner of counting years and thus concludes that brtson 'grus gźon nu's monk-ordination took place in 1141.

The four main students of Ñi ma Grags, who were called 'the four sons of sPa tshab' (*spa tshab bu bźi*), were gTsaṅ pa sar sbos, rMa bya Byaṅ chub Ye śes, Dar Yon tan Grags and Źaṅ thaṅ Sag pa Ye śes 'Byuṅ gnas. From these four students along with rMa bya Byaṅ chub bTson 'grus, a student of Phya pa Chos kyi Seṅge (who had also studied with Ñi ma Grags), the teachings in the writings of Candrakīrti were spread and taught widely in Tibet. Thaṅ Sag pa and his students give the transmission-line from Candrakīrti to Ñi ma Grags as follows (ROERICH, 1949:344): Candrakīrti, Mañjukīrti, Devacandra, brāhmaṇa Ratnavajra, Parahita, Hasumati and sPa tshab Ñi ma Grags. In general, Ñi ma Grags' translation of Pras is very precise and literal.[118]

1.13 Description of the Significant Tibetan Ms and Xylographs

As noted above, the autograph of Ñi ma Grags' Tibetan translation of Pras is no longer extant, and regrettably even an early ms of this translation is not to be found. The translation is only preserved in the late editions of the canonical collection of Buddhist commentarial literature, the *bstan 'gyur*.[119] Thus, a single ms and four xylographs are preserved from the five extant editions of the *bstan 'gyur*. Here the four adopted bstan 'gyur editions are listed and briefly described in chronological order.[120]

Q, *Peking Kao Tsung Tibetan xylograph bstan 'gyur*

The Kao-tsung or Ch'ien-lung Peking edition is the earliest complete printed edition of the *bstan 'gyur* (RATIA, 1993:19-20). Its wooden blocks were engraved in 1724 (ibid.) and the printing was completed in 1737 under the

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[118] This is also confirmed by MAY (1959:6-7), who writes: "Le *Tanjur* nous a conservé une traduction tibétaine de la *Prasannapadā*, extrêmement remarquable pour la précision et l'exactitude qu'elle met à rendre les nuances et la terminologie de l'original sanscrit ... Elle constitue donc un précieux moyen de contrôle des manuscrits sanscrits beaucoup plus tardifs..." English translation: "A Tibetan translation of *Prasannapadā* has been preserved for us in the *Tanjur*, which is quite remarkable in the precision and accuracy with which it renders the nuances and terminology of the original Sanskrit ... It thus constitutes a valuable means of control of the much later Sanskrit manuscripts..."

[119] For a stemma codicum of the bstan 'gyur editions, cf. RATIA (1993).

[120] For more details, cf. RATIA (1993) and VOGEL (1965:22ff.).

Chinese emperor Ch'ien-lung in Peking (HARRISON & EIMER, 1987:xiii). It was based on a ms-*bstan 'gyur* prepared by the Tibetan regent sDe srid Saṅs rgyas rGya mtsho and possibly also on an earlier, incomplete xylograph *bstan 'gyur* edition prepared in Peking under the Chinese emperor K'ang hsi after 1683 CE (RATIA, 1993:19). For the present edition, the modern facsimile-reprint by SUZUKI (1955-1961, vol. 98) was used.

N, *sNar thaṅ Tibetan xylograph bstan 'gyur*

The sNar thaṅ xylograph *bstan 'gyur* was engraved in 1741-1742 at sNar thaṅ monastery in gTsaṅ at the behest of the 7th Dalai Lama (RATIA, 1993:21-22). Like Q, it is also based on the ms-*bstan 'gyur* prepared by sDe srid Saṅs rgyas rGya mtsho. For the present edition, an original print kept at the Royal Library of Denmark was used.[121] Besides Pras, the separate *kārikā*-text of Mmk from the *sNar thaṅ bstan 'gyur* was experimentally adopted in the analysis of the Mmk-verses. This text was given the siglum N^k.

D, *sDe dge Tibetan xylograph bstan 'gyur*

The sDe dge xylograph *bstan 'gyur* was engraved in sDe dge in Khams in 1737-1744 on the basis of a compilation of four different ms-*bstan 'gyur* prepared by Źu chen Tshul khrims Rin chen under the patronage of the king of sDe dge, bsTan pa Tshe riṅ (1678-1738).[122] For the present edition, the electronic text of Pras prepared by ACIP was used,[123] although it contains a number of errors. This text was carefully checked against an original copy of the sDe dge *bstan 'gyur* kept at the National Library of Bhutan (vol. *dbu ma 'a pa*) and also against the facsimile reprint by TARTHANG (1981).

For texts other than Pras, which are referred to from the sDe dge edition in this study, a print from the *sDe dge mTshal pa bstan 'gyur* published by RIG PA'I RDO RJE (1981-1985) was sometimes used, which is a facsimile of an original print of the sDe dge *bstan 'gyur*. At other times, only

[121] Royal Library, Tibetan catalogue no. 3251 (BUESCHER & TULKU, 2000); the *mdo 'grel 'a* volume containing Pras is shelved as "Narthang Tanjur mdo 'A vol. 111." This volume of the *sNar thaṅ bstan 'gyur* is also available from NGMPP, microfilm reel no. A711.

[122] For a list of the four ms-*bstan 'gyur* editions used as its basis, cf. RATIA (1993:21).

[123] Cf. http://www.asianclassics.org/

the electronic versions of texts from the sDe dge *bstan 'gyur* prepared by ACIP were consulted.

G, *Pho lha nas Golden ms bstan 'gyur*

This ms *bstan 'gyur* was prepared under the patronage of the Tibetan ruler Pho lha nas bSod nams sTobs rgyas (1689-1747), some time before 1747 (RATIA, 1993:18). It was based on the 'Phyiṅ ba sTag rtse ms-*bstan 'gyur*. For the present edition, vol *dbu ma 'a pa* of a modern facsimile reprint edition from the Chinese Minority Library in Beijing was used, entitled *bstan 'gyur gser bris bskyar par*. According to SCHOENING (1992), this facsimile was made from the original mss kept at the palace of 'Phyiṅ ba sTag rtse.

1.14 Rejected Tibetan Xylograph

The Co ne xylograph *bstan 'gyur* was prepared under the patronage of the prince of Co ne, 'Jam dbyaṅs Nor bu (1703-1751), and continued by his widow Princess Rin chen dPal 'dzom in the period 1753-1773 (RATIA, 1993:22). It was based mainly on the *sDe dge* xylograph *bstan 'gyur*. Two thirds of the 17th chapter of Pras was collated for the critical edition, using a microfilm of the print kept at the US Library of Congress.[124] It quickly became apparent, however, that the Co ne *bstan 'gyur* copy of Pras purely is an apograph of D, because it reproduces all the substantive readings of D plus adds a number of further corruptions of its own. Hence, the Co ne *bstan 'gyur* xylograph has been rejected for this edition, and the collation of its readings has not been included in the critical apparatus.

1.15 Accidentals in the Tibetan Xylographs and Ms

The Tibetan xylographs and ms are much more consistent in their treatment of accidentals than the Sanskrit mss described above. This is probably due to a strict editorial policy applied at the time of compiling the printed editions of the *bstan 'gyur*.

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[124] Vol. *dbu ma 'a*, wherein Pras is contained, is referred to as: Choni edition of the Tibetan Tandjar vol. 23-24, shelf no. Orient China 242, reel no. 12.

Regarding punctuation, only two kinds are used in the xylographs and the ms: the single stroke called *śad*, which is represented in the critical edition by the sign |, and the double stroke called *ñis śad* represented by the sign ||. They are consistently treated in the manner that śad is applied within sentences to separate syntactical units and elements in lists, whereas *ñis śad* only is applied after sentence-end as indicated by a final-particle (*slar sdu*) and between *pādas* in verses. Ω occasionally deviate from these principles, although its overall application of these principles is quite consistent. These principles have been followed throughout in the critical edition. The treatment of *śad* was, unfortunately, not collated properly with ms G, since this ms was not available during my later research. Therefore, punctuation-variants have generally not been noted for G.

D differs from NQ in its treatment of *ñis śad* after the letter g. D applies the rule that the first *śad* in a *ñis śad* must be omitted after the letter g. D, however, does not apply this rule, if the g-letter is affixed with a vowel-sign, in which case it seems to have been thought that such a misreading could not take place. NQ, on the other hand, also apply this rule after g-letters affixed with vowel-signs, such as *gi* or *go*. In the present edition, the treatment by D has been followed on this point.

If the treatment of punctuation adopted in the entire critical edition is taken as the basis, the following deviations may be observed (using the same codes as for the Sanskrit edition):

	D	N	Q	DN	NQ	DQ	**Total**
p1	6	6	11	1	17	-	41
p2	4	3	2	3	1	-	13
p3	3	2	3	1	7	-	16
p4	8	2	2	-	17	-	29

As for orthographic variants (o4), there are variant readings for nine words: pha rol tu】 pha rol du D; brda'】 brda D; thun moṅ】 thun moṅs Q; gcig pu】 gcig bu Q; yi dwags】 yi dags DQ; ba laṅ】 ba glaṅ GQ; sā lu】 sa lu GNQ & NQ; sogs】 gsog GNQ; and 'brel pa】 'brel ba DGN and N separately. Further, N once attests the abbreviation *namkha'i* for *nam mkha'i*, a feature that normally would be typical only for hand-written mss.

1.16 Substantives in the Tibetan Xylographs and Ms

The same taxonomy, which was applied to the readings of the Sanskrit mss, has been used for the readings of the Tibetan xylographs and ms and noted exhaustively in the critical apparatus. In general, the Tibetan edition contains far fewer variants as regards accidentals but more variants as regards substantives, including both significant variant readings and solecisms. As mentioned above, this is probably due to that the editors of the first printed *bstan 'gyur* editions eliminated most accidental variants by imposing strict editing to the texts.

Not much detail will be given here to analyze the substantives, since the Tibetan substantives in terms of an edition of Pras are less important than those of the Sanskrit edition and also because the stemmatic relationships of the *bstan 'gyur* xylographs and ms are already known (cf. fn. 119 above). The following general table merely presents the number of such readings in the adopted xylographs and ms:

	D	G	N	N^k	Q	DN	DN^k	DG	GN	DQ	GQ	NQ	DGN	DNQ	GNQ	GNN^kQ	DGNQ	Ω	Total
V1	12	-	2	-	1	1	-	1	-	3	-	1	1	-	6	-	-	1	**29**
v2	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	**4**
v3	6	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	9	-	1	2	**17**
v4	6	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	**14**
v5	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	**6**
v6	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	**5**
v7	5	-	-	-	3	1	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	12	-	-	-	**25**
v8	5	1	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	**13**
v9	4	1	2	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	1	-	-	-	-	**14**
s1	3	2	1	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	2	**15**
s2	5	4	6	-	2	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**19**
s3	2	3	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	3	1	-	-	**15**
s4	2	1	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	**12**
s5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0**
s6	1	-	6	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	**17**
s7	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	**4**
s8	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	**5**
Total	**59**	**12**	**24**	**4**	**19**	**5**	**1**	**7**	**4**	**4**	**2**	**12**	**12**	**1**	**41**	**1**	**3**	**7**	**214**

The table indicates that substantive verbal forms (v1 and s7) are quite frequent (33 in total). Omissions (v4, v7 and s4) also account for a high rate of substantives (51 in total). Insertions (v9 & s3) are less frequent (29 in total) than omissions.

D alone deviates most frequently from the adopted readings (59 instances); however, it more often deviates with variant readings (42 instances) than with solecisms (17 instances). This is probably due to its being a misch-codex relying on four different ms-*bstan 'gyur* as its ancestors or due to heavy emendation. The mss GNQ form a stemmatic family. This group jointly deviates from the adopted readings in 41 instances, and likewise has a higher rate of variant readings (33 instances) than solecisms (8).


In its unique readings, G is more prone to solecisms (10 instances) than to variant readings (2 instances), which is typical of a hand-written ms. Surprisingly, N is also more inclined to solecisms in its unique readings (18 instances) than to variant readings (8 instances). This may indicate less precision in the copying process, which, as indicated above, is known to have gone very fast for the entire N *bstan 'gyur* (merely two years); or it may indicate meagre editorial supervision during the copying-process. Q is more balanced with its eleven variant readings and eight solecisms.

When GNQ are compared to D, it seems that D either was better copied or more thoroughly revised than GNQ, although Q appears to be a better or more revised copy than GN. Therefore, Q is best to take as the starting-point of a critical edition based on the *bstan 'gyur* editions, because D attests a higher number of variant readings that are to be rejected (when as here compared with a Sanskrit original). If D is taken as the starting-point of an edition, as it was done here, the editor needs to beware of the several variant readings in D that are to be eliminated.

1.17 Explanation of the Lay-out of the Editions

The Sanskrit and Tibetan editions have here been made as 'clear text editions', i.e., editions with a minimum of editorial markings and references inserted into the text itself. The critical apparatus thus refers to the text of the edition not by footnote-numbers but by reference to line-numbers. As argued by TANSELLE (1972, reprint 1990:123), the arrangement of the text

as a 'clear text' not only emphasises the primacy of the text without distractions but also permits proper quotation of the text in other sources without insertion of symbols or footnote-numbers, where such markings may be inappropriate. For the sake of cross-reference, the pagination of V (i.e., the vulgate edition by LVP) are marked in the text, thus allowing easy use of references in other works, particular the Pras-indices produced by YAMAGUCHI (1974). An illustration and explanation of the text-part and the critical apparatus of the Sanskrit edition now follows to facilitate a quick overview. Each page of the critical Sanskrit edition is divided into five parts: (1) the text-edition, (2) the critical apparatus of substantives, (3) the critical apparatus of accidentals, (4) a section showing textual parallels in the earlier sources, and (5) footnotes for each page of the edition. Here is the lay-out of the text-edition (follow the lines for each item to see its explanation; items to be explained are marked with grey background):


4 Prasannapadā, Sanskrit edition, Pras 303

ātmasaṃyamakaṃ cetaḥ parānugrāhakaṃ ca yat |
5 *maitraṃ sa dharmas tad bījaṃ phalasya pretya · ceha {ca}* | (Mmk 17.1) ज118a
tatrāhita utpādito 'haṃmāno 'sminn ity *ātmā* | skandhān upādāya prajñapyamānaḥ pudgala ātmety
ucyate | ātmānaṃ saṃyamayati viṣayeṣv asvatantrayati rāgādikleśa- द52a
vaśena pravṛttiṃ nivārayatīty *ātmasaṃyamakam* | cinoty upacinoti śubham aśubhaṃ ca karma vipākadānasāmarthye niyamayatīti

• page number. • page reference to LVP-edition. • line-number. • verses are marked by indention. • words in braces are not attested by the Tibetan edition (in the Tibetan edition words in braces are not attested by the Sanskrit edition). • text in red has a parallel in the earlier commentaries or in another sources as specified in the apparatus. • text in italics indicate root-text or a word from the root-text in the commentary. • small dot indicates folio-change in a ms, in this case ms ज. • reference to ms folio-change in the margin, i.e., ms ज folio 118b (if changes of folio occurs in two or three mss in the same line, these are listed in respective order, i.e., the first dot in the line refers to the first reference in the margin, etc.). • verse-reference in parenthesis. • grey line separates the text-edition from the critical apparatus.

The critical apparatus is placed below the grey separation-line. Here is the lay-out of the apparatus:

5 maitraṃ] बजलप Tib V : maitre द (v6).

• apparatus-reference to line-number of the text-edition above. • the lemma-sign] marks the word(s) that stand before it as a reference to the text-edition above; that is, *maitraṃ* here refers to the word *maitraṃ* in line five in the above text-edition. • the sigla (बजलप) following the lemma-sign indicate which mss attest the adopted reading. • Tib shows that the adopted reading also is supported by the corresponding Tibetan translation. • V shows that it is also the reading adopted in the V-edition. • colon indicates separation, i.e., that the reading, which follows the colon, is a variant to the adopted reading. • The sigla following a variant indicate which mss attest the variant. • taxonomy-codes (v6) given in parenthesis show the type of reading according to the taxonomy of readings described above.

As for other conventions used in the apparatus, comments are written in italics, or in most cases listed in the form of footnotes. Readings and sigla are not written in italics. The abbreviation *stand.* indicates a standardisation of orthography, where the mss attest an alternative, non-Sanskrit orthogra-phy or *sandhi.* Emendations are marked by the abbreviation *em.*

When two or three mss jointly attest a substantive reading, which may thus be attributed to their archetype, the archetype-sigla (e.g., γδ meaning ancestors gamma and delta) are indicated in parenthesis following the sigla.

A separate section marked ‘parallels’, placed at the end of the critical apparatus, lists parallel sentences found in the earlier Mmk-commentaries or other sources. This section follows the same principles of lay-out as those of the critical apparatus. Parallels are marked by red text in the edition. For example:

Parallels:

7-8 ātmānaṃ saṃyamayati…nivārayatīty ātmasaṃyama-kaṃ | 】 bdag ñid legs par sdom pa ni | bdag ñid legs par sdom par byed pa’o *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:220) : bdag ñid legs par sdom pa źes bya ni bdag ñid yaṅ dag par sdom par byed ciṅ mi dge ba las ldog par byed pa ste *Prajñāpradīpa (AMES, 1986:507*; T1566.99a[20]: 所言思者。謂能自調伏遠離非法).

• line-numbers indicate reference to line-numbers in the text-edition above. • text before the lemma-sign 】 indicates a reference to the text-edition above; text following the lemma-sign indicates a parallel found in an earlier source. • the parallel text is followed by a bibliographic reference to the text written in italics. • colon separates variants from different parallel sources; in the case of *Prajñāpradīpa*, which is extant in both a Tibetan and a Chinese translation, the Chinese is quoted in parenthesis following the Tibetan text, whenever applicable. • red text indicates parallels in both Pras and the quoted sources; black text indicates words or phrases that have no parallel.

Chapter Two: Critical Sanskrit Edition

ब$99a_6$, द$51b_8$, ज$117b_2$, ल$87a_1$, प$55a_3$, V302, VAIDYA (1960:132)

XVII.

(karmaphalaparīkṣā nāma saptadaśamaṃ prakaraṇam)

atrāha | vidyata eva saṃsāraḥ karmaphalasambandhāśrayatvāt |

yadīha santānāvicchedakrameṇa janmamaraṇaparamparayā hetuphalabhāvapravṛttyā saṃskārāṇām ātmano vā saṃsaraṇaṃ syāt syāt tadānīṃ karmmaphalasambandhaḥ | yathopavarṇṇitasaṃsārābhāve tu utpattyanantaravināśitvāc cittasya karmākṣepakāle ca vipākasyāsadbhāvāt karmaphalasambandhābhāva eva syāt | saṃsārasadbhāve tu satīha kṛtasya

Substantives

2 karmaphalaparīkṣā...prakaraṇam] V: *om.* Ω Tib.[1]

3 karmaphala°] karmapharla° द (s3). °sambandhā°] *stand.*: °saṃvaddhā° बल (γ) (v5, o2, o4): °samvadhā° द (s4, o4): °samvandhā° जप (α) (o4): °saṃbandhā° V.[2]

4 °paramparayā] प Tib: °parasparayor बज ल (γδ)(v5, v6): °parasparayā द (v5): °paraṃparayā V.

6 °sambandhaḥ] *em. stand.*: °saṃvaṃdho ब (v10, o2, o4): °samvadho द (v10, s4, o4): °saṃvandho जल (v10, o2, o4): °samvandho प (v10, o4): °saṃbandhaḥ V. |] *em.* Tib V: *om.* Ω.[3] yathopavarṇṇita°] *em.* Tib: yathāpaṇḍita° ब (v4, v5): yathopavarṇṇitaḥ दप (α)(v6): yathāpaṇḍitaḥ ज (v4, v5, v6): yathāpaṇḍite ल (v4, v5): yathāvarṇite V.[4] tu] *om.* प (v7).[5]

7 °anantara°] दप (α) Tib V: °anantana° बज ल (γδ)(s2). karmākṣepakāle] प Tib V (DE JONG, 1978b:220): karmokṣayakāle ब (s2): karmākṣeyakāla द (s1, s2): karmākṣayakāle जल (δ)(s2). ca] *om.* द (v7)(DE JONG, 1978b:220).[6] vipākasyāsadbhāvāt] दप (α) Tib V: vipākaḥ syāt sadbhāvāt बज ल (γδ)(v8).[7]

8 sambandhābhāva] *stand.* Tib: °saṃvaṃdhābhāva ब (o2, o4): °samvadhābhāva द (s4, o4): °samvandhābhāva जल (δ)(o4): °samvandhābhāvā प (o4, v6): °saṃbandhābhāva V. saṃsārasadbhāve] samsārasadbhāve प (s3).[8] satīha] sagīha द (s2) .

Accidentals

3 1st |] द Tib V: || बजल (p2): *om.* प (p3). 2nd |] बप: || दजल V (p2).

4 santānā°] दजप: saṃtānā° बल V (o2). pravṛttyā] बदजल Tib V: pravṛtyā प (o4).

5 *After* 1st syāt] प: | ब Tib (p4): || दजल (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V. karmma°] प: karma° बदजल V (o1).

6 *After* °yathopavarṇṇita°] बजल (γδ) Tib V: daṇḍa प (p4): dvidaṇḍa द (p4). *After* tu] दप V: | बज Tib (p4): || ल (p4).

Parallels

3 atrāha |】 'dir smras pa | *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II: 220): 問曰 *Chung lun* (T1564.21b$_{21}$): smras pa *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:506, T1566.99a$_{9}$ 阿毘曇人言). karmaphalasambandhāśrayatvāt |】 las daṅ 'bras bur 'brel pa'i phyir ro || *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:220), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 196:506; omits the terminative particle after *'bras bu;* T1566.99a$_{15}$: 與業果合故).

5 saṃskārāṇām】 naṅ gi 'du byed *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:506; T1566.99a$_{15}$: 內諸入諸行).

Notes

[1] The chapter-title in parenthesis is inserted here by the editor, since the mss do not cite the title at the beginning of a chapter but only at the end at the chapter. The title contains an emendation in that all the Sanskrit mss omit the word *phala,* whereas *phala* is attested by the Tibetan translation (D3860.110b$_{1}$: *las daṅ 'bras bu brtag pa). Karmaphalaparīkṣā* is adopted as the more logical title for the chapter, since the chapter discusses the relation between *karman* and *phala* and not merely *karman.*

[2] The standardisation is based on जप. The variant *saṃvaddhā* is rejected due to the occurrence of the same word in the commentary below (Pras 303$_{1}$), where all the mss attest some form of *samvandhā.*

[3] The *daṇḍa* is syntactically required.

[4] As indicated by DE JONG (1978b:219-220), the Tib reading should be adopted for the best sense. The emendation is thus based on दप, but the *visarga* attested by these mss is to be eliminated and the word is to be compounded with the following phrase. The corrupt form *yathāpaṇḍit°* attested by mss बजल (γ) with various case-endings must have involved the loss of the *va-akṣara* and the *repha*-letter above the geminated *ṇṇ.* Subsequently, the corrupt form *yathopaṇṇita°* must have been corrected to the more familiar *yathāpaṇḍita°.*

[5] It is possible but uncertain that the Tibetan translation (D3860.100b$_{7}$: *'khor ba med na ni)* attests *tu.* In many cases, Ñi ma grags seems to employ the topic-marker *ni* as a translation or substitute for Sanskrit *tu,* e.g., *iha tu* (Pras 304$_{9}$; D3860.101a$_{7}$: *'dir ni), puruṣakārādayas tu* (Pras 305$_{8}$; D3860.101b$_{5}$: *skyes bu'i byed pa la sogs pa rnams ni), tat tu* (Pras 306$_{7}$; D3860.102a$_{3}$: *de ni), avipraṇāśas tu* (Pras 319$_{3}$; D3860.106a$_{7}$: *chud mi za ba ni),* etc. In such cases, Ñi ma grags seems to imbue the Tibetan topic-marker *ni* with the meaning of Sanskrit *tu* as a coordinating conjunction, i.e., meaning 'but'. However, in Ñi ma grags' translations of absolutive constructions *(sati saptamī),* there are examples where the topic-marker *ni* is used regardless of whether *tu* occurs in the Sanskrit original, e.g.: *gamanābhāve tu* (Pras 102$_{12}$; *'gro ba med na ni,* MAY 1959:314$_{30}$), *ahetukavādābhyupagame tu* (Pras 182$_{11}$; *rgyu med par smra ba khas blaṅs na ni,* ibid.:373$_{23}$), *saṃsārasadbhāve tu sati* (Pras 302$_{7}$; D3860.101a$_{1}$: *'khor ba yod na ni)* as opposed to the examples *saty eva hi hetor abhyupagame* (Pras 182$_{9}$; *rgyu khas blaṅs par gyur na ni,* MAY 1959:373$_{19}$) and *nanv evaṃ sati* (Pras 311$_{15}$; D3860.103b$_{1}$: *de lta yin na ni).* Keeping this uncertainty in mind, the reading *tu* is here adopted on the basis of the reconstruction of hyparchetype β and the possibility of support from the Tibetan translation.

[6] DE JONG (1978b:220) argues that the *ca* should be eliminated (as also omitted in द), because "the non-existence of *vipāka* is a result of the *utpattyanantaravināśitva* of the *citta.*" However, since the *citta* does exist at the time of the execution of the action *(karmākṣepa-kāle),* this is no argument why the *vipāka* should not exist at that time. Rather, the sentence must be construed as giving two separate arguments, thus warranting *ca,* as does the Tibetan translation.

[7] In ms ल, the visarga has been added, probably by another hand. The variant in बजल does not fit syntactically in the sentence.

[8] प inserts the wrong homorganic nasal.

karmaṇo janmāntare 'pi vipākaphala·sambandhāt karmaṇāṃ phala- V303
sambandho na virodhito bhavati | tasmād vidyata eva saṃsāraḥ karmaphala-
sambandhāśrayatvād {iti} |

kāni punas tāni karmāṇi kiṃ vā tat phalam iti · tatprabhedavivakṣa-
yedam ucyate | | ∘ | |

ātmasaṃyamakaṃ cetaḥ parānugrāhakaṃ ca yat |
maitraṃ sa dharmas tad bījaṃ phalasya pretya · ceha {ca} | (Mmk 17.1) ज118a

tatrāhita utpādito 'haṃmāno 'sminn ity ***ātmā*** | skandhān upādāya
prajñapyamānaḥ pudgala ātmety ucyate | ā·tmānaṃ saṃyamayati viṣayeṣv द52a
asvatantrayati · rāgādikleśavaśena pravṛttiṃ nivārayatīty ***ātmasaṃyamakam*** | V304
cinoty upacinoti śubham aśubhaṃ ca karma vipākadānasāmarthye

Substantives

1 °sambandhāt] °saṃvadhāt द (o2, o4, s4). karmaṇāṃ] karmaṇā द (v4).
2 °sambandho] °savandho द (o4, v4). virodhito] दप (α) V: virodhitā बजल (γδ)(v6). tasmād] tasmā ल (s4). saṃsāraḥ] दप (α) Tib V: saṃsāra° बजल (γδ)(v6).[1]
4-5 °vivakṣayedam] °vivakṣeyedam प (s2).
6 ca yat] yataḥ प (v8).[2]
7 maitraṃ] maitre द (v6).[3] sa dharmas] प Tib V: saddharmas बदजल (βγδ)(v6).[4] bīaṃ] *stand.* Tib V: vīja° बजल (γδ)(v6, o4): vījaṃ दप (α)(o4).[5] pretya] pratya ज (s4). ceha] *vahe* द (s2, s5). ca] दप (α) V: ra बजल (γδ)(s2).[6]
8 ity] *stand.* V: iti Ω (s6). skandhān] skaṃndhān द (s3).
9 prajñapyamānaḥ] prajñapyamāna° द (v6). ātmānaṃ...etc.] *in all the extant Sanskrit mss, the sentences cinoty upacinoti...paryāyāḥ (Pras 304_{1-2}) are placed at this point before ātmānaṃ saṃyamayati...etc. The Tibetan translation, however, reflects the sentence arrangement adopted in this edition, which allows for a more natural flow of the commentary on the verse. Thus, the sentence-order of the Sanskrit mss has been emended.* saṃyamayati] Ω Tib VAIDYA (1960:132): saṃyamati V.
10 rāgādikleśavaśena pravṛttiṃ] rāgādikle [7] प (*lacuna*).
11 cinoty] *stand.* V: cinoti Ω (s6 in प).[7] upacinoti] प Tib V: *om.* बदजल (βγδ)(v7).[8] śubham aśubhaṃ ca karma] [7] प (*lacuna*). ca] *em.* Tib: *om.* बदजल (v7).[9] °sāmarthye] °sāmarthya द (s1).

Accidentals

1 ’pi】 *stand.*: pi Ω (04). °sambandhāt】 *stand.*: °samvandhāt बप (o4): °saṃvadhāt द (o2, o4, s4): °samvaṃdhāt ज (o2, o4): °saṃvandhāt ल (o2, o4): °saṃbandhāt V.

2 °sambandho】 *stand.*: °saṃvandho बल (o2, o4): °savandho द (o4, v4): °samvandho जप (o4): °saṃbandho V. karmaphala°】 Ω V: in ब the la-akṣara is added in the margin.

8 |】 प Tib: *om.* बदजल V (p3).[10] skandhān】 जलप V: skaṃdhān ब (o2).

Parallels

4 kāni punas tāni karmāṇi kim vā tat phalam iti】 las gaṅ źe na *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:220): 所謂業者 *Chung lun* (T1564.21b$_{24}$).

6-7 ātmasaṃyamakaṃ cetaḥ…*etc.*】 bdag ñid legs par sdom pa daṅ||gźan la phan ’dogs byams sems gaṅ|| de chos de ni ’di gźan du||’bras bu dag gi sa bon yin|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403; *bźin du* instead of *gźan du), Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:220), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; T1566.99a$_{18\text{-}19}$: 自護身口思。及彼攝他者。慈法爲種子。能得現未果): 人能降伏心。利益於衆生。是名爲慈善。二世果報種 *Chung lun* (T1564.21b$_{25\text{-}26}$).[11]

9-10 ātmānaṃ saṃyamayati…nivārayatīty ātmasaṃyamakam|】 bdag ñid legs par sdom pa ni| bdag ñid legs par sdom par byed pa’o *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:220): bdag ñid legs par sdom pa źes bya ni bdag ñid yaṅ dag par sdom par byed ciṅ mi dge ba las ldog par byed pa ste *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; T1566.99a$_{20}$: 所言思者。謂能自調伏遠離非法).

Notes

[1] In ms द, the visarga is only written as a single dot instead of two dots, but a clear space is left for it.

[2] The reading ca yat is adopted, since it is supported by the Tibetan translation and all the other extant commentaries, although either variant makes sense both grammatically and metrically. The variant yataḥ would, however, require an implied *asti* or *santi* in pādas ab.

[3] In ms ल, the ai-vowel is written in Nevārī-style.

[4] The reading of ms प is also supported by the commentary below (Pras 305$_4$), where all mss clearly attest the reading *sa dharmas.* With both readings, the heavy syllable ‘mas’ in dharmas results in an m-vipulā.

[5] The reading of दप is supported by all Ω in the commentary below (Pras 305$_5$).

[6] The Tibetan translation does not attest *ca,* which is, however, probably due to the Tibetan prosody.

[7] V places the ty-syllable in brackets. In ms प, this reading conflicts with sandhi-rules, because the word is followed by *upacinoti.* In the other mss, the sandhi is correct, because the word is followed directly by *śubham.*

[8] V places *upacino* in brackets.

[9] The size of the lacuna in ms प does not suggest that this ms would attest the emendation. The Tibetan translation (D3860.101a$_4$) attests *ca* (Tib. *daṅ*), and although one would expect either the compound *śubhāśubhaṃ* or a reading involving *ca,* such as *śubham aśubhaṃ ca,* none of the Sanskrit mss attest *ca.* Hence, *ca* is inserted as an emendation.

[10] In ms प, the daṇḍa is quite blurred, but a clear space is left between the akṣaras.

[11] As noted above, pāda c in Chung lun attests the variant reading “wholesome action” (*kuśalam, shan 善), which in the commentary that follows in Chung lun is glossed with “merit” (*puṇya, 福德, T1564.21c$_1$). Thus, this pāda in Chung lun may be reconstructed as *maitraṃ tad kuśalaṃ bījam.

niyamayatīti ***cetaḥ***| cittaṃ mano vijñānam iti tasyaiva paryāyāḥ | tad etad ātmasaṃyamakaṃ kuśalaṃ cetaḥ prāṇātipātādiṣu pravṛttividhārakaṃ durgatigamanād dhārayatīti ***dharma*** ity ucyate |

dharmaśabdo 'yaṃ pravacane tridhā vyavasthāpitaḥ svalakṣaṇadhāraṇārthena kugatigamanavidhāraṇārthena pāñcagatikasaṃsāragamanavidhāraṇārthena | | tatra · svala·kṣaṇadhāraṇārthena | sarve sāśravā प55b, ल87b
anāśravāś ca dharmā ity ucyante | kugatigamanavidhāraṇārthena daśakuśalādayo dharmā ity ucyante |

dharmacārī sukhaṃ śete hy asmiṃl loke paratra ca | |

pāṃcagatikasaṃsāragamanavidhāraṇārthena nirvāṇaṃ dharma ity ucyate |

Substantives

1 niyamayatīti] बदज Tib V: niyamatīti ल (s4): niyamaya[1]ī⌊t⌋i प (*lacuna*). cetaḥ] *em.* V: ceta° बजल (γδ)(v6): cetaś द (v8): ce⌊t⌋aś प (*lacuna*)(v8).[1] 1st |] *em.* Tib V: *om.* Ω.[2] cittaṃ] [1]i[1]ṃ प (*lacuna*). tasyaiva] tathaiva ब (v5).

2-4 prāṇātipātādiṣu] prāṇādipātādiṣu ज (s2). prāṇātipātādiṣu...svalakṣaṇa° (*line 4*)] ⌊prāṇātipātādi⌋[3]⌊i⌋[1]⌊i⌋[3]ṃ[1]r[1]⌊i⌋ [15]r[18]⌊ṇadhāraṇārthena | kugati⌋[2]⌊i⌋ [1]ra⌊ṇār⌋ [1]⌊ena | ⌋[17] प (*lacunae*).[3]

3 dhārayatīti] dhācayatīti द (s2).

4 vyavasthāpitaḥ] vyavasthitaḥ ज (v4).

5 pāñcagatika°] *em.* V: paṃcagatika° बद जल (s4, o2).[4] °saṃsāragamana°] *em.* V: saṃsārāgamana° बजल (γδ)(v5): °saṃsāragamane द Tib (v6).[5]

6 °vidhāraṇārthena] °vidhāraṇārthe ल (v7). svalakṣaṇadhāraṇārthena] svalakṣaṇadhāraṇārthenaḥ द (s1).

6-7 sāśravā anāśravāś] दप (α): sāśravānāśravāś बजल (γδ)(v6): sāsravā [a]nāsravāś V.[6]

7 ucyante] दजलप VAIDYA (1960:132): ucyaṃte ब (o2): ucyate V.[7] kugatigamanavidhāraṇārthena] बदज: kugatigamanavidhāraṇārthana ल (s4): ⌊kugatigamanavidhāraṇārthena⌋ प (*lacuna*).[8]

7-10 daśakuśalādayo... °gamana° (*line 10*)] [43] प (*lacuna*).[9]

8 °kuśalādayo] °kuśarādayo ल (s2). ucyante] बदल VAIDYA (1960:132): ucyate ज V (v1).[10]

9 hy] *em.*: *om.* Ω Tib V (v7).[11] ca] caḥ द (s3).

10 pāṃca°] pāva° द (s2, s4): pāñca° V. nirvāṇaṃ dharma ity ucyate] *em.* Tib: nirvāṇam ucyate Ω (v4): nirvāṇe [dharma i]ty ucyate V.[12]

Accidentals

1 *After* iti】 द्प Tib V: | ब (p4): || जल (p4). paryāyāḥ】 Ω Tib V: in ms प, the word has been corrected to *paryāryāḥ* by another hand. 2nd |】 *om.* बद्जल (p3).
2 *After* cetaḥ】 | ब (p4).
3 |】 द्: || बजल V (p2).
4 °śabdo】 *stand.* V: °śavdo Ω (o4). 'yaṃ】 *stand.* V: yaṃ बद्जल (o4). *After* 'yaṃ】 || ल (p4). *After* vyavasthāpitaḥ】 द्ज V: | ब (p4): || ल (p4).
5 *After* 1st °ārthena】 बद्जल V: | प Tib (p4). *After* 2nd °ārthena】 | Tib V.
6 ||】 द्ल Tib V: | बज (p1). |】 || ज (p2): *om.* Tib V.
7 |】 बद्प: || जल V (p2).
8 |】 ब V: || द्जल (p2).
9 dharmacārī】 dharmmacārī ब (o1). asmiṃl】 *em.*: 'smiṃl बद्ल (o4): 'smiṃ ज (o4): 'smim̐l V.[13] ||】 *em.* Tib V: *om.* बद्जल (p3).
10 |】 द्प: || बजल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V.

Parallels

9 dharmacārī sukhaṃ śete hy asmiṃl loke paratra ca】 dharmacārī sukhaṃ śete hy asmiṃ loke paratra ca *Udānavarga* 4.35cd, 30.5cd (BERNHARD, 1965:137, 303).

Notes

[1] The variant *cetaś* in द्प has correct sandhi given that Ω omit the following daṇḍa. Since a daṇḍa has been inserted in this edition, the emendation of *cetaś* to *cetaḥ* is adopted.

[2] The daṇḍa is adopted as syntactically preferable.

[3] The lacunae correspond in size to the paradosis of the other mss.

[4] The grammatically correct form *pāñcagatika°* is emended on the basis of the occurrence of the same word in its correct form *pāñcagatika°* at Pras 304_8 attested by mss बजल (γδ).

[5] The emendation is based partially on ms द् and on the occurrence of the same compound with the form *°saṃsāragamana°* at Pras 304_8 attested by Ω.

[6] *Sāśravā* is a common orthographical variant of *sāsravā* (EDGERTON, 1953.II:110-111).

[7] *Ucyante* is also adopted by DE JONG (1978.II:220).

[8] In प, the word is partly damaged on top, but all akṣaras can be read with reasonable certainty.

[9] The size of the lacuna corresponds almost to the 39 akṣaras attested by the other mss.

[10] *Ucyante* is also adopted by DE JONG (1978b:220).

[11] The emendation is based on Udānavarga, the source of this quotation (cf. 'parallels' above).

[12] Ω omits the words *dharma ity,* although the context calls for these words, which are attested by the Tibetan translation (D101a^7: mya ṅan las 'das pa la chos źes brjod do). The locative case *nirvāṇe* in V's emendation is taken from the Tibetan syntax, where the verb *brjod* requires a locative-II particle, but this is not required in Sanskrit syntax as is clear from the similar structures in Pras 304_5. DE JONG (1978.II:220) also adopts the reading *nirvāṇaṃ dharma ity ucyate.*

[13] The emendation is based on Udānavarga.

dharmaṃ śaraṇaṃ gacchatīty atra| |iha tu kugatigamanavidhāraṇārthenaiva
dharmaśabdo ’bhipretaḥ|

kiṃ punar ātmasaṃyamakam eva ekaṃ ceto dharmaḥ| nety āha| kin tarhi
parānugrāhakañ ca maitrañ ca · yac ceto ’sāv api dharmaḥ| maitram ity atra V305
caśabdo luptanirdiṣṭo veditavyaḥ| tatra param anugṛhṇā·tīti ***parānugrāhakaṃ*** ज118b
cetaḥ| catuḥsaṃgraha·vastupravṛttaṃ bhayaparitrāṇapravṛttaṃ ca yac ceto ब100a
’sāv api dharmaḥ| mitre bhavam aviruddhaṃ sattveṣu yac cetas tan ***maitraṃ***
cetaḥ| mitram eva vā maitram| ātmānugrāhakaṃ yac cetas tan maitrañ cetaḥ|

Substantives

1 dharmaṃ śaraṇaṃ...°ārthenaiva】: [24]-va प (*lacuna*).[1] dharmaṃ śaraṇaṃ】ल VAIDYA (1960:132): dharmmaśaraṇaṃ ब (o1, v6): dharmaśaraṇaṃ दज V (v6).[2] kugatigamana°】बजल Tib V: kugatigamanaṃ द (s3). °vidhāraṇā°】बदल Tib V: °vidharaṇā° ज (v7).

3 eva ekaṃ】दप: eva kaṃ बज (γ)(s4): eva ca kaṃ ल (s2): evaikaṃ V.[3] ceto】बप: cetaḥ दजल V (s6). dharmaḥ】दलप: dharma बज V (v10). nety】प Tib: ity बदज ल (βγδ) V (v7).

4 parānugrāhakañ】दप: parānugrāhakaṃ बज V (o3): parānugrāha| |kaṃ ल (s3). maitrañ ca yac ca ceto】: *om.* ज (v7). *After* yac】*em.* Tib: ca Ω (v9).[4] dharmaḥ】बदप (αβ) Tib V: varṣaḥ ज (v5): vardhaḥ ल (v5). maitram...*etc.*】: ⌊mai-tram i⌋[7] ⌊nirdiṣṭo veditavyaḥ| ⌋ प (*lacunae*).[5] atra】बदज (βγδ) Tib V: utra ल (s2).

5 °nirdiṣṭo】बप (αγ) Tib V: °nidirṣṭo द (s5): °nidiṣṭo जल (δ)(v4). anugṛhṇātīti】द Tib V: anugṛhnātīti बजल (γδ)(s6): anug[1]ṇā ⌊tīti⌋ प (*lacunae*). parānugrāhakaṃ】बद (αβγ) V: parānugrāhaka° जल (δ)(v6): ⌊pa⌋[1]⌊nu⌋grāhakaṃ प (*lacuna*).

6 catuḥsaṃgraha°】: catusaṃgraha° ज (s4): catuḥ saṃgraha° V. bhayaparitrāṇa°】*em.* Tib V: bhavaparitrāṇa° Ω (v5).[6]

7 dharmaḥ】: dharmartha ल (v8). mitre bhavam...*etc.*】mi[7]tveṣu प (*lacuna*). mitre】बदल V (βγ): mitra° ज (v6).[7]

7-8 maitraṃ cetaḥ】दप (α) V: maitracetaḥ बजल (γδ)(v6).[8]

8 mitram eva vā】प Tib: maitram eva vā बदजल (βγδ)(v5): maitraṃ eva vā V.[9] ātmānugrāhakaṃ】*em.* Tib: *om.* Ω (v7).[10] cetas】: ca द (v8). tan】दप V: taṃ ब (o3): ta जल (δ)(s4).

Accidentals

2 °śabdo】*stand.* Tib V: °śavdo Ω (o4). |】बजप: || दल V (p2).

3 *After* eva ekaṃ】दप Tib V: | ब (p4): || जल (p4). 1st |】दप: *om.* बजल V (p3). 2nd |】प Tib V: *om.* बदल (p3): || ज (p2). kin】प: kiṃ बदजल V (o3).

4 maitrañ】दप: maitraṃ बल V (o3). *After* ceto】बदप Tib V: || ल (p4). ’sāv】दप V: sāv बजल

(o4). |】 बद्प V: || जल (p2).
5 |】 बजप V: *om.* द् (p3): || ल (p2).
6 |】 बप: || द् (p2): *om.* जल (p3): ardhadaṇḍa V.
7 |】 बद्प: || ज V (p2): *om.* ल (p3). sattveṣu】 *stand.* V: satveṣu Ω (o4). tan द्प V: taṃ बजल (o3).
8 1st |】 : || ल (p2). 2nd |】 द् Tib: *om.* बजलप (p3). maitrañ cetaḥ】 प: maitraṃ cetaḥ बद्जल (o3): maitraceto V. 3rd |】 बद्प Tib V: *om.* ज (p3): || ल (p2).

Parallels

5 param anugṛhṇātīti parānugrāhakaṃ】 gźan la phan 'dogs pa ni gźan dag la 'dogs par byed pa źes bya ba'i tha tshig go *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:220; om. źes bya ba'i tha tshig go): 以如是等能攝他故。名爲攝他 *Prajñāpradīpa* (T1566.$99a_{22}$, om. Tib).

6 catuḥsaṃgrahavastupravṛttaṃ bhayaparitrāṇapravṛttaṃ】 gźan la phan 'dogs par źes bya ba ni sbyin pa daṅ sñan par smra ba daṅ| 'jigs pa las yoṅs su skyob pa la sogs pa gźan dag la phan 'dogs par byed pa'o *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; T1566:$99a_{21-22}$ 攝他者。謂布施愛語救護怖畏者).

7-8 mitre bhavam aviruddhaṃ sattveṣu yac cetas tan maitraṃ cetaḥ| mitram eva vā maitram |】 byams pa ni mdza' bśes la 'byuṅ ba ste gcugs pa las byuṅ ba źes bya ba'i tha tshig go| |yaṅ na byams pa ni byams pa ñid de sems snum pa źes bya ba'i tha tshig ste| de ni bdag gi don gyi rkyen yin no| | *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:220): byams pa źes bya ba ni mdza' bśes las 'byuṅ bas byams pa'o| |yaṅ na byams pa ñid byams pa ste| bdag gi don la de daṅ mthun pa'i rkyen brjod pa'i phyir ro| | *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; only partly translated in Chinese, T1566:$99a_{22-23}$ 慈者謂心).

Notes

[1] The size of the lacuna corresponds well to the 25 akṣaras attested by the other mss.

[2] The non-compounded form is, e.g., also attested in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (PRADHAN, 1967:216_{22}; ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970-1973:629_{3}).

[3] द् inserts || between *eva* and *ekaṃ*.

[4] In प, the *cca*-akṣara in *yac ca* is damaged, but appears to be *cca*. The *ca* attested by Ω is syntactically unintelligible.

[5] The size of the lacuna corresponds to the paradosis of the other mss.

[6] The paradosis of Ω is not impossible, but Tib renders the sense better. The reading of Tib is supported by *Prajñāpradīpa,* which reads *'jigs pa las yoṅs su skyob pa la sogs pa* (**bhayaparitrāṇādi;* AMES, 1986:507; T1566.$99a_{21-22}$ *chiu-hu pu-wei* 救護怖畏).

[7] Tib is uncertain.

[8] *Maitraṃ cetaḥ* is parallel to the phrases *parānugrāhakaṃ cetaḥ* in lines 5-6 and *maitrañ cetaḥ* in line 8.

[9] In V, this phrase has been transposed to after *maitrañ cetaḥ* in line 8, perhaps as an emendation. VAIDYA (1960:132, note 4) reconstructs the Tibetan as *api ca| mitrataiva maitram.*

[10] The word attested by Tib is required by the sense and is also supported by the explanations given in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* and *Prajñāpradīpa.* VAIDYA (1960:132, note 4) reconstructs the Tibetan likewise. DE JONG (1978b:220) rejects the Tib reading.

yac {caitat} trividhaṃ ceto nirdiṣṭaṃ ***sa dharma*** ity ucyate | viparyayād adharmo yojyaḥ |

yac caitan nirdiṣṭaprabhedaṃ cetas ***tad bījaṃ phalasya*** | asādhāraṇaṃ phalābhinirvṛttau yat kāraṇaṃ tad {eva} ***bījam*** ity ucyate | tadyathā śālyaṅkurasya śālibījaṃ | yat tu sādhāraṇaṃ kṣityādi na tad bījaṃ kāraṇam eva tat | yathaitad evam ihāpīṣṭasya vipākasyābhinirvṛttau trividhaṃ ceto bhavati bījaṃ puruṣakārādayas tu kāraṇam eva |

kasmin punaḥ kāle bījasya phalaniṣpattir ity āha | ***pretya ceha ca*** | ***pretye***ty adṛṣṭe janmani | ***ihe***ti dṛṣṭe janmanīty arthaḥ | etac cāgamād vistareṇa boddhavyaṃ |

evan tāvac cittātmakam evaikaṃ dharmaṃ vyavasthāpya punar api

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Substantives

1 caitat **]** दप (αβ) V: caitaṃ बजल (γδ)(s2). trividhaṃ **]** बदल (βγδ) V: trividha° जप (v6). ceto **]** द Tib V: cetā बजल (γδ)(s2): caito प (s3). nirdiṣṭaṃ **]** : nirdiṣṭaḥ प (v6).

2 yojyaḥ **]** : yohyaḥ ब (s2).

3 caitan **]** दप (α) Tib V: caita बजल (γδ)(s4). nirdiṣṭa° **]** : nidiṣṭa° ज (s4). cetas **]** दप (α) V: cetaṃ ब (s2): ceta° जल (δ)(s4). phalasya | asādhāraṇaṃ **]** प Tib V: phalasyaḥ asādharaṇa° द (s2, p3)[1]: phalasyāsādhāraṇa° ब (v10, p3): phalasyā asādhāraṇa° जल (δ)(s1, p3).

4 °nirvṛttau **]** द Tib V: °nivṛttau बजलप (αγδ) (s4). kāraṇaṃ **]** : kāraṇa° प (s4).

5 śālyaṅkurasya **]** *em.* V: sālyaṃkulasya ब जल (o4, s2): sālyaṅkurasya प (o4): sālyaṃkurasya द (o2, o4).[2] sādhāraṇaṃ **]** : sādhārāṇaṃ प (s3). na **]** : nā ब (s3).

6 eva tat **]** प Tib: etat बदजल (βγδ) V (v7).[3] yathaitad **]** : yathaivad ज (s2). ihāpī° **]** *em.* V Tib: ihāpi बजलप (αγδ)(v10): ihāyapi द (s3, v10). °īṣṭasya **]** *em.* Tib V: iṣṭasya Ω (v10). °ābhinirvṛttau **]** बजल (γδ) Tib V: °ābhinivṛttau दप (α)(s4). trividhaṃ **]** : trividha° प (v6).[4] ceto **]** : caito प (s3).[5]

7 puruṣakārādayas **]** : puruṣakādayas ज (s4).

8 kāle **]** : kāla° द (s1). āha **]** : °ādi प (v8). pretya **]** प Tib V: pretye द (s1): pratya बजल (γδ)(s2).

9 pretyety **]** प Tib V: pretyebhy बल (γδ) (s2): pratyaty द (s2): pratyety ज (s2). cāgamād **]** : cāgamāt ज (s6).

11 evan **]** प: eva द (s4): evaṃ बजल V (o3).

Accidentals

1 dharma】 dharmma ब (o1). |】 प Tib: *om.* बद्जल (βγδ) V (p3).
2 |】 बजप: || दल V (p2).
3 bījaṃ】 *stand.* V: *vījaṃ* Ω (o4).
4 bījam】 *stand.* V: vījam बद्लप (o4): vīḥjam ज (s3). |】 प V: || बद्जल (p2). *After* tadyathā】 प Tib V: dvidaṇḍa बद्जल (p4).
5 śālibījaṃ】 *stand.* V: śālivījaṃ Ω (o4). |】 बजप V: *om.* द (p3): || ल (p2). bījaṃ】 *stand.* V: vījaṃ Ω (o4).
6 |】 बप V: || दजल (p2). *After* ihāpī°】 Tib V: | बप (p4): || दजल (p4).[6]
7 bījaṃ】 *stand.* V: vījaṃ Ω (o4). |】 बद्प: *om.* ज (p3): || ल V (p2).
8 kasmin】 बप V: kasmiṃ दजल (o3). bījasya】 *stand.* V: vījasya Ω (o4). 1st |】 प V: || बद्जल (p2). 2nd |】 प V: *om.* बज (p3): || दल (p2).
9 1st |】 बद्प Tib V: om. ज (p3): || ल (p2). 2nd |】 द्प: || बजल V (p2).
10 boddhavyaṃ】 *stand.* V: voddhavyaṃ बद्लप (o4): vodhavyaṃ ज (o4). |】 बप: || दजल V (p2).
11 dharmaṃ】 : dharmmaṃ ब (o1).

Parallels

1 yac caitat trividhaṃ ceto nirdiṣṭaṃ sa dharma ity ucyate】 de dag gi sems gaṅ yin pa de ni chos yin par ṅes par bzuṅ bar bstan to *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403): bdag ñid legs par sdom par byed pa daṅ| gźan la phan 'dogs par byed pa daṅ| byams pa'i sems gaṅ yin pa de ni chos yin no|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:220): de lta bu'i sems pa gaṅ yin pa de chos yin no|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; only partly translated in Chinese, T1566:99a_{23}:心即名法).

1-2 viparyayād adharmo yojyaḥ】 chos las bzlog pas chos ma yin pa ste *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; T1566:99a_{26} 云何名非法。違法故名爲非法).

3 tad bījaṃ phalasya】 'bras bu dag gi sa bon yin par bstan to| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986: 403): de ñid 'bras bu dag gi sa bon te *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:220): de ni sa bon yin te| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; T1566:99a_{23} 亦是種子).

4 kāraṇaṃ】 'bras bu dag gi rgyu yin no|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:220): rgyu daṅ rkyen ces bya ba'i tha tshig go| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986: 507; T1566:99a_{23} 種子者亦名因).

6-7 °īṣṭasya vipākasyābhinirvṛttau trividhaṃ ceto bhavati bījaṃ】 亦名今世後世樂果種子 *Chung lun* (T1564. 21c_{1-2}).

8 kasmin punaḥ kāle】 gaṅ du źe na| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; *om.* in Chinese). pretya ceha ca】 de ni 'jig rten 'di daṅ gźan dag tu *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403): 亦名今世後世樂果種子 *Chung lun* (T1564.21c_{1-2}): 'di daṅ gźan dag tu *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II: 220): 'di daṅ gźan du ste| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; T1566:99a_{24-25} 謂是現在未來之果).

9 adṛṣṭe janmani| iheti dṛṣṭe janmanīty arthaḥ】 tshe 'di daṅ tshe gźan dag tu myoṅ bar 'gyur ba'i dbaṅ gis so|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; T1566:99a_{24-25} 謂是現在未來之果).

Notes

[1] The visarga must have been misread as a daṇḍa.

[2] The preferred spelling śāly° is also attested by the mss below.

[3] The reading eva tat is also supported by the parallel sentence in line 4.

[4] Cf. line 1 above.

[5] Cf. line 1 above.

[6] The daṇḍa has been rejected as unnecessary.

{dvividham} bhagavatā | | ◦ | |

cetanā cetayitvā ca ***karmoktaṃ paramarṣiṇā*** | (Mmk 17.2ab) · V306

paramārthagamanād ṛṣiḥ | paramaś cāsāv ṛṣiś ceti ***paramarṣiḥ*** | sarvvākāratayā paramārthagamanāc chrāvakapratyekabuddhebhyo 'py utkṛṣṭatvāt paramarṣiḥ sambuddho bhagavān | tena · paramarṣiṇā ***cetanā***karma ल88a
cetayitvā ca karmety uktaṃ sūtre | ya·c caitad dvividhaṅ karmoktaṃ ज119a

tasyānekavidho bhedaḥ ***karmaṇaḥ parikīrttitaḥ*** | (Mmk 17.2cd)

kathaṃ kṛtvā | | ◦ | |

tatra yac cetanety uktaṃ ***karmma tan mānasaṃ smṛtam*** |

cetayitvā ca yat tūktan ***tat tu kāyikavācikaṃ*** | (Mmk 17.3)

Substantives

2 cetayitvā】 दप (α) Tib V: cetamitvā बजल (γδ)(s2). paramarṣiṇā】 दप (α) Tib V: paramārṣiṇā बजल (γδ)(s3).
3 °gamanād】 प Tib: °darśanād बदजल (βγδ) V (v8). ṛṣiḥ】 दप (α) Tib V: ṛṣṭiḥ बजल (γδ)(v9). sarvvākāratayā】 प Tib: sarvākāratayā बदल V (o1): sarvākālatayā ज (v5).
4 °gamanāc chrāvaka°】 दप (α): °gamanā chrāvaka° बजल (γδ)(v6): °gamanāt | śrāvaka° V Tib. buddhebhyo】 *stand.* V: vuddhebhyo बदजल (βγδ)(o4): vuddho-bhyo प (o4, s2). 'py】 *em.* V: pi Ω (s6). utkṛṣṭatvāt】 बदप (αβ) Tib V: utkṛṣṭatvān जल (δ)(s2).
5 bhagavān】 : bhagavavāna प (s3).[1] paramarṣiṇā】 : paraparṣitā ल (s2).
6 karmety】 बदप (αβγ) Tib V: kamety जल (δ)(s4). dvividhaṅ】 प Tib: vividhaṃ बजल (γδ) V (v4, o3): dvividhaṃ द (o3).[2]
7 tasyānekavidho】 बदप (αβ) Tib V: tasyārekavidho जल (δ)(s2).
9 cetanety】 प Tib V: caitaṃ nety ब (s3): caitena ty दज (s3): caitana ty ल (s3). tan】 : tat ज (s6). mānasaṃ smṛtam】 प Tib V: mānasa smṛte बजल (γδ)(s4, v6): mānasaṃ smṛta द (s4).[3]
10 ca】 V: tu Ω (v8).[4] kāyika°】 दलप (αβ) V: kāyikaṃ बज (γ)(v9).

Accidentals

1 dvividham】 प: dvividhaṃ बदजल V (o3). *After* dvividham】 दप V: || बल (p4): | ज (p4). || ◦ ||】 प: *om.* बदजल (p5): | V.
2 |】 प V: *om.* बज (p3): || दल (p2).
3 1st |】 बदप V: || जल (p2). 2nd |】 दप: || बजल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V.
5 *After* paramarṣiḥ】 दप Tib V: | ब (p4): || जल (p4). sambuddho】 *stand.*: saṃvuddho बदजल (o2,

o4): samvuddho प (o2): saṃbuddho V. |】 : || ल (p2).
6 |】 प: || बद्जल V (p2).
7 parikīrttitaḥ】 Ω: parikīrtitaḥ V. |】 प: || बद्जल V (p2).
8 || ◦ ||】 प: | बद् Tib V (p5): || जल (p5).
9 karmma】 बलप: karma द्ज V (o1). |】 : || ल (p2).
10 tūktan】 प: tūktaṃ बद्जल V (o3). |】 द्प Tib: *om.* बजल (p3): || V.

Parallels

1 punar api dvividham bhagavatā】 draṅ sroṅ mchog saṅs rgyas bcom ldan 'das kyis las rnams ni 'di ltar mdor bsdu ba las rnam pa gñis gsuṅs te| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:221): de ltar chos la sogs pa'i dbye bas tha dad pa de dag kyaṅ rnam pa gñis te| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986: 508; T1566. 99b$_{2\text{-}3}$ 亦有二種。其義云何。故論偈曰).

2 cetanā cetayitvā ca karmoktaṃ paramarṣiṇā】 draṅ sroṅ mchog gis las rnams ni| |sems pa daṅ ni bsam par gsuṅs *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II: 221), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:508; 1566.99b$_4$ 大仙所說業　思及思所起): 大聖說二業　思與從思生 *Chung lun* (T1564. 21c$_3$).

3 paramaś cāsāv ṛṣiś ceti paramarṣiḥ】 de ni draṅ sroṅ yaṅ yin la mchog kyaṅ yin te *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:508; *om.* T1566).

4 chrāvakapratyekabuddhebhyo 'py utkṛṣṭatvāt】 ñan thos daṅ| raṅ saṅs rgyas daṅ| byaṅ chub sems dpa' źes bya ba'i draṅ sroṅ rnams las mchog tu 'gyur ba'i phyir ro| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:508; T1566.99b$_{6\text{-}7}$ 聲聞辟支佛諸菩薩等亦名爲仙。佛於其中最尊上故。名爲大仙).

5 paramarṣiḥ sambuddho bhagavān】 draṅ sroṅ mchog saṅs rgyas bcom ldan 'das *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:221): draṅ sroṅ mchog ni bcom ldan 'das te *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:508; *om.* T1566).

5-6 tena paramarṣiṇā cetanākarma cetayitvā ca karmety uktaṃ sūtre】 大聖略說業有二種。一者思。二者從思生 *Chung lun* (T1564.21c$_5$): sems pa daṅ| bsam pa'o źes gsuṅs so|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:508; *om.* T1566).

6 yac caitad dvividhaṅ karmoktaṃ】 las rnam pa gñis su gsuṅs te *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:221): tha dad pa rnam pa gñis te| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:508; *om.* T1566): de ltar re źig las rnam pa gñis bstan to|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509).

7 tasyānekavidho bhedaḥ karmaṇaḥ parikīrttitaḥ|】 las de dag gi bye brag ni||rnam pa du mar yoṅs su bsgrags|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:404), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:221), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:508; T1566.99b$_5$ 於是二業中　無量差別說): 是業別相中 種種分別說 *Chung lun* (1564.21c$_4$).

9-10 tatra yac cetanety uktaṃ karmma tan mānasaṃ smṛtam| cetayitvā ca yat tūktan tat tu kāyikavācikaṃ|】 de la las gaṅ sems pa źes||gsuṅs pa de ni yid kyir 'dod||bsam pa źes ni gaṅ gsuṅs pa||de ni lus daṅ ṅag gi yin|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:404; HUNTINGTON *has źis in the first line instead of źes, which obviously must be a typing-mistake*), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:221), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509; T1566.99b$_{11\text{-}12}$ 如前所說思　但名爲意業　從思所起者　即是身口業): 佛所說思者　所謂意業是　所從思生者　即是身口業 *Chung lun* (1564.21c$_{7\text{-}8}$).

Notes

[1] The stroke for the long *ā* in ms प might have been added by another hand.

[2] WOGIHARA (1938:559) and DE JONG (1978b:220) both support the reading *dvividhaṃ*.

[3] In प, the anusvāra above °saṃ has mistakenly been joined with an akṣara in the line above.

[4] V's emendation is supported by Pras 307$_1$.

manasi bhavaṃ ***mānasaṃ***| · manodvāreṇ{aiva} tasya niṣṭhāgamanāt ब100b
kāya·vākpravṛttinirapekṣatvāc ca manovijñānasaṃprayuktaiva ***cetanā*** द52b
mānasaṃ karmety ucyate| ***tatra***śabdo nirddhāraṇe| yat tu dvi·tīyañ cetayitvā V307
ca karmety uktaṃ tat punaḥ kāyikaṃ vācikañ ca veditavyaṃ| evaṃ caivañ ca kāyavāgbhyāṃ pravarttiṣya ity evañ cetasā sañcintya yat kriyate tac cetayitvā karmety ucyate| tat punar dvividhaṃ kāyikaṃ vācikañ ca| kāyavācor
bhavatvāt taddvāreṇa · ca niṣṭhāgamanāt| evaṃ ca trividhaṃ kāyikam प56a
vācikaṃ mānasañ ca| etad api trividhaṃ karma punar bhidyamānaṃ saptavidhaṃ saṃjāyate| ity evan tasya karmaṇo bhagavatā bahuprakāro bhedo 'nuvarṇṇitaḥ| kathaṃ kṛtvā| | ◦ | |

Substantives

1 manodvāreṇaiva 】: manodvoreṇaiva ल (s2). tasya】 Ω Tib: *om.* V.[1] niṣṭhāgamanāt】 प Tib V: niṣṭāgamanāt बदजल (βγδ) (s2).

2 manovijñāna°】 दप (α) Tib V: manovijñānaṃ बजल (γδ)(s3). °saṃprayuktaiva】: °saṃyukta° प (v4, v7).

3 nirddhāraṇe】: nirddhāraṇo ल (v6): nirdhāraṇe V.[2] 2nd |】 *em.* Tib: *om.* Ω (p3): || V.[3]

4 karmety】 बदप (αβγ) Tib V: karmāty जल (δ)(s2). tat】 बदप (αβγ) Tib V: tan जल (δ)(s2). caivañ】 प Tib: caivaṃ बजल V (o3): caiva द (v4). 3rd ca】 लप (αγ) V: *om.* बदज (βγδ)(v7).

5 kāya°】: kārya° द (v9). pravarttiṣya】 द Tib: pravarttiṣye बजलप (s6): pravartiṣya V. cetasā】 बदप (αβ) Tib V: catasā जल (δ)(s2).

6 karmety】 जप Tib V: karmmety ब (o1): karmaty दल (s2). punar】: puna द (s4). ca】: *om.* ज (v7). kāyavācor】: kāyavāco ल (s4).

7 taddvāreṇa】 *em.* Tib V: tadvāreṇa Ω (s4). niṣṭhāgamanāt लप Tib V: niṣṭāgamanāt बदज (βγ) (s2). evaṃ】 *em.* Tib V: etac Ω (v8).[4]

8 mānasañ】 *stand.* Tib: mānasaṃ बदजल V (o3): manasañ प (s2).[5] ca】 दप (α) Tib V: cātra बज (γ)(v9): cā 'tra ल (v9). etad】 दजप (αβ) Tib V: tad बल (γ)(v4). punar】 प Tib: punaḥ punar बदजल (βγδ) V (v9). bhidyamānaṃ】: bhidyamāna° ज (v4).

9 saptavidhaṃ】: saptavidha° द (s1). saṃjāyate】: sajāyate ज (s4): saṃjāyata V. evan】 प Tib: evaṃ बदल V (o3): eva ज (v4). bahuprakāro】 *stand.* V: vahuprakāro बजलप (o4): vahuprakārā द (s2).

10 'nuvarṇṇitaḥ】 प Tib: 'nuvarttitaḥ बदज (βγδ)(v5): 'nuvartyitaḥ ल (s2): 'nuvarṇitaḥ V.[6]

Accidentals

1 |】 बदप: || जल (p2): *om.* V. *After* niṣṭhāgamanāt】 V: | बदप Tib (p4): || जल (p4).[7]

3 1st |】 दप V: || बजल (p2). dvitīyañ】 प: dvitīyaṃ बदजल V (o3).

4 *After* punaḥ】 प Tib V: | बदज (p4): || ल (p4). vācikañ】 प: vācikaṃ बदजल V (o3). |】 बदप V: || जल (p2).

5 evañ】 प: evaṃ बदजल V (o3). *After* evañ】 बदप Tib V: | ज (p4): || ल (p4). sañcintya】 प: saṃcintya बदजल V (o2). *After* kriyate】 प Tib V: | बद (p4): || जल (p4).

6 1st |】 बप: || दजल V (p2). vācikañ】 प: vācikaṃ बदजल V (o3). 2nd |】 बदप Tib: *om.* ज (p3): || ल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V.

7 |】 दप V: || बजल (p2). kāyikam】 प: kāyikaṃ बदजल V (o3).

8 |】 प Tib V: *om.* बजल (p3): || द (*blurred*)(p2). karma】 : karmma ब (o1).

9 |】 बजप Tib: || दल (p2): *om.* V. karmaṇo】 दजप V: karmmaṇo बल (o1).

10 |】 दप V: *om.* ब (p3): || जल (p2). || ◦ ||】 प: || बल (p5): | द V (p5): *om.* ज (p5).

Parallels

1 manasi bhavaṃ mānasaṃ | 】 yid kyi źes bya ba ni yid las byuṅ ba ste | *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509; *om.* T1566). manodvāreṇaiva tasya niṣṭhāgamanāt 】 yid kyi sgo kho na nas de mthar thug par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro | | *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509; 1566.99b_{14}復次此思於意門中得究竟故).

2-3 manovijñānasaṃprayuktaiva cetanā mānasaṃ karmety ucyate | 】 謂思與意相應名爲意業 *Prajñāpradīpa* (T1566,99$b_{13\text{-}14}$; *om. Tibetan*).

3 tatraśabdo nirddhāraṇe | 】 de la źes bya ba'i sgra ni dmigs kyis bsal ba'i don to | | *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509; *om.* T1566).

3-4 cetayitvā ca karmety uktaṃ 】 las gaṅ bsams pa źes gsuṅs pa *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II: 221).

5-6 evañ cetasā sañcintya yat kriyate tac cetayitvā karmety ucyate | | tat punar dvividhaṃ kāyikaṃ vācikañ ca | 】 las gaṅ bsams pa źes gsuṅs pa blos 'di bya'o sñam du gsuṅs nas lus sam ṅag gis byed pa de ni lus daṅ ṅag gi yin te gaṅ ma bsams par byas pa ni ma yin no | | *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:221): blos bsams nas byed pa gaṅ yin pa ste | de ltar las gaṅ bsam pa źes bya ba gsuṅs pa de ni lus daṅ ṅag gi yin te | *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509; *om.* T1566).

6-7 kāyavācor bhavatvāt taddvāreṇa ca niṣṭhāgamanāt | 】 lus daṅ | ṅag gi sgo nas yoṅs su rdzogs pa'i phyir ro | | *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509): lus daṅ ṅag las byuṅ ba'i phyir daṅ | de dag gi sgo ñid nas mthar thug par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro | | (ibid.; T1566.99b_{17}若於身門究竟。口門究竟者。名身業口業).

9-10 bahuprakāro bhedo 'nuvarṇṇitaḥ | kathaṃ kṛtvā | 】 ji ltar rnam pa du ma źe na | *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:510; T1566.99$b_{18\text{-}19}$云何名無量種差別耶).

Notes

[1] DE JONG (1978b:220) also adopts *tasya*.

[2] The locative case is expected as a typical lexiographical reference. in ल, a daṇḍa was possibly mistakenly attached to the ṇe-akṣara to form ṇo.

[3] The daṇḍa is syntactically required as is clearly attested by the Tibetan translation.

[4] The emendation is adopted to rend a better sense.

[5] In प, a long ā-vowel stroke has been added above the line by another hand.

[6] Although both *anuvarṇṇitaḥ* and *anuvarttitaḥ* are possible readings, the former is adopted with the support of the Tibetan translation.

[7] The daṇḍa is rejected as disturbing the syntax.

vāg viṣpando 'viratayo *yāś cāvijñaptisaṃjñitāḥ|*
avijñaptaya evānyāḥ *smṛtā viratayas tathā|| ∘ ||* (Mmk 17.4)
paribhogānvayaṃ puṇyam apuṇyañ ca tathāvidhaṃ|
cetanā ceti saptaite *dharmāḥ karmāñjanāḥ smṛtāḥ|* (Mmk 17.5)

tatra vyaktavarṇṇoccāraṇam ***vāk***| ***viṣpandaḥ*** śarīraceṣṭā| tatra kuśalā 'kuśalā vā ·vāk sarvaiva vi·ratyaviratilakṣaṇāvijñaptisamutthāpikā sāmānyena V308, ज119b vāg iti gṛhyate| evaṃ kuśalo 'kuśalo vā viratyaviratilakṣaṇāvijñaptisamutthāpako viṣpandaḥ sāmānyena gṛhyate|

yathā caiṣa vijñapter dvidhā bheda evam avijñapter api| aviratilakṣaṇā avijñaptayo viratilakṣaṇāś ceti kṛtvā| tatr***āvirati***lakṣaṇā ***avijñaptayas***

Substantives

1 'viratayo】 : 'vitarayo ज (s5). yāś】 बदप (αβγ) Tib V: vāś जल (δ)(s2). °saṃjñitāḥ】 : °saṃjñitā द (s1).
2 viratayas】 : virataḥ yas ज (s3).
3 puṇyam】 : puṇyaṃm ल (s3). apuṇyañ】 प: apuṇyaṃ बदज V (o3): apuṇya ल (s4). tathāvidhaṃ】 : tathāvidhāṃ ल (s2).
4 saptaite】 दप (α) Tib V: sapteti ब (v5): saptete जल (δ)(s2). smṛtāḥ】 : smṛtā द (s1).
5 viṣpandaḥ】 द V: niṣpandaḥ बज (v3): aniṣpandaḥ ल (v2, v3): vispandaḥ प (o4). śarīraceṣṭā】 बदल (βγ) Tib V: śarīraceṣṭāḥ जप (s3).
5-6 kuśalā 'kuśalā】 जलप: kuśalākuśalā ब V (v6): kuśalo 'kuśalo द (s1).
6 sarvaiva】 ज Tib V: tarvaiva बदल (βγ)(s2): savaiva प (s4). °lakṣaṇā°】 : °lakṣaṇāḥ ज (s1): °lakṣaṇā V. °āvijñapti°】 दपज (αβ) Tib: avijñapti° बल (γ)(v2): vijñapti° V.[1] °samutthāpikā】 : °samutthapikā ज (s2).
7 °lakṣaṇāvijñapti°】 *em.* Tib: lakṣaṇo vijñapti° Ω V (v5).[2]
7-8 °samutthāpako】 : °samutthapako ज (s2).
9 caiṣa】 दप (α): caika° बल (γ)(v5): caita° ज (s2): caitad° Tib V.[3] vijñapter】 प Tib V: vijñapte बदजल (βγδ)(s1). bheda】 दप (α) Tib V: bhede बजल (γδ)(v6). avijñapter】 : avijñaptair ब (s2).
10 °lakṣaṇāś】 : °lakṣaṇā ज (s1). ceti】 : caiti ज (s2). tatrāvirati°】 : tatra virati° ज (v2). avijñaptayas】 : avijñaptayes ल (s2): avijñaptayaḥ V.

Accidentals

1 viṣpando】 *stand.* V: vispando Ω (o4).[4] |】 बप V: || दजल (p2).
2 || ∘ ||】 प: | बद (p5): || जल Tib V (p5).
3 |】 : || ब (p2).

4 dharmāḥ】: dharmmāḥ ल (o1). karmāñjanāḥ】 दप V: karmmāñjanāḥ ब (o1): karmāṃjanāḥ जल (o2). |】 बजप: || दल V (p2).

5 °varṇṇoccāraṇam】 प: °varṇoccāraṇaṃ बल V (o1, o3): °varṇṇoccāraṇaṃ दज (o3). 1st |】 दप Tib V: *om.* बजल (p3). 2nd |】 बद Tib: || ल (p2): *om.* जप (p3).

6 *After* °lakṣaṇā】 बजल Tib V: | दप (p4).[5]

7 |】 प V: || बदजल (p2).

8 viṣpandaḥ】: vispandaḥ प (o4). *After* viṣpandaḥ】: | ब (p4). |】 बदप V: || जल (p2).

9 |】 बदप: || जल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V.

10 *After* ceti】 बदप Tib V: || जल (p4). |】 प Tib V: *om.* बदजल (p3). *After* avijñaptayas】 Ω: | V.[6]

Parallels

1-2 vāg viṣpando 'viratayo yāś cāvijñaptisaṃjñitāḥ| avijñaptaya evānyāḥ smṛtā viratayas tathā||◦||】 ṅag daṅ bskyod daṅ mi spoṅ ba'i||rnam rig byed min źes bya gaṅ||spoṅ ba'i rnam rig byed min pa||gźan dag kyaṅ ni de bźin 'dod|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986: 404), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:221), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:510; T1566.99b$_{20-21}$ 身業及口業 作與無作四 語起遠離等 皆有善不善): 身業及口業 作與無作業 如是四事中 亦善亦不善 *Chung lun* (T1564.21c$_{13-14}$).[7]

3-4 paribhogānvayaṃ puṇyam apuṇyañ ca tathāvidhaṃ| cetanā ceti saptaite dharmāḥ karmāñjanāḥ smṛtāḥ|| 】 loṅs spyod las byuṅ bsod nams daṅ|| bsod nams ma yin tshul de bźin||sems pa daṅ ni chos de bdun||las su mṅon par 'dod pa yin|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:221-222), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:510; T1566.99c$_{3-4}$ 受用自體福 罪生亦如是 及思爲七業 能了諸業相): 從用生福德 罪生亦如是 及思爲七法 能了諸業相 *Chung lun* (T1564.21c$_{15-16}$).

5 tatra vyaktavarṇṇoccāraṇaṃ vāk】 de la ṅag ces bya ba ni yi ge gsal bar brjod pa'o|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:222): de la ṅag ni yi ge gsal bar brjod pa'o|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:510; T1566.99b$_{22}$ 語起者。謂以文字了了出言。名爲語起). viṣpandaḥ śarīraceṣṭāḥ|】 bskyod pa źes bya ba ni lus kyi g-yo ba rnam pa gsum mo|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986: 405): bskyod pa ni lus g-yo ba ste| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:222): bskyod pa ni lus g-yo ba'o|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:510; T1566.99b$_{23}$ 云何名遠離。謂運動身手等).

Notes

[1] V's interpretation yielding *vijñapti°* without a negation does not seem to be correct.

[2] The Tibetan translation clearly attests a compound. Eventually the mss can also be emended as *°lakṣaṇo 'vijñapti°* (o4). This, however, would make *°lakṣaṇo* an attribute of *viṣpandaḥ,* which is not entirely impossible. *°Lakṣaṇa* as an attribute of *°avijñapti°* is, moreover, supported by the root-verse (Mmk 17.4).

[3] DE JONG (1978.II:220) also adopts the reading of द.

[4] Below (307$_{10}$, 308$_{2}$) the mss other than प attest the retroflex sibilant.

[5] A daṇḍa would be syntactically disturbing. The daṇḍa and the visarga in ms ज after *°lakṣaṇā°* could possibly indicate an earlier avagraha thus yielding *'vijñapti°.* Cf. also note on *°lakṣaṇāvijñapti°* in the following line.

[6] The daṇḍa is, however, supported by the parallel sentence in line 6 on the next page *("yathā caitās...")*, where mss जप attest a daṇḍa after *avijñaptayaḥ*.

[7] Could Kumārajīva when translating *Chung lun* possibly have read *yāś ca vijñapti°* in pāda b thus causing him to translate "vijñapti (tso 作) and avijñapti (wu-tso 無作)"?

tadyathā ’dyaprabhṛti mayā prāṇinaṃ hatvā cauryaṅ kṛtvā jīvi·kā parikalpa- ल88b
yi·tavyeti | pāpakarmābhyupagamakṣaṇāt prabhṛti tadakāriṇo ’py akuśala- ब101a
karmābhyupagamahetukāḥ satatasamitam ***avijñaptayaḥ*** samupajāyante |
kaivarttādīnāñ ca jālādiparikarmakālāt prabhṛti tadakāriṇām api ***yā*** avijñap-
taya upajāyante tā etā ***avirati***lakṣaṇā {***avijñaptaya***} ity ucyante | yathā caitās
tathā ’nyā viratilakṣaṇāḥ kuśalasvabhāvā ***avijñaptayaḥ*** | tadyathā ’dyapra-
bhṛti prāṇātipātādibhyaḥ prativiramāmīti kāyavāgvijñaptiparisamāptikā-
lakṣaṇāt prabhṛti taduttarakālaṃ pramattādyavasthasyāpi yāḥ kuśalopacaya-
svabhāvā avijñaptaya upajāyante | tā etā viratilakṣaṇā avijñaptaya ity ucyante | · V309
tā etā evaṃ rūpakriyāsvabhāvā api satyo vijñaptivat parān na vijñapayantīty · ज120a
avijñaptayaḥ |

tathā ***paribhogānvayaṃ puṇyaṃ*** kuśalam ity arthaḥ | paribhogenānva-

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Substantives

1 cauryaṅ】 प Tib: cāryaṃ ब (v5): corya द (s2, s4): coryaṃ जल (δ)(s): cauryaṃ V.

2 pāpa°】 : papa° द (s2). °upagama°】 : °upama° प (s4). ’py】 *stand.* Tib V: pi बजलप (o4): *om.* द (v7).

2-3 akuśalakarmā°】 : akuśalagakarmā° ल (s3)

3 avijñaptayaḥ】 : avijñeptayaḥ ल (s2).

4-5 avijñaptaya】 बदप (αβ) Tib V: avijñaya जल (δ)(s4).

5 etā: eva प (v8).[1] avirati°】 : avirata° प (s2). {avijñaptaya}】 दप (α) V: avijñeya बजल (γδ)(v8). ucyante】 बद V: ucyaṃte जल (o2): ucyate प (s7).

6 tathā ’nyā】 प Tib: tathānyā द V (o4): tathānyo बजल (γδ)(s1). viratilakṣaṇāḥ】 : viratilakṣaṇātha द (s3). kuśalasvabhāvā】 : kuśalasvabhāvāḥ प (s6). avijñaptayaḥ】 ज प (α) Tib V: avijñāptayas बदल (s2, v10).

7 prāṇātipātādibhyaḥ】 बदल (βγ) Tib V: prāṇādipātādibhyaḥ ज (s2): prāṇitipātādibhyaḥ प (s2). prativiramāmīti】 द Tib V: prativiramānīti ब (s2): pativiramānīti जल (δ)(s2, s4): pradiviramāmīti प (s2). kāya°】 : kāyā° द (s2).

8 °uttarakālaṃ】 : °urakālaṃ ब (s4).[2]

9 viratilakṣaṇā】 प Tib V: vinetilakṣaṇā ब (s2): vinatilakṣaṇā द[3] (v5): vinetilakṣaṇo जल (δ)(s1, s2). avijñaptaya】 : avijñaye ज (s1, s4). ity ucyante】 : ucyaṃte iti ब (o2, v11).

10 tā】 प: *om.* बदजल Tib V (v7). evaṃ】 प:

om. बद्जल Tib V (v7). vijñapayantīty】 *em.*: vijñapayantīti बद्जप (s6): vijñāpayantīty ल V (o4).[4] (βγ) Tib V: *om.* ज (v7): ta⌊th⌋[10]lam i⌊ty⌋[3]ribhogenā[2]⌊o 'sye⌋[1]i[1]ribhogānvayaṃ| प.[5]

12-1 tathā …'syeti paribhogānvayaṃ|】 बद्ल

Accidentals

1 *After* tadyathā】 : || ज (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V. 'dyaprabhṛti】 : adyaprabhṛti ब V (o4).

2 |】 बजप: || द्जल (p4): *om.* V. °karmā°】 : °karmmā° ल (o1).

3 *After* °hetukāḥ】 : | प (p4). |】 बद्प V: || जल (p2).

4 kaivarttādīnāñ】 प: kaivarttādīnāṃ बद्जल (o3): kaivartādīnāṃ V.

5 upajāyante】 : upajāyaṃte ब (o2). *After* upajāyante】 Ω: ardhadaṇḍa V. |】 प: || बद्जल V (p2).

6 *After* viratilakṣaṇāḥ】 द्प Tib V: || बजल (p4). |】 जप Tib V: *om.* बद्ल (p3). *After* tadyathā】 : || ज (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V.[6] 'dya°】 : adya° ज V (o4).

7 *After* prativiramāmīti】 प Tib V: | ब (p4): || द्जल (p4).

8 *After* °lakṣaṇāt】 लप Tib V: | ब (p4): || द्ज (p4).

9 *After* °svabhāvā】 : || द् (p4). 1st |】 प: || बद्जल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V. 2nd |】 प: || द्जल V (p2): *om.* ब (p3).

10 *After* vijñapayantīty】 : || ज (p4).

11 |】 द्प: || बजल V (p2).

12 |】 ब Tib: *om.* द्ल (p3): ardhadaṇḍa V.

Parallels

10-11 tā etā evam rūpakriyāsvabhāvā api satyo vijñaptivat parān na vijñāpayantīty avijñaptayaḥ|】 rnam par rig byed ma yin pa źes bya ba ni| gzugs daṅ bya ba'i ṅo bo ñid yin du zin kyaṅ rnam par rig byed bźin du gźan la rnam par rig par mi byed pa'i phyir ro|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:511; T1566.$99b_{29}$-$99c_{1}$, only partially corresponding to the Tibetan translation, 云何名作無作色。以身口色令他解者名爲作色。不以身口色令他解者名無作色).

12 puṇyaṃ kuśalam ity arthaḥ|】 bsod nams źes bya ba ni dag par byed pas bsod nams te| dge ba źes bya ba dag gi rnam graṅs so|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:511; *om.* T1566).

Notes

[1] Tib is inconclusive. The parallel sentence at Pras 308_{12} indicates *tā etā* to be correct.

[2] The anusvāra in ms द् may have been added by another hand.

[3] In द्, the word has been corrected to *vilatilakṣaṇa* by another hand.

[4] The emendation consists of the reading बद्जप with a correction of the external sandhi.

[5] The sizes of the lacunae in प correspond to the paradosis of the other mss. In ms ज, the omitted reading from *paribhogenānvayo* onwards is inserted from the next line of the folio with appropriate markings by the same hand.

[6] Cf. also after *tadyathā* in line 1.

yo 'syeti paribhogā·nvayaṃ | paribhogaḥ parityaktasya vastunaḥ saṅghādibhir V310
upabhogaḥ | anvayo 'nugamo dāyakasantānajaḥ kuśalopacaya ity arthaḥ |
apuṇyañ ca tathāvidhaṃ paribhogānvayam ity arthaḥ | tadyathā devakulādi-
pratiṣṭhāpanaṃ yatra · sattvā hanyante | yathā yathā hi tatkīrttau prāṇino द53a
hanyante tathā tathā taddevakulādyupabhogāt tatkarttṝṇāṃ santāne pari-
bhogānvayam apuṇyam upajāyate | ity evam ***apu·ṇyañ ca tathāvidhaṃ*** प56b
bhavati | · V311

cittābhisaṃskāramanaskarmalakṣaṇā · ***cetanā ceti*** | ब101b

saṃkṣepeṇaitat saptavidhaṃ karma bhavati | kuśalākuśalā vāk | {kuśa-
lākuśalo} vispandaḥ | kuśalam avijñaptilakṣaṇam | akuśalam avijñaptilakṣa-

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Substantives

1 paribhogenānvayo 】 बजल (βγ) Tib V: paribhoganānvayo द (s2). paribhogaḥ… dāyakasantānajaḥ 】 *om.* ज *and then inserted from the next line of the folio with appropriate markings by the same hand.* vastunaḥ 】 : vaṣtunaḥ ल (s2).

2 dāyaka° 】 : [1]ka प (*lacuna*).

3 tadyathā…°bhogāt (*line 4*) 】 [41]devakulādyupabhogāt प.[1]

4 pratiṣṭhāpanaṃ 】 बजल (γδ) Tib V: pratiṣṭāpanaṃ द (s2).

5 tatkarttṝṇāṃ 】 *em.* Tib V: tatkartṛṇāṃ बदजल (o1, s2): tatkarttṛṇāṃ प (s2).[2]

6 upajāyate…apuṇyañ 】 upa[7]ṇyañ प (*lacuna*).[3] upajāyate 】 द Tib: api jāyate बजल (γδ): upa[-] प: api jāyata V.[4] apuṇyañ 】 *em.*: apuṇyaṃ बदजल V: [-]ṇyañ प.[5]

8 °saṃskāra° 】 : °saṃskārā प (s1).[6] °karma° 】 दलप Tib V: °karmmaḥ ब (o1): °karmaḥ ज (s3). °lakṣaṇā 】 दप (α) Tib V: °kṣaṇā बज (γ)(v4): °nakṣaṇā ल (s2).

9 karma 】 : *om.* प (v7). kuśalākuśalā… smṛtāḥ (*next page, line 2*) 】 [40] ⌊ptilakṣa⌋ṇam | paribhogānvayam puṇ-yaṃ | ⌊paribhogā⌋[22]ktāḥ karmalakṣaṇāḥ smṛtāḥ | प (*lacunae*).

9-10 kuśalākuśalo 】 *em.* Tib V: kuśalākuśalā बदज (βγ)(s1): kuśalākuśalya ल (s2).

10 vispandaḥ 】 बदजल: viṣpandaḥ V. 1st °lakṣaṇam 】 *em.*: lakṣaṇaṃ बदजल (βγδ) V (o3).[7]

Accidentals

1 | 】 दप Tib: *om.* बजल (p3): ardhadaṇḍa V. saṅghādibhir 】 प: saṃghādibhir बदजल V (o2).

2 | 】 : || ल (p2). 'nugamo 】 : anugamo ज (o4). °santānajaḥ 】 प: °saṃtānajaḥ बदजल V (o2). 2nd | 】 बदप: || जल V (p2).

3 apuṇyañ 】 प: apuṇyaṃ बदजल V (o3). | 】 प V: || बदजल (p2). *After* tadyathā 】 बद Tib V: || जल

(p4).
4 *After* pratiṣṭhāpanaṃ】 ब Tib V: | द (p4): || जल (p4). sattvā】 *stand.* V: satvā बदजल (o4). hanyante】 बदल V: hanyaṃte ज (o2). |】 ब Tib V: || दजल (p2). tatkīrttau】 बदजल: tatkīrtau V.
5 santāne】 जलप: saṃtāne बद V (o2).
6 |】 बद Tib: || जल (p2): *om.* V.
7 |】 बप: || दजल V (p2).
8 *After* °karma°】 दलप Tib V: | ब (p4): || ज (p4). |】 : || ल V (p2).
9 1st |】 बद V: || जल (p2). 2nd |】 बद: *om.* ज (p3): || ल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V.
10 1st |】 ब: || दजल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V. 2nd |】 ज: || बल (p2): *om.* द (p3): ardhadaṇḍa V.
10-1 °lakṣaṇam】 प: °lakṣaṇaṃ बदजल V (o3).

Parallels

1-2 paribhogaḥ parityaktasya vastunaḥ saṅghādibhir upabhogaḥ|】: yoṅs su loṅs spyod pa źes bya ba ni dkon mchog gsum gyi yul la dṅos po yoṅs su btaṅ ba ñe bar spyod pa'o|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:511; T1566.99$c_{5\text{-}6}$ 云何名受用自體。謂檀越所捨房舍園林衣服飲食臥具湯藥資身具等; slightly differently in T1566 with an added list of articles to be donated).

2 anvayo 'nugamo】: rgyu las byuṅ ba źes bya ba ni| rjes su 'gro ba *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:222): de'i rgyu las byuṅ ba źes bya ba ni de'i rjes las byuṅ ba ste| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:511; *om.* T1566).

3 apuṇyañ ca tathāvidhaṃ paribhogānvayam ity arthaḥ|】: bsod nams ma yin tshul de bzhin źes bya ba ni yoṅs su loṅs spyod pa'i rgyu las byuṅ ba źes bya ba'i tha tshig go| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405): loṅs spyod pa las byuṅ ba'i bsod nams ma yin pa yaṅ tshul de bźin no|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:222): loṅs spyod pa las byuṅ ba'i bsod nams ma yin pa yaṅ tshul de bźin te| yoṅs su loṅs spyod pa'i rgyu las byuṅ źes bya ba'i tha tshig go| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:511; *om.*T1566).

8 cittābhisaṃskāramanaskarmalakṣaṇā cetanā ceti|】: sems pa źes bya ba ni mṅon par 'du byed pa źes bya ba'i tha tshig go| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405-406): sems pa źes bya ba ni sems mṅon par 'du byed pa'o|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II: 222): sems pa źes bya bas ni yid kyi las bstan te| 'o na sems pa źes bya ba de gaṅ yin źe na| yon tan daṅ skyon las sems mṅon par 'du byed pa ste yid kyi las so|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:511; T1566.99$c_{11\text{-}13}$ 次解思義。以何法故。名之爲思。謂功德與過惡。及非功德與過惡。起心所作意業者名思). *The underlined ablative particle in Prajñāpradīpa may appear difficult, but is supported by the Chinese translation, which takes *guṇa and *doṣa as those factors that arouse (ch'i* 起*) the mind; thus, it here indicates cause (cf. HAHN, 1996:111).*

Notes

[1] The size of the lacuna corresponds nearly to the 39 akṣaras attested by the other mss.

[2] The genitive plural form of *kartṛ* requires a long *ṝ*-vowel and not a short *ṛ* as attested by all the mss, and hence the reading has been emended. Further, the geminated form attested by ms प has been adopted.

[3] The size of the lacuna corresponds approximately to the 8 akṣaras attested by the other mss.

[4] DE JONG (1978:220) also adopts the reading of द.

[5] The emendation combines the readings of बदजल and प.

[6] Tib could possibly attest *°saṃskāro.*

[7] The emendation follows the reading of the 2nd *°lakṣaṇam* in ms प.

ṇam| paribhogānvayam puṇyaṃ| paribhogānvayam apuṇyaṃ| cetanā ceti||

ete ca ***sapta dharmāḥ karmā·ñjanāḥ*** karmatvenābhivyaktāḥ karma- ल89a

lakṣaṇāḥ ***smṛtāḥ***|

atraike paricodayanti| yad etat karma bahuvidham uktaṃ| tat kim āvipākakālam avatiṣṭhate 'tha na tiṣṭhati| utpattyanantaravināśitvāt| yadi tāvat|| ∘ ||

tiṣṭhaty ā pākakālāc cet karmma tan nityatām iyāt|
niruddhaṃ cen niruddhaṃ sat kim phalaṃ janayiṣyati| (Mmk 17.6)

yady utpannaṃ sat ***ka·rmāvipākakālaṃ*** svarūpeṇ***āvatiṣṭhata*** iti parikalpyate ज120b

tad iyantaṃ kālam asya ***nityatā***padyate vināśarahitatvāt| paścād vināśasadbhāvān na nityatvam iti cet| naitad evaṃ| pūrvam vināśarahitasyākāśādivat paścād api vināśena sambandhābhāvāt| vināśarahitasya cāsaṃskṛtatva-

Substantives

3 smṛtāḥ】: smṛtīḥ द (s3).
4 atraike】 बजप (αγ) Tib V: atrake द (s2): atraika ल (s2).
4-5 āvipākakālam】 प: ā vipākakālād द V (v6): ovipākakārād बजल (γδ)(s2, v6).
5 avatiṣṭhate】 दप (α) V: avatisthate बजल (γδ)(s2). 'tha】: *om.* द (v7). tiṣṭhati】 बज (γδ): tiṣṭati दल (s2): ⌊tiṣṭhati⌋ प: tiṣṭhaty V. utpattya°…ā pākakālāc (*line 5*)】: ⌊utpattya⌋[1] ⌊taravi⌋nāśitvāt[8]⌊tiṣṭhaty ā⌋pākakālāc प (*lacunae*). °vināśitvāt】 बदप (αβ) Tib V: °vināśitvāta जल (δ)(s4).
6 tan】: *om* द (v7). nityatām】: ityatām द (s4).
7 cen】: ce द (s4).
8 yady utpannaṃ sat karmāvipākakālaṃ】: yady utpa[5]pākakālaṃ प (*lacuna*).[1] °kālaṃ】: °kāla° ल (s4). parikalpyate】: parikalpate द (v1).
10 cet】 प Tib: cen बदजल V (v10). pūrvam】 प: pūrvaṃ बल V (o3): pūrva° दज (v6).
11 vināśena】: vināśenaṃ ज (s5).[2] sambandhābhāvāt】 *stand.:* saṃvaṃdhābhāvāt ब (o2, o4): savandhābhāvāt दजल (s4, o4), samvandhābhāvāt प (o4): saṃbandhābhāvāt V.

Accidentals

1 1st |】 दप: *om.* बजल (p3): ardhadaṇḍa V. 1st paribhogānvayam】 प: paribhogānvayaṃ बदजल V (o3). 2nd |】 दजप: *om.* ब (p3): || ल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V. 3rd |】 दज: || बल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V. ||】 द V: *om.* बजल (p3).

2 karmāñjanāḥ】 बद्ज V: karmaṃjanāḥ ज (o2): karmmāñjanāḥ ल (ȯ1). *After* karmāñjanāḥ】 बद् Tib V: | ज (p4): || ल (p4).

3 |】 द्प: || बजल V (p2).

4 1st |】 : || ल V (p2). bahuvidham】 *stand.* V: vahuvidham Ω (o4). 2nd |】 बद्: || जल (p2): *om.* Tib V.

5 *After* avatiṣṭhate】 : | प Tib (p4). 1st |】 बद् Tib: || जल (p2): *om.* V. 2nd |】 *em.* Tib V: *om.* बद्जल (p3). || ◦ ||】 *em.*: *om.* बद्जल (p5): ardhadaṇḍa V: | Tib.[3]

6 karmma】 प: karma बद्जल V (o1). |】 बप V: || द्जल (p2).

7 kim】 प: kiṃ बद्जल V (o3). |】 बजप: *om.* द् (p3): || ल V (p2).

8 *After* iti】 : | प (p4).

9 |】 बद्प V: || जल (p2).

10 1st |】 प Tib: *om.* बद्जल V (p3). 2nd |】 बद् Tib: || जल (p2): *om.* प (p3): ardhadaṇḍa V. *After* °ākāśādivat】 प Tib V: | ब (p4): || द्जल (p4).

11 |】 ब Tib V: *om.* द्प (p3): || जल (p2).

Parallels

2-3 ete ca sapta dharmāḥ karmāñjanāḥ karmatvenābhivyaktāḥ karmalakṣaṇāḥ smṛtāḥ |】 chos de bdun ni las su mṅon par 'dod pa yin no | | *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:406): 是七種即是分別業相 *Chung lun* (T1564.22a$_3$): chos bdun po de dag ni las su mṅon pa daṅ las kyi miṅ can daṅ | las kyi mtshan ñid dag tu 'dod pa yin no | | *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:223): las su mṅon par 'dod pa yin źes bya ba ni las kyi mtshan ñid dag tu 'dod pa yin no | | *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:511; T1566.99c$_{13}$ 彼論如是以七種業說爲業相).

4-5 atraike paricodayanti | yad etat karma bahuvidham uktaṃ | tat kim āvipākakālam avatiṣṭhate | 'tha na tiṣṭhati | utpattyanantaravināśitvāt | yadi tāvat】 'dir bśad pa | 'di la las de skyes nas smin pa'i dus kyi bar du gnas pa'am | skyes nas 'jig par 'gyur ba źig graṅ na | de la re źig | *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:512; T1566.99c$_{18-21}$ 論者言。今此業者。爲一起已乃至受果已來恒住耶。爲一剎那起已即滅耶。是皆不然。其過如論偈說).

6-7 tiṣṭhaty ā pākakālāc cet karmma tan nityatām iyāt | niruddhaṃ cen niruddhaṃ sat kim phalaṃ janayiṣyati |】 gal te smin pa'i dus bar du | |gnas na las de rtag par 'gyur | |gal te 'gags na 'gags gyur pa | |ji ltar 'bras bu bskyed par 'gyur | | *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:406),[4] *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:223), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986512-513; T1566.99c$_{22-23}$ 若住至受果 此業即爲常 業若滅去者 滅已誰生果): 業住至受報 是業即爲常 若滅即無業 云何生果報 *Chung lun* (T1564.22a$_{6-7}$).

8-9 yady utpannaṃ sat karmāvipākakālaṃ svarūpeṇāvatiṣṭhata iti parikalpyate tad iyantaṃ kālam asya nityatāpadyate vināśarahitatvāt |】 re źig gal te las smin pa'i dus kyi bar du gnas na | de lta na rtag par 'gyur bas de ni mi 'dod do | | *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:406): 業若住至受果報。即爲是常。是事不然 *Chung lun* (T1564.22a$_8$): re źig gal te las smin pa'i dus kyi bar du gnas pa de bźin du dus gźan du yaṅ gnas par 'gyur bas rtag par 'gyur te | *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:223).

Notes

[1] The lacuna corresponds to the paradosis of the other mss.

[2] In ज, the anusvāra has been transported from the following syllable.

[3] The emendation is based on the standard daṇḍa-usage in प.

[4] HUNTINGTON adopts the reading *'gag na 'gag gyur pas* of D against the better reading *'gags na and gyur pa* attested by QN.

prasaṅgāt | asaṃskṛtānāñ ca vipākādarśanāt | avipākatvena sadaivāvasthānān nityatābhyupagama eva karmaṇām āpadyate | ity evaṃ tāvan nityatvadoṣaḥ | athotpādānantaravināśitvam eva karmaṇām abhyupeyate | nanv evaṃ sati

niruddhañ cen niruddhaṃ sat kiṃ phalañ janayiṣyati | (Mmk 17.6cd)

abhāvībhūtaṃ sat karmmāvidyamānasvabhāvatvān naiva ***phalaṃ janayiṣyatī***ty abhiprāyaḥ | · V312

atraike nikāyā·ntarīyāḥ parihāraṃ varṇṇayanti | utpattyanantaravināśi- ब102a
tvāt saṃskārāṇāṃ nityatvadoṣas tāvad asmākaṃ nāpadyate | yac cāpy uktaṃ

niruddhañ cen niruddhaṃ sat kiṃ phalañ janayiṣyatīty (Mmk 17.6cd)

atrāpi parihāram brūmaḥ || ◦ ||

yo 'ṅkuraprabhṛtir bījāt saṃtāno 'bhipravarttate |

Substantives

1 °prasaṅgāt] बप Tib: °prasaṃgāt दल (o2): °prasaṃgād ज (o2, v10): °prasaṅgād V. vipākādarśanāt] : vipāko darśanāt ब (s2): vipākādarśanād V.

1-2 sadaivāvasthānān] प Tib V[1]: sadaivāsthānāt बदल (βγδ)(s6): sadaivāsthanāt ज (s2, s6).

2 nityatābhyupagama] बजप (αγ) Tib V: mityatābhyupagama द (s2): nityatātyupagama ल (s2). karmaṇām āpadyate] दप (α) Tib: karmaṇā nopapadyate बजल (γδ)(v9): karmaṇām upapadyate V.[2]

2-3 nityatvadoṣaḥ] *em.* Tib: nityatve doṣaḥ Ω V (v6).[3]

3 athotpādā°] : athopādā° ज (s4). karmaṇām] दजल (βγδ) Tib V: kamarṇām ब (s5): karmāṇām प (s2). *After* karmaṇām] प Tib: evam बदजल (βγδ) V (v9). abhyupeyate] *em.* Tib: abhyupetaṃ बद (β) V (v1): atyupetaṃ जल (δ)(s2): abhyupeyati प (s7).[4]

4 sati] : śati प (s2).

6 abhāvībhūtaṃ] : abhāvībhūta° ब (s4). °svabhāvatvān] : °svabhāvatvām ज (s6): *om.* Tib. naiva...nityatvadoṣas (*line 8*)] *om.* ज (v7).

8 atraike] प Tib: tatraike बदल V (v8). utpatty°] बद Tib V: utpasty° ल (s2): utpaty° प (o4). °anantara°] बप Tib V: °anantarī° द (s2): °aṃnantara° ल (s3).

9 saṃskārāṇāṃ] : saṃskārāṇām V. nitya-

tvadoṣas】 : anityatvadoṣas V.[5] nāpadyate】 *em.* Tib: nopapadyate Ω (v8).[6]
10 cen】 प Tib V: cin वजल (γδ)(s2): ce द (s3). °īty】 दप (α): °īti वजल (γδ) V (v10).
11 brūmaḥ】 *stand.* Tib V: vrūmaḥ वदजप (o4): kramaḥ ल (v8).
12 yo】 : yā द (s2). 'ṅkura°】 दप (α) Tib V: 'kula° वजल (γδ)(s2, s4). °prabhṛtir】 द Tib V: °prabhṛtivījā na prabhṛti वल (γδ) (s3, s4): °prabhṛtijānaprabhṛti ज (s3, s4): °prabhṛti° प (s4). saṃtāno 'bhipravarttate】 *stand.* Tib: saṃtānātipravarttate व (s2): saṃtāno bhipravarttate दप (o4): satānātipravarttate जल (δ)(s2, s4): saṃtāno 'bhipravartate V.

Accidentals

1 1st |】 वदप Tib: *om.* ज V (p3): || ल (p2). asaṃskṛtānāñ】 प: asaṃskṛtānāṃ वदजल V (o3). 2nd |】 वदप Tib: || ज (p2): *om.* ल V (p3).
2 |】 वदप V: || जल (p2). evaṃ】 : evan ज (o3).
3 1st |】 जप: || वदल V (p2). °vināśitvam】 वद V: °vināsitvam जलप (o4). 2nd |】 *em.* Tib V: *om.* Ω (p3).
4 *After* sati】 Ω: | Tib V.
5 niruddhañ】 प: niruddhaṃ वदजल V (o3). palañ】 प: phalaṃ वदजल V (o3). |】 दजप V: || दल (p2).
6 °karmmā°】 प: °karmā° वदजल V (o1).
7 |】 प: || वल V (p2): *om.* द (p3).
8 varṇṇayanti】 दप: varṇayanti वल V (o2). |】 वद Tib V: || ल (p2): *om.* प (p3).
8-9 °vināśitvāt】 वदल Tib V: °vināsitvāt प (o4).
9 |】 वदप V: || जल (p2). *After* uktaṃ】 Ω: ardhadaṇḍa V.
10 niruddhañ】 प: niruddhaṃ वदजल V (o3). phalañ】 प: phalaṃ वदजल V (o3). *After* °īty】 दप: | वल V (p4): || ज (p4).
11 parihāram】 प: parihāraṃ वदजल V (o3). || ◦ ||】 प: | व V (p5): || दजल (p5).
12 bījāt】 *stand.* V: vījāt Ω (o4). |】 : || ल (p2).

Parallels

5 niruddhañ cen niruddhaṃ sat kiṃ phalañ janayiṣyati |】 *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:223) *also quotes pāda cd of the mūla-text at this point, although he did not quote pāda cd above together with pāda ab as in Pras.*
12-1 yo 'ṅkuraprabhṛtir bījāt saṃtāno 'bhipravartate | tataḥ phalam ṛte bījāt sa ca nābhipravartate |】 myu gu la sogs rgyun gaṅ ni | |sa bon las ni mṅon par 'byuṅ | |de las 'bras bu sa bon ni | |med na de yaṅ 'byung mi 'gyur | | *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:407), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:224), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:514; T1564.110a$_{16-17}$ 如芽等相續 而從種子生 由是而生果 離種無相續): 如芽等相續 皆從種子生 從是而生果 離種無相續 *Chung lun* (T1564.21a$_{11-12}$).

Notes

[1] V has the *va*-akṣara in brackets.

[2] DE JONG (1978b:220) also adopts the reading of द.

[3] The emendation is suggested by DE JONG (1978b:221) on the basis of the Tibetan translation and the parallel sentence at Pras 312_2.

[4] The emendation is based on the reading of ms प.

[5] DE JONG (1978b:221) also adopts the reading of द.

[6] The emendation is suggested by DE JONG (ibid.).

tataḥ phalam ṛte bījāt ***sa ca nābhipravarttate***| (Mmk 17.7)

iha bījaṃ kṣaṇikam api sat svajātīyabhāviphalaviśeṣaniṣpattisāmarthya{viśeṣa}yuktasyaiva santānasyāṅkurakāṇḍanālapattrādyabhidhānasya hetubhāvam abhyupagamya · nirudhyate| ***yaś*** cāyam ***aṅkuraprabhṛtir bījāt*** ल89b ***santānaḥ pravarttate*** tasmāt krameṇa sahakārikā·raṇāvaikalye sati svalpād ज121a api hetor vipula***phala***pracaya upajāyate| ***ṛte bījād*** vinā bījāt ***sa cā***ṅkurādisantāno ***nābhipravarttate***| tad evaṃ tadbhāve bhāvitvena tadabhāve cābhāvitvena bījahetukatvam aṅkurādisantānasya phalasyopadarśitaṃ bhavati| |tad evaṃ| | ◦ | | · V313

bījāc ca yasmāt santānaḥ ***santānā·c ca phalodbhavaḥ***| द53b

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Substantives

1 nābhipravarttate】: nobhipravarttate द (s2): nābhipravartate V.
2 sat】: *om.* प (v7). svajātīya°】: sajātīya° प (v4). °bhāvi°】: °vi° ज (s4).
3 °kāṇḍa°】: °kāṇu° ज (s2). °pattrādy°】 *stand.* V: °patrādy° बदजल Tib (o4): °patrā° प (o4, v4).
4 °bhāvam】: °bhāvim प (s3). abhy°】 दप (α) Tib: apy बजल (γδ) V (v5).[1] aṅkura°】 प Tib V: aṃkura° बदज (o2): aṃkula° ल (o2, s2). °prabhṛtir】 बदल (βγδ) Tib V: °prabhṛti° जप (s4). bījāt】 *stand.* Tib V: vījān बदजल (04, s2): vījāt प (o4).
6 hetor】 ब Tib V: heto दजलप (s4). vipula°】: vipulaḥ प (v6). ṛte】: mṛte ब (v9).
6-7 sa cāṅkurādisantāno】 प Tib: sa cāṃkurā hi santāno ब (o2, s2): sa cāṃkurādisaṃtāno द (o2): saṃcākurād dhi santāno ज (02, s3): sa cāṃkurā hi saṃtāro ल (o2, s2): sa cāṅkurādisaṃtāno V.
7 evaṃ】: eva ब (v4). tadbhāve】 *em.* Tib V: tadbhāvi° बजल (γδ)(v6): tadbhāva° दप (α) (v6).[2] tadabhāve】: dabhāve ज (s4).
8 phalasyopadarśitam】 प Tib V: phalasyodarśitaṃ बजल (γδ)(s4): phalasyāpa-darśitaṃ द (s2).[3]
9 evaṃ】: eva ब (v4).
10 phalodbhavaḥ】: phalodbhavo ब (v10).

Accidentals

1 bījāt】 *stand.* V: vījāt Ω (o4). |】 बप: || दजल V (p2).
2 bījaṃ】 *stand.* V: vījaṃ Ω (o4).
3 santānasyāṅkura°】 प: saṃtānasyāṃkura° बदल (o2): santānāsyāṃkura° ज (o2): saṃtānasyāṅkura° V.

4 |】 बप Tib V: || द (p2): *om.* जल (p3).

5 santānaḥ】 प: saṃtānaḥ बदजल V (o2). pravarttate】 Ω: pravartate V. *After* pravarttate】 प Tib: | बद (p4): || जल (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V. *After* tasmāt】 : | ल (p4).

6 |】 प: || बदजल V (p2). bījād】 *stand.* V: vījād Ω (o4). bījāt】 *stand.* V: vījāt Ω (o4). *After* bījāt】 प Tib V: | बद (p4): || जल (p4).

7 °pravarttate】 Ω: °pravartate V.

7-8 *After* cābhāvitvena】 दजप V: ardhadaṇḍa बल (p4).

8 bīja°】 *stand.* V: vīja° Ω (o4). aṅkurādi°】 प V: aṃkurādi° बदजल (o2). °santānasya】 : °saṃtānasya ब V (o2). ||】 : | ब V (p1).

9 || ◦ ||】 प: *om.* बदजल (p5): | V.

10 bījāc】 *stand.* Tib V: vījāc Ω (o4). santānaḥ】 : saṃtānaḥ ब V (o2). santānāc】 : saṃtānāc ब V (o2). |】 दप V: *om.* ब (p3): || जल (p2).

Parallels

2-6 iha bījaṃ … santānasyāṅkura kāṇḍanālapattrādy abhidhānasya hetubhāvam abhyupagamya nirudhyate| yaś cāyam aṅkuraprabhṛtir bījāt santānaḥ pravarttate tasmāt krameṇa sahakārikāraṇāvaikalye sati svalpād api hetor vipulaphalapracaya upajāyate|】 'di la sa bon ni myu gu'i rgyun bskyed nas 'gag go| myu gu la sogs pa'i rgyun gaṅ yin pa de ni sa bon las mṅon par 'byuṅ źiṅ rgyun de las 'bras bu mṅon par 'byuṅ ṅo| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:407), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:224): 如從穀有芽。從芽有莖葉等相續。從是相續而有果生 *Chung lun* (T1564.22a$_{19-20}$): myu gu daṅ| 'dab ma daṅ| sdoṅ bu daṅ| sbu gu daṅ| sñe ma daṅ| sbun pa daṅ| gra ma daṅ| srus daṅ| 'bras thug po che la sogs pa'i mtshan ñid kyi rgyun gaṅ yin pa de ni sa bon 'gags pa las mṅon par 'byuṅ źiṅ rgyun de las 'bras bu mṅon par 'byuṅ ṅo|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:514-515; T1566.100a$_{18-19}$ 此謂從芽生莖。乃至枝葉花果等各有其相。種子雖滅由起相續展轉至果).

6-7 ṛte bījād vinā bījāt sa cāṅkurādisantāno nābhipravarttate】 sa bon med na myu gu la sogs pa'i rgyun de yaṅ mṅon par 'byuṅ bar mi 'gyur ro| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:407), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:224): 離種無相續生 *Chung lun* (T1564.21$_{21}$): sa bon med na myu gu sṅon du btaṅ ba'i rgyun de las mṅon par 'byuṅ bar mi 'gyur ro| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:515; T1566.100a$_{19-20}$ 若離種子芽等相續則無流轉).

10-1 bījāc ca yasmāt santānaḥ santānā·c ca phalodbhavaḥ| bījapūrvvaṃ phalan tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvataṃ|】 gaṅ phyir sa bon las rgyun daṅ||rgyun las 'bras bu 'byuṅ 'gyur źiṅ||sa bon 'bras bu'i sṅon 'gro ba||de phyir chad min rtag ma yin|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:407), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:224), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:514; T1566.100a$_{22-23}$ 種子有相續 從相續有果 先種而後果 不斷亦不常): 從種有相續 從相續有果 先種後有果 不斷亦不常 *Chung lun* (T1564. 21a$_{13-14}$).[4]

Notes

[1] DE JONG (1978b:221) adopts the reading of द. Mss दप could possibly also be read as aty°, although this would make little sense.

[2] The emendation is based on the Tibetan translation and on the following parallel phrase "tadabhāve" attested by most mss.

[3] V has the *pa*-akṣara in brackets.

[4] *Akutobhayā* attests the reading *rtag pa min* in lieu of *rtag ma yin*. Further, HUNTINGTON adopts the reading *'bras bu sṅon 'gro ba* attested by DCQ, although N attests *'bras bu'i sṅon 'gro ba,* which seems more appropriate in comparison with the other texts.

bījapūrvvaṃ phalan tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvataṃ| (Mmk 17.8)

yad{īha} bījam aprasūyāṅkurādisantānaṃ jvālāṅgārādivirodhipratyayasānnidhyān nirudhyeta tadā tatkāryasantānapravṛttyadarśanāt syād ucchedadarśanaṃ| yadi ca bījaṃ na nirudhyetāṅkurādisantānaś ca pravarttate tadā bījasyānirodhābhyupagamāc chāśvatadarśanaṃ syāt| na caitad evam ity ato nāsti bījasya śāśvatoccheda{darśana}prasaṅ·gaḥ| yathā bīje 'yaṃ kramo 'nu- ब102b
varṇṇita evaṃ|| ∘ ||

yas tasmāc cittasantānaś cetaso 'bhipravarttate|
tataḥ phalam ṛte cittāt sa ca nābhipravarttate| (Mmk 17.9)

Substantives

1 phalan】 प Tib: phalaṃ बदल V (o3): phala° ज (s4). nocchinnaṃ】 : nācchinnaṃ द (s2). śāśvataṃ】 दजल Tib V: śāsvataṃ ब (o4): śāśvata प (s4).

2 aprasūyā° 】 *the Tibetan translation (D103b[7]: rkyen du ma gyur par) is possibly somewhat free but might attest a Sanskrit reading involving *pratyaya.* jvālāṅgārādi°】 प V: jvālāṃgārādi° ब (o2): jvālaṃgārādi° दजल (o2, s2). °virodhi°】 प Tib V: °virodhaḥ बजल (γδ)(v6): °virodha° द (v8).[1] °pratyaya°】 : °pratyayā° ज (s2).

3 °sānnidhyān】 *em.* Tib: °sānnidhya बदजल (s4): sānnirudhyān प (s3): °sāṃnidhyān V.[2] nirudhyeta】 : nirudhyata द (v1). tat°】 प Tib: tatra बदजल (βγδ) V (v8). °kārya°】 : kāya° द (v4). °santāna°】 जलप: °satāna° ब (s4): °saṃtāna° द V (o2). °pravṛtty°】 दल Tib V: °pravṛty° बप (o4): °pravṛrty° ज (04, s3). syād】 : svād ज (s2).

4 nirudhyetā°】 प Tib V: niruddhetā° बदजल (βγδ)(s2). °santānaś】 जलप Tib: °saṃtānaś ब V (o2): saṃntānaś द (s3). pravarttate】 Ω: pravarteta V.

6 śāśvatoccheda°: śāśvatāccheda° प (s2). °{darśana}°】 Ω: *om.* Tib V. °prasaṅgaḥ】 प V: °prasaṃgo ब (o2, v10): °prasaṃgaḥ दजल (o2). *After* yathā】 प Tib: ca बदजल (βγδ) V (v9).

6-7 'nuvarṇṇita 】 जप: 'nuvarṇita बल V (o1): 'nuvarttita द (v5).

8 yas tasmāc】 दप Tib V: mattasyā बजल (γδ)(s8).[3]

9 tataḥ】 : tata ल (s4). nābhi°】 : nabhi° प (s2).[4]

Accidentals

1 bīja°】 *stand.* Tib V: vīja° Ω (o4). °pūrvvaṃ】 प: °pūrvaṃ बदजल V (o1). |】 बप: || दजल V (p2).

2 bījam】 *stand.* Tib V: vījam Ω (o4). °āṅkurādi°】 प V: °āṃkurādi° बदजल (o2). °santānaṃ】 जप: °saṃtānaṃ बदल V (o2). *After* °santānaṃ】 : ardhadaṇḍa ल (p4).

3 *After* nirudhyeta 】 Ω: | Tib: ardhadaṇḍa V.
4 | 】 बदप V: || जल (p2). bījaṃ 】 *stand.* Tib V: vījaṃ Ω (o4). °āṅkurādi° 】 प V: °āṃkurādi° बदजल (o2). *After* pravarttate 】 दजप V: | ब Tib (p4): *ardhadaṇḍa* ल (p4).
5 bījasyā° 】 *stand.* Tib V: vījasyā° Ω (o4). chāśvata° 】 बदल Tib V: chāsvata° जप (o4). | 】 : || ल (p2).
6 bījasya 】 *stand.* Tib V: vījasya Ω (o4). | 】 प: *om.* ब (p3): || दजल Tib V (p2). bīje 】 *stand.* Tib V: vīje Ω (o4).
7 || ◦ || 】 प: | ब Tib (p5): || दजल (p5): *om.* V.
8 °santānaś 】 जप: °saṃtānaś बदल V (o2). 'bhi° 】 : bhi° प (o4). °pravarttate 】 Ω: °pravartate V. | 】 बदप V: || जल (p2).
9 °pravarttate 】 Ω: °pravartate V. | 】 प: || बदज V (p2): *ardhadaṇḍa* ल (p1).

Parallels

8-9 yas tasmāc cittasantānaś cetaso 'bhipravarttate| tataḥ phalam ṛte cittāt sa ca nābhipravarttate| 】 sems kyi ryun ni gaṅ yin pa| |sems pa las ni mṅon par 'byuṅ| |de las 'bras bu sems pa ni| |med na de yaṅ 'byuṅ mi 'gyur| | *Akutobhayā* (Huntington, 1986:408), *Buddhapālita* (Saito, 1984.II:225), *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:515; T1566.100a$_{27-28}$ 如是從初心 心法相續起 從是而起果 離心無相續): 如是從初心 心法相續生 從是而有果 離心無相續 *Chung lun* (1564.21a$_{15-16}$).

Notes

[1] The adjectival form *virodhin* is preferable to the noun *virodha.* De Jong (1978b:221) also prefers to read as V.

[2] The emendation is based on the Tibetan translation and V's emendation, but follows the spelling with homorganic nasal attested by Ω.

[3] All the earlier Tibetan translations of the verse omit *tasmāc,* probably metri causa. In Ñi ma grags' translation, *tasmāc* seems to have been connected with *cittāt* in pāda c and translated with *lta źig,* perhaps also metri causa (cf. also note on *tasmāc* at Pras 313$_{11}$).

[4] A long vowel stroke has been added by another hand making *nābhi°.*

tasmāt kuśal{ākuśal}acetanāviśeṣasaṃprayuktāc cittād ***yaś cittasantānas*** taddhetukaḥ ***pravarttate***| tasmāt kuśal{ākuśal}acetanāparibhāvitāc cittasantānāt sahakārikāraṇasaṃnidhānāvaikalye satīṣṭam {aniṣṭaṃ} ***phalam*** upajāyate {sugatidurgatiṣu} | ***ṛte tasmāc cittāt*** tac cittam antareṇa ***sa ca nābhiprava·rttate*** | |tad evam | | ◦ | | · ज121b, V314

cittāc ca yasmāt santānaḥ santānāc ca phalodbhavaḥ|
karmapūrvam phalan tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvataṃ| (Mmk 17.10)

yady arhaccaramacittam iva tad dhetuphalapāraṃparyāvicchinnakramavarttino bhāvinaś cittasaṃtānasya hetubhāvam anupagamya kuśalañ

Substantives

1 kuśal{ākuśal}a° 】 Ω V: **kuśala°* Tib.[1] yaś】 दप (α) Tib V: yac ब (s6): ya जल (δ) (s4). cittasantānas】 प Tib: cittasaṃtānas बद V (o2): cittasantāna जल (v6).

2 °paribhāvitāc】 प Tib V: °yavibhāvitā बजल[2] (γδ)(s2): °yacittāvito द (s2).

3 citta°】 : vitta° ल (s2). °kāraṇa°】 : °kāraṇaṃ द (v6). °saṃnidhānā°】 दप (α) Tib V: °saṃnidhānād ब (v6): °sānnidhārād जल (δ)(v5, v6). {aniṣṭaṃ}】 Ω V: *om.* Tib.[3]

4 {sugatidurgatiṣu}】 दजप (αβ) V: sumatidurgatiṣu जल (δ)(s2): *om.* Tib. tasmāc】 *em.* (Tib): tu tac Ω V.[4] °cittāt】 प Tib: cittā° बदजल (βγδ)(v4): cittāc V. tac】 *em.*: *om.* बदजल Tib V (v7): ta प (s4).[5] sa ca】 Ω V: *sa ca santāno Tib.[6]

5 evam】 प: evaṃ बदजल V (v10).

6 cittāc】 : ccittāc द (s3).

7 phalan】 प: phalaṃ बदल V (o3): pha ज (s4). nocchinnaṃ】 : nācchinnaṃ द (s2).

8 arhac°】 दप Tib V: arha° बजल (s4). °phala°】 : °phalaṃ द (v6). °pāraṃparyā°】 दप Tib V: °pālaṃparyā° बजल (s2).

9 bhāvinaś】 दप (α) Tib V: bhāvina° बजल (γδ)(v6). citta°】 : ⌊citta°⌋ प. anupagamya】 : upagamya ज (v4).[7]

Accidentals

2 pravarttate】 Ω: pravartate V. |】 प Tib: *om.* बदजल (p3): *ardhadaṇḍa* V.[8]

3 °santānāt】 जप: °saṃtānāt बदल V (o2).

4 |】 बप V: || दजल (p2).

5 °pravarttate】 Ω: °pravartate V. ||】 : | ब V (p1). || ◦ ||】 प: *om.* बदजल (p5): | Tib V.

6 santānaḥ】 बप: saṃtānaḥ दजल V (o2). santānāc】 जलप: saṃtānāc बद V (o2). |】 प V: *om.* ब (p3): || बजल (p2).

7 °pūrvam】 प: °pūrvaṃ बदजल V (o3). |】 जप: *om.* ब (p3): || द V (p2): *ardhadaṇḍa* ल (p1).

9 °varttino】 Ω: °vartino V. °santānasya】 : °saṃtānasya ब V (o2). kuśalañ】 प: kuśalaṃ बदजल V

(o3).

Parallels

1-4 tasmāt kuśal{ākuśal}acetanāviśeṣasamprayuktāc cittād yaś cittasantānas taddhetukaḥ pravarttate| tasmāt kuśal{ākuśal}acetanāparibhāvitāc cittasantānāt sahakārikāraṇasamnidhānāvaikalye satīṣṭam {aniṣṭaṃ} phalam upajāyate {sugatidurgatiṣu} | 】 sems kyi rgyun gaṅ yin pa ni sems pa las su brjod pa gaṅ yin pa 'gag bźin pa de las mṅon par 'byuṅ źiṅ rgyun de las 'bras bu mṅon par 'byuṅ ṅo| | *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:408): sems kyi rgyun gaṅ yin pa de ni sems pa las su brjod pa gaṅ yin pa 'gag bźin pa de las mṅon par 'byuṅ źiṅ rgyun de las 'bras bu mṅon par 'byuṅ ṅo| | *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:225): sems kyi rgyun 'brel par 'jug pa'i mtshan ñid gaṅ yin pa de ni byams pa daṅ| byams pa ma yin pa'i sems pa las su brjod pa gaṅ yin pa'i sems pa 'gags pa de las mṅon par 'byuṅ źiṅ rgyun de las 'bras bu 'dod pa daṅ mi 'dod pa ñams su myoṅ ba'i mtshan ñid mṅon par 'byuṅ ṅo| | *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:515-516; P om. "daṅ mi 'dod pa"; T1566.100a_{29}-110b_{2} 此謂慈心不慈心名爲業。此心雖滅而相續起。相續起。此相續果起者。謂愛非愛有受想故).

3-4 ṛte tasmāc cittāt tac cittam antareṇa sa ca nābhipravarttate| | 】 sems pa med na sems kyi rgyun de yaṅ mṅon par 'byuṅ bar mi 'gyur ro| | *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:225), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:516; with *mi 'gyur te* instead of *mi 'gyur ro;* T1566.100b_{2} 若離心者果則不起).

5-6 cittāc ca yasmāt santānaḥ santānāc ca phalodbhavaḥ| karmapūrvam phalan tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvataṃ | 】 gaṅ phyir sems pa las rgyun daṅ| |rgyun las 'bras bu 'byuṅ 'gyur źiṅ| |las ni 'bras bu sṅon 'gro ba| |de phyir chad min rtag ma yin| | *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:408), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:225), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:515; T1566.100$b_{4\text{-}5}$ 從心有相續 從相續有果 故業在果先 不斷亦不常), 從心有相續 從相續有果 先業後有果 不斷亦不常 *Chung lun* (T1564.21$a_{17\text{-}18}$).

Notes

[1] Throughout the given example, the Tibetan translation only attests **kuśala°* and omits **akuśala°*. It is possibly that the Tibetan translation reflects an earlier reading, since this corresponds to the example of *kuśaladharma* given in verse 17.1, where a negative example of *akuśaladharma* was not provided.

[2] ल adds ardhadaṇḍa after *ya*.

[3] In accordance with its omission of *°akuśala°* above, the Tibetan translation also omits **aniṣṭaṃ* here.

[4] The reading of the mss makes no sense. The Tibetan translation (D104a_{3}: *lta źig*) seems to indicate *tasmāc*, because the same translation for *tasmāc* seems to have been used in Ñi ma grags' translation of the mūla-verse (cf. Pras 313_{7}).

[5] Although omitted in the majority of the mss and the Tibetan translation, the emendation is proposed to account for the reading of ms प.

[6] The Tibetan translation attests **santāno*, which is similar to the parallel sentence at Pras $312_{10\text{-}11}$.

[7] The missing negation in ms ञ is probably due to reminiscience with *upagamya* in the following sentence.

[8] The daṇḍa is adopted as syntactically preferable.

cittaṃ nirudhyeta tadocchinnan tat karma syāt | athāpy anāgatasantānasya
hetubhāvam upagamya svarūpād apracyutaṃ syāt syāt tadānīṃ karmma
śāśvataṃ | na caitad evam iti | tasmāt kṣa·ṇikakarmābhyupagame 'pi nāsty ल90a
ucchedaśāśvatadarśana{dvaya}prasaṅga {iti} |

tad atra yathoditakarmaprabhedavyākhyāne daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathā
vyākhyātāḥ | | te ca | | ∘ | |

dharmasya sādhanopāyāḥ śuklāḥ karmmapathā daśa |
phalaṃ kāmaguṇāḥ pañca dharmmasya pretya ceha ca | (Mmk 17.11)

ta ete ***daśa*** kuśalāḥ ***karmapathā dharmasya sādhanopāyā*** niṣpattihetu-
bhūtā ity arthaḥ | kaḥ punar asau kuśalakarmapathavyatirikto dharmo nāma
yasyaite sādhanopāya·tvena vyavasthāpyante | ucyate | cittaviśeṣa eva kaś cid ब103a
dharmaśabdenoktaḥ |

Substantives

1 nirudhyeta】: nirudhyata द (v1). tadocchinnan】 प: tadocchinnaṃ बजल V (o3): tadācchinnaṃ द (s2, o3).

2 tadānīṃ】: tad edānīṃ ब (s3).[1]

3 tasmāt】: tasmā ल (s4). °karmā°】 बदल Tib V: °kamā° ज (s4): °ka⌊rmā°⌋ प (*wormhole*).

3-4 nāsty uccheda°】: nāsticcheda° द (s4).

4 °prasaṅga】 ब Tib V: °prasaṃga दजल (o2): °prasaga प (s4).

5 °prabhedavyākhyāne】 :⌊°prabhe⌋[2]khyāne प (*lacuna*).

6 vyākhyātāḥ】: vyāvyātāḥ ल (s2).

7 sādhanopāyāḥ】 बप (α) Tib V: sādhanopāyīḥ द (s2): sādhano sādhanopāyāḥ जल (δ)(s3). śuklāḥ】: śukāḥ ब (s4).[2]

8 pretya】 जलप Tib V: pratya बद (s2). ceha】: caha ल (s2).

9 ta】: te ब (s6). sādhanopāyā】: śādhanāpāyā द (s2).

10 ity】: i द (s4). kaḥ】: *om.* ल (v7). °vyatirikto】: °vyatirikta° द (v6). dharmo】 दप (α) Tib V: dharmā बजल (γδ)(v6).[3]

11 yasyaite】 दप (α) Tib V: yasyaiha बजल (γδ)(v8). sādhanopāyatvena】: sādha[5] प (*lacuna*). vyavasthāpyante】 द Tib V: vyavasthāpyate बजल (γδ)(v1): [2]sthāpyante प (*lacuna*). eva】: evā द (s2). cid】:

ci द (s4). (s1).

12 °oktaḥ] दप (α) Tib V: °oktāḥ बजल (γδ)

Accidentals

1 *After* nirudhyeta] Ω: | Tib: ardhadaṇḍa V. karma] : karmma ब (o1). |] दप V: || बजल (p2). °santānasya] : °saṃtānasya ब V (o2).

2 *After* 1st syāt] दप: | ब Tib (p4): || जल (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V. karmma] प: karma बदजल V (o1).

3 śāśvataṃ] : śāsvataṃ प (o4). 1st |] ज Tib V: *om.* बप (p3): || दल (p2).[4] 2nd |] बप V: || दजल (p2). 'pi] *stand.* Tib V: pi Ω (o4).

4 °śāśvata°] : °śāsvata° प (o4). |] बप: || दजल V (p2).

6 ||] : | ब V (p1). || ◦ ||] प: *om.* बदजल V (p5).

7 dharmasya] दजलप V: dharmmasya ब (o1). karmmapathā] प: karmapathā बदजल V (o1). |] प V: *om.* बदजल (p3).

8 *After* phalaṃ] : || ज (p4). *After* kāmaguṇāḥ] प Tib V: | ब (p4): || दजल (p4). pañca] द: paṃca बजल V (o2): pa⌊ñca⌋ प (*lacuna*). dharmmasya] प: dharmasya बदजल V (o1). |] बदप: || जल V (p2).

10 |] बप: || दजल V (p2).

11 1st |] बदप V: || जल (p2). 2nd |] : || ज (p2).

12 dharma°] : dharmma° ब (o1). |] ब Tib V: || दजल: *om.* प.[5]

Parallels

7-8 dharmasya sādhanopāyāḥ śuklāḥ karmmapathā daśa | phalaṃ kāmaguṇāḥ pañca dharmmasya pretya ceha ca |] chos bsgrub pa yi thabs rnams ni | |dkar po'i las kyi lam bcu ste | |chos kyi 'bras bu 'di gźan du | |'dod pa'i yon tan rnam lṅa'o | | *Akutobhayā* (Huntington, 1986: 409), *Buddhapālita* (Saito, 1984.II:225-226), *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:517; T1566.100b$_{12\text{-}13}$ 求法方便者 謂十白業道 勝欲樂五種 現未二世得): 能成福德者 是十白業道 二世五欲樂 即是白業報 *Chung lun* (T1564.22a$_{27\text{-}28}$).

Notes

[1] The phrase *syāt tadānīṃ karma* is written propia manu in smaller script in प indicating a correction.

[2] In ms ब, the word *guṇā* is written above *śukāḥ*.

[3] Judging also from the variants for the words *yasyaite* and *vyavasthāpyante* below, there is confusion as to the logical subject in mss बजल.

[4] Although not attested by प, the daṇḍa is adopted as syntactically preferable.

[5] Although not attested by प, the daṇḍa is adopted as syntactically preferable.

ātmasaṃyamakañ cetaḥ parānugrāhakañ ca yat |
maitraṃ sa dharmma (Mmk 17.1ac) · V315

ity anena | atha vā pariniṣṭhitarūpā ete daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathā dharmaśab-
davācyā bhavanti | kriyamāṇarū·pās tu kuśalakarmmapathaśabdavācyā ज122a
bhavanti | {tad} asyoktalakṣaṇasya ete daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathā niṣpattau
hetutvena vyavasthāpyante | kathaṃ punar atra prakrānte karmmavibhāge
daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathā iti | ucyate |

vāg viṣpando 'viratayo yāś cāvijñaptisaṃjñitā (Mmk 17.4ab)

ity ādinā kāyikās trayaḥ {karmapathā} vācikāś catvāro vyākhyātāḥ | ***cetanā***
cety anenānabhidhyāvyā·pādāsaṃyagdṛṣṭyākhyās trayo mānasā vyākhyātāḥ | द54a

Substantives

3 ity anena | atha vā **]** i[6] प (*lacuna*).[1] pariniṣṭhita° **]** बजल(प) (γδ) Tib V: pariniṣṭhate द (v8): parini⌊ṣṭh⌋ita° प (*lacuna*). °rūpā **]** : evā ल (s8). kuśalāḥ karmapathā **]** : ku[6] प (*lacuna*).

3-4 dharmaśabda° **]** बदल(प) Tib V: dharmaśabdaḥ ज (v6): dharmaśab⌊da°⌋ प.

4 bhavanti **]** : bhṛvanti ल (s3). kriya° **]** दप (α) Tib V: kiya° बजल (γδ)(s4). °śabdavācyā **]** द(प) Tib V: °śabde vācyā बजल (γδ) (s4): śab[1]a⌊vācyā⌋ प.

5 bhavanti **]** : ⌊bhavanti⌋ प (*lacuna*). {tad}...karmapathā (line 7) **]** [15]thā प.[2] asyoktalakṣaṇasya **]** बद (β) Tib V: asyoktalakṣaṇa tad asyolakṣaṇasya जल (δ)(s3). daśa **]** बजल (γδ) Tib V: śadaśa द (s3).

6 punar atra **]** दप (α) Tib V: punaś catuḥ ब (γ)(v8): punaś catu ज (s8): puna catu ल (s8). prakrānte **]** बप (α) Tib V: prakānte दजल (βδ)(s4).

7 iti **]** लप Tib V: ity बज (v10): itiḥ द (s3). 1st | **]** प Tib V: *om.* बज Tib (p3): || दल (p2).[3] ucyate **]** : ucyante ब (v1).

8 vāg...vyākhyātāḥ (line 9) **]** [37] vyā⌊khyātāḥ⌋ प (*lacuna*).[4] 'viratayo **]** *em.* Tib V: viratayor बदजल (βγδ)(s3).[5] cāvijñapti° **]** दजल V: cā 'vijñapti° ब (s3).

9 kāyikās **]** बजल Tib V: kāyakās द (s4). trayaḥ **]** *em.* Tib V: tuyaḥ बजल (s2): triyaḥ द (s3). vācikāś **]** द Tib V: cārikāś ब (s2): cārikā ज (s2): vārikāś ल (s2). vyākhyātāḥ **]** बदल(प) Tib V: vyākhyātā ज (s4): vyā⌊khyātāḥ⌋ प (*lacuna*). cetanā **]** बदजल V: ⌊cetanā⌋ प (*lacuna*).

10 cety anenānabhidyā° **]** *em.* Tib: cetanenā 'bhidhyā° ब (s4, o4): certy anenā 'bhidhyā° द (s3, o4): cetanenābhidhyā° ज (s4): cety ānenā 'bhidhyā° ल (s2, o4): ⌊cety ane⌋nābhidhyā° प (v2): cety anenābhidhyā° V.[6] °vyāpādā°...ity evaṃ **]** vyā[20]⌊ty evaṃ⌋ प (*lacuna*).[7] °vyāpādā° **]** बजल V: °vyāvyāpādā° द (s3).[8] °saṃyagdṛṣṭy° **]** *stand.* Tib V: °saṃyakdṛṣṭy° बदज

ल (s6). °ākhyās】 *em.* V: °āvyākhyās बद्ल (s3): °āvyākhyām ज (s2, s3).

Accidentals

V315 1 °saṃyamakañ】 प: °saṃyamakaṃ बद्जल V (o3). °grāhakañ】 प: °grāhakaṃ बद्जल V (o3).[9] प V: || बद्जल (p2).

2 dharmma】 बप: dharma द्जल V (o1).

3 |】 *em.* V: || बद्जल (p2).

4 |】 बप: || द्जल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V. kuśalakarmmapatha°】 प: kuśalakarmapatha° बद्जल
ज122a (o1).[10]

5 |】 बप V: || द्जल (p2).

6 vyavasthāpyante】 द्जप V: vyavasthāpyaṃte बल (o2). |】 बप: || द्जल V (p2). karmmavibl ge】 प: karmavibhāge बद्जल V (o1).

7 karmapathā】: karmmapathā ब (o1). 2nd |】 प V: || बद्जल (p2).

8 viṣpando】 stand. V: vispando बद्जल (o4; Cf. Pras 307_6).

9 *After* trayaḥ】 बजल Tib V: || द (p4). |】 बप V: || द्जल (p2).

10 |】 द V: || बजल (p2).

Parallels

13-14 ātmasaṃyamakañ cetaḥ parānugrāhakañ ca yat | maitraṃ sa dharmma】 人能降伏心 益於眾生是名爲慈善 得二世果報 *Prajñāpradīpa* (T1566. $100b_{22\text{-}23}$).[11]

Notes

[1] In ms प, the folio is badly damaged on the lower edge causing several lacunae in t
द54a following piece.

[2] The end of the line in प is completely damaged and the new line begins with ° *niṣpattau.*

[3] *Ucyate* indicates the answer to the question and is thus translated in Tib with *bśad pa* should not be read together with *iti* as in the phrase *"ity ucyate"* like it is done in mss ब Therefore, the daṇḍa is adopted.

[4] The size of the lacuna corresponds approximately to the 35 akṣaras attested by the otl mss.

[5] The reading *'viratayo* is attested at Pras 307_6.

[6] The emendation is based on the Tibetan translation, which attests the form **anabhid* (*brnab sems med pa*) that is also clearly supported by the context, since this is a list of t standard three wholesome mental states (trayo mānasāḥ).

[7] The lacuna in ms प, which covers the rest of the last line of the folio, correspor approximately to the 16 akṣaras attested by the other mss.

[8] Dittography caused by change of folio.

[9] A space between *°grāhaka* and *ñ* in ms प indicates a scribal deletion.

[10] This phrase is written in smaller script in प indicating a correction propia manu.

[11] The Chinese translation of Prajñāpradīpa varies substantially in this passage from t Tibetan translation. The latter does not include the quotation of Mmk 17.1, whereas t Chinese translation does. It should be noted that the quotation in the Chinese translati corresponds to the translation of Mmk 17.1 found in Chung lun and not to Pang jo teng l shih's own translation of Mmk 17.1. Only pāda c has been slightly altered in Pang jo teng l shih when compared to the translation found in Chung lun.

ity evaṃ · daśāpi kuśalāḥ karmapathā atra vyākhyātāḥ | प57b

te ca yathoditasya dharmasya niṣpattihetavo bhavanti | asya ca ***dharmasya*** rūpaśabdagandharasaspraṣṭavyalakṣaṇāḥ ***paṃca kāmaguṇāḥ pretya cā***dṛṣṭe paraloka ity artha ***iha*** cetīhaloka ity arthaḥ ***phalam*** upabhujyata iti |

evaṃ tāvad ekīyair ākṣepaparihāre varṇṇite sati tān praty apare doṣam udbhāvyānyathākṣepaparihāraṃ varṇṇayanta āhuḥ || ◦ || · V316

bahavaś ca mahāntaś ca doṣāḥ syur yadi kalpanā |
syād eṣā tena naivaiṣā ka·lpanātropapadyate | (Mmk 17.12) ल90b

Substantives

1 evaṃ 】 ब(प) Tib V: avaṃ द (s2): āvan ज (s2): āvaṃ ल (s2): ⌊evaṃ⌋ प. daśāpi 】 : daśā api ब (s3).

2 yathoditasya dharmasya 】 : yathoditadha syarmmasya ब (s5).[1] °hetavo 】 प Tib V: °hetavā बद्जल (s1). asya ca dharmasya… cetīhaloka ity (*line 4*) 】 asya ⌊ca⌋ dha⌊r⌋ma[40]ty प (*lacuna*).[2]

3 °gandha° 】 द्ज Tib V: °gaṃdha° ब (o2): °vāndha° ल (s2). °spraṣṭa° 】 बद् (β) Tib V: °spaṣṭa° जल (δ)(s4).

4 cādṛṣṭe 】 बजल (γδ) Tib V: cādṛṣṭa° द् (v6). *After* 2nd arthaḥ 】 *em.*: | बप (p4): || द्जल (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V.[3] upabhujyata 】 : uprabhujyata ज (s3).

5 evaṃ tāvad…praty 】 evaṃ tāvad e[18]ty प (*lacuna*).[4] ekīyair 】 *em.* Tib: ekīnikāyair ब (s3): ekīnikāryain द् (s2, s3): ekīnikāyor जल (s2, s3): e[-] प (*lacuna*): aikanikāyikair V (*erratum ekanikāyikair*).[5] ākṣepaparihāre 】 *em.* Tib V: ākṣepepayavihāre बल (γ)(s2, s3): ākṣeyaparihāre द् (s2): ākṣepapayavihāre ज (s2, s3).[6] tān 】 बजल Tib V: tāt द् (s2). praty 】 द् Tib V: prety बजल (s2): [-]ty प (*lacuna*). apare 】 : apara ज (v6). doṣam 】 : doṣem ल (s2).

6 udbhāvyānyathā° 】 द्प Tib: udbhāvyanyayā° बल (γδ)(s2): udbhāvyayā° ज (s4): udbhāvyānyā° V. ākṣepa° 】 : ākṣeya° द् (s2).

7 syur 】 बद्प V: syud जल (δ)(s2). yadi 】 द्प (α) Tib (DE JONG, 1978b:221): api बजल (γδ) V (v8). kalpanā 】 द्प (α) V: kalpano बजल (γδ)(v10).

8 syād eṣā 】 प Tib: °otpādeṣā बजल (s8): °ātpādeṣā द् (s8): yady eṣā V.[7] tena 】 : te⌊na⌋ प (*lacuna*). naivaiṣā 】 *em.* Tib V: naiveṣā बजल (γδ)(s2): naivaṃṣā द् (s2): n[2]ā प (*lacuna*). kalpanātropapadyate 】 : k⌊a⌋lp⌊1⌋ātr⌊o⌋p⌊apadya⌋t⌊e⌋ प (*lacunae*).

Accidentals

1 | 】 बजप V: || द्ल (p2).

2 bhavanti 】 : bhavaṃti ब (o2). | 】 बजप: || द्ल V (p2).

3 paṃca 】 बद्जल: pañca V.

4 *After* 1st artha 】 बल: | द् (p4): || ज (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V. | 】 बजप: || द् V (p2): *om.* ल (p3).

5 varṇṇite **]** दज: varṇite बल V (o1).
6 varṇṇayanta **]** दजप: varṇayanta बल V (o1). || ◦ || **]** प: | ब V (p5): || दजल (p5) .
7 bahavaś **]** *stand.* Tib V: vahavaś Ω (o4). | **]** प V: *om.* बदजल (p3).
8 | **]** बप: || दजल V (p2).

Parallels

5-6 tān praty apare doṣam udbhāvyānyathākṣepa-parihāraṃ varṇṇayanta āhuḥ **]** gźan dag gis smras pa| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:410), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:226), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:517; translated quite differently in T1566.100b$_{25-26}$ 論者言。汝說業果有相續故。而以種子爲喻者。則有大過): 答曰 *Chung lun* (T1564.21b$_{5}$).

7-8 bahavaś ca mahāntaś ca doṣāḥ syur yadi kalpanā| syād eṣā tena naivaiṣā kalpanātropapadyate| **]** gal te brtag pa der gyur na| |ñes pa chen po maṅ por 'gyur| |de lta bas na brtag pa de| |'dir ni 'thad pa ma yin no| | *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:410), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:226), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:517; T1566.100b$_{27-28}$ 作此分別者 得大及多過 是如汝所說 於義則不然): 若如汝分別 其過則甚多 是故汝所說 於義則不然 *Chung lun* (T1564.22b$_{6-7}$).

Notes

[1] A correction of the transposition in ब is indicated by the digits 2 and 1 above the line.

[2] The lacuna corresponds to the 41 akṣaras attested by the other mss.

[3] The daṇḍas are not adopted, since they tend to disturb the syntax.

[4] The lacuna is two akṣaras shorter than the 20 akṣaras attested by the other mss.

[5] The Tibetan translation (*kha cig gis*) attests **ekīyair,* which is supported by the size of the lacuna in ms प, since it is two akṣaras shorter than the paradosis of the other mss. The readings of the extant mss are all corrupt. DE JONG (1978b:221) has suggested the emendation ekanaikāyikair. To justify this emendation by accounting for the corruptions in the extant mss, no less than four changes of letters and loss of one syllable would have to be explained. Thus, the change involved starting from DE JONG's ekanaikāyikair to ms ब's *ekīnikāyair,* the following five changes would have occurred: (1) first vowel ai→e (very likely, merely the loss of one vowel-stroke); (2) second vowel a→ī (less likely, insertion of the separate ī-charactersign); (3) third vowel ai→i (not very likely, loss of ai-vowel-strokes and insertion of i-charactersign); (4) fourth vowel i→ai, which in जल is further corrupted to o (not very likely, loss of i-charactersign and insertion of ai/o-vowel-strokes); (5) loss of the kair-akṣara (very likely). Since these changes are too massive to be explained as simple akṣara-corruptions, the change from DE JONG's ekanaikāyikair to ms ब's ekīnikāyair would then have to be explained as an emendation made from a correct form into an incorrect form, which is, of course, not impossible. If, on the other hand, the reading of the Tibetan translation *ekīyair is adopted, as suggested here, the readings of the extant mss must be explained as an interpolation of the two syllables °nikā°, perhaps indicating a failed attempt in the later Nepalese ms-tradition to improve the reading of the text from *ekīyair to *ekīyanikāyair or DE JONG's *ekanaikāyikair.

[6] The emendation is a combination of the readings of द and ज. The emendation is also proposed by DE JONG (1978b:221), who, however, attributes it to द.

[7] प confirms the emendation of DE JONG (1978b:221).

yadi bījāṅkurasādharmyeṇa cittasantāne śāśvatoccheda{doṣadvaya}doṣaprasaṅgapa·rihāraḥ ***syāt*** tadā ***bahavaś ca doṣāḥ*** saṃkhyābahutvena ***mahāntaś*** ब103b ***ca*** dṛṣṭādṛṣṭavirodhena parapakṣe prāpnuvanti | ka·thaṃ kṛtvā | yadi hi bīja- ज122b saṃtānadṛṣṭānte śāli bījāc chālya ṅkurādisantāna eva pravarttate na vijātīyaḥ śālyaṅkurādisantānāc ca śāliphalam evopajāyate na nimbaphalaṃ bhinnajātīyatvād evam ihāpi kuśalacittāt kuśalasantāna eva syāt samānajātīyatvān nākuśalāvyākṛtasantāno vijātīyatvāt | evam akuśalāvyākṛtacittād akuśalāvyākṛtacittasantāna eva syān nānyo bhinnajātīyatvāt | kāmarūpārūpyāvacarānāśravacittebhyaḥ sadṛśānām eva cittānāṃ kāmarūpārūpyāvacarānāśravāṇām

Substantives

1 yadi **]** : y[a]di प (*lacuna*). bījāṅkura° **]** *stand.* Tib V: vījāṃkula° बजल (γδ)(o2, o4, s2): vījāṃkura° द (o2, o4): °vījāṅkura° प (o4). °sādharmyeṇa **]** द Tib V: °sādharmeṇa बजल (γδ)(s4): sā[3] प (*lacuna*). citta° **]** : c[i]tt[a]° प (*lacuna*). °santāne **]** बज Tib: °saṃtāne द V (o2): °saṃtāna° ल (o2, v6): °santān[1] प. (*lacuna*). °{doṣadvaya}° **]** Ω: *om.* Tib: °darśanadvaya° V.

2 tadā **]** : tadāc द (s3). bahavaś **]** *stand.* Tib V: vahavaś बजलप (o4): cahavaś द (s2). °bahutvena **]** *stand.* Tib V: °vahutvena बजलप (o4): °vahusvana द (o4, s2). mahāntaś **]** : mahān[1] प (*lacuna*).

3 ca dṛṣṭādṛṣṭavirodhena **]** : [6]rodhena प (*lacuna*). katham **]** : katha ल (s4).

4 dṛṣṭānte **]** प: dṛṣṭāntena बद्जल Tib V (v6).[1] °aṅkurādi° **]** द्प Tib V: °aṅkulādi° ब (s2): °aṃkulādi° जल (o2, s2). vijātīyaḥ **]** द्प Tib V: vijānīyaḥ बजल (γδ) (s2).

5 °aṅkurādi° **]** प Tib V: °aṅkulādi° ब (s2): °aṃkurādi° द (o2): °aṃkulādi° जल (o2, s2). śāliphalam **]** : śāliphalem द (s2). nimbaphalaṃ **]** *stand.* Tib: vimvaphalaṃ बद (o4, v5): vilvaphalaṃ ज (04, s2): vimvanphalaṃ ल (v5, s3): nimvaphalaṃ प (o4): bilvaphalaṃ V.[2] bhinna° **]** : bhinnaṃ ज (s1).

6 eva **]** बद्प (αβ) V: evaṃ जल (δ)(v9). °jātīyatvān **]** ज V: °jātīyatvāt बद्लप (s6).

7 1st °āvyākṛta° **]** द्प Tib V: °āvyākṛtaṃ बज ल (γδ) (v6). vijātīyatvāt **]** : vijātiyatvāt ज (s2). 2nd akuśalā° **]** : akuśaśala° द (s3).[3] °cittād **]** बजल Tib V: °cittā द्प (s4). 3rd akuśalā° **]** बजल Tib V: daśakuśalā° द्प (v9).

8 eva **]** : evaṃ ब (v9). bhinna° **]** : bhi° ज (s4).[4] kāmarūpā° **]** बप Tib V: kāmarūpyā° द्जल (s3). °āvacarā° **]** : °āvacanā° ल (s2).

9 °ārūpyāvacarā° **]** : °ārūpyāvararā° ल (s2): °ārūvy[āva]carā V.

Accidentals

2 °prasaṅga°】 प V: °prasaṃga° बद्जल (o2). *After* °parihāraḥ】 जप Tib V: | ब (p4): || द्ल (p4). *After* syāt】 Ω Tib: ardhadaṇḍa V.

3 prāpnuvanti】 : prāpnuvaṃti ल (o2). 1st |】 बप V: *om.* द् (p3): || जल (p2). 2nd |】 बप V: || द्जल (p2). bīja°】 *stand.* Tib V: vīja° Ω (o4).

4 śāli°】 : sāli° प (o4). °bījāc】 *stand.* Tib V: °vījāc Ω (o4). 2nd °santāna】 : °saṃtāna ब V (o2). pravarttate】 Ω: pravartate V.

5 °santānāc】 प: °saṃtānāc बद्जल V (o2). *After* evopajāyate】 प: | ब Tib (p4): || द्जल (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V.

6 °jātīyatvād】 Ω: °jātīyatvāt V. *After* °jātīyatvād】 Ω Tib: | V. °santāna】 जलप: °saṃtāna बद् V (o2). *After* syāt】 प V: | ब (p4): || द्जल (p4).

7 °santāno】 जप: °saṃtāno बद्ल V (o2). |】 बप V: || द्जल (p2).

8 °santāna】 प: °saṃtāna बद्जल V (o2). |】 बप V: || द्जल (p2).

8-9 °ānāśrava°】 Ω: °ānāsrava° V.

9 °ānāśravāṇām】 Ω: °ānāsravāṇām V.

Parallels

3-4 yadi hi bījasaṃtānadṛṣṭānte śāli bījāc chālya ṅkurādi-santāna eva pravarttate】 'di la sa bon las sa bon daṅ rigs mthun pa'i myu gu rgyun 'byuṅ bar 'gyur bas| *Buddhapālita* (Saito, 1984.II: 226-227).

4-6 na vijātīyaḥ śālyaṅkurādi-santānāc ca śāliphalam evopajāyate na nimbaphalaṃ bhinnajātīyatvād】 amra'i 'bras bu ñid skye źiṅ śiṅ nim pa'i 'bras bu mi skye la| śiṅ nim pa las kyaṅ nim pa'i 'bras bu ñid skye źiṅ| źiṅ amra'i 'bras bu mi skye bas de lta na sa bon daṅ 'dra ba'i rgyun 'byuṅ gi mi 'dra ba mi 'byuṅ ṅo|| *Buddhapālita* (Saito, 1984.II:226-227).

6-8 evam ihāpi kuśalacittāt kuśalasantāna eva syāt samānajātīyatvān nākuśalāvyākṛtasantāno vijātīyatvāt| evam akuśalāvyākṛtacittād akuśalāvyākṛtacittasantāna eva syān nānyo bhinnajātīyatvāt|】 de bźin du dge ba'i sems las mi dge ba daṅ| luṅ du ma bstan pa'i sems daṅ| mi dge ba'i sems las dge ba daṅ| luṅ du ma bstan pa'i sems daṅ| luṅ du ma bstan pa'i sems las dge ba daṅ| mi dge ba'i sems daṅ| *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:517-518; T1566.100c$_{11\text{-}14}$ 若善心次第能起善不善無記心。無記心次第能起善不善心。不善心次第能起善無記心者。義皆不然).

8-10 kāmarūpārūpyāvacarānāśravacittebhyaḥ sadṛśānām eva cittānāṃ kāmarūpārūpyāvacarānāśravāṇām utpādaḥ syān na bhinnajātīyānām|】 'dod pa na spyod pa'i sems las gzugs daṅ| gzugs med pa na spyod pa daṅ| 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems daṅ| gzugs na spyod pa'i sems las 'dod pa daṅ| gzugs med pa na spyod pa daṅ| 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems daṅ| gzugs med pa na spyod pa'i sems las 'dod pa daṅ| gzugs na spyod pa daṅ| 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems skye bar mi 'gyur te| *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:518; T1566-100c$_{14\text{-}16}$ 乃至欲界繫心次第能起色界無色界繫心。及起無漏心。無漏心復展轉起欲界色界無色界繫心。亦如上說芽起者。今悉不然).

Notes

[1] The reading of प renders better sense.

[2] De Jong (1978b:221) also adopts the reading of the Tib, which is here confirmed by ms प. Nimba, being a bitter fruit from the tree Azadirachta Indica, is more suitable as a compari-son to the fruit of akuśala than is bilva, which is a refreshing citrus-fruit from the tree Aegle Marmelos.

[3] Dittography due to change of line.

[4] Ms प originally has *bhinnā°* but the long vowel stroke has been partly erased.

utpādaḥ syān na bhinnajātīyānām | manuṣyacittān manuṣyacittam eva syān na devanārakapretatiryagādyanyacittam | tataś ca yo devaḥ sa deva eva syād yo manuṣyaḥ sa manuṣya eva syād ityādiḥ | tataś cākuśalam api kurvatāṃ devamanuṣyāṇāṃ gatiyonivarṇṇabuddhīndriyabalarūpabhogādivaicitryaṃ na syād apāyapatanañ ca | neṣyate caitat sarvam iti | evam ***bahavaś ca mahāntaś ca doṣā*** yasmād bījasantānasādharmyakalpanāyāṃ prasajyante tasmān ***naiṣā kalpanātropapadyate*** | | ◦ | | · V317

imāṃ punaḥ pravakṣyāmi kalpanāṃ yātra yojyate |
buddhaiḥ pratyekabuddhaiś ca śrāvakaiś cānuvarṇṇitāṃ | | (Mmk 17.13)

kā cāsau kalpanety āha | | ◦ | |

Substantives

1 manuṣyacittān】 : *om.* प (v7).
2 °nāraka°】 *em.* V: °naraka° Ω.[1] °preta°】 दप (α) Tib: *om.* बजल (γδ) V (v7). °an-ya°】 जल (δ) Tib V: °anna° ब (s2): °anyac दप (α)(s3). yo】 : ye प (s2).
3 manuṣyaḥ】 : manuṣyas ज (s6). ityādiḥ】 ब Tib: ityādi दजलप V (s4). kurvatāṃ】 प Tib V: kurvatā बजल (γδ)(v6): kurvaṃtāṃ द (s3).
4 gatiyoni】 प Tib V: rāgavidhāni° ब (s2, s3): rāgaviyoni° द (s2, v8): rāgavi° जल (δ)(s2, s3, s4).[2] °vaicitryaṃ】 *em.* Tib V: °vaici-traṃ बजलप (v4): °vecitraṃ द (s2).
5 ca】 : *om.* ज (v7). neṣyate】 *em.* Tib: iṣya-te Ω V.[3] caitat】 : naitat प (v8).
6 °sādharmya°】 दप Tib V: °sādharma° बज ल (s4).
7 kalpanātro°】 : kalpanā 'tro° ब (o4).
8 imāṃ】 दप (α) Tib V: idānīṃ ब (v8): imī जल (δ)(s2).[4] pravakṣyāmi】 दप (α) Tib V: pravakṣāmi बजल (γδ)(s4). kalpanāṃ】 Tib V: kalpanā द (s1). yātra】 दप (α) Tib V: yotra बजल (γδ)(s2).
9 buddhaiḥ】 *stand.* Tib V: vuddhaiḥ बदजप: vuddhai ल (s4).
10 cāsau】 : vāsau ल (s2).

Accidentals

1 °jātīyānām】 प: °jātīyānāṃ बदजल V (o3). |】 बप V: || दल (p2): *om.* ज (p3).
2 °cittam】 प: °cittaṃ बदजल V (o3). |】 बजप V: || दल (p2).
4 °varṇṇa°】 दजप: °varṇa° बल (o1). °buddhī°】 *stand.* Tib V: °vuddhī° Ω (o4). °bala°】 *stand.* Tib V: °vala° Ω (o4).

5 apāyapatanañ】 प: apāyapatanaṃ बद्जल V (o3). |】 प Tib V: *om.* बजल (p3): || द (p2). 2nd |】 बप V: || द्जल (p2). evam】 प: evaṃ बद्जल V (o3). bahavaś】 *stand.* Tib V: vahavaś Ω (o4).
6 bīja°】 *stand.* Tib V: vīja° Ω (o4). °santāna°】 जलप: °saṃtāna° बद् V (o2).
7 || ◦ ||】 प: || बद्जल V (p2).
8 |】 बप V: || द्जल (p2).
9 °buddhaiś】 *stand.* V: °vuddhaiś Ω. cānuvarṇṇitāṃ】 द्जप: cānuvarṇitāṃ बल V (o1). ||】 द्जलप V: | ब (p1).
10 || ◦ ||】 प: || बद्जल (p5): | V.

Parallels

1-2 manuṣyacittān manuṣyacittam eva syān na devanārakapretatiryagādyanyacittam |】 mi'i sems las kyaṅ mi'i rgyun kho na 'byuṅ la| lha'i sems las kyaṅ lha'i rgyun kho na 'byuṅ| dud 'gro'i sems las kyaṅ dud 'gro'i rgyun kho na 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ro|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:227): mi'i rgyud las lha la sogs pa'i rgyud du skye bar mi 'gyur te| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:517; T1566.100c$_{9-10}$ 有人相續能起天等相續業者。是義不然).

4 gatiyonivarṇṇabuddhīndriyabalarūpabhogādivaicitryaṃ】 'gro ba daṅ rigs daṅ rus daṅ yul daṅ lus daṅ dbaṅ po daṅ kha dog daṅ dbyibs daṅ stobs daṅ blo la sogs pa tha dad par *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II: 227).

5 neṣyate caitat sarvam iti|】 de ni mi 'dod do| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:227).

5-7 evam bahavaś ca mahāntaś ca doṣā yasmād bījasantānasādharmyakalpanāyāṃ prasjyante tasmān naiṣā kalpanātropapadyate||】 de'i phyir skyon chen po maṅ po du mar thal bar 'gyur bas brtag pa de ni 'dir 'thad pa ma yin no|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:227): de'i phyir brtag pa de ni 'dir 'thad pa ma yin no|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:518; om. T1566).

8-9 imāṃ punaḥ pravakṣyāmi kalpanāṃ yātra yojyate| buddhaiḥ pratyekabuddhaiś ca śrāvakaiś cānuvarṇṇitāṃ||】 saṅs rgyas rnams daṅ raṅ rgyal daṅ||ñan thos rnams kyis gsuṅs pa yi||brtag pa gaṅ źig 'dir 'thad pa||de ni rab tu brjod par bya|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:410), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:227), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:518; T1566.100c$_{20-21}$ 諸佛及緣覺。聲聞等所說。一切諸聖眾。所共分別者): 今當復更說 順業果報義 諸佛辟支佛 賢聖所稱歎 *Chung lung* (T1564.22b$_{19-20}$).

10 kā cāsau kalpanety āha||】 de yaṅ gaṅ źe na| smras pa| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986: 411): de yaṅ gaṅ źe na| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:227), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:518; T1566.100c$_{21-22}$ 分別何等。故論偈言): 所謂 *Chung lun* (T1564.22b$_{21}$).

Notes

[1] V's emendation *nāraka,* signifying a hell-[dwelling] being, rather than the paradosis *naraka,* signifying the hell-realm, is adopted.

[2] The *ti*-akṣara in *gati* has been corrupted to *a vi* in β yielding *viyoni* and further corrupted in ब. The *rā*-akṣara has been interpolated to yield *rāga.* In both ज and ल, a blank space occurs after the *vi*-akṣara indicating the loss of this akṣara in δ.

[3] The emendation is a conjecture based on the Tibetan translation. A negation is also attested in प after *iṣyate.*

[4] The variant in ब conflicts with the metre.

patraṃ yathā 'vipraṇāśas ***tatharṇṇam iva karma ca*** |
catu·rvidho dhātutaḥ sa ***prakṛtyā 'vyākṛtaś ca saḥ*** | (Mmk 17.14) ज122b

iha kuśalaṃ karma kṛtaṃ sad utpādānantaram eva nirudhyate na ca tasmin niruddhe phalābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ | yasmād yadaiva tat karmotpadyate tadaiva tasya karmaṇo 'vipraṇā·śākhyo · viprayukto dharmaḥ kartuḥ ब104a, ल91a santāne samupajāyate ṛṇapatrasthānīyaḥ | tad evaṃ ***patraṃ yathā 'vipraṇāśas tathā*** veditavyaḥ | yasya cāsāv avipraṇāśākhyo dharma utpadyate ***ṛṇam iva*** tat ***karma*** veditavyaṃ | · yathā ca ṛṇapatrāvasthānād upayukte 'pi dhane द54b dhanino na dhananāśo bhavati sambadhyata · eva sa kālā·ntare sopacayena प58a, V318

Substantives

1 tatharṇṇam] दजप: tathāvarṇam ब (v9): tatharṇam ल V (o1).
2 dhātutaḥ sa] *em.* Tib V: dhātutaś ca Ω (v8).[1]
3 sad] ज V: sat बदलप (s6). utpādānantaram] दप (α) Tib V: pādānantaram ब (s4): upādānantaram जल (δ)(s4).
4 karmotpadyate] दप (α) Tib V: karmepi vidyate ब (s8): kametpidyate जल (δ)(s8).
5 tadaiva tasya] दप (α) Tib: tadaitasya बज ल (γδ) V (v4). 'vipraṇāśākhyo] *stand.* Tib: 'vipraṇāśākṣo बजल (γδ)(s2): 'vipraṇāsākhyā द (o4, s1): 'vipraṇāsākhyo प (o4): 'vipraṇāśo V. *After* °ākhyo] *em.* (DE JONG, 1978b:221): nāma Ω (v9).
6 santāne] प Tib: saṃtānaiḥ ब (o2, v9): santāna द (s4): santānai जल (δ)(s3): saṃtāne V. ṛṇapatra°] बदप (αβ) Tib: ṛṇayatra° जल (δ)(s2): ṛṇapattra° V. °sthānīyaḥ] : °sthānīya द (s4). evaṃ] : eyaṃ द (s2).
7 veditavyaḥ] बदप (αβ) Tib V: veditavya ज ल (δ)(s4). yasya] : yasyai द (s3). avipraṇāśākhyo] *stand.* Tib V: avipraṇāsākhyo बदप (o4): avipraṇāṇāsākhyo जल (δ) (o4,s3).
8 upayukte] प Tib: aprayukte बदजल (βγδ) (v2): prayukte V.
9 dhanino] : dhanīno द (s2). sambadhyata] *stand.* Tib: saṃvandhata बजल (γδ) (o2,o4,s3): savadhyata द (o4,s4): saṃvadhyata प (o4): saṃbadhyata V. eva] : evaṃ प (v9). kālāntare] प Tib: kārāṃtare ब (s2, o2): kālāntara° द (v6): kārāntare जल (δ)(s2): kālāntareṇa V.[2] sopacayena] दप (α) Tib: sopaṃcayena बज (γ)(s3): sopaṃcamena ल (s3): paṃcamena V.

Accidentals

1 patraṃ] Ω: pattraṃ V.[3] yathā 'vipraṇāśas] *stand.*: yathāvipraṇāsas ब (o4): yathā 'vipraṇāsas दजलप (o4): yathāvipraṇāśas V. |] बजप V: || दल (p2).

2 |】 बप: || दल V (p2): *om.* ज (p3).

4 °prasaṅgaḥ】 प V: °prasaṃgaḥ बदजल (o2). |】 बप V: || द (p2): *om.* जल (p3).

5 kartuḥ】 दजप V: karttuḥ बल (o1).

6 *After* samupajāyate】 दप Tib V: | ब (p4): || जल (δ)(p4). |】 बप V: || दल (p2): *om.* ज (p3). patraṃ】 Ω: pattraṃ V. 'vipraṇāśas】 *stand.* Tib V: 'vipraṇāsas Ω (o4).

7 |】 जप V: *om.* ब (p3): || दल (p2). dharma】 : dharmma ल (o1). *After* utpadyate】 : || ज (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V.

8 |】 बप V: || दजल (p2). ṛṇapatrā°】 Ω: ṛṇapattrā° V. °āvasthānād】 Ω Tib: °āvasthānāt V. 'pi】 *stand.* V: pi Ω (o4).

9 dhananāśo】 : dhananāso प (o4).

Parallels

1-2 patraṃ yathā 'vipraṇāśas tatharṇṇam iva karma ca| catu·rvidho dhātutaś sa prakṛtyā 'vyākṛtaś ca saḥ| 】 ji ltar bu lon dpaṅ rgya ltar||de ltar las daṅ chud mi za||de ni khams las rnam pa bźi||de yaṅ raṅ bźin luṅ ma bstan|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411-412), *Buddha-pālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:228), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:518-519; T1566.100$c_{23\text{-}24}$ 不失法如券 業如負財物 而是無記性 約界有四種, not marked as a verse inT): 不失法如券 業如負財物 此性則無記 分別有四種 *Chung lun* (T1564.22$b_{22\text{-}23}$).[4]

3-7 iha kuśalaṃ karma kṛtaṃ sad utpādānantaram eva nirudhyate na ca tasmin niruddhe phalābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ| yasmād yadaiva tat karmotpadyate tadaiva tasya karmaṇo 'vipraṇāśākhyo viprayukto dharmaḥ kartuḥ santāne samupajāyate ṛṇapatrasthānīyaḥ| 】 'di la las ni skad cig ma ste| las skad cig ma de'i chud mi za ba źes bya ba skad cig ma ma yin pa'i chos skye ste| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:228).

7-8 tad evaṃ patraṃ yathā 'vipraṇāśas tathā veditavyaḥ| yasya cāsāv avipraṇāśākhyo dharma utpadyate ṛṇam iva tat karma veditavyaṃ| 】 bu lon ji lta ba de ltar ni las blta bar bya la| dpaṅ rgya ji lta ba de ltar ni chud mi za ba blta bar bya ste| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:228)[5]: 不失法者。當知如券。業者如取物。 *Chung lun* (T1564.22c_5).

8-9 yathā ca ṛṇapatrāvasthānād upayukte 'pi dhane dhanino na dhananāśo bhavati】 dper na bu lon gyi nor de spyad kyaṅ dpaṅ rgya yod pas nor bdag gi nor chud mi za źiṅ *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:228),[6] *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986: 519; T1566.100$c_{26\text{-}27}$ 雖與財而不散失).

Pras 317_6-318_5 is quoted by Jayānanda in **Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* (D3870.I.163a_5-163b_2) with only minor variants.

Notes

[1] Pras 318_6 supports LVP's emendation.

[2] DE JONG (1978b:221) adopts the reading of द.

[3] The mss consistently use the spelling patra, which is also attested by APTE (1890:957).

[4] It should be noted that the first two lines of the Tibetan translation of Pras differs from the translation found in the other commentaries: *dpaṅ rgya ji lta de bźin chud|| mi za las ni bu lon bźin||*. This translation maintains the Sanskrit wording.

[5] SAITO, however, reads *blta bar bya'o* instead of *blta bar bya ste* at the end.

[6] SAITO, however, begins the sentence with *de la* and reads *nor bdag de'i* instead of *nor bdag gi*.

dhanaskandhena tathā vinaṣṭe 'pi karmaṇy avipraṇāśākhyadharmāntarāvasthānāt tannimittakena phalenābhisambadhyata eva karttā | yathā ca ṛṇapatraṃ dātur ddhanābhyāgamaṃ kṛtvā nirbhuktaṃ sat punar api vidyamānaṃ vā 'vidyamānaṃ vā na dhanābhyāgame samartham evam avipraṇāśo 'pi dattavipākaḥ san vidyamāno vā 'vidyamāno vā na śaknoti nirbhuktapatravat kartuḥ punar api vipākasambandhaṃ kartuṃ |

yaś cāyam avipraṇāśo 'smābhir uktaḥ sūtrāntaroktaś ***caturvidho***

Substantives

1 vinaṣṭe] : vinaṣṭā प (s1). 'pi] *stand.* V: vi बजल (γδ)(s2): pi दप (α)(o4). karmaṇy] : karma na vinaṣṭa प (s3). avipraṇāśākhya°] द Tib V: apipraṇāśākhya° ब (s2): apipraṇāsākhya° ज (s2, o4): apipraṇāśādhavya° ल (s2, s3): avipraṇāsākhya° प (o4).

2 tannimittakena] दप (α) Tib V: taṃnimittakena ब (o2): tanimittakena जल (δ)(s4). °ābhisambadhyata] *stand.*: °ābhisaṃvadhyata बल (γ)(o4): °ābhisavadhyata द (*om. anusvāra*)(o4, s4): °ābhisamvadhyata जप (o4): °ābhisaṃbadhyata V.

3 ddhanābhyāgamaṃ] बजप: ābhyāgamaṃ द (s4): ddhanātyāgamaṃ ल (s2): dhanābhyāgamaṃ V.

3-4 vidyamānaṃ vā 'vidyamānaṃ vā] : vidyamānaṃ avidyamānaṃ vā प (v7).[1]

4 dhanābhyāgame] : dhanātyāgame ल (s2). evam] प Tib V: evas बदजल (s2).

5 'vidyamāno vā] दप (α) Tib V: *om.* बजल (γδ)(v7).[2]

6 punar api vipāka°] : *om.* ब (v7). °sambandhaṃ] *stand.*: *om.* ब (v7): °saṃvandhaṃ दल (o2,o4): °samvandhaṃ जप (o4): °saṃbandhaṃ V. kartuṃ] दजप (αβ) Tib V: *om.* ब (v7): karttuṃ ल (o1).

Accidentals

1 °skandhena] जलप V: °skaṃdhena बद (o2). *After* skandhena] Ω Tib: ardhadaṇḍa V. °dharmāntarā°] : °dharmāṃtarā° ब (o2).

2 karttā] Ω: kartā V. |] बजप V: || दल (p2).

2-3 ṛṇapatraṃ] Ω: ṛṇapattraṃ V.

3 *After* nirbhuktaṃ] दजप V: ardhadaṇḍa बल (γ)(p4).

4 avipraṇāśo] : avipraṇāso प (o4).

5 'pi] *stand.* Tib V: pi Ω (o4).

6 °patravat] Ω: °pattravat V. kartuḥ] दजप V: karttuḥ बल (o1). *After* kartuḥ] : | द (p4). |] बप: || दजल V (p2).

7 avipraṇāśo] : avipraṇāso प (o4). sūtrāntaro°] : sūtrāṃtaro° ब (o2).

Parallels

1-2 sopacayena dhanaskandhena tathā vinaṣṭe 'pi karmaṇy avipraṇāśākhyadharmāntarāvasthānāt tannimittakena phalenābhisambadhyata eva karttā | 】 nor gyi phuṅ po bskyed daṅ bcas par 'oṅ ba de bźin du las skad cig ma 'gags su zin kyaṅ de'i rgyu las byuṅ ba chud mi za ba źes bya ba'i chos yod pas byed pa po'i las kyi 'bras bu chud mi za źiṅ 'bras bu khyad par daṅ bcas pa 'oṅ bar 'gyur ro | | *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986: 519,[6] T1566.$100c_{27\text{-}28}$ 至於後時子本俱得。業亦如是。能得後果。業雖已壞由有不失法在): nor skyed daṅ bcas te 'oṅ bar 'gyur ba de bźin du | las skad cig ma 'gags su zin kyaṅ | de'i rgyu las byuṅ ba chud mi za'i chos skye ba de yod pas byed pa po'i las kyi 'bras bu chud mi za źiṅ 'oṅ bar 'gyur ro | | *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:228).

2-6 yathā ca ṛṇapatraṃ dātur ddhanābhyāgamaṃ kṛtvā nirbhuktaṃ sat punar api vidyamānaṃ vā 'vidyamānaṃ vā na dhanābhyāgame samartham evam avipraṇāśo 'pi dattavipākaḥ san vidyamāno vā 'vidyamāno vā na śaknoti nirbhuktapatravat kartuḥ punar api vipākasaṃban-dhaṃ kartuṃ | 】 ji ltar nor bdag gi nor phyir źugs na bu lon gyi dpaṅ rgya ror 'gyur ba de ltar | byed pa pos 'bras bu myoṅ na chud mi za ba yaṅ de bźin du 'gyur ro | *Akutobhayā* (HUNTING-TON, 1986:411)[7]: ji ltar nor bdag gis nor phyir bkug ste | 'bras bu spyad zin na dpaṅ rgya yod kyaṅ yaṅ daṅ yaṅ du nor 'daḥ bar mi nus pa de ltar | byed pa pos 'bras bu myoṅ zin na chud mi za bas kyaṅ yaṅ daṅ yaṅ 'bras bu bskyed par mi nus te | *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:228): ji ltar nor bdag gi nor phyir khugs na bu lon gyi dpaṅ rgya ror 'gyur ba de ltar byed pa pos 'bras bu myoṅ na chud mi za ba yaṅ de bźin du 'gyur ro | | *Prajñāpradipa* (AMES, 1986:519;[8] T1566.$100c_{28}$-$101a_{2}$ 能令行人得勝果報。亦如債主既得財已。於負債人前毀其本劵。如是如是。不失法能與造業者果已。其體亦壞).

7-1 yaś cāyam avipraṇāśo 'smābhir uktaḥ sūtrāntaroktaś caturvidho dhātutaḥ sa kāmarūpārūpyā-vacarānāśravabhedāt | | 】 chud mi za ba de ni 'dod pa daṅ gzugs daṅ gzugs med par gtogs pa daṅ | zag pa med pa'i khams kyi bye brag las rnam pa bźir 'gyur ro | | *Akutobhayā* (HUNTING-TON, 1986:411-412), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:519; T1566.$101a_{2\text{-}3}$ 約界有四。云何爲四。謂欲界色界無色界及無漏界): 欲界繫色界繫無色界繫亦不繫 *Chung lun* (T1564.$22c_{6}$): chud mi za ba'i chos de ni khams las rnam pa bźir 'gyur te | 'dod par gtogs pa daṅ | gzugs su gtogs pa daṅ | gzugs med par gtogs par daṅ | zag pa med pa'o | | *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II: 228).

Notes

[1] This phrase is written in smaller script in प indicating a correction propria manu. In the margin above is written "vāvidyamānaṃ 1" in another hand. This probably indicates a cor-rection made by an editor after the scribe wrote a first draft of the text (cf. MACDONALD, 2003a). In this case, the scribe forgot to erase the editorial note after he had inserted his cor-rection in the smaller script. The scribe seems, however, not to have made the correction cor-rectly, since the correction stipulates a vā-akṣara after vidyamānaṃ as also attested by the other mss, but this vā has been omitted the scribe.

[2] V emends this phrase.

[6] Prajñāpradīpa reads *skyed daṅ bcas pa 'oṅ bar 'gyur ba* and inserts śad after *zin kyaṅ* and *yod pas.*

[7] *Nor bdag gi* has been emended from *nor bdag gis; ror* has been emended from *rod.*

[8] *Nor bdag gi* has been emended from *nor bdag gis.*

dhātutaḥ sa kāmarūpārūpyāvacarānāśravabhedāt | | ***prakṛtyā 'vyākṛtaś ca***
saḥ | kuśalākuśalatvenāvyākaraṇād avyākṛta evāvipraṇāśaḥ | yady asāv
akuśalā·nāṅ karmmaṇām akuśalaḥ syāt tadā kāmavītarāgāṇāṃ na syāt | ज123b
yadi ca kuśalānāṃ kuśalaḥ syāt samucchinnakuśalamūlānāṃ sa na syāt |
tasmāt prakṛtyā 'vyākṛta evāsau | kiñ ca | | ◦ | | · V319

prahāṇato na praheyo ***bhāvanāheya eva vā*** | (Mmk 17.15ab)

sa cāyam avipraṇāśaḥ ***prahāṇato na praheyaḥ*** | pārthagjanikāni karmāṇi
darśanamārgeṇaiva prahīyante mā bhūd āryaḥ pṛthagjanakarmasamanvāgata
iti | avipraṇā·śas tu tatka·rmaprahāṇe 'pi darśanamārgeṇa na prahīyate | kin ब104b, V320
tu ***bhāvanā***mārgeṇa ***vā*** tasya prahāṇam bhavati | dhātusamatikramaṇa-

Substantives

1 kāmarūpārūpyā°] प Tib V: kāmarūpa-rūpyā° बदजल (s2). °āvacarānāśrava°] दप (α) Tib: °āvacarāṇāśrava° बजल (γδ)(s6): °āvacarānāsrava° V. ||] *em.* Tib V: *om.* Ω (p3).
2 1st |] *em.* Tib V: *om.* Ω (p3).[1]
3 kāmavītarāgāṇāṃ] दप (α) Tib: kāmavītarāgānāṃ बजल (γδ)(s6): kāmaṃ vītarāgāṇāṃ V.[2]
4 kuśalaḥ] : kuśala द (s4).
5 prakṛtyā 'vyākṛta] प Tib: prakṛtyāṃ vyākṛta बजल (γδ)(s3): prakṛtyāvyākṛta द (o4): prakṛtyavyākṛta V.[3] kiñ] प: kiṃ बदल V (o3): ki ज (s4).
6 prahāṇato] दप (α) V: prahānato बजल (γδ)(s6). praheyo] दप (α) V: praheyā बजल (γδ)(s2).
7 pārthagjanikāni] : prārthagjanikāni द (s3).
8 °mārgeṇaiva] दप (α): °mārgenaiva बजल (γδ) V (s6). pṛthagjana°] : pṛgjana° द (s4).[4] °samanvāgata] बदज (βγ) Tib V: °samatvāgata ल (s2): °samvanvāgata प (s3).
9 avipraṇāśas] बजल (γδ) Tib V: avipraṇāśās द (s1): avipraṇāsas प (o4). tatkarma°] : datkarma° द (s2). darśanamārgeṇa] : darśanamārgena द (s6).[5]
10 prahāṇam] प: prahāṇaṃ बदल V (o3): prahāṇa ज (s4).

Accidentals

2 °āvipraṇāśaḥ] *stand.* V: °āvipraṇāsaḥ Ω (o4). 2nd |] जप Tib V: || बल (p2): *om.* द (p3).
3 akuśalānāṅ] प: akuśalānāṃ बदजल V (o3). karmmaṇām] प: karmaṇām बदजल V (o1). *After* 1st syāt] Ω: ardhadaṇḍa V. |] बप V: || दजल (p2).
4 *After* 1st syāt] : || द (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V. |] बप V: || दजल (p2).

5 |】 प Tib: *om.* बद्जल (p3): || V. || ◦ ||】 प: | बद् V (p5): || जल (p5).
6 |】 बद्प V: || जल (p2).
7 avipraṇāśaḥ】 द्प (α) V: avipraṇāsaḥ बजल (γδ)(o4). |】 प Tib: *om.* बद्जल V (p3).
8 prahīyante】 : prahīyaṃte ब (o2). *After* prahīyante】 प Tib V: | ब (p4): || द्जल (p4).
9 1st |】 बप V: || द्जल (p2). 'pi】 *stand.* V: pi Ω (o4). 2nd |】 प Tib: *om.* बद्जल (p3): ardhadaṇḍa V. kin】 प: kiṃ बद्जल V (o3).
10 |】 प Tib V: *om.* बद्ज (p3): ardhadaṇḍa ल (p1).

Parallels

1-2 prakṛtyā 'vyākṛtaś ca saḥ| kuśalākuśalatvenāvyākaraṇād avyākṛta evāvipraṇāśaḥ|】 de yaṅ raṅ bźin luṅ ma bstan||chud mi za ba de yaṅ raṅ bźin gyis dge ba daṅ mi dge ba ñid du brda' mi sprod pa'i phyir luṅ du ma bstan pa yin te| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:412)[6]: de yaṅ raṅ bźin luṅ ma bstan||de yaṅ raṅ bźin gyis dge ba daṅ mi dge bar luṅ du ma bstan pa yin no|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:228): de yaṅ raṅ bźin luṅ ma bstan||dge ba daṅ mi dge ba ñid du brda mi sprod pa'i phyir ro|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:519; passage heavily para-phrased in the Chinese translation, T1566.101a$_{3-6}$).

6 prahāṇato na praheyo bhāvanāheya eva vā|】 spoṅ bas spaṅ ba ma yin te||bsgom pas spaṅ ba ñid kyaṅ yin|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:412), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:228), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:519-520; T1566.101a$_{7}$ 不爲見道斷 而是修道斷): 見諦所不斷但思惟所斷 *Chung lun* (T1564.22b$_{24}$).

7 sa cāyam avipraṇāśaḥ prahāṇato na praheyaḥ|】 chud mi za ba de ni sdug bsṅal la sogs pa mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba spoṅ bas spaṅ ba ma yin te| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:412)[7]: 見諦所不斷 *Chung lun* (T1564.22c$_{8}$): de ni sdug bsṅal daṅ kun 'byuṅ daṅ 'gog pa daṅ lam mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba spoṅ bas spaṅ ba ma yin te| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II: 228), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:520;[8] T1566.101a$_{9}$ 此謂見苦集滅道所不斷).

8-9 mā bhūd āryaḥ pṛthagjanakarmasamanvāgata iti|】 'phags pa yaṅ so so'i skye bo'i las daṅ ldan par gyur na ni mi ruṅ ba'i phyir ro|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:521;[9] T1566.101a$_{22}$ 聖人應具足有凡夫業).

10 kin tu bhāvanāmārgeṇa vā tasya prahāṇam bhavati|】 'bras bu 'pho ba na bsgom pa'i lam gyis spaṅ ba daṅ| 'bras bu bskyed pas kyaṅ spaṅ ba ñid yin no|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:412): 從一果至一果。於中思惟所斷 *Chung lun* (T1564.22c$_{8-9}$): de ni 'bras bu gźan du 'pho ba na bsgom pas spaṅ bar bya ba yin no|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:229): 'bras bu 'pho ba na bsgom pa'i lam gyis spaṅ ba yin pa'i phyir ro|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:520; T1566.101a$_{9-10}$ 謂修道進向後果時斷).

Notes

1 The emended daṇḍas have been adopted for the sake of comprehension.

2 DE JONG (1978b:221) adopts the reading of द.

3 DE JONG (1978b:221) adopts the reading of द.

4 Corrected to *pṛthagjana*° with a *tha*-akṣara written above the line.

5 In द, the *n*-akṣara is corrected to *ṇ* with *ṇ* written above the line.

6 Huntington has *brta'* instead of *brda',* although the reading *brda'* is attested in the criti-cal apparatus for DC.

7 HUNTINGTON writes *na* instead of *ni* and omits *bas spaṅ.*

8 AMES writes *ma yin pa'i phyir ro* instead of *ma yin te.*

9 In *Prajñāpradīpa,* this sentence is, however, placed in the commentary to Mmk 17.16.

praheya eva veti vāśabdo vikalpārthaḥ| yataś caivam avipraṇāśaḥ · karma- ल91b vināśe 'pi na naśyati karmaprahāṇe 'pi na prahīyate|

tasmād avipraṇāśena ***jāyate karmaṇāṃ phalam***| (Mmk 17.15cd)

yadi punar asyāvipraṇāśasya karmaṇaḥ prahāṇena prahāṇāt ***prahāṇataḥ*** prahāṇaṃ ***syāt***| ***karmaṇaś*** ca ***saṃkrameṇa*** karmaṇo vināśena karmāntara-saṃmukhībhāvena vināśaḥ syāt ko ***doṣaḥ*** syād iti| ucyate|| ◦ ||

prahāṇataḥ praheyaḥ syāt ***karmaṇaḥ saṃkrameṇa vā***|
yadi doṣāḥ prasajyeraṃs ***tatra karmavadhādayaḥ***| (Mmk 17.16)

yadi darśanamārgeṇa pārthagjanikakarmavad avipraṇāśaḥ prahīyeta tadā karmaṇo nāśa eva syāt| karmavināśāc cāryāṇā·m iṣṭāniṣṭakarmaphala- ज124a vipākaḥ pūrvvakarmahetuko na syāt| · akṛtasyaiva karmaṇaḥ phalodayaḥ V321 syāt| karmaphalābhāvadarśanāc ca mithyādarśanaṃ syād {iti}| evaṃ karmavadhādayo doṣāḥ prasajyante prahāṇataḥ praheyatvābhyupagame saty avipraṇāśasya| evaṃ karmaṇaḥ saṃkrame 'pi yojyaṃ|| ◦ ||

Substantives

1 eva veti**]** *em.* Tib: eveti Ω V (s4).

3 avipraṇāśena**]** दप (α) Tib V: api praṇāśena बज (γ)(s2): api praṇāṇena ल (s2). karmaṇāṃ**]** : karmāṇā ज (s2, s4).

4 *After* punar**]** Ω Tib (DE JONG, 1978b: 221): apy V.

5 saṃkrameṇa**]** : sakrameṇa द (s4).

6 °bhāvena**]** : °bhāve प (v4).

7 praheyaḥ**]** : prahetaḥ ज (s2).

8 yadi doṣāḥ**]** : [2]⌊doṣāḥ⌋ प (*lacuna*).

9 °mārgeṇa**]** बजप (αγ) Tib V: °mārgeṇar द ल (β)(s3). °karmavad**]** : °karnavad द (s2). avipraṇāśaḥ**]** : aviṇāśaḥ ज (s4). prahīyeta**]** : prahīyate द (v1).

10 nāśa**]** Ω: [vi]nāśa V. syāt**]** : [2] प (*lacuna*).

10-11 karmavināśāc…°vipākaḥ**]** : ⌊kar⌋[2]i[4]⌊ṇām⌋ i⌊ṣṭāni⌋ṣṭakarmaphalavi[1]⌊kaḥ⌋ प *lacuna*.

11 pūrvvakarma°**]** प Tib: pūrvakarmaphala° बदजल V (o1, s3).

12 karmaphalābhāvadarśanāc】 : karmaphalā[bhāvādarśa]nāc प (*lacuna*). mithyādarśanaṃ】 बदल (βγ) Tib V: mithyādarśana ज (s4): [1]i[4] प (*lacunae*). syād iti】 : [3] प (*lacuna*).

12-13 evaṃ karma°】 : [3]rma° प (*lacuna*).

13 prahāṇataḥ】 दजप Tib V: pradānataḥ ब (s2, s6): pradāṇataḥ ल (s2). °ābhyupagame】 : °ātyupagame ल (s2).

14 avipraṇāśasya】 द Tib V: aripraṇāśasya ब जल (γδ)(s2): avipraṇāsasya प (o4). yojyaṃ...tu saḥ (*line 2*)】 [32] saḥ प (*lacuna*).

Accidentals

1 vāśabdo】 *stand.* Tib V: vāśavdo Ω (o4). |】 बप: || दजल V (p2).

2 1st 'pi】 *stand.* V: pi Ω (o4). *After* naśyati】 : | Tib ब (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V. 2nd 'pi】 *stand.* V: pi Ω (o4). |】 प Tib V: *om.* बदजल (p3).

3 phalam】 प: phalaṃ बदजल V (o3). |】 बजप: || दल V (p2).

4 °āvipraṇāśasya】 : °āvipraṇāsasya द (o4). |】 बप: || दजल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V.

6 |】 दप Tib V: || बल (p2): *om.* ज (p3). || ◦ ||】 प: || बजल (p5): | द V (p5).

7 |】 बप V: || दजल (p2).

8 |】 बप: || द V (p2): *om.* जल (p3).

9 *After* prahīyeta】 Ω: ardhadaṇḍa V.

10 |】 ब Tib V: || दजल (p2).

11 |】 दप V: || बजल (p2).

12 1st |】 बप V: || दजल (p2). 2nd |】 ब V: || दजल (p2): [1] प.

13 prasajyante】 : prasajyaṃte ब (o2).

14 |】 बप V: || दजल (p2). 'pi】 *stand.* V: pi Ω (o4). || ◦ ||】 *em.*: *om.* बदज: ardhadaṇḍa ल: || V.[3]

Parallels

10-1 dhātusamatikramaṇapraheya eveti vāśabdo vikalpārthaḥ|】 kyaṅ źes bya ba'i sgra ni 'bras bu bskyed pas kyaṅ spaṅ ba ñid yin no źes rnam par brtag pa'i don to|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:520; om. T1566).

3 tasmād avipraṇāśena jāyate karmaṇāṃ phalam|】 de phyir chud mi za ba yis||las kyi 'bras bu bskyed par 'gyur|| *Akutobhayā* (Huntington, 1986:412), *Buddhapālita* (Saito, 1984.II:229), *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:520; T1566.101a$_8$ 以是不失法 諸業有果報): 以是不失法 諸業有果報 *Chung lun* (T1564.22b$_{25}$).

7-8 prahāṇataḥ praheyaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ saṃkrameṇa vā| yadi doṣāḥ prasajyeraṃs tatra karmavadhādayaḥ|】 gal te spoṅ bas spaṅ ba daṅ||las 'pho ba daṅ mthun gyur na||de la las 'jig la sogs pa'i||skyon rnams su ni thal bar 'gyur|| *Akutobhayā* (Hunting-ton, 1986:413), *Bud-dhapālita* (Saito, 1984.II:229), *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:520-521;[1] T1566.101a$_{16\text{-}17}$ 若見道所斷 彼業至相似 則得壞業等 如是之過咎): 若見諦所斷 而業至相似 則得破業等 如是之過咎 *Chung lun* (T1564.22b$^2_{6\text{-}27}$).[2]

12-13 karmaphalābhāvadarśanāc ca mithyādarśanaṃ syād iti| evaṃ karmavadhādayo doṣāḥ prasajyante】 de la las kyi 'bras bu med pas las 'jig pa la sogs pa'i skyon rnams su thal bar 'gyur bas de ni mi 'dod do| *Akutobhayā* (Huntington, 1986:413), *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:521 (Ames inserts śad after *med pas*); T1566.101a$_{20}$ 即壞業果): de la las 'jig pa la sogs pa'i skyon rnams su thal bar 'gyur ro|| *Buddhapālita* (Saito, 1984.II:229).

Notes

[1] Ames, however, reads *mthoṅ bas* instead of *spoṅ bas.*

[2] It remains unclear what the Sanskrit reading might have been for the variants in pāda b attested by all the other commentaries apart from Pras.

[3] The emendation is based on the standard daṇḍa-use before mūla-verse in प.

sarveṣāṃ visabhāgānāṃ ***sabhāgānāṃ ca karmaṇāṃ/***
pratisandhau sadhātūnām ***eka utpadyate tu saḥ*** (Mmk 17.17)

bhinnajātīyāni karmāṇi visabhāgāni | sadṛśāni sabhāgāni | teṣāṃ ***sarveṣām*** eva ***sabhā·gānāṃ visabhā·gānāñ ca karmaṇāṃ*** kāmarūpārūpyadhātu- द55a, प58b
pratisandhiṣu sarvvakarmopamardana ***eka*** evāvipraṇāśa ***utpa·dyate|*** sa cāpi ब105a
sadhātūnāṃ samānadhātukānām evotpadyate na visabhāga{dhātukā}nāṃ | | ◦ | |

karmaṇaḥ karmaṇo dṛṣṭe ***dharma utpadyate tu saḥ|***
dviprakārasya sarvasya ***vipakve 'pi ca tiṣṭhati|*** (Mmk 17.18)

Substantives

2 pratisandhau **]** ज: pratisaṃdhau बल V (o2): pratisadhau द (s4). utpadyate **]** बदल Tib V: utpadyata ज (s2).

3 bhinna° **]** बद Tib V: linna° जल (s2): bhina° प (o4). sadṛśāni...visabhāgānāñ (*line 4*) **]** [23]gānāñ प (*lacuna*).[1]

4 ca **]** : *om.* ब (s4). karmaṇāṃ **]** : karmaṇā द (s4).

5 °karmopamardana **]** बजप (αγ) Tib: °karmopadena द (s4): °karmāpamardana ल V (v3).[2] utpadyate **]** *em.* V: upapadyate बज ल (γδ)(v8): utpadyante द (s7): ⌊ut⌋[3] प (*lacuna*). sa cāpi...°dhātukānāṃ (*line 6)* **]** [37] प (*lacuna*).[3]

6 sadhātūnāṃ **]** *em.* Tib V: dhātūnāṃ बदज ल (v4).[4] evotpadyate **]** बजल (γδ) Tib V: avotpadyate द (s2).

7 karmaṇaḥ karmaṇo dṛṣṭe dharma utpadyate tu saḥ **]** : ⌊karmaṇaḥ karmaṇo dṛṣṭe dharma utpadyate tu saḥ⌋ प (*lacuna*).[5]

8 dviprakārasya...avipraṇāśākhyo (*line 9*) **]** [22]praṇāśākhyo प (*lacuna*).[6] vipakve **]** *em.* Tib V: vipakṣe बदजल (βγδ)(v5).[7]

9 avipraṇāśākhyo **]** : avipraṇāśokhyo ज (s2). karmaṇaś **]** : karmaṇaḥ V: karmaṇaḥś ज (s3).

Accidentals

1 visabhāgānāṃ **]** द: viśabhāgānāṃ बजल (o4): viṣabhāgānāṃ V.[8] | **]** बद V: *om.* ज (p3): || ल (p2).

2 *After* saḥ **]** : || द Tib V (p4).

3 visabhāgāni **]** Ω: viṣabhāgāni V. 1[st] | **]** प Tib: *om.* बदजल (p3): ardhadaṇḍa V. 2[nd] | **]** *em.* Tib: *om.* बदजल (p3): ardhadaṇḍa V.[9]

4 *After* sabhāgānāṃ **]** बदज (βγδ): ardhadaṇḍa ल (p4): ca V. visabhāgānāñ **]** *em.*: visabhāgānāṃ बदजल: [-]gānāñ प (*lacuna*): viṣabhāgānāṃ V.[10]

5 °pratisandhiṣu **]** : °pratisaṃdhiṣu ल V (o2). sarvva° **]** प: sarva° बदजल V (o1). *After* evāvipraṇāśa **]** बप V Tib: || दल (p4): | ज (p4). | **]** ब V: || दजल (p2).

6 visabhāga° **]** : viṣabhāga° V. || ◦ || **]** प: | बद (p1): *om.* ज (p3): || ल V (p2).

7 | **]** बज V: *om.* द (p3): || ल (p2): [-] प (*lacuna*).

8 'pi **]** *stand.* V: pi बदजल (o4). | **]** ब: || दजल V (p2).

Parallels

1-2 sarveṣāṃ visabhāgānāṃ sabhāgānāṃ ca karmaṇāṃ| pratisandhau sadhātūnām eka utpadyate tu saḥ】khams mtshuṅs las ni cha mtshuṅs daṅ||cha mi mtshuṅs pa thams cad kyi||de ni ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe||gcig pu kho na skye bar 'gyur|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986: 413-414), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II230), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:521; T1566.101a$_{27\text{-}28}$ 一切諸行業 相似不相似 現在未終時 一業一法起): 一切諸行業 相似不相似 一界初受身 爾時報獨生 *Chung lun* (T1564.22b$_{28\text{-}29}$).

3 bhinnajātīyāni karmāṇi visabhāgāni| sadṛśāni sabhāgāni|】las cha mtshuṅs pa ni rig mthun pa'o||cha mi mtshuṅs pa ni rigs mi mthun pa'o|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:521; T1566. 101a$_{29}$-101b$_{1}$ 相似者。謂同類業。... 不相似者。謂業種差別).

3-5 teṣāṃ sarveṣām eva sabhāgānāṃ visabhāgānāñ ca karmaṇāṃ kāmarūpārūpyadhātu pratisan-dhiṣu sarvvakarmopamardana eka evāvipraṇāśa utpadyate|】khams mtshuṅs pa'i las cha mtshuṅs pa daṅ cha mi mtshuṅs pa thams cad kyi chud mi za ba de'i tshe 'di la re re las skyes pa dag ni ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe de dag thams cad 'gag pa na yaṅ gcig pu kho na skye bar 'gyur ro|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:230): de dag thams cad kyi chud mi za ba de tshe 'di la re re las bskyed pa dag ni ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i dus kyi tshe de dag thams cad 'gag pa na yaṅ gcig pu kho na skye bar 'gyur ro|| *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:521-522; om. T1566).

7-8 karmaṇaḥ karmaṇo dṛṣṭe dharma utpadyate tu saḥ| dviprakārasya sarvasya vipakve 'pi ca tiṣṭhati|】tshe 'di la ni las daṅ las||rnam pa gñis po thams cad kyi||de ni tha dad skye 'gyur źiṅ||rnam par smin kyaṅ gnas pa yin|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:414), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:230), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:522; T1566.101b$_{4\text{-}5}$ 如是二種業 現在受果報 或言受報已 此業猶故在): 如是二種業 現世受果報 或言受報已 而業猶故在 *Chung lun* (T1564.22c$_{1\text{-}2}$).

Notes

[1] The size of the lacuna corresponds to the 23 akṣaras attested by the other mss.

[2] The form *karmāpamardana* is attested by EDGERTON, 1953.II:43. DE JONG (1978b:222), by referring to two occurrences of *upamardena* at Pras 99$_{13}$ and 103$_{11}$, suggests an emendation of V's reading to *karmopamarda.* The reading *°karmopamardana* attested here by mss बजप is, however, equally possible and has been adopted without need of emendation.

[3] The lacuna seems longer than the 26 akṣaras attested by the other mss.

[4] V also emends the *sa*-akṣara. Given that this word is quoted from the root-verse, where the form is *sadhātūnām,* it seems reasonable to emend it accordingly, which is also supported by the Tibetan translation.

[5] Only the lower part of the line is legible in प due to damage of the upper edge of folio.

[6] The size of the lacuna corresponds to the 22 akṣaras attested by the other mss.

[7] The emendation is supported by the commentary below (Pras 322$_{2}$), where ms प attests the form *vipakve.*

[8] As indicated by DE JONG (1978b:221-222), the upasarga *vi~* does not cause the sibilant in the *sa*-prefix to become retroflex; hence such a change is not included in the rules for retroflex sibilant change by Pāṇini (cf. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 8.3.55ff).

[9] The daṇḍa is added as required by the sense.

[10] The emendation adopts the homorganic nasal of प.

sa cāyam avipraṇāśākhyo dharmaḥ ***sarvvasyai***va karmaṇaś cetanāceta-
yitvāsvabhāvasya sāśravā·nāśravabhedena vā ***dviprakāra***bhinna***sya dṛṣṭe*** V322
dharma ihaiva janmani ***karmaṇaḥ karmaṇa ekai***ko 'vipraṇāśa ***utpadyate***| sa
cāyam avipraṇāśo ***vipakve 'pi*** vipāke nāvaśyaṃ nirudhyate | nirbhuktapatra-
vac ca vidyamāno 'pi san na śaknoti punar api vipaktuṃ ·| | ◦ | | ज124b

phalavyatikra·mād vā sa maraṇād vā nirudhyate| ल92a
anāśravaṃ sāśravañ ca vibhāgaṃ tatra lakṣayet| (Mmk 17.19)

Substantives

1-2 cetanācetayitvā° 】 दप (α) Tib V: cetanā-cetayitvāt बजल (γδ)(s3).
2 sāśravānāśrava°】 : sāśravānāsrava° ल (o4): sāsravānāsrava° V. dviprakāra° 】 दप Tib (α) V: viprakāra° बजल (γδ)(v4). dṛṣ-ṭe 】 : dṛ⌊ṣṭ⌋[-] प (*lacuna*).
3 dharma】 *em.* Tib V: dharme बद्जल (βγδ) (s6): [2] प (*lacuna*). ihaiva janmani】 : ⌊ih⌋[2]⌊mani⌋ प (*lacuna*). karmaṇaḥ 】 : ⌊karmmaṇaḥ⌋ प (*lacuna*). 2nd karmaṇa 】 द Tib V: karmeṇa बजल (γδ)(v5): ⌊ka][-] ⌊maṇ⌋[-] प (*lacunae*). ekaiko 】 : ⌊eka⌋[-] ⌊ko⌋ प (*lacuna*).
4 cāyam】 बद्प (αβ) Tib V: cādyam जल (δ) (s2). vipakve】 प Tib V: vipakṣe बद्जल (βγδ)(v5). nirudhyate】 : ⌊nirudhyate⌋ प (*lacuna*).
4-5 nirbhuktapatravac】 : ⌊ni⌋[-]⌊bhuktapa⌋[2] प (*lacunae*): nirbhuktapattravac V.
5 ca…śaknoti】 : [8] śaknoti प (*lacuna*).[1] vipaktuṃ 】 दजप (αβ) Tib V: vipektuṃ बल (γ)(s2).
6 nirudhyate】 : rirudhyate ल (s2).
7 anāśravaṃ sāśravañ 】 प Tib: anāśravaṃ smaśravaṃ बजल (γδ)(s2, o3): anāśrava-syaśravaṃ द (s2, o3): anāsravaṃ sāsravaṃ V. *After* vibhāgaṃ】 दप Tib V: mss बजल contain a longer dittography (s3) repea-ting Pras $322_{1\text{-}5}$.[2]

Accidentals

1 *After* dharmaḥ】 दप V: | ब (p4): || जल (p4). sarvvasyaiva】 प: sarvasaiva बद्जल V (o1).
3 *After* 1st karmaṇaḥ】 : | द (p4). 'vipraṇāśa】 *stand.* Tib V: vipraṇāśa बजल (o4): 'vipraṇāsa द (o4): '⌊vipra⌋ṇāśa प (*lacuna*). |】 बद्प V: || जल (p2).
4 'pi】 *stand.* V: pi Ω (o4). |】 प Tib: *om.* बद्जल V (p3).[3]
5 'pi】 *stand.* V: pi बद्जल (o4). || ◦ ||】 प: | बद् V (p5): *om.* ज (p5): || ल (p5).
6 |】 बद्प V: || जल (p2).
7 |】 प: || दजल V (p2): *om.* ब (p3).

Parallels

1-3 sa cāyam avipraṇāśākhyo dharmaḥ sarvvasyaiva karmaṇaś cetanācetayitvāsvabhāvasya sāśra-vānāśravabhedena vā dviprakārabhinnasya dṛṣṭe dharma ihaiva janmani karmaṇaḥ karmaṇa

ekaiko 'vipraṇāśa utpadyate|】 tshe 'di la ni las daṅ las so so ba sems pa daṅ bsam pa'i bye brag gam dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i bye brag gi rnam pa gñis po thams cad kyi chud mi za ba gaṅ yin pa de ni tha dad par skye bar 'gyur ro|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:414), *Buddha-pālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:230; om. *bye brag gam* and *bye brag gi*), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986: 522; only partially attested in T1566.101b$_6$ 二業者。謂思及從思生).

3-5 sa cāyam avipraṇāśo vipakve 'pi vipāke nāvaśyaṃ nirudhyate| nirbhuktapatravac ca vidyamāno 'pi san na śaknoti punar api vipaktuṃ】 rnam par smin na yaṅ gnas pa yin te| de ni las rnam par smin pa'i rgyus 'gag pa ltar ṅes pa ñid ma yin no||de gnas su zin kyaṅ 'bras bu bskyed par ni mi nus te| 'bras bu bskyed zin pa'i phyir ṅes par spyad zin pa'i dpaṅ rgya bźin no|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:414-415), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:230-231),[4] *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:522).[5]

6-7 phalavyatikramād vā sa maraṇād vā nirudhyate| anāśravaṃ sāśravañ ca vibhāgaṃ tatra lakṣayet|】 de ni 'bras bu 'phos pa daṅ||śi bar gyur na 'gag par 'gyur||de yi rnam dbye zag med daṅ||zag daṅ bcas par śes par bya|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:415), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:231), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:522; T1566.101b$_{14\text{-}15}$ 度果及命終 至此時而滅 有漏無漏等 差別者應知): 若度果已滅 若死已而滅 於是中分別 有漏及無漏 Chung lun (T1564.22c$_{3\text{-}4}$).

Notes

[1] The size of the lacuna corresponds to the paradosis of the other mss.

[2] The dittography reads: *[tatraikai]ko 'vipraṇāśa utpa(dya)te|(|)sa cādyam avipraṇāśo vipakṣe pi vipāke nāvaśyaṃ nirudhyate nirbhukta-patravac ca vidyamāno pi san na śaknoti punar api vipektuṃ phalavyatikramā[d](t) vā sa maraṇād vā nirudhyate||*. The syllables marked with brackets in this variant are omitted in ms जल. The syllables marked with paren-theses are omitted in ms ब. Ms ज inserts dvidaṇḍa after *nāvvaśyaṃ nirudhyate* and after *°vyatikramāt.* Ms ल reads *avipraṇāśa* for *'vipraṇāsa* and *nirudhya* for the 2nd *nirudhyate.* After *vipektuṃ,* ms ब inserts a daṇḍa and ms ल a dvidaṇḍa. In mss बज, the dittography has been marked, probably by another hand; thus, in ms ब it is marked with double caption before and after the repeated lines, whereas in ms ज it is marked with a single caption. In ms ल, the ditto-graphy is left unmarked.

[3] The daṇḍa in प is partly damaged by lacuna.

[4] *Buddhapālita* omits *'bras bu bskyed zin pa'i phyir* and inserts *las rnam par smin kyaṅ brgya la ji srid du 'khrugs par ma gyur pa de srid kyi bar du gnas te| 'khrugs par gyur na ni 'gag go|* after the phrase *ṅes pa ñid ma yin no||.*

[5] The Chinese translation has a slightly expanded explanation, of which only the phrase 如已了之券 (T1566.101b$_{10}$) is parallel to Pras.

tatra ***phalavyatikramān nirudhyate*** yathoktaṃ bhāvanāheya eveti (Mmk 17.15b) | ***maraṇān nirudhyate*** yathoktaṃ

pratisandhau sadhātūnām eka utpadyate tu sa iti | (Mmk 17.17cd)

sa cāyaṃ sāśravāṇāṃ ***sāśravo*** 'nāśravāṇām ***anāśrava*** ity evam ***vibhāgan tatra lakṣayet*** | | tad evam | | ◦ | |

śūnyatā ca na cocchedaḥ saṃsāraś ca na śāśvataḥ |
karmaṇo 'vipraṇāśaś ca dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ | · (Mmk 17.20) V323

yasmāt karma kṛtaṃ san nirudhyate na svabhāvenāvatiṣṭhate tasmāt karmaṇaḥ svabhāvenānavasthānā·c ***chūnyatā*** copapadyate | ***na*** caivaṃ ब105b
karmaṇo 'navasthānād ***uccheda***darśanaprasaṃgo 'vipraṇāśaparigraheṇa karmavipākasadbhāvāt | vipākābhāve hi karmaṇa ucchedadarśanaṃ syāt |

Substantives

1 °kramān **]** : °kramāt ज (s6).
2 maraṇān **]** : maraṇan प (s2).
4 cāyaṃ **]** : cāya[-] प (*lacuna*). sāśravāṇāṃ **]** बजल (γδ): sāśravāsāṃ द (s2): sā-⌊śravāṇā⌋[-] प (*lacuna*): sāsravāṇāṃ V.
5 tatra **]** दप (α) Tib: *om.* बजल (γδ) V (v7).[1]
6 1st ca **]** बदपल Tib V; va ज (s2). cocche-daḥ **]** बजप Tib V: vācchedaḥ द (s2): voc-chedaḥ ल (s2). 2nd na **]** : *om.* ब (s4). śāś-vataḥ **]** Ω: śāśvataṃ V.
7 deśitaḥ **]** जलप (αδ) Tib V: deśito ब (v10): deśita द (s4).
9 °ānavasthānāc **]** दजप Tib V: the 1st *n* is added supra lineam in ब: ātavasthānā ल (s2, s4). copapadyate **]** : vopapadyate ल (s2). caivaṃ **]** बल (γ) Tib V: caiva दजप (αβ)(v4).[2]
10 'navasthānād **]** : 'navasthanād ज (s2). °prasaṃgo **]** : °prasaṃgā ज (s2): °prasaṃ-gaḥ V. °parigraheṇa...°parikalpanā° (*line 1*) **]** *om.* ज.[3]

Accidentals

1 *After* nirudhyate **]** ब Tib V: || दजल (p4): | प (p4).
2 | **]** प Tib V: *om.* बदजल (βγδ)(p3). *After* nirudhyate **]** बजल Tib V: || द (p4): | प (p4). *After* yathoktaṃ **]** लप: | बद Tib (p4): || ज (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V.[4]
3 pratisandhau **]** जप: pratisaṃdhau बदल V (o2). sadhātūnām **]** बप V: sadhātūnāṃ दजल (o3). sa **]** Ω: saḥ V. *After sa* **]** Ω: ardhadaṇḍa V. | **]** प V: || बदजल (p2).

4 sāśravo 'nāśravāṇām anāśrava】 Ω: sāsravo 'nāsravāṇāṃ anāsrava V. evam】 प: evaṃ बद्जल V (o3). vibhāgan】 प: vibhāgaṃ बद्जल V (o3).
5 ||】 दजलप V: | ब (p1). evam】 प: evaṃ बद्जल V (o3). || ◦ ||】 प: *om.* बजल (γδ)(p5): | द V (p5).
6 |】 दप V: *om.* ब (p3): || जल (p2).
7 'vipraṇāśaś】 बद्प V: 'vipraṇāsaś ज (o4): vipraṇāsaś ल (o4). buddhena】 *stand.* Tib V: vuddhena Ω (o4). |】 प: *om.* बजल (p3): || द V (p2).
8 *After* °āvatiṣṭhate】 : | प Tib (p4): ardhadaṇḍa V.
9 |】 बप V: || दजल (p2).
10 *After* °prasaṃgo】 Ω: ardhadaṇḍa V. 'vipraṇāśa°】 Ω: avipraṇāśa° V.
11 1st |】 दप Tib: || बल (p2): ardhadaṇḍa V. 2nd |】 बप V: || दल (p2).

Parallels

1-3 tatra phalavyatikramān nirudhyate yathoktaṃ bhāvanāheya eveti| maraṇān nirudhyate yathoktaṃ pratisandhau sadhātūnām eka utpadyate tu sa iti|】 chud mi za ba de ni 'bras bu 'phos par gyur daṅ|śi bar gyur na 'gag par 'gyur te|de la 'bras bu 'phos par gyur pa ni bsgom pas spaṅ ba ñid daṅ|'bras bu bskyed pas spaṅ ba ñid yin no|śi bar gyur pa ni ñiṅ msthams sbyor ba'i tshe|gcig pu skye bar 'gyur ba kho na yin no| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:415): 'bras bu 'phos par gyur daṅ|śi bar gyur pa'o| de la 'bras bu 'phos par gyur pa ni bsgom pas spaṅ ba źes bstan pa yin no||śi bar gyur pa ni 'gag pa dag na ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe gcig pu kho na skye bar 'gyur ro||źes bstan pa yin no|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984. II:231), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:523;[5] only partially attested by the Chinese translation, T1566.101b$_{16-17}$ 此謂修道時斷者。如前命終時。相似不相似業。共有一不失法持者是也).

4-5 sa cāyaṃ sāśravāṇāṃ sāśravo 'nāśravāṇām anāśrava ity evam vibhāgan tatra lakṣayet||】 chud mi za ba'i rnam par dbye ba ni rnam pa gñis su śes par bya ste| zag pa med pa daṅ zag daṅ bcas pa'i las kyi bye brag gis so|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:415): de'i de yaṅ rnam par dbye na rnam pa gñis su śes par bya ste| zag pa med pa daṅ zag pa daṅ bcas pa'i las kyi bye brag gis so|| *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:231), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:523; T1566. 101b$_{18-20}$ 此不失法復有差別。云何差別。由漏無漏業別故。不失法亦有漏無漏).

6-7 śūnyatā ca na cocchedaḥ saṃsāraś ca na śāśvataḥ| karmaṇo 'vipraṇāśaś ca dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ|】 stoṅ pa ñid daṅ chad min daṅ||'khor ba daṅ ni rtag pa min||las rnams chud mi za ba'i chos||saṅs rgyas kyis ni bstan pa yin|| *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:416), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:231), *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:523; T1566. 101b$_{24-25}$ 雖空而不斷 雖有而不常 諸業不失法 此法佛所說): 雖空亦不斷 雖有亦不常 業果報不失 是名佛所說 *Chung lun* (T1564.22c$_{21-22}$).

Notes

[1] DE JONG (1978b:222) also adopts this reading.

[2] Ms प is blurred due to a lacuna above the line and it is difficult to determine whether it attests the anusvāra or not. In V's edition of Pras, the phrase *na caiva* is only attested in quotations from other sources, whereas the phrase *na caivaṃ* or *na caivam* is attested 23 times in Candrakīrti's own prose (incl. the present occurrence).

[3] Telehaplography due to saut du même au même.

[4] In ms ल, a dvidaṇḍa is added above the line.

[5] Prajñāpradīpa adds *bya ñid kyaṅ yin* after *bsgom pas spaṅ ba,* and replaces *'gag pa dag na* with *khams mtshuṅ las ni cha mtshuṅs daṅ||cha mi mtshuṅs pa thams cad kyi||de ni.*

avipraṇāśadharmasadbhāvād bījasantānasādharmyaparikalpanābhāvāc ca nānāgatijātiyonidhātubhedabhinnaś ca pāṃcagatikaḥ ***saṃsāro*** vicitraḥ siddho bhavati | ***na ca śāśvata***vādaprasaṅgaḥ karmaṇaḥ svarūpeṇānavasthānābhyupagamāt | ***karmaṇāñ cāvipraṇāśo*** 'vipraṇāśasadbhāvād iti | evaṃ niravaśeṣā·vidyānidrāpagamād vibuddhena ***buddhena*** bhagavatā yasmād ज125a ayan ***dharmo deśitas*** tasmād yat pūrvvam uktaṃ pareṇa |

tiṣṭhaty ā pākakālāc cet ***karma tan nityatām iyāt*** |
niruddhaṃ cen niruddhaṃ sat ***kim phalañ janayiṣyatīti*** (Mmk 17.6)

tad asmatpakṣe nopapadyata iti | tasmād asmābhir upavarṇṇitakalpanaiva nyāyyeti |

Substantives

1 °sadbhāvād】 बदप Tib V: °sadbhāvātaḥd ल (s3). °sādharmya°】 प V: °sādharma° ब ल (γ)(s4): °sadharmma° द (v4).

2 °yoni°】 : °yopti° द (s2). pāṃca°】 दप (α) Tib V: yāṃca° बजल (γδ)(s2).[1] vicitraḥ】 : vicitra° द (v4).

3-4 °ānavasthānābhy°】 दप (α) Tib: °āvasthānābhy° बज (γ) V (v2): °ānavasthānāty° ल (s2).[2]

4 *After* cāvipraṇāśo 】 दप (α) Tib V: 'vipraṇāśo बजल (γδ) (v9; *dittography*). 'vipraṇāśa° 】 बजल (γδ) Tib V: chavipraṇāśa° द (s2): 'vipraṇāsa° प (o4).

5 niravaśeṣā°】 : niravaśeṣo° ल (s2). °āvidyā°】 : °ānidyā° प (s2). °nidrāpagamād】 : °nidrāpagamāt ज (s6). buddhena】 *stand.* Tib: *om.* बदजल V (v7): vuddhena प (o4).[3]

6 deśitas】 बदप (αβ) Tib V: deśita जल (δ) (s4). tasmād】 : tasyāc ल (s2). yat】 बदप (αβ) Tib V: ya ज (s4): cat ल (s2).

7 tan】 : taṃn ब (s3).

8 janayiṣyatī°】 : janayiṣyati ब Tib V (s6). °īti】 : iti ब Tib V (s6).

9 nopapadyata】 : nopavadyata ल (s2).

10 nyāyyeti】 : nẏāyeti ज V (v4).

Accidentals

1 bīja°】 *stand.* V: vīja° बदलप (o4). °santāna°】 बप: °saṃtāna° दल V (o2).

3 |】 प Tib: *om.* बदजल (p3): ardhadaṇḍa V. °prasaṅgaḥ】 दप: °prasaṃgaḥ बजल V (o2).

4 1st |】 बप V: || दजल (p2). karmaṇāñ】 दप: karmaṇāṃ बजल V (o3). cāvipraṇāśo】 : cāvipraṇāso प (o4). 2nd |】 प: || बदजल V (p2).

5 vibuddhena】 *stand.* Tib V: vivuddhena Ω (o4).

6 ayan】 प: ayaṃ बद्जल V (o3). pūrvvam】 प: pūrvam बद्जल V (o1). |】 द् Tib V: || बजल (p2): *om.* प (p3).
7 |】 *em.* V: || Ω (p2).[4]
8 kim】 प: kiṃ बद्जल V (o3). phalañ】 प: phalaṃ बद्जल V (o3). *After* janayiṣyatī°】 Ω: | Tib V. *After* °īti】 प Tib: | ब V (p4): || द्जल (p4).
9 |】 ब V: || द्जल Tib (p2): *om.* प (p3). upavarṇṇita°】 द्जप: upavarṇita° बल V (o1).
10 |】 बद्प: || जल V (p2).

Notes

[1] In ms प, the akṣaras *°śca pāṃca°* are written in smaller writing indicating a correction propria manu. The *ga*-akṣara in *°gatikaḥ* is not legible.

[2] The negated form is also adopted by DE JONG (1978b:222).

[3] This word, attested by प and Tib, is the word from the root-text, which is being com-mented upon, and is, therefore, not a dittography.

[4] The emendation is based on the occurrence of this verse at Pras 311_8.

Chapter Two: Critical Tibetan Edition

D100b^6, G142b, N112a^3, Q48-2-7

XVII.

(las daṅ 'bras bu brtag pa źes bya ba rab tu byed pa bcu bdun pa'i 'grel pa'o)

(D100b$_6$) 'dir smras pa | 'khor ba ni yod pa ñid de | las daṅ (Q48-2-8) 'bras bu 'brel pa'i rten yin pa'i phyir ro | | 'di ltar gal te rgyun rnam par chad pa med pa'i rim pas skye ba daṅ 'chi ba gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa ñid · G143, Q48-
kyis rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'i (D100b$_7$) dṅos po 'jug pas 'du byed (Q48-3-1) rnams sam bdag 'khor bar gyur na ni | de'i tshe las daṅ 'bras bu 'brel par 'gyur na | ji skad smras pa'i 'khor ba med na ni | sems ni skyes ma thag tu 'jig pa'i phyir daṅ | las 'phen pa'i dus na rnam (Q48-3-2) par smin pa med pa'i phyir las daṅ 'bras bu'i (D101a$_1$) 'brel pa med pa kho nar 'gyur ro | | 'khor ba yod na D101a
ni 'dir byas pa'i las tshe rabs gźan du yaṅ rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu · V303
daṅ 'brel pa'i phyir las rnams 'bras (Q48-3-3) bu daṅ 'brel pa mi 'gal bar 'gyur ro | | de'i phyir las daṅ 'bras bu 'brel pa'i rten yin pa'i phyir 'khor

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Substantives

1-2 The title has been inserted by the editor on the basis on how it appears at the end of the chapter (D3860.110b).

5 'di ltar **]** : 'dir ltar Q (s1).[1]

8 gyur **]** : 'gyur Q (v1).[2]

9 smras pa'i **]** : smras pha'i N (s2).

14 'gyur ro **]** D Pras: mi 'gyur ro GNQ (*bad* v2).[3]

Accidentals

8 'brel par **]** Q: 'brel bar DGN (o4).[4]

11 'brel pa **]** Q: 'brel ba DGN (o4).

13 'brel pa **]** Q: 'brel ba DGN (o4).

Notes

[1] The double terminative particle in Q is grammatically unlikely.

[2] As indicated by HAHN (1996:165-166), the perfect stem (*gyur*) seems to be the most commonly used stem in such hypothetical constructions, which here represents the first optative verb in a Sanskrit hypothetical sentence using a double optative construction (*yadi... syāt, syāt tadānīm...*). The Tibetan perfect stem would thus indicate that "if the condition has taken place, then ..."

[3] A double negation *mi 'gal bar mi 'gyur ro* as attested by GNQ would contradict the meaning of the sentence and is to be rejected.

[4] In chapter 17 of Pras, DG attest both the forms *'brel ba* and *'brel pa,* whereas Q only attests the form *'brel pa.* The Dunhuang ms Pelliot Tibétain 551 attests the form *'breld pa* (cf. text in SCHOENING, 1995:408, 422), which in classical orthography gives the form *'brel pa* as adopted here. KHARTO (p. 190), however, gives *'breld* as the perfect stem and *'brel* as the present stem to be expected here.

(D101a$_2$) ba yod pa ñid do| |

las de dag kyaṅ gaṅ {yin} źiṅ| de'i 'bras bu yaṅ gaṅ źig {yin} źe na| de dag gi rab tu (Q48-3-4) dbye ba brjod par 'dod pas 'di skad du brjod de|

bdag ñid legs par · sdom pa daṅ| |gźan la phan 'dogs byams sems gaṅ| | N112b
de chos de ni 'di gźan du| | 'bras bu (D101a$_3$) ***dag gi sa bon yin| |*** (Mmk 17.2ab)

de la bdag tu ṅa (Q48-3-5) rgyal ba 'di la bźag ciṅ bskyed pas ***bdag ñid de***| phuṅ po la brten nas gdags pa'i gaṅ zag la bdag ces bya'o| |bdag ñid yaṅ
dag par sdom źiṅ| |yul dag la raṅ dbaṅ med par byed · ciṅ 'dod chags la V304
(Q48-3-6) sogs pa'i dbaṅ gis 'jug pa (D101a$_4$) zlog par byed pas na ***bdag ñid legs par sdom pa'o***| |sog ciṅ ñe bar sogs la dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i las rnam

Substantives

2 yaṅ】 : yad Q (s2).[1]
5 gźan du】 [2]
6 bźag】 GQ Pras: gźag DN (v1).[3]
6-7 ñid de】 GNQ: ñid do D (v3).[4]
9 'jug pa】 : 'jug pha G (s2). zlog】 D Pras: bzlog GNQ (v1).[5]

Accidentals

7 ||】 : | N (p1).
10 sog】 D: gsog GNQ (o4).[6] sogs】 D: gsog GNQ (o4).[7]

Notes

[1] The *ṅ*-letter has been carved too long in Q.

[2] HUNTINGTON's edition (1986:403) of the this verse in *Akutobhayā* gives *bźin du* instead of *gzhan du.*

[3] As the translation of the past participle *āhitaḥ* (Pras 303$_6$), the perfect stem *bźag* (cf. KHARTO, p. 220) is to be adopted.

[4] Since the following sentence elaborates the meaning of the present sentence, the semifinal particle de is adopted as the better reading.

[5] The futurum stem bzlog is rejected.

[6] The verbal stem *gsog* must be a secondary derivation from present stem *sog* or *sogs.* The root of this verb must be **tshogs* or **tshog* "to gather," as it also occurs in the noun *tshogs* "assemblage, gathering." The intransitive stems are *'tshogs,* P *tshogs,* F *'tshog,* and I *tshogs* (JÄSCHKE, 1881:460; KHARTO, p. 210). The transitive stems of *stsog* "to gather, collect" are *stsog,* P *bstsags,* F *bstsag,* I *stsogs* (KHARTO, p. 206). The stem *sog* or *sogs* (see below) is thus a simplification of the transitive present stem *stsog* (or **stsogs* when compared with the intransitive present stem *'tshogs*); its forms would be *sog(s),* P *bsags,* F *bsag,* I *sogs.* This stem is also known from the verbal-noun *sogs,* e.g., in the idiom *la sogs pa* (archaic form *la stsogs pa*). The stem *gsog* seems to be an orthographical variant derived from the original stem *sog(s)* by adding the neutral verbal prefix *g* for the present and imperative stems. It forms are *gsog,* P *bsags,* F *bsag,* I *gsogs* (KHARTO, p. 256). Hence, the reading *sog* of ms D is adopted as the more basic form of the verb, with *gsog* marked as an orthographical variant.

[7] *Sogs* is an orthographical variant of *sog* (see above). Since both forms are possible, it has not been emended to *sog* in spite of the slight inconsistency in the sentence.

par smin pa ’byin par nus pa la ṅes par byed pas na ***sems*** te | (Q48-3-7) sems {daṅ} yid {daṅ} rnam par śes pa źes bya ba ni de ñid kyi rnam · graṅs dag **G143b** go | | de’i phyir bdag ñid legs (D101a$_5$) par sdom pa srog gcod pa la sogs pa la ’jug pa las bzlog pa dge ba’i sems de ni ṅan ’gror ’gro ba las (Q48-3-8) ’dzin par byed pas ***chos*** źes bya’o | |

chos kyi sgra ’di ni gsuṅ rab las gsum du rnam par bźag ste | raṅ gi mtshan ñid ’dzin pa’i don {daṅ} | ’gro ba ṅan par ’gro ba las (D101a$_6$) ’dzin pa’i don {daṅ} | ’gro ba lṅa’i (Q48-4-1) ’khor bar ’gro ba las ’dzin pa’i don **Q48-4** gyis so | | de la zag pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ zag pa med pa thams cad ni raṅ gi mtshan ñid ’dzin pa’i don gyis na chos źes bya’o | | dge ba bcu la sogs (Q48-4-2) pa’i chos rnams ni |

’jig rten ’di daṅ pha rol tu | | chos spyod pa ni bde bar (D101a$_7$) ñal | | {źes bya ba der} ’gro ba ṅan par ’gro ba las ’dzin pa’i don gyis na chos źes bsñad do | | chos la skyabs su mchi’o źes bya ba der (Q48-4-3) ni ’gro ba lṅa’i ’khor bar ’gro ba las ’dzin pa’i don gyis na mya ṅan las ’das pa la {chos źes} brjod do | | ’dir ni ’gro ba ṅan par ’gro ba las ’dzin pa’i don (D101b$_1$) ñid **D101b** kyis chos kyi sgrar bźed do | | yaṅ ci bdag ñid (Q48-4-4) legs par sdom pa’i sems źig · gcig pu chos yin nam źe na | smras pa ma yin te | ’o na ci {źe na | } **N113a**

Substantives

1 la 】 : *las* Q (v3).
5 *After* byed pas 】 : na D (v9).[1]
6 bźag 】 : gźag D (v1).
9 med pa 】 : meṅ pa Q (s2).
12 chos spyod 】 : chos spyad N (v1).
18 *After* smras pa 】 NQ Pras: śad D (p4).

Accidentals

3 || 】 D: || with first | omitted NQ (p3).[2]
6 | 】 NQ: || D (p2).
12 pha rol tu 】 : pha rol du D (o4).[3] 1st || 】 D: *om.* GNQ (p3). 2nd || 】 D Pras: *om.* in NQ (p3).

Notes

[1] Being a translation of *iti,* the locative-I-particle is not commonly added after the instrumental particle (e.g., D3860.101a$_3$: *bskyed pas*). The particle was probably interpolated in D due to reminiscence with the three *gyis-na*-constructions at D3860.101a$_6$ and D3860. 101a$_7$.

[2] It is costumary to admit a śad after the letter *ga* affixed with a vowel-sign, as is the case here, but not after *ga* without a vowel-sign.

[3] The spelling *pha rol tu,* which presupposes the archaic form *rold,* is well-known, e.g., from the term *pha rol tu phyin pa.* The spelling *pha rol du,* which presupposes the archaic form *rol,* is, however, also attested in early sources, e.g., in Dunhuang ms no. IOL Tib J 784, British Library.

gźan la phan 'dogs pa daṅ ***byams*** pa'i · ***sems gaṅ*** yin pa de yaṅ chos yin no | | V305 {gźan la phan (Q48-4-5) 'dogs} byams sems źes bya ba (D101b$_2$) 'dir daṅ gi sgra źig mi mṅon par byas śiṅ bstan par rig par bya'o | | de la gźan rjes su 'dzin par byed pas na ***gźan la phan 'dogs*** pa'i sems te | bsdu ba'i dṅos po (Q48-4-6) bźi la źugs pa · daṅ | 'jigs pa las skyob pa {la sogs pa} la źugs pa'i sems gaṅ yin pa G24a de yaṅ chos yin no | | (D101b$_3$) mdza' bśes la 'byuṅ {źiṅ} sems can rnams daṅ 'gal ba med pa'i sems gaṅ yin pa (Q48-4-7) de ni ***byams*** pa'i ***sems*** so | | yaṅ na byams pa ni gñen bśes ñid yin te | {bdag la phan 'dogs pa'i} sems gaṅ yin pa de {ñid} byams pa'i sems yin no | | gaṅ źig sems rnam pa gsum (D101b$_4$) bstan pa de ni chos (Q48-4-8) źes bya ste | bzlog pa ni chos ma yin par sbyar bar bya'o | |

de ltar rab tu dbye ba bstan pa'i sems gaṅ yin pa ***de ni 'bras bu {dag} gi sa bon yin*** no | | rgyu gaṅ źig 'bras bu 'grub pa la thun moṅ ma yin pa de la (Q48-5-1) sa bon źes bya ste | dper na sā lu'i sa bon ni sā lu'i myu gu'i Q48-5 (D101b$_5$) {rgyu} yin pa lta bu'o | | sa la sogs pa thun moṅ pa gaṅ yin pa de ni

Substantives

2-3 daṅ gi sgra】 *em.* Pras: raṅ gi sgra Ω (v5).
6 la 'byuṅ】 *em.*: las 'byuṅ Ω.[1]
13 sa bon】 : sa phon N (s2). *After* de la】 GQ: ni DN (v9).[2]
15 {rgyu}】 : rgyu'i G (s1).

Accidentals

1 ||】 DQ: | N (p1).
6 ||】 NQ: | D (p1).
13 thun moṅ】 : thun moṅs Q (o4).[3]
14 1st sā lu'i】 DN Pras: sa lu'i NQ (o4).
2nd sā lu'i】 DN Pras: sa lu'i NQ (o4).
15 thun moṅ pa】 : thun moṅs pa Q (o4, cf. line 13).

Notes

[1] The emendation is based on Aṣṭādhyāyī 4.3.53.

[2] The particle ni is eliminated as an interpolated refinement.

[3] Q consistently writes *thun moṅs,* which seems to be a secondary form. The Dunhuang ms *India Office Library 189* at least twice attests the form *thun moṅ* (cf. text in SCHOENING, 1995:489), which has been adopted here. *Thun moṅ* seems to be a compound consisting of *thun* 'period, shift' and *moṅ* perhaps originally meaning 'inside' (?); cf. the archaic words *moṅ du chud pa* or *moṅ du chub* glossed with *khoṅ du chud pa* 'to put inside, to understand' (ZHANG, 1984:2122; BTSAN LHA, 1996:648-649) and *moṅ rtul* or *moṅ brtul* (lit. 'inside-dull') glossed with *blun po* 'fool' (ZHANG, 1984:2122; BTSAN LHA, 1996:649). The verbal stem *rmoṅ* 'to be dull, obscured' may be related but seems to carry a meaning not agreeing with the expression *moṅ du chud pa.* Likewise, the stem *moṅs* 'to obscure, defile' in the well-known compound *ñon moṅs* (transl. for Sanskrit kleśa) may be related but again has a sense not agreeing with *moṅ du chud pa* or *thun moṅ.*

sa bon ma yin gyi | de ni rgyu ñid {yin par zad do} | | de ji ltar yin pa de bźin du (Q48-5-2) 'dir yaṅ rnam par smin pa yid du 'oṅ ba mṅon par 'grub pa la sems rnam pa gsum sa bon yin te | skyes bu'i byed pa la sogs pa rnams ni (D101b_6) rgyu tsam du {zad do} | |

yaṅ dus gaṅ gi tshe sa bon 'bras bu'i sgrub (Q48-5-3) par byed pa yin źe na | ***'di gźan du*** { ***'bras bu dag gi*** źes bya ba gsuṅs te} | ***'di*** źes bya ba ni mthoṅ ba'i skye ba la yin la | ***gźan du*** źes bya ba ni ma mthoṅ ba'i skye ba la'o źes bya ba'i tha tshig go | 'di yaṅ luṅ las rgyas (Q48-5-4) par khoṅ du (D101b_7) chud par bya'o | |

de ltar re źig sems kyi · bdag ñid can gyi chos gcig · ñid rnam par bźag N113b, G144b nas slar yaṅ bcom ldan 'das |

draṅ sroṅ mchog gis las {rnams ni} | | ***sems pa daṅ ni bsams par*** (Mmk 17.2ab)
(Q48-5-5) te rnam pa gñis su ***gsuṅs*** · so | | V306

don dam pa thugs su chud pas na ***draṅ sroṅ*** ño | | draṅ (D102a_1) sroṅ D102a yaṅ yin la mchog kyaṅ yin pas na ***draṅ sroṅ mchog*** go | | don dam pa rnam pa thams cad du thugs su chud pa'i phyir la | (Q48-5-6) ñan thos daṅ raṅ saṅs rgyas dag las kyaṅ mchog tu byuṅ ba yin pa'i phyir na draṅ sroṅ mchog ste saṅs rgyas bcom ldan 'das so | | draṅ sroṅ (D102a_2) mchog des mdo las | ***sems pa***'i las ***daṅ bsams pa***'i las so źes ***gsuṅs*** so | | (Q48-5-7) gaṅ źig las rnam pa gñis gsuṅs pa'i | |

Substantives

6 'di źes bya ba … tha shig go (*line 8*)】 reversed sentence order.[1]
7 skye ba la】 : skye ba Q (v7).
10 rnam par bźag】 : rnam par gźag D (v1).
12 gis】 : gi D (v4).
14 chud pas】 D Pras: chud pa GN (v4).
19-20 rnam pa gñis】 NQ: rnam gñis DG (v7).

Accidentals

6 1st |】 DQ: || N (p2).
8 |】 D: *om.* NQ (p3).
13 *After* te】 D: | NQ (p4).
14 ||】 : śad N (p3).
15 ||】 D: 1st | of || om. after *go* in NQ.

Notes

[1] The sentence order of *'di źes bya ba* and *gźan du źes bya ba* is reversed when compared to Pras, which is possibly due to the different word-order between the Sanskrit kārikā (Mmk 17.1) and its Tibetan translation.

las de dag gi bye brag ni | ***| rnam pa du mar yoṅs su bsgrags*** | | (Mmk 17.2cd)
ji ltar źe na |
de la las gaṅ sems pa źes | ***| gsuṅs pa de ni yid kyir*** (Q48-5-8) ***'dod*** | |
bsams ($D102a_3$) ***pa źes ni gaṅ gsuṅs pa*** | ***| de ni lus daṅ ṅag gir 'dod*** | | (Mmk17.3)
yid la yod pa ni ***yid kyi*** ste | yid kyi sgo nas de mthar thug par 'gro ba'i phyir
daṅ | lus daṅ ṅag 'jug pa la ltos pa med pa'i (Q49-1-1) phyir yid kyi rnam par Q49-1
śes pa daṅ tshuṅs par ldan pa'i ***sems pa*** kho na la yid kyi las źes brjod do | |
($D102a_4$) ***de la*** źes bya ba'i sgra ni dmigs kyis dgar ba'o | | · las gñis pa ***bsams*** V307
pa źes gaṅ gsuṅs (Q49-1-2) ***pa de ni lus daṅ ṅag gi*** yin par rig par bya ste | lus
daṅ ṅag dag gis de lta de ltar 'jug par bya'o źes de ltar sems kyis bsams nas
gaṅ źig byed pa de ni bsams pa'i las źes bya'o | | yaṅ ($D102a_5$) de ni · rnam pa G145a
gñis (Q49-1-3) te | lus daṅ ṅag la yod pa'i phyir daṅ | de dag gi mthar sgo nas
thug par 'gro ba'i phyir na lus kyi daṅ ṅag gi'o | | de ltar na lus kyi daṅ ṅag gi
daṅ yid kyi ste | rnam pa gsum du 'gyur ro | | las rnam pa gsum (Q49-1-4) po
'di dag kyaṅ slar phye na rnam pa bdun du 'gyur ro | | de ($D102a_6$) ltar bcom
ldan 'das kyis las de'i bye brag rnam pa maṅ por · gsuṅs te | ci ltar źe na | N114a
ṅag daṅ bskyod daṅ mi spoṅ ba'i | ***| rnam rig byed min źes bya*** (Q49-1-5) ***gaṅ*** | |
spoṅ pa'i rnam rig byed min pa | ***| gźan dag kyaṅ ni de bźin 'dod*** | | (Mmk 17.4)
loṅs spyod las byuṅ bsod nams daṅ | ***| bsod nams*** ($D102a_7$) ***ma yin tshul de bźin*** | |
sems pa daṅ ni chos de bdun | ***| las su mṅon*** (Q49-1-6) ***par 'dod pa yin*** | | (Mmk 17.5)
de la ***ṅag*** ni yi ge gsal por brjod pa'o | | ***bskyod pa*** ni lus kyi g-yo ba'o | | de la ṅag
ces bya bas ni dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i · ṅag rnam par rig byed ma yin pa V308

Substantives

1 bsgrags 】 : sgrags DG (v4).
4 ṅag gir 】 : ṅag gi N^k (s1).
6 ltos pa 】 D Pras: bltos pa GNQ (v1).
8 dgar ba'o 】 GN Pras: bkar ba'o DQ (v1).
15 phye na 】 D: phyi nas GNQ (v5).
16 gsuṅs te 】 GNQ: gsuṅs so D (v3).
21 yi ge 】 DQ: yi ger GN (s1).
22 ces bya bas 】 DNQ: ces bya ba G (s1). dge ba'i ṅag 】 GN Pras: dge ba'i dag DQ (s2). rnam par rig byed ma yin pa 】 *em.* Pras: rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'i Ω (s1).[1]

Accidentals

1 1^{st} || 】 DQ: | N (p3).
2 | 】 Q: || DN (p2).
16 1^{st} | 】 NQ: || D (p2).

Notes

[1] The genitive particle is eliminated based on the syntax and the parallel sentence *de bźin du...* beginning in line two below.

spoṅ ba daṅ | mi spoṅ ba'i (Q49-1-7) mtshan ñid (D102b$_1$) can kun nas sloṅ bar D102b byed pa thams cad spyir gzuṅ ste | de bźin du dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i bskyod pa rnam par rig byed ma yin pa spoṅ ba daṅ mi spoṅ ba'i mtshan ñid can kun nas sloṅ bar byed pa yaṅ (Q49-1-8) spyir gzuṅ ño | |

ji ltar rnam par rig byed 'di'i dbye ba rnam pa gñis su 'gyur ba de bźin du | rnam par (D102b$_2$) rig byed ma yin pa'i yaṅ yin te | mi spoṅ ba'i mtshan · G145b ñid can gyi rnam par rig byed ma yin pa dag daṅ | spoṅ ba'i (Q49-2-1) mtshan Q49-2 ñid can gyi rnam par rig byed ma yin pa dag ces bya bar byas pa'i phyir ro | | de la ***mi spoṅ ba'i*** mtshan ñid can gyi ***rnam par rig byed ma yin pa dag*** ni 'di lta ste | deṅ nas (D102b$_3$) bzuṅ nas bdag gis sems can (Q49-2-2) bsad ciṅ chom rkun byas la 'tsho bar bya'o źes sdig pa'i las khas blaṅs pa'i dus nas bzuṅ ste | de mi byed pa dag la yaṅ rtag par rgyun mi 'chad par mi dge ba'i las khas blaṅs pa'i rgyu can gyi ***rnam par rig*** (Q49-2-3) ***byed ma yin pa dag*** ñe bar skye bar 'gyur ba daṅ | rgya'i (D102b$_4$) las byed pa nas bzuṅ ste ña pa la sogs pa rnams de mi byed pa la yaṅ rnam par rig byed ma yin pa dag ñe bar skye ba ***gaṅ yin pa*** ste | 'di dag ni ***mi spoṅ ba'i*** mtshan (Q49-2-4) ñid can źes bya'o | | 'di dag ji ltar yin pa ***de bźin du spoṅ ba'i*** mtshan ñid can gyi ***rnam par rig byed ma yin pa*** dge ba'i raṅ (D102b$_5$) bźin can · ***gźan dag*** kyaṅ yin no | | 'di lta ste | N114b deṅ nas bzuṅ ste srog gcod pa la sogs (Q49-2-5) pa dag spoṅ ṅo źes lus daṅ ṅag gi rnam par rig byed yoṅs su rdzogs pa'i dus nas bzuṅ ste | dus phyis myos pa la sogs pa'i gnas skabs su yaṅ dge ba bsags pa'i raṅ bźin gyi rnam (D102b$_6$) par rig byed (Q49-2-6) ma yin pa dag ñe bar skye ba gaṅ yin pa 'di dag ni spoṅ ba'i

Substantives

2 gzuṅ】 GN: bzuṅ DQ (v1).[1]
4 gzuṅ ño】 GN Pras: bzuṅ ño DQ (v1).
6 mi spoṅ ba'i】 Q: mi spoṅ pa'i DGN (s6).
7 spoṅ ba'i】 Q: spoṅ pa'i DGN (s6).
11 bzuṅ ste: gzuṅ ste N (s7).

Accidentals

1 |】 DN: *om.* Q (p3).
14 *After* ma yin pa】 DG: | NQ (p4).

Notes

[1] Pras attests the indicative present passive verb *gṛhyate* and thus Tib *'dzin par 'gyur* would be expected. The futurum stem *gzuṅ* has been adopted instead in the sense of prescription, i.e., 'should be included'; the variant perfectum stem *bzuṅ* is also possible in the perfect sense 'have been included'.

mtshan ñid can gyi rnam par rig byed ma yin pa źes bya'o | · | gzugs daṅ bya V309 ba'i raṅ bźin yin du zin kyaṅ | rnam par rig byed bźin du gźan la (Q49-2-7) rnam par rig par mi byed pas na rnam par rig byed ma yin pa (D102b$_7$) dag go | |

de bźin du ***loṅs spyod las byuṅ ba bsod nams*** te | dge ba źes bya ba'i don to | | loṅs spyod las byuṅ ba 'di la yod pas na loṅs (Q49-2-8) spyod las byuṅ ba'o | · · | loṅs spyod ni yoṅs su btaṅ ba'i dṅos po dge 'dun la sogs pa rnams kyis G146a ñe bar loṅs spyod pa'o | | byuṅ ba ni rjes su (D103a$_1$) byuṅ ba ste | sbyin pa D103a po'i rgyud la skyes pa'i dge ba 'phel bar 'gyur (Q49-3-1) ro źes bya ba'i don Q49-3 to | | ***bsod nams ma yin tshul de bźin*** te | loṅs spyod las byuṅ źes bya ba'i don to | | ji ltar gaṅ du srog chags dag gsod pa'i lha khaṅ la sogs pa rtsig pa lta bu ste | (Q49-3-2) ji lta (D103a$_2$) ji ltar lha khaṅ der srog chags dag gsod pa de lta de ltar lha khaṅ la sogs pa der loṅs spyod pa las byed pa po rnams kyi rgyud la loṅs spyod pa las byuṅ ba'i bsod nams ma yin pa skye bar 'gyur ro | | (Q49-3-3) de ltar na ***bsod nams ma yin pa yaṅ tshul de bźin*** du 'gyur ro | · | V311

yid kyi las kyi mtshan ñid can (D103a$_3$) sems mṅon par 'du byed pa ***sems pa źes bya ba daṅ*** ste | mdor bsdu na las rnam pa bdun po 'di dag tu 'gyur ro | | (Q49-3-4) dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i ṅag daṅ bskyod pa gñis daṅ | dge ba rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'i mtshan ñid can daṅ | mi dge ba rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'i mtshan · ñid can daṅ | (D103a$_4$) loṅs spyod las byuṅ ba'i bsod N115a nams (Q49-3-5) daṅ | loṅs spyod las byuṅ ba'i bsod nams ma yin pa daṅ | sems pa źes bya ba ste |

Substantives

5 byuṅ ba **]** Q: byuṅ DGN (s4).
6 1st loṅs spyod **]** D: loṅs spyad pa GNQ (v1). las **]** GQ: bas D (s2): ras N (s2).
11 rtsig pa **]** GNQ Pras: brtsigs pa D (v1).[1]
13 loṅs spyod pa **]** Q Pras: loṅs spyad pa DGN (v1).
14 loṅs spyod pa **]** *em.*: loṅs spyad pa Ω (v1).
19 ma yin pa'i **]** GNQ Pras: ma yin pa D (s1).
22 ste **]** GNQ: te D (s6).

Accidentals

4 || **]** D: | NQ (p3).
22 | **]** NQ: *om.* D (p3).

Notes

[1] The present stem *rtsig pa* is syntactically preferably over the perfectum stem *brtsigs pa*. The Sanskrit text attests the nominalised form *pratisthāpanam*.

chos de bdun las su mṅon par te las ñid du gsal źiṅ ***las kyi mtshan ñid can du 'dod pa*** yin no | |
'di la kha cig (Q49-3-6) rgol bar byed de | las rnam pa maṅ po źig (D103a$_5$)
bśad pa gaṅ yin pa de ci rnam par smin pa'i dus kyi bar du gnas pa źig gam |
'on te skyes ma thag tu · 'jig pa'i phyir | mi gnas pa źig yin graṅ | re źig | G146b
gal te (Q49-3-7) ***smin pa'i dus bar du | |gnas na las de rtag par 'gyur | |***
gal te 'gags na 'gags gyur pa | |ji ltar 'bras bu (D103a$_6$) ***bskyed par 'gyur | |*** (Mmk 17.6)
gal te ***las*** 'di skyes nas ***rnam par smin pa'i dus kyi bar du*** raṅ gi ṅo bos (Q49-3-8)
gnas so źes bya bar rtog na ni | de'i phyir de ltar na ***de*** dus 'di tsam gyi bar du
rtag pa ñid du 'gyur te | 'jig pa daṅ bral ba'i phyir ro | |phyis 'jig par 'gyur ba'i
phyir rtag pa ma yin no źe na | de ni (D103a$_7$) de ltar ma yin te | (Q49-4-1) sṅar Q49-4
'jig pa daṅ bral ba ni nam mkha' la sogs pa ltar phyis kyaṅ 'jig pa daṅ 'brel ba
med pa'i phyir daṅ | 'jig pa daṅ bral ba yaṅ 'dus ma byas ñid du thal bar 'gyur
ba'i phyir daṅ | 'dus ma (Q49-4-2) byas rnams la ni rnam par smin pa ma mthoṅ
ba'i phyir daṅ | rnam par smin (D103b$_1$) pa med pa ñid kyis rtag tu gnas par D103b
'gyur ba'i phyir | las rnams rtag pa ñid du khas blaṅs pa kho nar 'gyur ro | |de
ltar na re źig (Q49-4-3) rtag pa ñid kyi skyon du 'gyur ro | |ci ste las rnams
skyes ma thag tu 'jig pa ñid du khas len no {źe na} | de lta yin na ni |
gal te 'gags na 'gags gyur pa | |ji (D103b$_2$) ***ltar 'bras bu bskyed par 'gyur | |***
las med (Q49-4-4) par gyur pa ni yod pa ma yin pa'i raṅ bźin yin pa'i phyir
'bras bu bskyed par mi ***'gyur*** ro źes bya bar bsams pa'o | | · V312

Substantives

6 'gags na 'gags gyur pa **]** : see footnote 1.
11 1st 'jig pa **]** : 'jigs pa Q (v9). 2nd 'jig pa **]** : 'jigs pa N (v9).
12 'jig pa **]** DG: 'jigs pa NQ (v9).
15 *After* phyir **]** : daṅ N (v9). rtag pa **]** DG Pras: rtag pa pa NQ (v9).
18 bskyed par **]** NQ Pras: skyed par DG (v1).

Accidentals

4 3rd | **]** DN: *om.* Q (p3).
5 1st || **]** DN: | Q (p1).
6 2nd || **]** DQ: | N (p1).

Notes

[1] In Huntington's edition of *Akutobhayā* (1986:406) the reading *'gag na 'gag gyur* pas of D is adopted against the probably more correct reading *'gags na 'gags gyur pa* attested by PN. This reading of D is not impossible, but would not correspond to the Sanskrit absolutive con-struction with sat.

’di la sde pa gźan dag kha cig · lan ’debs par byed pa ni | re źig kho bo cag N115b la ’du (Q49-4-5) byed rnams rtag pa ñid kyi ñes par ni (D103b$_3$) mi ’gyur te | skyes ma thag tu ’jig pa’i phyir ro | | gaṅ yaṅ

gal te · ’gags na ’gags gyur pa| |ji ltar ’bras bu bskyed par ’gyur| | (Mmk 17cd) G147a

źes smras pa de la yaṅ lan (Q49-4-6) brjod par bya ste |

myu gu la sogs rgyun gaṅ ni| |sa bon las ni mṅon par ’byuṅ| |
de las ’bras bu sa bon ni| |(D103b$_4$) ***med na de yaṅ ’byuṅ mi ’gyur| |***

’dir sa bon ni skad cig ma yin du zin kyaṅ | rgyun myu gu daṅ (Q49-4-7) sdoṅ bu daṅ sbubs ’chas pa daṅ | lo ma la sogs pa’i miṅ can ’byuṅ bar ’gyur ba’i ’bras bu’i khyad par raṅ daṅ rigs mthun pa bskyed pa’i nus pa daṅ ldan pa kho na’i rgyu’i dṅos por gyur (D103b$_5$) nas ’gag pa yin (Q49-4-8) la | ***gaṅ*** yaṅ ***myu gu la sogs pa’i rgyun sa bon las byuṅ ba*** de las ni rgyu chuṅ ṅu yin du zin kyaṅ rim gyis lhan cig byed pa’i rgyu ma tshaṅ ba med pas ***’bras bu’i*** tshogs rgya chen po skye bar ’gyur ro | | ***sa bon ni med na*** ste | (Q49-5-1) sa bon mi Q49-5 bdog par ’gyur na ni myu gu la sogs (D103b$_6$) pa’i rgyun ***de yaṅ ’byuṅ*** bar ***mi ’gyur*** ro | | de’i phyir de ltar de yod na yod pa ñid daṅ | de med na med pa ñid kyis na myu gu la sogs pa’i rgyun gyi (Q49-5-2) ’bras bu ni sa bon gyi rgyu can ñid yin par bstan par ’gyur ro | | de’i phyir de ltar | · V313

gaṅ phyir sa bon las rgyun daṅ| |rgyun las ’bras bu ’byuṅ (D103b$_7$) ***’gyur {źiṅ}|***
sa bon ’bras bu’i sṅon ’gro ba| |de phyir chad (Q49-5-3) ***min rtag ma yin| |*** (Mmk 17.8)

Substantives

2 ñes par】 NQ: ñes bar DG (s6).
5 de la】 : de D (s4).
7 mi ’gyur】 DG: min ’gyur NQ (s3).
8 *After* skad cig ma】 G Pras: ñid DNQ (v9).[1]
11 ’gag pa】 : ’gags pa D (v1).
11 chuṅ ṅu】 : chuṅ du D (v5).
15 ’gyur na】 DG: gyur na NQ (v1).
16 de yod na】 : yod na Q (v7).
20 chad min】 Q Pras: chad mi DGN (v4). rtag ma yin】 see footnote 2.

Accidentals

1 |】 NQ: || D (p2).
3 *After* gaṅ yaṅ】 : | D (p4).

Notes

[1] The *ñid* must have been added as a refinement to avoid taking the nominative particle *ma* as a negation for the following verb *yin*.

[2] HUNTINGTON’s *Akutobhayā* edition (1986:407) attests the reading *rtag pa min* in lieu of *rtag ma yin*. Further, in pada c, HUNTINGTON adopts the reading *’bras bu sṅon ’gro ba* attested by DCQ, although N attests *’bras bu’i sṅon ’gro ba*.

gal te sa bon myu gu la sogs pa'i rgyun gyi rkyen du ma gyur par me lce daṅ me mdag la sogs pa 'gal ba'i rkyen ñe bas 'gags par gyur na ni | de'i tshe de'i 'bras bu'i rgyun 'byuṅ bar (Q49-5-4) ma mthoṅ bas chad par lta (D104a$_1$) D104a
bar 'gyur la | yaṅ gal te sa bon mi 'gag ciṅ myu gu la sogs pa'i · rgyun 'byuṅ G147b
bar 'gyur na ni | de'i tshe sa bon mi 'gag par khas blaṅs pas rtag par · lta bar N116a
'gyur na | 'di ni de ltar (Q49-5-5) yaṅ ma yin no | | de'i phyir sa bon chad pa daṅ rtag par thal bar 'gyur ba yod pa (D104a$_2$) ma yin no | | ji ltar sa bon la tshul 'di smras pa de bźin du |

sems kyi rgyun ni gaṅ yin pa | | sems las mṅon par (Q49-5-6) ***'byuṅ bar 'gyur | |***
de las 'bras bu sems lta źig | med na de yaṅ 'byuṅ mi 'gyur | | (Mmk 17.9)

sems sems pa dge ba'i khyad par daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa de las ni de'i rgyu can sems kyi rgyun (D104a$_3$) gaṅ yin pa 'byuṅ (Q49-5-7) la | sems pa dge bas yoṅs su bsgos pa'i sems kyi rgyun de las ni lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu ñe ba ma tshaṅ ba med pa na 'bras bu yid du 'oṅ ba skye bar 'gyur ro | | sems lta źig med na ste | sems mi bdog (Q49-5-8) na {rgyun} de yaṅ 'byuṅ bar mi 'gyur
ro | | de'i phyir de ltar na | · V314

Substantives

1 rgyun gyi 】 D Pras: rgyun gyis GNQ (v3).
2 rgyun 】 : rgyu ni D (v9).
5 lta bar 】 D Pras: *om.* GNQ (v7).
7 'gyur ba 】 : 'gyur pa N (s6).
10 lta źig 】 : see footnote 1.
14 ma tshaṅ ba 】 : ma chod pa N (v8).

Accidentals

2 | 】 NQ: || D (p2).
5 | 】 DN: || Q (p2).
9 1st || 】 DQ: | N (p1).

Notes

[1] The Tibetan translations of the earlier commentaries, viz. *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:408), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:225) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:515), do not translate *tasmāc* in pāda a of the Sanskrit text. Ñi ma grags, however, inserted *lta źig* in pāda c of the Tibetan verse in his Pras-translation, possibly as a translation of *tasmāc* from pāda a of the Sanskrit verse. Ñi ma grags thus preserves the translation of pāda a attested by the earlier commentaries and can insert *lta źig* by removing the insignificant words *pa ni* in pāda c of the earlier translation of the verse.

gaṅ (D104a^4) ***phyir sems las rgyun daṅ ni| |rgyun las 'bras bu 'byuṅ 'gyur źiṅ| |***
las ni 'bras bu'i sṅon 'gro ba| |de phyir chad min rtag ma yin| | (Mmk 17.10)

gal (Q50-1-1) te sems dge ba de dgra bcom pa'i sems tha ma ltar| sems kyi Q50-1
rgyun rgyu daṅ 'bras bu gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa'i rim pa rgyun ma chad
(D104a$_5$) pa 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba'i rgyu'i dṅos por ma gyur par 'gag na ni| de'i
(Q50-1-2) phyir las de rgyun chad par 'gyur la| ci ste yaṅ ma 'oṅs pa'i rgyun gyi
rgyu'i dṅos por gyur nas raṅ gi ṅo bo las mi ñams par 'gyur na ni| de'i tshe
las rtag par 'gyur ba źig na| de ni de ltar yaṅ ma yin no| |(D104a$_6$) de'i (Q50-1-3)
phyir las skad cig mar khas blaṅs su zin kyaṅ chad pa daṅ rtag par lta bar thal
ba · yod pa ma yin no| | G148a

de'i phyir ji skad bstan pa'i las kyi rab tu dbye ba rnam par bśad pa 'dir
dge ba bcu'i las kyi lam {yaṅ} (Q50-1-4) bśad pa yin la|

dkar po'i las kyi lam bcu po| |de dag kyaṅ| (D104a$_7$)***chos sgrub pa yi thabs yin te| |***
chos kyi 'bras bu 'di gźan du| |'dod pa'i yon tan rnam lṅa'o| | (Mmk 17.11)

dge · ba'i ***las kyi lam bcu po*** de dag ni (Q50-1-5) ***chos sgrub pa'i thabs yin*** N116b
te 'grub pa'i rgyur gyur pa yin no źes bya ba'i tha tshig go| 'di dag gaṅ gi

Substantives

1 2nd rgyun】: rgyu DN^k (v4).
2 de phyir】 N^k: de'i phyir DGNQ (v6).
3 dge ba de】 D: dge ba ste GNQ (v5). dgra bcom pa'i】: dgra bcom pali N (s3).
5 pa 'byuṅ bar】: daṅ 'byuṅ bar Q (v8). 'gag na】: 'gags na D (v1).
7 'gyur na】: gyur na D (v1).
11-12 dkar po'i las kyi lam bcu po| |chos sgrub pa yi thabs yin te| |】 See footnote 1.
13 dkar po'i】 N^k: dkar po DGNQ (v3).[2] bcu po】: bcu po'o D (s3). sgrub pa yi】 N^k: sgrub pa'i DGNQ (o4).[3]
16 gaṅ gi】 *em.* Pras: gaṅ gis Ω (v3).

Accidentals

13 2nd ||】 NQ: | D (p1).
14 1st ||】 Q: *om.* DN (p3). 2nd ||】 NQ: | D (p1).
16 *After* yin no】 DG: || NQ (p4).

Notes

[1] In comparison with the translation of the verse found in the earlier commentaries, Ñi ma grags' has revesed the order of pāda ab in his translation of Pras, whereby the proper Sanskrit syntax is obtained, namely that *dkar po'i las kyi lam bcu po* is the subject and *chos sgrub pa yi thabs yin* is the predicate. In the translations of the earlier commentaries, viz. *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:409), *Buddhapālita* (SAITO, 1984.II:225-226) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:517), these two padas read *chos bsgrub pa yi thabs rnams ni/ /dkar po'i las kyi lam bcu ste/ /.*

[2] The genitive particle seems syntactically superior for Skt. *śuklāḥ karmapathā daśa.*

[3] The separate genitive particle *yi* is metrically superior.

bdag ñid legs par sdom pa daṅ| |gźan la phan ’dogs byams sems gaṅ| |
de chos · źes (Q50-1-7) {brjod pa’i phyir ro} | | (Mmk 17.1ac) V315

sgrub pa’i thabs ñid du ’jog par ’gyur ba’i chos ($D104b_1$) źes bya ba dge ba’i las D104b kyi lam las tha dad pa ’di gaṅ (Q50-1-6) źig yin źe na| brjod par bya ste| chos kyi sgras ni sems kyi khyad par ’ga’ źig kho na brjod pa yin te| rnam ($D104b_2$) pa gcig tu na dge ba bcu’i las kyi lam ’di dag yoṅs su mthar gtugs pa’i ṅo bo ni chos kyi sgra’i brjod bya yin la| byed bźin pa’i ṅo bo ni dge ba’i las kyi lam gyi sgra’i brjod byar ’gyur ro| |(Q50-1-8) dge ba bcu’i las kyi lam ’di dag ni bśad zin pa’i mtshan ñid can de ’grub par bya ba ($D104b_3$) la rgyu ñid du rnam par bźag go| |yaṅ las kyi rnam par dbye ba’i skabs thal zin pa der dge ba bcu’i las kyi lam du ji ltar ’gyur (Q50-2-1) źe na| brjod par bya Q50-2 ste| lus kyi gsum daṅ| ṅag gi bźi ni|

ṅag daṅ bskyod daṅ mi spoṅ pa’i| |rnam rig byed min źes bya gaṅ| | (Mmk 17.4ab)

źes bya ba la ($D104b_4$) sogs pas bśad pa yin la| yid kyi gsum po brnab sems (Q50-2-2) med pa daṅ| · gnod sems med pa daṅ| yaṅ dag par lta ba źes bya G148b ba ni| sems pa daṅ ni źes bya ba des rnam par bśad pa yin no| |de ltar na der dge ba’i las kyi lam {de dag} bcu car yaṅ rnam par bśad pa yin la|($D104b_5$)

de (Q50-2-3) dag kyaṅ ji skad bśad pa’i chos ’grub pa’i rgyur ’gyur ro| | chos de’i ’bras bu ni gzugs daṅ sgra daṅ dri daṅ ro daṅ reg bya’i mtshan ñid can ’dod pa’i yon tan lṅa ñe bar loṅs spyod pa’o| |’di źes bya ba ni ’jig rten (Q50-2-4) ’di źes bya ba’i don to| |gźan du źes bya ba ni ma mthoṅ bar te ’jig ($D104b_6$) rten pha rol tu źes bya ba’i tha tshig go| |

de ltar re źig kha cig gis brtsad pa’i lan btab pa yin daṅ| gźan dag gis de

Substantives

1 legs par】 : logs par N (v5).
7 byed bźin pa’i】 : de bźin pa’i Q (v8).
10 bźag go】 : gźag go D (v1).[1]
16 der】 DN Pras: daṅ GQ (v8).
17 yaṅ rnam par】 : yaṅ dag par G (v8).
21 gźan du źes bya ba】 D Pras: gźaṇ du GNQ (v7).

Accidentals

1 1st ||】 DN: | Q (p1).
10 ||】 D: *om.* 1st | of || NQ (p1).
13 2nd ||】 DN: | Q (p1).
22 pha rol tu】 : pha rol du D (o4). ||】 D: *om.* 1st | of || NQ (p1).

Notes

[1] Pras attests a present stem verb.

la skyon · brjod nas | brtsad (Q50-2-5) pa'i lan gźan gdab pa'i phyir smras pa | · N117a, V316
gal te brtag pa de 'gyur na | | ***ñes pa chen po · mań por 'gyur*** | | N_k11a
de lta bas na brtag pa de | | ($D104b_7$) ***'dir ni 'thad pa ma yin no*** | | (Mmk 17.12)
gal te sa bon dań myu gu dań chos mthun (Q50-2-6) pa'i sgo nas sems kyi
rgyun la chad pa dań rtag pa'i skyon du thal ba spoń par ***'gyur na*** ni de'i tshe
gźan gyi phyogs la ***ñes pa chen po*** ste mthoń ba dań ma mthoń ba dań 'gal ba
dań | grańs mań ba ñid kyis ***mań por*** 'gyur (Q50-2-7) ro | | ($D105a_1$) ji ltar źe D105a
na | gal te sa bon gyi rgyun gyi dpes yin na ni sā lu'i sa bon las ni sā lu'i myu
gu la sogs pa'i rgyun kho na 'byuń bar 'gyur gyi | rigs mi mthun pa ma yin la
sā lu'i myu gu la sogs pa'i rgyun las kyań (Q50-2-8) sā lu'i 'bras bu kho na
skye'i | rigs tha dad pa'i ($D105a_2$) phyir nim pa'i 'bras bu ma yin pa de bźin du |
'dir yań · rigs mtshuńs pa'i phyir dge ba'i sems las dge ba'i sems kyi rgyun kho G149a
nar 'gyur gyi | rigs mi (Q50-3-1) mthun pa'i phyir mi dge ba dań luń du ma Q50-3
bstan pa'i rgyun ni ma yin no | | de bźin du mi dge ba dań luń du ma bstan pa'i
sems ($D105a_3$) las {kyań} mi dge ba dań luń du ma bstan pa'i sems kyi rgyun
kho nar 'gyur te | rigs (Q50-3-2) tha dad pa'i phyir gźan ma yin no | | 'dod pa
dań gzugs dań gzugs med pa na spyod pa dań | zag pa med pa'i sems rnams
las {kyań} 'dra ba'i sems 'dod pa dań | gzugs dań | gzugs med pa ($D105a_4$) pa
na spyod pa dań | (Q50-3-3) zag pa med pa'i sems rnams kho na 'byuń bar
'gyur gyi | rigs mi mthun pa rnams ni ma yin no | | mi'i sems las {kyań} mi'i
sems kho nar 'gyur gyi | gźan lha dań dmyal ba dań yi dwags dań dud 'gro la
sogs (Q50-3-4) pa'i sems ni ma yin no | | de'i phyir gań źig ($D105a_5$) lha yin pa de

Substantives

2 de】 *em.* Pras: der Ω (s1).'gyur na】: gyur na N^k (s7).
3 2nd de】 N^k Pras: ste DGNQ (v8).
5 chad pa】: 'chad pa N (s3).
12 rigs】: rigs pa D (v9).
16 gźan】 DG: gźan ni NQ (v9).
19 spyod pa dań】 D Pras: spyod pa na GNQ (v3).

Accidentals

7 ||】 NQ: | D (p1).
8 1st sā lu'i】 D Pras: sa lu'i GNQ (o4). 2nd sā lu'i】 D Pras: sa lu'i GNQ (o4).
9 |】 D Pras: *om.* NQ (p3).
10 1st ssā lu'i】 D Pras: sa lu'i GNQ (o4). 2nd sā lu'i】 D Pras: sa lu'i GNQ (o4).
11 1st śad】 Q: ñis śad DN (p2).
13 |】 DQ: ñis śad N (p2).
21 yi dwags】 GN: yi dags DQ (o4). *After* 3rd dań】 DG Pras: | NQ (p4).

ni lha kho nar ’gyur la | gaṅ źig mi yin pa de ni mi kho nar ’gyur ro źes bya ba la sogs · pa {’gyur ro} | | de’i phyir lha daṅ mi mi dge ba byed pa rnams kyi N117b (Q50-3-5) ’gro ba daṅ skye gnas daṅ rigs daṅ blo daṅ dbaṅ po daṅ stobs daṅ gzugs daṅ loṅs spyod la sogs pa tha dad pa daṅ | ṅan (D105a$_6$) ’gror ltuṅ ba yaṅ yod par mi ’gyur ba źig na | ’di dag thams cad ni ’dod pa yaṅ (Q50-3-6) ma yin no | | gaṅ gi phyir de ltar sa bon gyi rgyun daṅ chos mthun par rtog na ñes pa chen po daṅ maṅ por thal bar ’gyur ba de’i phyir ***brtag pa de ’dir ’thad pa ma yin no*** | | · G149b & V317

saṅs rgyas rnams daṅ (D105a$_7$) ***raṅ rgyal daṅ*** | | ***ñan thos*** (Q50-3-7) ***rnams kyis***
gaṅ gsuṅs pa’i | |
brtag pa gaṅ źig ’dir ’thad pa | | ***de ni rab tu brjod par bya*** | | (Mmk 17.13)

brtag pa de yaṅ gaṅ źig yin źe na | | smras pa | |

dpaṅ rgya ji lta de bźin chud | | ***mi za las ni bu lon bźin*** | |
de ni khams (Q50-3-8) ***las rnam pa bźi*** | | ***de yaṅ*** (D105b$_1$) ***raṅ bźin luṅ ma*** D105b
bstan | | (Mmk 17.14)

’dir dge ba’i las byas par gyur pa ni skyes ma thag tu ’gag pa yin la | de ’gags pas ’bras bu med par thal ba yaṅ ma yin te | gaṅ gi phyir las de gaṅ gi (Q50-4-1) tshe skye ba de ñid kyi tshe byed pa po’i rgyud la las de’i chud mi Q50-4 za ba źes bya ba ldan pa ma (D105b$_2$) yin pa’i chos bu lon gyi dpaṅ rgya ’dra ba źig skye bar ’gyur ro | | de’i phyir de ltar na dpaṅ rgya ji lta ba de bźin du chud (Q50-4-2) mi za bar rig par bya la | gaṅ gi chud mi za ba źes bya ba’i chos de

Substantives

2 la sogs pa】D: la sogs par GNQ (s3). {’gyur ro}】GNQ: {gsuṅs so} D (v8).[1]
7 *After* ’dir】GNQ Pras: yaṅ D (v9).
11 brjod par bya】: brjod par byed D (v1).
13 See footnote 2. chud】D: chu GNQ (s4).
16 ’gag pa】: ’gags pa D (v1).
17 thal ba】Q Pras: thal bar ’gyur ba D (v9): thal ba’gyur ba GN (v9).
21 gaṅ gi】*em.* Pras: gaṅ la Ω (v3).

Accidentals

3 *After* gnas daṅ】DG Pras: | NQ (p4). *After* stobs daṅ】DG Pras: | NQ (p4).
12 1st ||】DN: | Q (p1). 2nd ||】DN: | Q (p1).

Notes

[1] Pras implies *’gyur ro* rather than *gsuṅs so.*

[2] In the earlier commentaries padas ab are translated *ji ltar bu lon dpaṅ rgya ltar* | | *de ltar las daṅ chud mi za* | | (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411-412; SAITO, 1984.II:228; AMES, 1986:518-519).

skye ba'i las de ni bu lon bźin rig par bya'o| |ji ltar bu lon gyi dpaṅ rgya bźag
nas nor spyad kyaṅ nor (D105b$_3$) bdag gi nor chud za bar mi 'gyur bar dus gźan
gyi tshe skyed daṅ (Q50-4-3) bcas pa'i nor gyi phuṅ po daṅ 'brel pa ñid du
'gyur ba · de bźin du las źig tu zin kyaṅ chud mi za ba źes bya ba'i chos gźan V318
gnas pas byed pa po de'i rgyu can gyi 'bras bu daṅ mṅon par 'brel ba ñid
du 'gyur ro| |yaṅ ji ltar (D105b$_4$) bu (Q50-4-4) lon gyi dpaṅ rgyas gtoṅ ba po la
nor bkug nas ror gyur pa ni yod dam med kyaṅ ruṅ ste yaṅ nor 'gugs · par mi N118a
nus pa de bźin du chud mi za ba yaṅ rnam par smin pa phyuṅ nas yod dam
med kyaṅ ruṅ ste dpaṅ rgya ror (Q50-4-5) gyur pa ltar yaṅ byed pa po rnam
par smin pa daṅ · 'brel par byed mi nus so| | (D105b$_5$) G150a

yaṅ mdo gźan las gsuṅs {śiṅ} kho bo cag gis smras pa'i chud mi za ba gaṅ
yin pa| ***de ni khams las rnam pa bźi*** ste| 'dod pa (Q50-4-6) daṅ gzugs daṅ
gzugs med pa na spyod pa daṅ| zag pa med pa'i dbye ba las so| | ***de yaṅ raṅ
bźin luṅ ma bstan***| |chud mi za ba ni dge ba daṅ mi (D105b$_6$) dge ba ñid du
brda' mi sprod pa'i phyir luṅ du ma bstan pa kho na yin no| |(Q50-4-7) gal te
mi dge ba'i las rnams kyi de mi dge ba źig yin na ni de'i tshe 'dod pa'i 'dod
chags daṅ bral ba rnams la med par 'gyur ro| |gal te dge ba rnams kyi dge ba
źig yin na ni dge ba'i rtsa ba chad pa rnams la de med (Q50-4-8) par (D105b$_7$)
'gyur ro| |de'i phyir de ni raṅ bźin gyis luṅ du ma bstan pa ñid yin no| |gźan
yaṅ| · V319

spoṅ bas spaṅ ba ma yin te| |sgom pas spaṅ ba ñid kyaṅ yin| | (Mmk 17.15ab)

Substantives

1 skye ba'i】 : bskyed ba'i D (v1). rig par】 : rigs par Q (s3).
2 nor bdag gi】 D Pras: *om.* GNQ (v7).
3 skyed】 D Pras: bskyed GNQ (s3).
4 gźan】 D Pras: *om.* GNQ (v7).
6 gtoṅ ba po】 : gtoṅ pa po N (s6).
13 dbye ba】 : dbye ba'i G (s3).
13-14 raṅ bźin】 : raṅ bźin du Q (v6).
14 ñid du】 : ñid tu D (s2).
18 la】 DN Pras: *om.* GQ (s4).
21 spoṅ bas】 : spoṅ ba D (s1). sgom pas】 GNQ Pras: bsgoms pas D (v1): bgom pas N^k (s4). yin】 : min D (v2).[1]

Accidentals

10 'brel par】 DGQ: 'brel bar N (o4).
15 brda'】 GNQ: brda D (o4).
16 *After* tshe】 DG Pras: | NQ (p4).
21 1^{st} ||】 DGN: | Q (p1).

Notes

[1] The reading yin is confirmed below in the commentary to the verse; cf. D106a$_1$.

chud mi za ba de spoṅ bas spaṅ ba ni ma yin no | | ’phags pa yaṅ (Q50-5-1) so so Q50-5
skye bo’i las daṅ ldan par ’gyur du ’oṅ bas mthoṅ ba’i ($D106a_1$) lam gyis so so D106a
skye bo’i las dag kho na spoṅ gi | chud mi za ba ni · de’i las spaṅs kyaṅ mthoṅ V320
ba’i lam gyis spoṅ ba ma yin te | ’on kyaṅ de ni sgom pa’i lam (Q50-5-2) gyis
kyaṅ spoṅ bar ’gyur ro | | kyaṅ gi sgra ni khams las yaṅ dag par ’das pas kyaṅ
spaṅ bar bya ba yin ($D106a^2$) no źes rnam par rtog pa’i don to | | gaṅ gi phyir de
ltar las ’jig kyaṅ chud mi za ba mi ’jig la | las spaṅs (Q50-5-3) kyaṅ spaṅ bar bya
ba ma yin pa |

de phyir chud mi za ba yis| | las kyi ’bras bu bskyed par ’gyur| · | (Mmk 17.15cd) G150b

yaṅ gal te chud mi za ba ’di las spoṅ bas te ’dor bas spoṅ bar ’gyur ($D106a_3$) la |
las ’pho ba ste las ’jig ciṅ las (Q50-5-4) gźan mṅon du phyogs pa’i · ṅo bos ’jig N118b
par ’gyur na ñes pa ci yod ce na | brjod pa |

gal te spoṅ bas spaṅ ba daṅ| | las ’pho ba yis {’jig ’gyur na} | |
de la las ’jig la sogs pa’i| | skyon rnams su ni thal bar ’gyur| | (Mmk 17.16)

(Q50-5-5) gal ($D106a_4$) te so so skye bo’i las bźin du mthoṅ pa’i lam gyis chud mi
za ba spoṅ na ni | de’i tshe las ’jig pa kho nar ’gyur la | las ’jig pa’i phyir ’phags
pa rnams kyi las kyi ’bras bu rnam par smin pa yid du ’oṅ ba daṅ mi ’oṅ ba
sṅon gyi (Q50-5-6) las kyi rgyu can du yaṅ mi ’gyur ro | · | ma byas pa’i las las V321

Substantives

2 skye bo’i】 : skye ba’i D (s8). ’gyur du ’oṅ bas】 : see footnote 1.
3 skye bo’i】 : skye ba’i D (s8).
4 sgom pa’i lam】 : bsgom pa’i lam D (s7).
5 sgra: gras D (v6).
9 de phyir】 DN^k: de’i phyir GNQ (v6). bskyed par】 : bskyod par D (s2).
12 ce na】 D Pras: na GNQ (v7).
13 spang ba】 Q: spang pa DGN (s6). las ’pho ba yis {’jig ’gyur na}】 : see footnote 2.
14 las ’jig】 D Pras: las ’jigs GNN^kQ (s3).
15 so so】 DN: so so’i Q (v3). mthoṅ ba’i】 Q: mthoṅ pa’i DGN (s6).
17 las kyi】 D Pras: *om.* GNQ (v7).[3] rnam par】 DG Pras: *om.* NQ (v7).

Accidentals

18 ||】 DGN: | Q (p1).

Notes

[1] The Tibetan translation for Sanskrit *mā bhūt* is not literal; cf. fn. in the English translation.

[2] In the translation of this verse in the earlier commentaries (HUNTINGTON, 1986:413; SAITO, 1984.II:229; AMES, 1986:520-521), pada b is translated *las ’pho ba daṅ mthun gyur na.*

[3] N leaves a small space containing two tsha.

(D106a_5) 'bras bu 'byuṅ bar yaṅ 'gyur ro| |las daṅ 'bras bu med par lta ba'i phyir log par lta bar yaṅ 'gyur ro| |de ltar chud mi za bas spoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba (Q50-5-7) ñid du khas len na las 'jig pa la sogs pa'i skyon rnams su thal bar 'gyur ro| |de bźin du las 'pho ba la yaṅ sbyar (D106a_6) bar bya'o| |

khams mtshuṅs las ni cha mtshuṅs daṅ| |cha mi mtshuṅs pa thams cad kyi| |
de ni (Q50-5-8) ***ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe| |gcig pu kho na skye bar 'gyur| |***
(Mmk 17.17)

cha mtshuṅs pa ni las rigs 'dra ba rnams so| |cha mi mtshuṅs pa ni las rigs
tha dad pa rnams (D106a_7) so| |***las cha mtshuṅs pa daṅ| cha mi mtshuṅs pa de***
rnams thams cad kyi chud (Q51-1-1) ***mi za ba*** ni 'dod pa daṅ gzugs daṅ gzugs Q51-1
med pa'i khams dag tu ñiṅ ***mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe*** las thams cad bśig nas G151a
gcig kho na skye bar 'gyur ro| |(D106b_1) de yaṅ ***khams mtshuṅs*** te khams (Q51- D106b
1-2) mñam pa rnams kyi de kho na skye bar 'gyur gyi| mi mtshuṅs pa rnams
kyi ni mi 'gyur ro| |

mthoṅ ba'i chos la rnam gñis po| |thams cad las daṅ las kyi de| |
tha dad par ni skye 'gyur źiṅ| |rnam par smin kyaṅ (Q51-1-3) ***gnas pa yin| |***
(Mmk 17.18)

(D106b_2) ***chud mi za ba*** źes bya ba'i chos ***de*** ni ***mthoṅ ba'i chos la*** ste tshe 'di la zag pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ zag pa med pa'i dbye bas ***rnam pa gñis*** te| tshul gñis po

Substantives

3 'jig pa】 : 'jigs pa Q (s3).
4 'pho ba la】 D Pras: 'pho G (s4): 'pho ba NQ (v4).
6 ñiṅ】 : nyid G (s2).
8 1st las rigs】 D Pras: *om.* GNQ (v7). 2nd cha】 D Pras: *om.* GNQ (v7).
9 cha mi mtshuṅs pa】 : mi mtshuṅs pa Q (v7).
11 ñiṅ】 DN: nyid G (s2).
15 mthoṅ ba'i chos la rnam gñis po| |thams cad las daṅ las kyi de| |·】 See footnote 1.
19 tshul gñis po】 D Pras: tshul gñis po kun gyi GNQ (v9).

Accidentals

6 gcig pu】 : gcig bu Q (o4).
9 śad】 DGN: *om.* Q (p3).
10 *After* 1st daṅ】 NQ: śad DG (p4). *After* 2nd daṅ】 NQ: śad DG (p4).
12 *After* te】 NQ: śad DG (p4).

Notes

[1] Pada ab of this verse is translated differently in the earlier commentaries (HUNTINGTON, 1986:414; SAITO, 1984.II:230; AMES, 1986:522), viz. *tshe 'di la ni las daṅ las| |rnam pa gñis po thams cad kyi| |*.

thams cad kyi ste sems pa daṅ bsams (Q51-1-4) pa'i las · kyi raṅ bźin can gyi las daṅ las kyi · chud mi za ba re re ***skye bar 'gyur ro***| |chud mi za N119a, V322 (D106b$_3$) ba de ni ***rnam par smin kyaṅ*** ste rnam par smin pa na gdon mi za bar 'gag pa ma yin la| yod du zin kyaṅ dpaṅ rgya ror gyur pa ltar yaṅ 'bras (Q51-1-5) bu 'byin par ni byed mi nus so| |

de ni 'bras bu 'pho ba daṅ| |***śi bar gyur na 'gag par 'gyur***| |
de yi rnam dbye zag med daṅ| |***zag daṅ bcas par*** (D106b$_4$) ***śes par bya***| | (Mmk 17.19)

de la ***'bras bu 'pho ba na 'gag pa*** ni ji skad du| ***sgoms pas*** (Q51-1-6) ***spaṅ ba ñid kyaṅ yin*** (Mmk 17.15b)| |źes bśad pa lta bu'o| |***śi bar gyur pa na 'gag pa*** ni ji skad du|

de ni ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe| |***gcig pu kho na skye bar 'gyur***| | (Mmk 17.17cd)

źes bsñad pa lta bu'o| |

de yaṅ zag (D106b$_5$) pa daṅ bcas pa rnams kyi (Q51-1-7) ni ***zag pa daṅ bcas pa*** yin la| zag pa med pa rnams kyi ni ***zag pa med pa*** yin te| de ltar de'i ***rnam par dbye ba śes par bya'o***| |de'i · phyir de ltar na| G151b

stoṅ pa ñid daṅ chad med daṅ| |***'khor ba daṅ ni rtag pa min***| |
las rnams chud mi (Q51-1-8) ***za ba'i chos***| |***saṅs*** (D106b$_6$) ***rgyas kyis ni bstan pa yin***| | (Mmk 17.20)

Substantives

1 thams cad kyi ste] D Pras: thams cad te GN (v7, s6): thams cad de Q (v7). raṅ bźin can gyi] D: raṅ bźin can GNQ (v3).
4 gyur pa] GQ: gyur ba DN (s6).
6 'pho ba] See footnote 1. gyur na] DNQ: gyur pa na G (s3).
8 sgom pas] GNQ: bsgoms pas D (v1).
11 ñiṅ] : ñid G (s2).
14-15 rnam par dbye ba] D Pras: dbye ba GNQ (v7).
15 de ltar na] : da ltar na D (s2).
16 chad med] DGQ Pras: tshad med N (v5).[2]
17 saṅs rgyas kyis] : saṅs rgyas gyis N (s6).

Accidentals

8 *After* 'pho ba na] DGQ: śad N (p4).
9 1st ||] DG: | NQ (p1). *After* gyur pa na] NQ: | DG (p4).
11 1st ||] : | N (p1). 2nd ||] DG: | NQ (p1).

Notes

[1] The translation of this verse found in the earlier commentaries (HUNTINGTON, 1986: 415; SAITO, 1984.II:231; AMES, 1986:522) reads *'phos pa* in lieu of *'pho ba*.

[2] The translation of this verse found in the earlier commentaries (HUNTINGTON, 1986: 416; SAITO, 1984.II:231; AMES, 1986:523) reads *chad min* in lieu of *chad med*.

gaṅ gi phyir las ni byas nas ’gag gi raṅ bźin gyis gnas pa ma yin la | las raṅ
bźin gyis gnas pa ma yin pa de’i phyir | ***stoṅ pa ñid*** du ’thad pa yin no | | de
(Q51-2-1) ltar las mi gnas pas ***chad par*** lta bar thal bar ’gyur ba yaṅ ***ma yin*** te | Q51-2
chud mi za ba yoṅs (D106b$_7$) su bzuṅ bas las kyi ’bras bu yod pa’i phyir te |
rnam par smin pa med na ni las chad par lta bar ’gyur ba źig go | | chud mi za
ba’i (Q51-2-2) chos yod pa’i phyir daṅ | sa bon gyi rgyun daṅ chos mthun pa’i
brtag pa med pa’i phyir ’gro ba daṅ rigs daṅ skye gnas daṅ | khams sna tshogs
pa’i dbye bas (D107a$_1$) phye ba | ’gro ba lṅa’i ***’khor ba*** bkra ba yaṅ grub pa yin D107a
no | | gaṅ gi phyir (Q51-2-3) las raṅ gi ṅo bos mi gnas · par khas blaṅs pas ***rtag*** N119b
par smra bar thal ba ***yaṅ ma yin*** la | chud mi za ba yod pa’i phyir ***las rnams***
kyaṅ chud mi za ba źes bya ba de lta bu’i ***chos ’di*** ma rig pa’i gñid ma lus
(D107a$_2$) pa daṅ (Q51-2-4) bral bas sad par gyur pa | ***saṅs rgyas*** bcom ldan ’das
kyis ***bstan pa*** de’i phyir sṅar gźan gyis |

> ***gal te smin pa’i dus bar du| |gnas na las de rtag par ’gyur| |***
> ***gal te ’gags na ’gags gyur pa| |ji*** (Q51-2-5) ***ltar ’bras bu bskyed par ’gyur| |*** (Mmk 17.6)

źes gaṅ smras pa de kho bo cag gi (D107a$_3$) phyogs la mi ’thad do | | de’i phyir
kho bo cag gis brjod pa’i brtag pa kho na rigs so źe ’o | |

Substantives

2 ’thad pa】: thal ba D (v8).
7 brtag pa】 *em.* Pras: rtag pa Ω (v4)
8 ’gro ba lnga’i】: ’gro lnga’i D (v4).
10 thal ba】: thal bar N (s1). yaṅ ma yin】 DG Pras: yaṅ bam yin N (s3): yaṅ ba ma yin Q (s3).
11 ma rig pa’i gñid】: ma rig pa ñid D (v8).

Accidentals

5 ||】 DG: | NQ (p1).
15 2nd ||】: | Q (p1).

Chapter 3: Translation and Commentary

This chapter offers a literal translation of the selected passage from the seventeenth chapter of *Prasannapadā* along with an interspersed commentary discussing points of interest. The translation is given with Sanskrit words in parenthesis after each word or phrase in order to facilitate easy comparison with the original text. Sanskrit nomina are given with their proper case endings but without the external sandhi-modifications. In the case of Sanskrit phrases, the external sandhi between words is maintained. Words implied by the Sanskrit text, which need to be supplied in the translation, have been added in braces. The translation is set in a slightly larger font and each section begins with a page-reference to the Sanskrit text using the pagination and line-breaks of LA VALLÈE POUSSIN's edition (as also indicated in the critical edition given above). The interspersed commentary is set in smaller script to distinguish it clearly from the translation. Sanskrit nomina supplied in the interspersed commentary are usually given in the stem form.

(V302$_2$): [The 17th (*saptadaśamam*) Chapter (*prakaraṇam*) called (*nāma*) The Analysis of Action and Result (*karmaphalaparīkṣā*)]

3.1 The Interlocutor's Objection[214]

(Pras 302$_3$): Here (*atra*) [the interlocutor] says (*āha*): "*Saṃsāra* (*saṃsāraḥ*) really does exist (*vidyata eva*) because of its being the basis for the connection between action and result (*karmaphalasambandhāśrayatvāt*). Here in this context (*iha*),[215] if (*yadi*), through the uninterrupted progression of the series [of the five *skandhas*] (*santānāviccheda-*

[214] It should be noted that all headings are inserted by the me and are not found in the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts.

[215] The word *iha*, lit. 'here', may either be interpreted as meaning 'here in this context' but could, for example, also be interpreted as meaning 'here in this world.'

kramena), [which is] a succession of birth and death (*janma-maraṇaparamparayā*) [and which is] a continuation of entities that are cause and result (*hetuphalabhāvapravṛttyā*), the transmigration (*saṃsara-ṇam*) of conditioned phenome-na (*saṃskārāṇām*) or (*vā*) of a Self (*ātmanaḥ*) would exist (*syāt*), then (*tadānīm*) a connection between ac-tion and result (*karmmaphalasambandaḥ*) would exist [as well] (*syāt*).

The chapter begins with an unnamed interlocutor raising an objection to the explanations given by Candrakīrti in the preceding chapter. This is indicated by the phrase *atrāha* (Tib. *'dir smras pa*), which is used throughout Pras for this purpose.[216] It is the typical beginning of a chapter in Pras, since chapters 2-12 and 14-26 all begin in this manner, although the objections raised by the interlocutor, of course, vary. In general, Candrakīrti tends to use the verb *āha* (Tib. *smras pa*) to indicate questions and objections raised by the interlocutor,[217] whereas he tends to use the verb *ucyate* (Tib. *bśad pa*) to indicate the answer given by the *Mādhyamika*, i.e., himself, to these questions and objections.[218]

The interlocutor's objection links the present chapter with the topic of the preceding chapter called "The Analysis of Bondage and Liberation" (*bandhanamokṣaparīkṣā*).[219] This feature of beginning each chapter with an objection associated with the preceding chapter, as is also found in the earlier commentaries on Pras, constitutes the commentarial tradition's

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[216] For the expression *atrāha*, cf. e.g., Pras 39_8 (STCHERBATSKY, 1927:129), 54_9 (op.cit:140), 81_6 (op.cit:179), 83_3 (op.cit:129), 87_4 (op.cit:186), 88_5 (op.cit:188), 89_{10} (op.cit:189), 92_3 (MAY, 1959:51), 93_{16} (tatrāha; op.cit:55), 97_3 (op.cit:59), 97_{10} (op.cit:60), 98_6 (op.cit:61), 99_{10} (op.cit:62), 99_{13} (ibid.), 101_{13} (op.cit:66), 102_5 (op.cit:67), 102_{11} (ibid.), 103_1 (ibid.), 105_{12} (op.cit:71), 113_3 (op.cit:78), 117_1 (op.cit:82), 117_{11} (op.cit:83), 118_7 (op.cit:84), 119_7 (op.cit:85), 123_3 (op.cit:88), etc. This list is not exhaustive but merely illustrative.

[217] Within chapter 17 of Pras, this is attested at Pras 304_{10}, 305_{10}, 315_{13}, 317_3, 323_{15}, 326_{12}, 327_6, 327_9, 327_{15}, 327_{10} and 329_{10}. There are, however, also some exceptions to this rule in Candrakīrti's own prose; cf. Pras 323_{17} and 334_4. The rule does not apply to quotations from other texts.

[218] Thus, the verb *ucyate* is used in this sense in at least nine cases at Pras 303_3, 315_4, 320_7, 323_{11}, 324_3, 326_{15}, 327_8, 328_{10} and 329_{13}. It is also sometimes used when defining terminology: Pras 303_7, 304_2, 304_5, 304_6, 304_8, 307_2, 308_{12}.

[219] Pras 280-301, German translation by SCHAYER (1931:81-109).

attempt to present the chapters as logical stages in an ongoing debate on the existence or nonexistence of phenomena and thus represents an interpretation for the order of the chapters of Mmk, which otherwise seems rather haphazard.

How does Candrakīrti then link the present chapter seventeen to the discussion of the preceding chapter? At the beginning of chapter sixteen, the interlocutor argued that entities (*bhāva*) possess an own-being (*svabhāva*), because *saṃsāra* exists. In SCHAYER's (1931:81) translation, the passage reads: "Es gibt den *svabhāva* in den *bhāvas*, weil der *saṃsāra* wirklich ist. Hier in der Welt bedeutet das Wort *saṃsāra* das Wandern, [d.h.] das Übergehen von einer Daseinsform zu einer anderen (*gater gaty-antara-gamanaṃ*). Gäbe es in den *bhāvas* keinen *svabhāva*, wie könnte dann der *saṃsāra* das Übergehen von einer Daseinsform zu einer anderen sein? Das Wandern der *saṃskāras*, welche irreal sind wie der Sohn einer unfruchtbaren Frau, ist doch überhaupt nicht möglich. Deshalb [behaupten wir:] weil der *saṃsāra* wirklich ist, gibt es den *svabhāva* in den *bhāvas*."[220] This position was refuted by Candrakīrti in chapter sixteen.

Subsequently, the interlocutor in the present passage raises a counter-argument to this refutation by stating that *saṃsāra* exists, because it is the basis for the connection between action and result. Thus, 'being a basis for the connection between action and result' is here used as an argument (*hetu*) for the proposition that *saṃsāra* exists. Seen from the perspective of the interlocutor, the given argument is a property of the proposition (*pakṣadharma*), because *saṃsāra* constitutes a basis for the connection between action and result. The argument presupposes the premise (*anvaya-vyāpti*) that whatever is the basis for the connection between action and result, that exists. The argument also presupposes the counter-premise

[220] English translation: "*Svabhāva* exists in the *bhāvas,* because *saṃsāra* is real. Here in the world, the word *saṃsāra* means wandering, i.e., the transition from one form of existence to another (*gater gaty-antara-gamanaṃ*). If a *svabhāva* did not exist in the *bhāvas,* how could *saṃsāra* then be the transition from one form of existence to another? Wandering of the *saṃskāras* that are unreal like the son of a barren woman is indeed not at all possible. Therefore [we maintain]: since *saṃsāra* is real, *svabhāva* exists in the *bhāvas.*" Pras $280_{3\text{-}6}$: atrāha| vidyata eva bhāvānāṃ svabhāvaḥ saṃsārasadbhāvāt| iha saṃsaraṇaṃ saṃsṛtir gater gaty-antaragamanaṃ saṃsāra ity ucyate| yadi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvo na syāt kasya gater gatyantara-gamanaṃ saṃsāraḥ syāt, na hy avidyamānānāṃ vandhyāsūnusaṃskārāṇāṃ saṃsaraṇaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ, tasmāt saṃsārasadbhāvād vidyata eva bhāvānāṃ svabhāva iti||.

(*vyatirekavyāpti*) that whatever does not exist, that cannot be the basis for the connection between action and result.[221] This argument is not valid for Candrakīrti.

The interlocutor then explains how he considers *saṃsāra* to exist as the basis for the connection between action and result: *saṃsāra* is the transmigration (*saṃsaraṇa*) of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskārāṇām*) or of a Self (*ātmanaḥ*). In the quotation given above from chapter sixteen, the word *saṃsāra* was already explained as 'transmigration' or 'wandering' (*saṃsaraṇam*), in that *saṃsāra* means to pass through (*saṃsṛtiḥ*) a course of rebirth (*gateḥ*) going to another course of rebirth (*gatyantaragamanam*). Similarly, in the present context, *saṃsāra* is glossed with the word 'transmigration' (*saṃsaraṇam*). In Candrakīrti's answer to the argument given by the interlocutor in chapter sixteen, it is stated that transmigration must either involve transmigration of the conditioned phenomena (*saṃskāra*) constituting a sentient being or transmigration of the sentient being itself (*sattva*).[222]

As indicated by LVP (V280, fn. 1), transmigration of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskāra*) must here logically refer to the passing of some or all of the five aggregates (*skandha*) constituting an individual from one life into

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[221] In my exegesis, I occasionally employ the *Dharmakīrtian* system of logical reasoning as taught in the Tibetan tradition, as is the case here. According to this system, there are three requirements for a proposition to be true: (1) the argument given to prove the proposition must be a property of the subject of the proposition; e.g., in the argument that "all conditioned things are impermanent, because they have been produced," the argument "because they are produced" must be a property of the proposition's subject 'all conditioned things' – that is to say 'all conditioned things' must be 'produced'. (2) the premise must be fulfilled that the proposition follows from the argument, e.g., in the mentioned example, whatever is produced must be impermanent. (3) Also, the counter-premise must be fulfilled that the opposite of the proposition does not follow from the argument, e.g., whatever is not impermanent is not produced. For a brief presentation of the concept of *vyāpti* and its use in Indian logic as premise and counter-premise, cf. UNO (1962).

[222] Cf. SCHAYER (1931b:81): "Wenn nämlich der *saṃsāra* wirklich wäre, dann müßte er notwendigerweise entweder ein *saṃsāra* der *saṃskāras*, oder ein *saṃsāra* des *sattva* (= des ganzen Individuums) sein." English translation: "If indeed *saṃsāra* were real, then it necessarily would have to be either a *saṃsāra* of the *saṃskāras*, or a *saṃsāra* of the *sattva* (= of the whole individual)." Pras 280_7: iha yadi saṃsāraḥ syāt, sa niyataṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ vā bhavet sattvasya vā |. The same distinction appears in the *kārikā*-verse that follows this passage, i.e., Mmk 16.1. Regarding different views on the process of rebirth, cf. GETHIN (1995) and KRITZER (1998, 2000).

the next birth.[223] In chapter sixteen, the interlocutor admits that the conditioned phenomena cannot transmigrate in the sense of being permanent phenomena, but can only transmigrate in the sense of constituting an uninterrupted series in which each element is impermanent. Thus, the interlocutor says (SCHAYER, 1931b:84): "Die *saṃskāras* wandern [im *saṃsāra*], obwohl sie nicht beharrlich sind. Durch die *paraṃparā* der Relation Ursache und Wirkung bilden sie eine stetige (*avicchinna*) Reihe und haben [so als aktive Kräfte] ihren Fortbestand im *saṃtāna*."[224] The interlocutor thereby accepts the general truth of the impermanence (*syād anityā eva*) of conditioned phenomena. The conditioned phenomena thus transmigrate (*saṃskārāḥ saṃsaranti*) in that they constitute an uninter-rupted progression (*avicchinnakramāḥ*) since the individual instances of a conditioned phenomenon involves a succession (*paramparayā*) of causal relationships (*hetuphalasaṃbandha*). Due to this series (*saṃtānena*) of the instances of each conditioned phenomenon, the conditioned phenomena continue (*pravartamānāḥ*) throughout time.

This explanation of the transmigration of conditioned phenomena taken from chapter sixteen of Pras is more or less repeated in the present context. Thus, in the introductory statement, which the interlocutor gives at the beginning of chapter seventeen, it is similarly said that there is transmigration of conditioned phenomena due to the uninterrupted progression of their series (*santānāvicchedakrameṇa*), i.e., the series of the five aggregates (*skandhas*). This progression (*krama*) constitutes a succession of birth and death (*janmamaraṇaparamparā*), which in turn equals a continuation of each entity as a chain of causes and results (*hetuphalabhāvapravṛtti*).[225] Thus, in brief, the transmigration-theory here set forth by the

[223] In a more narrow sense of *saṃskāra* as 'creative processes' or 'dispositions', *saṃskāra* also appears as an intrinsic element of transmigration in its role as the second cause (*nidāna*) in the process of dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*). Regarding the various meanings of *saṃskāra* (Pāli *saṅkhāra*), see JOHANSSON (1979:41-53) and VETTER (1988:50-53).

[224] English translation: "The *saṃskāras* wander [in *saṃsāra*], although they are not lasting. Through the *paraṃparā* of the connection of the cause and the effect, they make up a steady (*avicchinna*) series and have [thus as active forces] their persistence in the *saṃtāna*." Pras 281_3-282_1: athāpi syād anityā eva santo hetuphalasaṃbandhaparamparayāvicchinnakramāḥ saṃtānena ca pravartamānāḥ saṃskārāḥ saṃsarantīti | |.

[225] It should be noted that Ñi ma grags' Tibetan translation of the word *paramparayā* (Pras 302_4) is *gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa*, and the word *brgyud pa* should therefore not be

interlocutor involves a *santāna*-theory, in which no stable or permanent element transmigrates but what transmigrates (*saṃsarati*) is rather a series of ever changing instances of the conditioned phenomena that constitute an individual.

Alternatively, the word transmigration may also mean that it is not just the impermanent constituents of an individual that transmigrate, because these constituents perish as conditioned, impermanent phenomena. Instead, what transmigrates is the sentient being itself (*sattva*), that is to say a Self (*ātman*) or an individual (*pudgala*).[226] This possibility is also rejected by Candrakīrti in chapter sixteen of Pras.[227] Given the explanation of the transmigration of the conditioned phenomena in chapter sixteen quoted above, it should be noted that the arguments in the interlocutor's opening statement of chapter seventeen that there is an interrupted progression of their series, etc., refers specifically to the transmigration of conditioned phenomena but does not refer to the transmigration of a Self.

The interlocutor thus states that if there would be transmigration of conditioned phenomena or of a Self, there would also be a connection between action and result. The theory of action and result (*karmaphala*) necessitates transmigration, because – as stated in Mmk 17.1 – action is taught in the Buddhist scriptures to yield its result in the present or a future life.[228] Hence, without transmigration the theory of action and result becomes impossible as is explained by what the interlocutor says next:

(V302$_6$):When, on the one hand (*tu*), *saṃsāra* is non-existent (*°saṃsārābhāve*) in the manner that has been depic-

understood as an interpolation or variant in the Tibetan translation. A similar translation of *parampara* is attested at Pras 218$_4$ (MAY, 1959:218, 390 (critical Tibetan edition); D3860.75a$_5$) and Pras 314$_3$ (D3860.104a$_4$).

[226] For a general discussion of rebirth, action, Self and no-Self in Buddhism, cf. LVP (1902:255-256, 287-288; 1917:57-66), SASAKI (1956), MCDERMOTT (1980:165-172), VETTER (1988:41-44) and KRITZER (1998). For a summary and discussion of LVP's writings on this issue, cf. FALK (1940:647-663).

[227] Pras 283$_7$-287$_{15}$ (SCHAYER, 1931b: 87-95). In this discussion, the words *sattva*, *ātman* and *pudgala* seem to be used interchangeably; for the occurrence of the word *ātman* in this context, cf. Pras 284$_1$ (SCHAYER, 1931b:88) and 284$_9$ff. (SCHAYER, 1931b:89).

[228] Cf. the commentary to Mmk 17.1 below (Pras 305$_{9-10}$), at which point this issue will be discussed.

ted [by you] (*yathopavarṇṇita°*), the connection between action and result (*karmaphalasambandha°*) would be (*syāt*) entirely (*eva*) non-existent (*°abhāva*), because of the perishability (*°vināśitvāt*) of the mind (*cittasya*) immediately upon [its] arising (*utpattyanantara°*) and (*ca*) because of the non-existence (*asadbhāvāt*) of the ripening (*vipākasya*) [of the result] at the time when the action is executed (*karmākṣepakāle*). When, on the other hand (*tu*), there is (*sati*) real existence of *saṃsāra* (*saṃsārasadbhāve*), the connection of actions (*karmaṇām*) to [their] results (*phalasambandhaḥ*) is not contradicted (*na virodhito bhavati*), because an action done here [in this life] (*iha kṛtasya karmaṇaḥ*) has a connection to a result (*°phalasambandhāt*), which ripens even in another life (*janmāntare 'pi vipāka°*). Therefore (*tasmāt*), *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāraḥ*) really does exist (*vidyata eva*) because of its being the basis for the connection between action and result (*karmaphalasambandhāśrayatvāt*)" (*iti*).

The interlocutor then states the counter-premise (*vyatirekavyāpti*) of his argument, namely that if *saṃsāra* is denied existence in the manner that has been depicted by Candrakīrti in chapter sixteen,[229] there cannot be a

[229] This is a basic theme in the discussion of chapter sixteen; cf. Pras $280_{6\text{-}8}$: ucyate | syād bhāvānāṃ svabhāvo yadi saṃsāra eva bhavet, na tv asti | iha yadi saṃsāraḥ syāt sa niyataṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ vā bhavet sattvasya vā |; SCHAYER (1931b:81): "[Darauf] erwidert [der Mādhyamika:] Wenn der *saṃsāra* wirklich wäre, so würde es allerdings den *svabhāva* in den *bhāvas* geben. Das ist aber nicht der Fall. Wenn nämlich der *saṃsāra* wirklich wäre, dann müßte er notwendigerweise entweder ein *saṃsāra* der *saṃskāras*, oder ein *saṃsāra* des *sattva* (= des ganzen Individuums) sein. Nun ist aber beides falsch." English translation: "[The Mādhyamika] answers [to this]: if *saṃsāra* were real, then there would indeed be a *svabhāva* in the *bhāvas*. This is, however, not the case. That is, if *saṃsāra* were real, then it would necessarily have to be a *saṃsāra* of the *saṃskāras*, or a *saṃsāra* of the *sattva* (= of the whole individual). However, neither is the case." And further, Pras $287_{14\text{-}18}$: yadā ca saṃskārāṇām ātmanaś ca saṃsāro nāsti, tadā nāsty eva saṃsāra iti sthitaṃ| |atrāha| vidyata eva saṃsāraḥ pratidvandvisadbhāvāt| iha yo nāsti na tasya pratidvandvī vidyate tadyathā vandhyāsūnor iti| asti ca saṃsārasya pratidvandvi-nirvāṇaṃ, tasmād asti saṃsāra iti| |ucyate| syāt saṃsāro yadi tatpratidvandvinirvāṇaṃ syāt| na tv astīty āha|; SCHAYER (1931b:95): "[Zusammenfassend] stellen wir fest: weil weder der *saṃsāra* der *saṃskāras*, noch der *saṃsāra* des *ātman* wirklich

connection between action and result; i.e., what does not exist, that can not be the basis for the connection between action and result. Why is a basis (*āśraya*) required for there to be a connection between action and result? To answer this question, the interlocutor first argues that the mind (*citta*) perishes immediately upon arising. As Candrakīrti explains below ($V303_{7\text{-}8}$), the mind (*citta* or its synonym *cetas*) is responsible for the accumulation (*upacinoti*) of pure and impure actions in a capacity to yield a ripening (*vipākadānasāmarthye*). As a conditioned phenomenon (*saṃskāra*), the mind is impermanent and thus perishes immediately upon arising.[230] Candrakīrti has formulated this principle in chapter sixteen of Pras when saying (SCHAYER, 1931b:82): "Was nicht beharrt, schwindet sofort nach der Entstehung."[231] The impermanence of the mind thus means that the individual instance of mind, in which the action is done and accumulated, is not capable of ensuring the continued existence of the accumulation of the action, which will later yield its result, because the individual instance of mind perishes immediately upon arising. Rather, the continued existence of the accumulation of the action is ensured by the production of a mind-series (*citta-santāna*), i.e., a series of instances of mind in which each instant is a result of the preceding instant and a cause for the succeeding instant. However, if the existence of *saṃsāra* is denied, the existence of the mind-series is also denied,

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ist, deshalb gibt es überhaupt keinen *saṃsāra.* [Der Gegner] ergreift das Wort: Es gibt den *saṃsāra,* weil sein Gegensatz (*pratidvandvin*) wirklich ist. Wenn hier, in dieser Welt etwas irreal ist, wie der Sohn einer unfruchtbaren Frau, dann ist dessen Gegensatz ebenfalls Irreales. Der Gegensatz des *saṃsāra,* d.h. das *nirvāṇa* ist aber etwas Wirkliches. Deshalb ist auch der *saṃsāra* etwas Wirkliches. [Darauf] erwidert [der Mādhyamika:] Gewiß würde der *saṃsāra* wirklich sein, wenn dessen Gegensatz, das *nirvāṇa,* wirklich wäre. So ist est aber nicht. Deshalb sagt [der Leh-rer]..." English translation: "In conclusion, we establish: since neither the *saṃsāra of the saṃskāras* nor the *saṃsāra* of the *ātman* is real, therefore there is no *saṃsāra* at all. [The opponent] says: *saṃsāra* exists, because its opposite (*pratidvandvin*) is real. When something here in this world is unreal, such as the son of a barren woman, then is its opposite likewise unreal. The opposite of *saṃsāra,* viz. *nirvāṇa,* is, however, something real. *Saṃsāra* is, therefore, also something real. [To this] answers [the Mādhyamika]: True, *saṃsāra* would be real, if its opposite, *nirvāṇa,* were real. This is, however, not the case. Therefore, [the teacher] says..."

[230] For a debate on the duration of the mind, cf. *Kathāvatthu* 2.7 (TAYLOR, 1897:204-208; transl. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:124-127).

[231] English translation: "What is impermanent, perishes right after its arising." Pras 281_1: ye hy anityās ta utpādasamanantaram eva vinaṣṭāḥ. For a presentation and discussion of impermanence (*anitya*), cf. LVP (Pras 281, fn. 1) and SCHAYER (1931b:82-85, fn. 58).

because the word *saṃsāra* refers to the transmigration of the conditioned phenomena in the sense of their uninterrupted series as was explained above. The impermanence of the mind coupled with the denial of *saṃsāra*, therefore, has the consequence that the *cittasantāna* cannot function as the basis (*āśraya*) for the connection between the action and the result.

But is there at all need for a connection between action and result? Yes, as is shown by the second argument supplied by the interlocutor, the ripening of the result does not exist at the time of the execution (*ākṣepa*) of the action by the intention.[232] Thus, the time of the execution of the action and of the ripening of the result is different – indeed the span of time may be enormous.[233] Hence, there is a need for postulating a chronological connection between the action and the later ripening of its result. The interlocutor thus argues that if one admits the existence of *saṃsāra* in the sense of the *santāna* of the *saṃskāras*, there is no contradiction of the doctrine of *karmaphala*. If, however, one would deny the existence of *saṃsāra*, as Candrakīrti has stated in chapter sixteen, that would involve a denial of *karmaphala* and hence a denial of the very cornerstone of the Buddhist

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[232] In the Buddhist *śāstra*-literature, *ākṣepa* literally denotes that y 'triggers off' x, often translated with the verb 'to project' (e.g., by LAMOTTE, 1936:265 and DE JONG, 1949:16). A general example of this use is attested at Pras 356_8 (D3860.115b_1; transl. DE JONG, 1949:16). In the context of *karman*, *akṣepa* is used with respect to two different processes. First, it occurs that a state of mind 'triggers off' an action (e.g., cf. Pras 555_9, transl. MAY, 1959:263; AKBh, ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:634 (D4090.I.186a_2); AKBh, ŚĀSTRĪ 1971:658 (D4090.I.194a_5); *Madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarkajvālā* D3856.200a_6; *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* D3870.I295b_6). Secondly, it occurs that action 'triggers' off a rebirth or course of rebirth (e.g., cf. AK 4.95a, ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:721; D4090.I.214b_1). In the present compound *karmākṣepakāle*, both interpretations are possible. LVP (Pras 302, fn. 3) argues for the latter interpretation, which is adopted by LAMOTTE (1936:265): "au moment où l'acte projette [son fruit]"; English translation: "in the moment when the action projects [its fruit]." This would require a *Sarvāstivāda*-interpretation of the present context, which is not impossible, i.e., that "at the time when the action projects its result [which then exists as a future phenomenon], the ripening of this result has not yet taken place" (for a brief introduction to the *Sarvāstivāda*-theory, see below, p. 257). Alternatively, the compound may be interpreted in the former sense, namely "at the time when the action is triggered off [by the person's intention], a ripening does not exist." It seems simpler to employ this latter interpretation, which has been adopted here.

[233] Cf. e.g., Pras $324_{1\text{-}2}$, which will be explained below: na praṇaśyanti karmāṇi kalpakoṭiśatair api | sāmagrīm prāpya kālañ ca phalanti khalu dehinām iti |; "Actions do not perish even after thousands of millions of aeons. Having reached completeness [of the right conditions] and the [right] time, [they] certainly yield fruit (*phalanti*) for the incarnate beings."

theory of ethics.

Candrakīrti thus introduces the topic of chapter seventeen by linking it with the topic of the preceding chapter through this objection raised by his interlocutor. The same basic pattern can be seen in all the earlier extant commentaries. Starting from *Akutobhayā* onwards, the commentaries begin the chapter with an interlocutor raising an objection, which in the commentaries (except the Tibetan translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*) is indicated by the phrase *atrāha* (Tib. *'dir smras pa*, Chin. *wen yüeh* 問曰 in *Chung lun* or *a-p'i-t'an jen yen* 阿毘曇人言 in *Pang jo teng lun*). In the early commentaries, the objection raised by the interlocutor is, however, very brief. Thus, in *Akutobhayā, Chung lun* and Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti*, the interlocutor merely states that phenomena are not empty, because there is action and result. As the first, Buddhapālita introduces the idea of the connection between the action and the result (SAITO, 1984.II:220: *las daṅ 'bras bur 'brel pa'i phyir ro*). In *Prajñāpradīpa*, on the other hand, the topic of the discussion in chapter sixteen is linked with the present chapter by a slightly longer introduction summarising the key-points of chapter sixteen. Further, the objection raised by the interlocutor is expanded into a more detailed argument along with an explicit statement of the required elements of this argument. Bhāvaviveka also expresses the interlocutor's argument as involving the connection between action and result (AMES, 1986:506: *las daṅ 'bras bu 'brel pa'i phyir ro;* T1566.99a$_{15}$: *yü yeh-kuo ko ku* 與業果合故). Bhāvaviveka may have adopted this form of the interlocutor's argument from Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* but could also have adopted it from an earlier non-extant commentary. Bhāvaviveka also contributes with a clearer expression of the meaning of the word *saṃskāra.* He lets his interlocutor refer to the conditioned phenomena as 'the internal conditioned phenomena' (**ādhyātmikasaṃskāra;* AMES, 1986:506: *naṅ gi 'du byed rnams*, T1566.99a$_{15}$: *nei chu-ju chu-hsing* 內諸入諸行). As indicated by the Chinese translation, the inner *saṃskāras* may refer to the internal āyatanas (**ādhyātmikāyatana, nei chu-ju* 內諸入), that is to say the personal constituents of an individual as opposed to other non-personal conditioned phenomena.[234]

[234] Cf. **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (T1552.28.871b$_{17-18}$): 在自身名爲內。在他身及非眾生數名爲外。復次內外義如入處說. Translation (DESSEIN, 1999.I:16): "What abides in one's own person is called 'inward'; what abides in someone else's person and is not relating

Candrakīrti's version of the interlocutor's objection differs from that of the earlier commentaries. He partly adopts the argument of the connection between action and result first found in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti*, but otherwise adopts most of his material directly from his own commentary on chapter sixteen of Pras (which, however, would have to be compared with the other commentaries on chapter sixteen to investigate its originality). Compared with the earliest commentaries and Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti*, the objection raised in Pras is relatively long, but it is not as long as the more extensive version given by Bhāvaviveka. It is also noteworthy that Candrakīrti does not adopt the more elaborate and explicit statement of the argument given by Bhāvaviveka, which indicates Candrakīrti's unwillingness to adopt Bhāvaviveka's predilection for Nyāya- or Pramāṇa-style presentations.

At the end of this passage, an *iti* is attested by all the extant Sanskrit manuscripts, but is not attested by the Tibetan translation. The *iti* could indicate the end of the interlocutor's speech, i.e., the end of the *pūrvapakṣa*. However, if this *iti* is interpreted so, then Candrakīrti's structure of the root-verses would differ from that of the other commentaries. In the other commentaries, the interlocutor's speech continues up to and includes verse Mmk 17.5 with its commentary,[235] and the *Mādhyamika* begins his answer to the interlocutor's speech just before verse Mmk 17.6. The *Mādhyamika*'s answer is in these commentaries variously introduced by the phrases *'dir bśad pa* (*Akutobhayā*, HUNTINGTON, 1986:406; *Prajñāpradīpa*, AMES, 1986:512; T1566.99c$_{18}$: 論者言), *ta-yüeh* 答曰 (*Chung lun*, T1564.22a$_{5}$) and *de la bśad par bya ste* (Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti*, SAITO, 1984.II:223). Likewise, Candrakīrti introduces verse Mmk 17.6 with the phrase "here someone objects" (V311$_{6}$: *atraike paricodayanti*), which from the context must belong either to the *Mādhyamika* or to the *santāna*-proponent, whose position follows in the text. At V304$_{10}$, the phrase *nety āha* is used when giving an answer, which may indicate that this answer is given by the interlocutor,

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to beings, is called 'outward'. Furthermore the meaning of 'inward' and 'outward' is as is said with the sense(-fields)."

[235] Thus, *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403-406), *Chung lun* (T1564.21b$_{21}$-22a$_{5}$), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:220-223) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:506-512, cf. also p.260, fn. 6; T1566.99a$_{7}$-99c$_{18}$).

whose speech in most cases is identified by the verb *āha*. Since the passage at V304$_{10}$ belongs to the explanation of Mmk 17.1-5, the present *iti* will here not be interpreted as the end of the interlocutor's speech, but verses Mmk 17.1-5 will be interpreted as belonging to the interlocutor's speech, which would also be in accordance with the other commentaries. This calls for a different interpretation of the present *iti,* and there are two possibilities. First, the *iti* could indicate that the preceding text is an explication of the interlocutor's first general statement, viz. that "saṃsāra really does exist because of its being the basis for the connection between action and result" (*vidyata eva saṃsāraḥ karmaphalasambandhāśrayatvāt,* V302$_3$). Secondly, the *iti* could indicate that the last piece of the interlocutor's speech, starting with *yathopavarṇṇita°,* is an explication of his general statement that "a connection between action and result would exist, if the transmigration of conditioned phenomena or of a Self would exist" (*yadīha santānāviccheda-kremeṇa janmamaraṇaparamparyā hetuphalabhā-vapravṛttyā saṃskārāṇām ātmano vā saṃsaraṇaṃ syāt syāt tadānīṃ karmmaphalasambandhaḥ,* V302$_{4\text{-}5}$). Either way, the *iti* indicates the end of a subsection of the interlocutor's speech, but does not indicate the end of his entire speech.

3.2 A Brief Presentation of Karmaphala

(V303$_3$): [One might ask] (*iti*): "but (*punaḥ*) what (*kāni*) [are] those (*tāni*) actions (*karmāṇi*)?" or (*vā*), "what (*kim*) [is] that result (*tat phalam*)?" Wishing to express their divisions (*tatprabhedavivakṣayā*), the following (*idam*) is stated (*ucyate*):

> ***"Which (yat) state of mind (cetas) [leads to being] self-restraining (ātmasaṃyamakam) and (ca) benefiting others (parānugrāhakam) [and] friendly (maitram), that (saḥ) [is] dharma (dharmaḥ). It (tat) [is] a seed (bījam) for a result (phalasya) both (ca) after passing away***

(pretya) and (ca) in this world (iha)."[236] (Mmk 17.1)

The verses Mmk 17.1-5 introduce the theory of *karmaphala* by presenting various divisions of actions. Thus, Mmk 17.1 is introduced in *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (Saito, 1984.II:220) and Pras (as well as partially in *Chung lun*, T1564.21b_{21}) with an introductory question asking what these actions and their results are.

The first verse (Mmk 17.1) presents the state of mind or attitude (*cetas*) which can be designated as *dharma*, literally 'that which is to be upheld or kept' and further 'that which holds or keeps' (cf. the commentary below for an analysis). As Candrakīrti indicates below ($V305_4$), the verse also indicates presents its opposite, 'unrighteous action' (*adharma*). The verse is, in fact, very compact, since it in essence explains the whole principle of *karmaphala* in a most brief form. This is also reflected in Candrakīrti's commentary to this verse, which is rather extensive.

Candrakīrti ($V305_{11}$) considers the verse to present a single rightful action, which is of a mental nature (*cittātmaka eko dharma*).[237] This

[236] It should be noted that this translation agrees with Candrakīrti's interpretation of the verse below, in which *ātmasaṃyamakam, parānugrāhakam* and *maitram* are taken as three adjectives modifying *cetas*, and the word *ca* 'and' is read as implied after *maitram* (as indicated by the square-bracket in my translation). If Candrakīrti's interpretation is disregarded, it is, however, also possible to read the verse in a way, in which *maitram* is not taken as an adjective but, more normally, as a noun. In that case, *dharma* would refer to both *ātmasaṃyamakam cetas* and *parānugrāhakaṃ maitram,* and so the translation would be: "What (*yat*) [is] a self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamakam*)state of mind (*cetas*) and (*ca*) friendliness (*maitram*) benefiting others (*parānugrāhakam*), that (*saḥ*) is *dharma* (*dharmaḥ*)." Alternatively, *yat* may be taken with *parānugrāhakam*, in which case *saḥ* must be understood as a singular collective pronoun referring to two nouns, viz. *cetas* and *maitram.* If so, the translation would be: "The self-restraining state of mind and friendliness, which (*yat*) is benefiting others (*parānugrāhakam*), that (*saḥ*) is *dharma.*" I am indebted to Claus OETKE for making me aware of these alternatives. I will again underline that these alternatives do not represent how the verse is read by Candrakīrti. Regarding the interpretations by the other commentators, *Chung lun* along with both Chinese translations of this verse do not follow Candrakīrti's interpretation, and the earlier commentaries *Akutobhayā, Buddhapālita* and *Prajñāpradīpa,* are far less explicit than Candrakīrti in stating *maitram* to be an adjective with an implied *ca.* These details are discussed below at the relevant points in relation to Candrakīrti's commentary.

[237] Avalokitavrata argues, however, in *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.18b_1) that verbal and bodily actions also are implied by this verse: 'dir tshig le'ur byas pa sems pa źes bya bas yid kyi las 'ba' źig bstan pa ni mtshon pa tsam du zad kyi| des kun nas bslaṅ ba'i lus daṅ ṅag gi las dag

statement points to a numeric division in verses Mmk 17.1-5, in that Mmk 17.1 present a single division of action as *dharma*, Mmk 17.2 a twofold division, Mmk 17.3 a threefold division, and Mmk 17.4-5 a sevenfold division. Such an arrangement into divisions with one member, two members, etc., is typical of the early *Abhidharma*-genre, where it is attested by *Saṃgīti-paryāya*, parts of *Prakaraṇapāda* and *Puggalapaññatti*. Further, the verses exhibit an arrangement, in which actions of a mental nature are presented first (Mmk 17.1) followed by divisions of action into both mental and physical types (Mmk 17.2-17.5).

The state of mind here designated as *dharma* has three aspects: it is self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamaka*), caring for others or benefiting others (*parānugrāhaka*), and friendly or kind (*maitra*).[238] It could be a useful source critical clue for the study of Nāgārjuna to identify the provenance of this threefold constellation, but although each of these terms are common

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kyaṅ de bźin du sbyar te|. Translation: "It appears that only mental action is taught by the word *cetas* in this verse, but the bodily and verbal actions aroused thereby should also be included in the same manner."

[238] It must be remarked that Kumārajīva's translation of these three aspects in *Chung lun* (T1564.21b$_{25}$) is problematic. His translation reads: 人能降伏心。利益於眾生。是名爲慈善。二世果報種 *Chung lun (T1564.21b$_{25\text{-}26}$).* The problem lies in his translation of *ātmasaṃyamakam*, which he renders as *jen-neng-hsiang-fu hsin* (人能降伏心). The most obvious way to read the phrase would be to interpret it as a regular subject-verb-object construction, i.e., "[When] someone (*jen* 人) can restrain (*neng-hsiang-fu* 能降伏) the mind (*hsin* 心) [and] bring benefit (li-i 利益) to sentient beings (*yü-chung-sheng* 於眾生), this is called (*shih-ming-wei* 是名爲) kindness (*tz'u* 慈) [and] wholesome action (*shan* 善)." This interpretation is confirmed by the prose-commentary following in *Chung lun* (T1564.21b$_{27}$), where *jen* (人) is treated as the subject of a sentence ("a person has three poisons. Since [they] cause distress for others", *jen yo san-tu wei-nao t'a ku* 人有三毒。爲惱他故) and *hsin* (心) is not treated as the subject of the verse but rather as an object ("therefore, it is said that to tame one's mind...", *shih-ku shuo chiang-fu ch'i-hsin* 是故說降伏其心)(for the English translations, see BOCKING, 1995:257). The same interpretation holds true for the three other occurrences of the phrase *jen-neng-hsiang-fu* (人能降伏) in the Taishō (T587.15.71a$_{16}$, T1509.25.579a$_{25\text{-}26}$, T1532.26.352a$_{19\text{-}20}$). Although the word *jen* (人) does occur as a synonym of 'I' (*wo* 我)(cf. CHÂU, 1999:101, note 411), it would require a strained interpretation to render *jen-neng-hsiang-fu* (人能降伏) as the Sanskrit compound *ātmasaṃyamaka*. If so, *jen* (人) would equal *ātma*, *neng* (能) would represent the suffix *°aka*, and *hsiang fu* (降伏) would equal *saṃyama*, but this would constitute an unusual construction. In *Pang jo teng lun* (T1566.99a$_{18}$), the compound *ātmasaṃyamakam* is understood correctly as 'self-restraint' (*tzu-hu* 自護), but the word *cetas* is misconstrued as an object of *ātmasaṃyamaka* and is then in the Chinese translation enlarged to include 'body, speech and mind' (*shen-k'ou-ssu* 身口思). For more on these translations, cf. also below p. 205.

separately in the Buddhist scriptures, they do not seem to be found elsewhere in this combination.[239]

The state of mind leading to or involving these three aspects is said to be a seed (*bīja*) for a result here in this world or after passing away, i.e., in a future life. Nāgārjuna's use of the word 'seed' is interesting, particularly given the terminological meaning, which *bīja* holds in the possibly later *Sautrāntika*-doctrine, e.g., explained in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* and *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*.[240] Although Mmk is an earlier source than the extant *Sautrāntika*-works, it contains below (Mmk 17.7-17.11) a presentation of a *santāna*-theory partly similar to the theory known in these works. Hence, Nāgārjuna must have been aware of the terminological use of the word *bīja*. Nevertheless, it still cannot be ruled out that he merely applied it in the present verse (Mmk 17.1) in a non-terminological sense.

An equation of action (*karman*) with a seed (*bīja*) would seem to be an obvious choice, given that its result literally is called a fruit or crop (*phala*) and that the scriptures speak of the ripening, growth or maturation (*vipāka*) of this fruit. As indicated by DONIGER O'FLAHERTY (1980:xvi-xviii), the metaphor generally used in the case of *karmaphala* is most likely that of rice-cultivation.[241] However, such an equation of action (*karman*) with a seed (*bīja*) is only vaguely or not at all attested in the canonical scriptures. In *Saṃyuttanikāya*, auspicious actions (*kalyāṇa*) and unfortunate actions (*pāpa*)

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[239] Electronic cross-searches in the Chinese *Tripiṭaka* with the available Chinese translations of *ātmasaṃyamaka* (T1564.21b_{25} *jen-neng-hsiang-fu* 人能降伏; T1566.99a_{18} *tzu-hu* 自護), *parānugrāhaka* (T1564.21b_{25} *li-i yü chung-sheng* 利益於眾生; T1566.99a_{19} *she-ta* 攝他) and *maitra* (T1564.21b_{26} & T1566.99a_{19} *tz'u* 慈) thus did not yield any match.

[240] COX (1995:103, note 44) remarks that the earliest examples of *bīja* in any technical sense are found in **Mahāvibhāṣā* and **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (T1552.28.907c_{14ff}); she also (ibid.) provides further references to later occurrences. To this list may be added the occurrence in **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (T1552.28.888$a_{18\text{-}19}$): 以業爲種。彼有芽生業差別故生差別。如種差別故芽差別; transl. by DESSEIN (1999.I:149): "Because of action, seed is made. This [seed] has a sprout that arises. Because of difference in action, what arises is different – just as when the seed is different, the sprout is therefore different."

[241] DONIGER O'FLAHERTY writes (1980:xvii): "…it is easy to see why the rice imagery would be so persistent and, perhaps, even why the karma theory would arise among rice-growers rather than wheat-growers: rice is planted twice, first the seed and then the seedling that is replanted; rice is also harvested over and over in a year, rather than at a single harvest season; hence it is a natural symbol for rebirth." POTTER (1980:245-246) and KRISHAN (1997:20) illustrate that the rice-metaphor also occurs in Brāhmaṇical texts.

are compared to seeds.[242] Further, in *Aṅguttaranikāya (*AN III.404-409), wholesome *dharmas* (*kuśalā dhammā*) and unwholesome *dharmas* (*akuśalā dhammā*) are compared to seeds.[243] The present verse (Mmk 17.1) is reminiscent of this juxtaposition of *dharma* and seed. Yet, the word action (*karman*) is nowhere to be found in the canon as directly equated to a seed. Rather, a passage repeated several times in *Aṅguttaranikāya* compares action (*kamma*) to a field (*khetta*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*) to the seed (*bīja*), while craving (*taṅha*) is the moisture (*sineho*) enabling the growth of seed in the soil.[244] Without digressing further into this analysis of the canonical sources, it is noteworthy that the present verse (Mmk 17.1) does not equate action (*karman*) with a seed, but rather equates the mental state (*cetas*) with a seed, which would agree with the statement of *Aṅguttaranikāya* I.223. As will be shown below, this also agrees with the

[242] SN 1.227: yādisam vapate bījam, tādisam harate phalam, kalyāṇakārī kalyāṇaṃ pāpakārī ca pāpakaṃ, pavutthaṃ tāta te bījaṃ phalaṃ paccanubhossasīti. Translation by Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS (1917:293): "According to the seed that's sown, so is the fruit ye reap therefrom. Doer of good [will gather] good, doer of evil evil [reaps]. Sown is the seed and planted well. Thou shall enjoy the fruit thereof." The first verse is repeated with pāda ab and cd reversed in *Dhonasākhajātaka* (*Jātaka* no. 353; FAUSBØLL, 1883:158; transl. by FRANCIS & NEIL, 1957:105). It may be noted that *Mahābhārata* 13.6.6 (this *parvan* belonging to a late stratum of the text (KRISHAN, 1997:178)), echoes these verses: yādṛśam vapate bījam kṣetramāsādhya karṣakaḥ| sukṛte duṣkṛte vāpi tādṛśaṃ labhate phalam||. Translation by KRISHAN (1997:97): "The cultivator gets a crop in accordance with the seed sown. Likewise, one gets fruit depending on his good and bad deeds."

[243] E.g., AN III.404-405: Seyyatāpi ānanda, bījāni akhaṇḍāni apūtīni avātātapahatāni sāradāni sukhasayitāni sukhette suparikammakatā yabhūmiyānikkhittāni, jāneyyāsi tvaṃ ānanda imāni bījāni vuddhiṃ viruḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjissanti, ti. evaṃ bhante. Evam eva kho ahaṃ ānanda, idhekaccaṃ puggalaṃ evaṃ cetasā ceto paricca pajānāmi: "imassa kho puggalassa vijjamānā kusalāpi dhammā akusalāpi dhammā" ti. Tamenaṃ aparena samane evaṃ cetasā cato paricca pajānāmi. "Imassa kho puggalassa kusalā dhammā antarahitā, akusalā dhammā sammukhībhūtā. Atthi ca khvassa kusalamūlaṃ asamucchinnaṃ, tambhā tassa kusalamūlā kusalaṃ pātubhavissati, evam ayaṃ puggalo āyatiṃ aparihānadhammo bhavissatī"ti. Transl. by HARE (1934:288): "'If, Ānanda, seed, neither split, rotten, nor spoilt by wind and heat, but vital, well-seasoned, be thrown on well-tilled ground in a goodly field; can you say for certain: "It will yield its growth, increase and abundance"?' 'Yes, surely, lord.' 'Even so, Ānanda, by mind compassing mind, I know of some person: "There is good and evil in him" – and then: "The good has disappeared, the evil is uppermost; but the root of goodness is not cut off and from that good will proceed. Thus he is bound not to fall in future."' For a discussion of this passage in terms of various interpretations and the *bīja*-theory, cf. JAINI (1959:245-246).

[244] For example, attested at AN I.223: Iti kho ānanda, kammaṃ khettaṃ, viññāṇaṃ bījaṃ, taṅha sineho. The same comparison is repeated in *Śālistambasūtra* (SCHOENING, 1995: 316, 425, 724).

explanation given by Mmk 17.9 and Mmk 17.11.

If Nāgārjuna did not use the word *bīja* in a non-terminological sense in the present verse (Mmk 17.1) but rather intended it in its terminological sense, the question remains why he should choose to use this term in the opening statement of his presentation of the divisions of action. If the interpretation of Pras indicating verses 17.1-5 are not spoken by the interlocutor is adopted, this would in turn mean that the present verse must be spoken by the *Mādhyamika*. Thus, it would be strange that the word *bīja* is used here, given that the *bīja*- and *santāna*-theory is strongly criticised below in verse Mmk 17.12 and its commentary. Hence, if such an interpretation of the verse-structure is adopted, the word ought not to be taken in any technical sense. Candrakīrti, however, does not clarify this point in his commentary. As mentioned above, the other possible interpretation of Pras as well as the other commentaries, on the other hand, clearly interpret verses Mmk 17.1-5 as belonging to the interlocutor's speech. If that position is adopted, verses Mmk 17.1-5 may be linked with verses Mmk 17.7-11, wherein the *bīja*- and *santāna*-theory is presented, thus constituting a logical whole only interrupted by verse Mmk 17.6, in which the fundamental problematic of the *karmaphalasaṃbandha* is raised. The only point that would speak against such an interpretation is the seven-fold division of action presented in verses Mmk 17.4-5, which contain certain elements that are criticised by the later *Sautrāntika*-works (see below).[245] In spite of such interpretative strategies, the fact remains that Mmk 17.1 uses the word *bīja* in a sense that invites a technical interpretation (and which seems to have been known to Nāgārjuna; cf. Mmk. 17.7-11). As such, the verse does not contain anything in particular to indicate that the verse does not express Nāgārjuna's own point of view but must be interpreted as expressing a speech by an interlocutor.

Lastly, it should be noted that the Chinese translation of the verse found in *Chung lun* contains what may be interpreted as a variant reading. In

[245] As indicated by AMES (1986:299, note 6), Avalokitavrata (D3859.III. 29b$_1$), however, identifies the speaker of verses Mmk 17.1-5 as **śrāvaka-vaibhāṣikāḥ* (*ñan thos bye brag tu smra ba dag*), and thus not as the *santāna*-proponent speaking in verses Mmk 17.7-11, whom he only identifies as "the follower of another school" (*sde pa gźan dag rnam pa gźan,* ibid.) and not directly as a *Sautrāntika.*

this translation, the last word of *pada c* in the verse is the Chinese word *shan* (T1564.21b_6: 善), which normally and throughout this text is used as a translation for *kuśala* 'wholesome action'. There are four possibilities for interpreting this word. First, it may simply be a free Chinese rendering of Sanskrit *dharma* that the translator Kumārajīva here interpreted as carrying the meaning of *kuśala.* Secondly, it may be that it should be read together with the preceding syllable, i.e., *tz'u shan* (慈善), a compound that in Middle Chinese may mean 'charitable, benevolent, philantropic', in which case the word *dharma* has been omitted in the Chinese translation. Thirdly, it may truly represent the standard Chinese translation of Sanskrit *kuśala,* which would then be an early variant reading in the Sanskrit text that perhaps could be reconstructed as **maitraṃ tad kuśalaṃ bījam,* although such a variant is completely unknown in the Indic commentarial tradition. Fourthly, it may constitute a variant reading that occurred in the later Chinese trans-mission of *Chung lun.* I consider the first or fourth possibility more likely, and the second or third possibility less likely.

(V303$_6$): In that [verse] (*tatra*), [it is called] 'self' (*ātman*), because (*iti*) egocentrism (*ahaṃmānaḥ*) is placed (*āhita*), [i.e.,] generated (*utpāditaḥ*), on to it (*asmin*). The individual (*pudgalaḥ*) being conceptualised (*prajñapyamānaḥ*), having taken the aggregates (*skandhān*) as [its] basis (*upādāya*), is called (*ucyate*) 'the Self' (*ātmety*).

Candrakīrti begins his commentary on the verse by explaining its first word in Sanskrit, namely 'self-restraining' (*ātmasaṃyamakam*). First, only the word Self (*ātman*) is explained. Such an explanation is not found in the other commentaries. Candrakīrti first defines the Self as the object of egocentrism (*ahaṃmāna*). In fact, this definition seems to be a semantic analysis (*nirukti*), in which the definition forms an epigram of the word *ātmā.* The first syllable, *āt,* is implied as meaning *āhitaḥ* (where *ā* and *t* spell *āt*), i.e., 'placed'. The word *āhitaḥ* is further glossed with the word 'generated' (*utpāditaḥ*). The second syllable, *mā* (starting from its nominative form *ātmā* and not its stem-form *ātman*), is implied as meaning *ahaṃmānaḥ,* i.e., 'self-conceit', 'I-notion', 'self-assertion' or 'egocentrism'. To indicate *ātman* to be the object of such

egocentrism the word 'on to it' (*asmin*) is added. Such an interpretation would at least explain the slightly unusual syntax of the definition. It does not seem that this *nirukti* of *ātman* appears in any other source, although it would seem likely that Candrakīrti adopted it here as a well-known *nirukti* not requiring any further explanation. Whether or not the definition may be read as a *nirukti* in this manner, Candrakīrti's first definition certainly underlines the common Buddhist rejection of *ātman* as a real entity, since *ātman* is merely seen as the imagined referent of ignorance.

In a following, more explanatory definition, Candrakīrti defines the Self as the conceptualised individual (*prajñāpyamāṇaḥ pudgalaḥ*), i.e., a designation or concept (*prajñapti*), which is not a real entity. The referent or substratum (*upādāna*) for this conceptualisation is the five aggregates (*skandha*).[246] This definition agrees with similar statements made by Candrakīrti elsewhere[247] and, for example, with AKBh, which states that the aggregates

[246] For a brief discussion of the phrase *upādāya prajñapyamānaḥ*, cf. MAY (1959:161, fn. 494). For another passage in Pras discussing *upādāna* and Self, cf. Pras $345_{2\text{-}16}$ (D3860.112a), transl. by DE JONG (1949:7).

[247] Cf., e.g., Pras $519_{9\text{-}10}$ (D3860.173$b_{2\text{-}3}$): tatropadhīyate 'sminn ātmasneha ity upadhiḥ| upadhiśabdenātmaprajñaptinimittāḥ pañcopadānaskandhā ucyante|. Translation by STCHERBATSKY (1927:193-194): "A substratum is what underlies all these defiling agencies, it is the inveterate instinct of cherishing one's own life (*ātma-sneha*). The word *residual substratum* thus refers to that foundation of our belief in personal identity (*ātma-prajñapti*), which is represented by the ultimate elements of our mundane existence (*upādāna-skandhāḥ*), which are systematized in five different groups." Further, see Pras 285_6-286_3 (D3860.95$b_{6\text{-}7}$): [bhavaḥ] pañcopādānaskandhaḥ, tad gahitaḥ syāt| yaś ca vibhavo 'nupādānaḥ [sa]skandharahitatvāt prajñatyupādānakāraṇarahitatvān nirhetukaḥ syāt| |yaś ca anupādāno nirañjano 'vyakto nirhetukaḥ kaḥ sa na kaś cit saḥ| nāsty eva sa ity arthaḥ| tasmiṃś cāsati [tada]bhāvād evopādānam api nirupādātṛkaṃ nāsti iti. Translation by SCHAYER (1931b:92): "Das »Sein« (*bhava*) bedeutet hier die fünf *upādāna-skandhas*. Dieser [fünf *upādāna-skandhas*] müßte [der *ātman*] in der Zwischenphase beraubt sein. Des Seins enthoben und frei von dem *upādāna* würde er zugleich ohne Ursache (*nirhetuka*) sein. Denn das *skandha-rahitatva* ist identisch mit dem *prajñapty-upādāna-kāraṇa-rahitatva*, mit dem Fehlen des *upādāna*, welches den Pseudo-Begriff [des Individuums] bedingt. [Ein solcher *ātman*], welcher frei von dem *upādāna* ist, welcher sich in der Sphäre der empirischen Wirklichkeit gar nicht manifestiert (*nirañjana*), welcher als individuelle Existenz nicht in Erscheinung tritt (*avyakta*) und ohne Ursache ist, wer ist er? – Ein Niemand! Er existiert überhaupt nicht, das ist der Sinn. Weil ein solcher [*ātman*] irreal ist, deshalb ist auch das *upādāna* irreal, da es doch ohne den *upādātar* nicht existieren kann." English translation: "'Being' (*bhava)* here signifies the five *upādāna-skandhas.* [The *ātman*] would be devoid of these [five *upādāna-skandhas*] in the intermediate phase. Without being and freed of the *upādāna,* it would also be without a cause (*nirhetuka*). For the *skandha-rahitatva* is identical with the *prajñapty-upādāna-kāraṇa-rahitatva,* with the

are the substratum for the designation of an individual (*pudgalaprajñapti-kāraṇa*).[248]

(V303$_7$) To be ***"self-restraining"*** (*ātmasaṃyamakam*) is (*iti*) to restrain oneself (*ātmānaṃ saṃyamayati*), [i.e.,] to be controlled (*asvatantrayati*) in relation to the sense-objects (*viṣayeṣu*), to avoid (*nivārayati*) behaviour (*pravṛttim*) urged by the defilements, such as passion and so forth (*rāgādi-kleśavaśena*).

Having separately defined the word 'Self', Candrakīrti goes on to explain the meaning of the word 'self-restraining' (*ātmasaṃyamaka*). This is done by glossing the term with three phrases. The first phrase, "to restrain oneself" (*ātmānaṃ saṃyamayati*), is simply a grammatical analysis (*vigraha*) of the compound, where the adjectival form *saṃyamaka* is verbalised to its causative form *saṃyamayati*, and the compound-member 'self' (*ātman*) is given as its direct object, thus indicating that the compound should be interpreted as an accusative *tadpuruṣa*-compound. The same phrase occurs with minor variants in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:220) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; T15566.99a$_{20}$). *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403), on the other hand, explains *ātmasaṃyamaka* as meaning 'that which holds back the Self' (**nirdharati; bdag ñid ṅes par 'dzin par bstan to).*

The second gloss, "to be controlled with regard to the sense-objects"(*viṣayeṣv asvatantrayati*), further clarifies the relevant sense of *to restrain* (*saṃyamayati*): it is to limit indulgence in the sense-fields or sense-objects, i.e., with regard to what is seen, heard, smelled, tasted or felt.[249] Self-restraint thus means to avoid sensual addictions. This gloss is not found in

lack of the *upādāna,* that condition the pseudo-concept [that is the individual]. [Such a *ātman*] that is free of the *upādāna,* that does not at all manifest (*nirañjana*) itself in the sphere of the empirical reality, that does not become apparent (*avyakta*) as an individual existence and that is without a cause, what is it? A nobody! It does not at all exist, that is the meaning. Since such an [*ātman*] is unreal, therefore also the *upādāna* is unreal, since it indeed cannot exist without the *upādātar.*"

[248] AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1987:1193; D4090.II.82b$_4$).

[249] For a list of the *pañca viṣayāḥ* (*yul lnga*), cf. e.g., Candrakīrti's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (LINDTNER, 1979:95$_{27\text{-}28}$).

the other commentaries. *Asvatantrayati* 'to be controlled' is a denominative verb from the noun 'non-freedom' or 'non-independence' (*asvatantra*), which literally means "to cause non-freedom". The above translation 'to be controlled' is, therefore, a free English translation not reproducing the Sanskrit word in its literal sense. The word freedom (*svatantra*), which in its non-negated form only occurs as a technical term in Pras,[250] does not seem to have a particularly positive connotation. The negated form is attested in three other places in Pras: in the sense of something that cannot be used freely,[251] in the sense of binding,[252] and in the sense of confining.[253] As should be clear from the last example (cited in fn. 253), the verb *asvatantra-yanti* is used as a transitive verb taking its direct object in the accusative case. Thus, in the passage above, the word *viṣayeṣu* is not the direct object, i.e., self-restraint does not limit the sense-objects, which also would make no sense. Rather, self-restraint limits oneself (*ātmānam* implied) or one's indulgence *in relation to* the sense-objects. LAMOTTE (1936:266) overlooked the negation of *asvatantrayati* in his French translation of this passage: "Le penser *disciplinant l'âme* (*ātmasaṃyamaka*) est celui qui disci-pline l'âme

[250] All occurrences of *svatantra* are found in the rhetorical discussions within the first chapter of Pras: an independent reasoning (Pras 28_8: *svatantraprayoga;* D8b$_2$: *raṅ gi rgyud kyi sbyor ba*) and an independent inference (Pras 16_{11}, 18_5 & 34_4: *svatantrānumāna;* D6a$_5$, 6b$_2$ & 11a$_4$: *raṅ gi rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa*).

[251] Pras 263_3: tāvatkālikāyācitakam asvatantram; D3860.89a$_3$: re źig pa'i brñan por raṅ dbaṅ med pa; translation by SCHAYER (1931b:62): "...zB. ein auf bestimmte Frist geliehenes Gut, darüber man frei nicht verfügen darf." English translation: "...for example, a thing borrowed for a limited time that is not at one's free disposal."

[252] Pras 290_7: iha ya ime rāgādayaḥ kleśā baddhānām asvatantrīkaraṇena bandhanam iti vyapadiśyate (cf. text-critical remark by DE JONG, 1978b:18); D3860.97b$_3$: 'di na 'dod chags la sogs pa ñon moṅs pa gaṅ dag bciṅ bar bya ba rnams raṅ dbaṅ med par byed pas 'chiṅ pa'o źes bya bar bsñad ciṅ; translation by SCHAYER (1931b:98): "Als »*bandhana*« (= Bindung) bezeichnet man die *kleśas*, wie Leidenschaft usw., und zwar mit Rücksicht darauf, daß durch sie die gebundenen [Wesen] ihrer Autonomie beraubt werden (= *asvatantrī-karaṇe*)." English translation: "One characterises the *kleśas,* such as passion, etc., as *"bandhana"* (= bonds) from the point of view that the constrained [beings] loose their autonomy through them."

[253] Pras $24_{3\text{-}5}$: na hi śabdā dāṇḍapāśikā iva vaktāram asvatantrayanti, kiṃ tarhi satyāṃ śaktau vaktur vivakṣām anuvidhīyante; D3860.8a$_{3\text{-}4}$: sgra rnams ni dbyug pa daṅ źags pa can bźin du smra ba po raṅ dbaṅ med par byed pa ma yin no| |'o na ci ź e na nus pa yod na smra ba po'i brjod par 'dod pa'i rjes su byed pa yin no; Translation: "For words do not confine (*asvatantra-yanti*) the speaker, like policemen, but being potent they conform to what the speaker wishes to communicate" (for slightly different translations, see RUEGG, 2002:39 and STCHERBATSKY, 1927:109).

(*ātmānaṃ saṃyamati*): qui la rend libre à l'égard des objets des sens et l'empêche d'agir sous l'action des passions, concupiscence, etc."[254]

While the second gloss thus emphasised the ascetic nuance of *ātma-saṃyamaka*, the third gloss emphasises its ethical aspect: 'to avoid behaviour urged by the defilements, such as desire and so forth'. It further specifies how self-restraint controls one's behaviour in relation to the sense-fields. This gloss is partly based on a second gloss given by Bhāvaviveka in *Prajñā-pradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; T1566.99a_{20}), where *ātmasaṃyamaka* is glossed with 'to avoid (**nivārayati, ldog par byed pa, yüan* 遠) unwholesome actions or *adharma* (*mi dge ba, fei-fa* 非法)'. Bhāvaviveka further clarifies *ātma-saṃyamakaṃ cetas* as meaning 'a state of mind associated with the intention of abandoning unwholesome action (*mi dge ba spoṅ ba'i sems pa daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa'i sems źes bya ba'i tha tshig go*|, AMES, 1986:507; *yü i-hsin hsian-ying-ssu ku ming-wei ssu* 與此心相應思故名為思, *omits the phrase mi dge ba spoṅs ba'i*, T1566.99$a_{20\text{-}21}$).

'That which is to be avoided' is according to Candrakīrti's gloss a certain behaviour (*pravṛtti*), which thus becomes a clarification for the word 'self' (*ātman*). The behaviour to be avoided is that urged by the defilements (*kleśa*), which usually are listed as sixfold (EDGERTON, 1953.II:198): passion (*rāga*), anger (*pratigha*), pride (*māna*), ignorance (*avidyā*), wrong views (*ku-dṛṣṭi*) and doubt (*vicikitsā*).[255] The term *kleśa* carries two shades of meaning:

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[254] English translation: "The thinking that disciplines the soul (*ātmasaṃyamaka*) is that which disciplines the soul (*ātmānaṃ saṃyamati*): which sets it free with regard to the objects of the senses and which hinders acting by action of the passions, sensual desire, etc."

[255] Candrakīrti does not provide the full list of the defilements (*kleśa*) anywhere in his writings. In four cases, he indicates the list as beginning with desire (Pras 304_1, 350_6, 474_3, 451_5: *rāgādikleśa*), whereas in two cases, he indicates it as beginning with ignorance and desire (Pras 519_8: *avidyārāgādikasya kleśagaṇasya;* MavBh D3862.34b_3: *de la ñon moṅs pa dag ni ma rig pa daṅ 'dod chags la sogs pa dag ste*). In Candrakīrti's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*, the dispositions (*anuśaya, phra rgyas*) are equalled with the defilements (*kleśa*): "Because these dispositions, which were stated as six fold, defile/afflict (**kliśnantīti, ñon moṅs par byed pas*) the series of the body, speech and mind, they are called defilements (**kleśāḥ, ñon moṅs pa*)" (Tibetan text in LINDTNER, 1979:$135_{7\text{-}9}$: de la phra rgyas drug tu brjod pa de dag ñid lus daï ïag daï yid kyi rgyud ñon moïs par byed pas 'di dag la ñon moïs pa źes bya'o). EDGERTON (1953.II:35) confirms the identity of the dispositions and the defilements. In *Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa*, the dispositions are thus listed as the same six as the defilements (LINDTNER, 1979: $130_{21\text{-}24}$: 'dod chags kyi phra rgyas daṅ| khoṅ khro'i phra rgyas daṅ| ṅa rgyal gyi phra rgyas daṅ| ma rig pa'i phra rgyas daṅ| lta ba'i phra rgyas daṅ| the tshom gyi phra rgyas źes bya ba ste).

'defilement' in the sense of sullying the mind-series of a sentient being (cf. fn 255) and 'affliction' in the sense of causing suffering and frustration. The Chinese translation emphasises the latter meaning (*fan-nao* 煩惱, lit. 'affliction-trouble'), whereas the Tibetan translation reflects both meanings (*ñon moṅs,* lit. 'affliction-defilement'). SCHMITHAUSEN (1987:246-247, note 21) points out that 'defilement' is the original meaning, whereas 'affliction' is a secondary meaning likely to have been added to the word due to standard Sanskrit usage of the verbal root *kliś,* meaning 'to torment, trouble, molest, cause pain or afflict' (APTE, 1890:619; MONIER-WILLIAMS, 1899:323). Candrakīrti's explanation of *kleśa* cited above (fn. 255) as well as almost the same definition, which occurs twice in Pras, does not directly clarify Candrakīrti's interpretation of this term, since he only explains the noun *kleśa* with its verbal form *kliśnanti* (Tib. *ñon moṅs par byed pa*).[256]

Finally, it should be stated that Candrakīrti does not use the word *ātmasaṃyamaka* (Tib. *bdag ñid legs par sdom pa*) anywhere else in any of his writings. The word is generally somewhat rare,[257] whereas the term 'restraint' (*saṃyama*) occurs more commonly in Buddhist canonical litera-ture.[258]

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[256] The first occurrence is at Pras 334_7: tatra kleśā rāgādayaḥ| kliśnanti sattvacitta-santānānīti kṛtvā|; D3860.110$a_{4\text{-}5}$: de la ñon moṅs pa ni 'dod chags la sogs pa dag ste| sems can gyi sems kyi rgyud dag ñon moṅs par byed pa'i phyir ro. Literally, this passage reads "In that [verse], the *kleśāḥ,* such as desires and so forth, are called so, because they 'kleśafy' (*kliśnanti*) the mind-series of sentient beings." In LAMOTTE's translation (1936:287), *kliśnanti* is translated with 'souillent', i.e., 'defile'. The second occurrence is at Pras 455_2: kliśyantīti kleśāḥ|; D3860.148b_5: ñon moṅs par byed pas ni ñon moṅs pa rnams so||. Literally: "*Kleśāḥ* because they *'kleśafy'* (*kliśnanti*)." In MAY's translation (1959:184), *kliśnanti* is translated with 'tourmentent', i.e., 'torment'.

[257] The Critical Pāli Dictionary only cites a single occurrence in the Pāli-canon, viz. SN 1.106_{28}: yo suññagehāni sevati seyyā so muni attasaññato, vossajja careyya tattha so patirūpaṃ hi tathāvidhassa taṃ. Translation by Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS (1917:133): "O well is him, the self-restrained sage, whose haunts are homes of empty loneliness! There let him fare who hath relinquished all. Men of his stamp such life in sooth beseems." For other examples possibly of **ātmasaṃyama* (but perhaps of **ātmasaṃvara*), see *Smṛtyupasthānasūtra* (*Cheng fa nien ch'u ching* 正法念處經, T721.17. 142$c_{26\text{-}27}$) discussing **ātmasaṃyama/*ātmasaṃvara* (*tzu-hu* 自護) and **parasaṃyama/*parasaṃvara* (*hu-ta* 護他) or Vasubandhu's *Daśabhūmikasūtra-śāstra* (*Shih ti ching lun* 十地經論, T1522.26.16$bb_{27\text{-}28}$), where a *bodhisattva* is said to possess shame and embarrassment (*ts'an-k'uei* 慚愧), because of having self-restraint (*tzu-hu* 自護) and restraint towards others (*hu-pi* 護彼).

[258] In the present context of Mmk, the most important occurrence seems to be in Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* I.8-9 (HAHN, 1982:4-5): ahiṃsā cauryaviratiḥ paradāravivarjanam| mithyā-paiśunyapāruṣyābaddhavādeṣu saṃyamaḥ|| I.8 || lobhavyāpādanāstikyadṛṣṭ[īnāṃ parivar-

(V303$_8$): [It is called] a state of mind (*cetas*), because (*iti*) [it] collects (*cinoti*), [i.e.,] accumulates (*upacinoti*), [i.e.,] causes a pure (*śubham*) or (*ca*) impure (*aśubham*) action (*karma*) to be retained (*niyamayati*) as a capacity for yielding a ripening (*vipākadānasāmarthye*). 'Mind' (*cittam*), 'intellect' (*manas*) [and] 'consciousness' (*vijñānam iti*) [are] merely (*eva*) synonyms (*paryāyāḥ*) of precisely that [word *cetas*] (*tasya*).

To recapitulate the verse (Mmk 17.1), being self-restraining (*ātma-saṃyamaka*) is one of the three qualities attributed to the state of mind (*cetas*), which is *dharma*. Candrakīrti next explains the word *cetas*, unlike the other commentaries, which omit any explanation of this word. Generally speaking, *Cetas* may be explained as a derivative from the verbal root *cit* 'to perceive or think' (*cetati*) or from the verbal root *ci* 'to gather' (*cinoti*). In agreement with the semantic analysis (*nirukti*) of both *cetas* and *citta* most common in Buddhist texts, Candrakīrti begins his explanation with indicating that *cetas* is derived from the root *ci* 'to gather' (*cinoti*).[259] To gloss the meaning of *cinoti*, the word *upacinoti* 'to hoard together, heap up, accumulate', that is to say an intensified form of *cinoti*, is given. Candrakīrti elsewhere uses derivatives of *upa-√ci* (Tib. *ñe bar sogs*) in the sense of 'hoarding' wealth[260] and of 'accumulating' the collection (*saṃbhāra*) of the roots of

janam | ete karmapathāḥ] śuklā daśa kṛṣṇā viparyayāt | | I.9 | |. Translation: "Non-violence, abstention from theft, desisting other's wives, being restrained (*saṃyamaḥ*) with regard to falsehood, slander, (*pāruṣya*) and talking nonsense; avoidance of covetousness, ill will and views of nihilism, these [are] the ten white actions and their paths. Otherwise, [they should be known as] the [ten] black [actions and their paths]." Regarding the translation of *karma-pathāḥ*, cf. AYMORÉ (1995:33-34, especially note 42). For an example speaking of restraint (*saṃyama*) in body, speech and mind, cf. AN I.155 (MORRIS, 1885:155; transl. WOODWARD 1932:139).

[259] For a discussion of and scriptural references to this definition, cf. SCHMITHAUSEN (1987:536, note 1433).

[260] Having just explained in CŚV on CŚ 1.10 (cf. LANG, 1986:28-29) that everything is transitory and remains but for a moment, Candrakīrti says (D3865.38a$_7$-38b$_1$): de'i phyir 'dus byas thams cad kyi chos ñid de ltar rnam par gnas pa na kha cig dag yun riṅ du gson pa re bas śin tu yun riṅ por yul loṅs spyad par bya ba'i phyir sdig pa'i bya ba khas blaṅs nas yul ñe bar

wholesome action (*kuśalamūla*).[261]

Having thus identified *cetas* as a derivative from the verbal root *ci*, Candrakīrti elucidates this derivation by saying that *cetas* is that which "causes a pure or impure action to be retained in [the form of] a capacity to yield a ripening." A pure or impure action (*śubham aśubhaṃ ca karma*) is synonymous with a wholesome or unwholesome action (*kuśalākuśalaṃ karma*),

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sogs pa gaṅ yin pa de ni mi rigs so| |. Translation: "If the nature (*chos ñid*) of all composite phenomena (*'dus byas thams cad*) is fixed (*rnam par gnas pa na*) in this way [as being transitory], the hoarding (**upaciti, ñe bar sogs pa*) of wealth (**viṣaya, yul*) after having undertaken negative actions (*sdig pa'i bya ba khas blaṅs nas*) for the sake of enjoying [that] wealth (*yul loṅs spyad par bya ba'i phyir*) for a very long time (*śin tu yun riṅ por*) by those (*kha cig dag*), who hope to live long (*yun riṅ du gson pa re bas*), would not be justifiable (*de ni mi rigs so*)."

261 **Catuḥśatakavṛtti* (D3865.45b$_1$) commenting on *Catuḥśataka* 2.1 (cf. LANG, 1986:32-33) says: de ltar yin mod kyi| de lta na yaṅ de bsruṅ bar bya ste| dgos pa daṅ bcas pa ñid kyi phyir ro| |dgos pa de yaṅ ci źig ce na| lus la brten nas dge ba'i rtsa ba'i tshogs thams cad ñe bar sogs pa'o| |. Translation: "Although this is so [that the body is an enemy due to its being transitory as explained before] (*de ltar yin mod kyi*), nevertheless (*de lta na yaṅ*), it should be protected (*de bsruṅ bar bya ste*), because it is endowed with an opportunity (**prayojana, dgos pa*)(*dgos pa daṅ bcas pa ñid kyi phyir ro*). What is that opportunity (*dgos pa de yaṅ ci źig ce na*)? Based on the body (*lus la brten nas*) every accumulation (*tshogs thams cad*) of the roots of wholesome action (**kuśalamūla, dge ba'i rtsa ba'i*) is gathered (**upacīyate, ñe bar sogs pa'o*)." Regarding the *kuśalamūla*, Candrakīrti explains these in **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (LINDTNER, 1979:124-125; D3866.256a$_{3-5}$): dge ba'i rtsa ba ni gsum ste| ma chags pa daṅ| źe sdaṅ med pa daṅ| gti mug med pa'o| |de la ma chags pa ni sred pa'i gñen por gyur pa'i chos dṅos po'i don la źen med pa'i mtshan ñid do| |źe sdaṅ med pa ni khoṅ khro ba'i gñen po'i chos sems can rnams la sems rtsub pa med pa'i mtshan ñid do| |gti mug med pa ni ma rig pa'i gñen po'i chos śes rab kyi ṅo bo'o| |'di dag ni raṅ gi bdag ñid kyaṅ dge ba yin la| dge ba gźan rnams kyi yaṅ rtsa bar gyur par dge ba'i rtsa ba ste| 'di ltar śiṅ rnams kyi rtsa ba 'dab ma la sogs pa skye ba daṅ gnas pa daṅ 'phel ba'i rgyur gyur pa ltar| de bźin du dge ba'i rtsa ba'i chos thams cad kyi rtsa bar dge ba'i gsum po 'di dag ñid śes par bya'o| |. Translation: "The roots of wholesome action (**kuśalamūla, dge ba'i rtsa ba*) are threefold: desirelessness, anti-malevolence and anti-bewilderment. With regard to them, desirelessness is the *dharma*, which is the remedy against craving (*sred pa'i gñen por gyur pa'i chos*), having the characteristic (**lakṣaṇa, mtshan ñid*) of being without longing (**alālasa, źen med pa*) towards sensory objects that are concrete entities (** bhāvārtha* or perhaps **padārtha* (?), *dṅos po'i don*). Anti-malevolence is the *dharma*, which is the remedy against anger (**pratigha, khoṅ khro ba*), having the characteristic of being without a harsh attitude (**paruṣacitta, sems rtsub pa*) towards sentient beings. Anti-bewilderment is the *dharma*, which is the remedy against ignorance (**avidyā, ma rig pa*), having the nature of insight (**prajñārūpa, śes rab kyi ṅo bo*). Being both wholesome in terms of their own-nature (*raṅ gi bdag ñid*) and being roots (*rtsa bar gyur pa*) for other wholesome actions, they are [called] roots of wholesome action (**kuśalamūla, dge ba'i rtsa ba*). Just like the roots of a tree are the cause for the production, remaining and increasing of the leaves, etc., similarly these three wholesome [qualities] should be known as the roots for all [other] *dharmas*, which are roots of wholesome action."

which will be explained below. 'To cause to retain' (*niyamayati*) must be seen as a synonym of 'to accumulate' (*upacinoti*). When the mind (*citta* or *cetas*) accumulates (*upacinoti*) an action, it means that the mind causes the action to be withheld (*niyamayati*) in the form of a capacity or potential (*sāmarthya*). This capacity is responsible for giving (*dāna*) or producing the result (*phala*) or the ripening (*vipāka*)[262] of the action in the future.[263]

Finally, Candrakīrti states that he considers the words 'mind' (*citta*), 'intellect' or 'thought' (*manas*) and 'consciousness' (*vijñāna*) to be synonyms (*paryāya*) of *cetas*. This view agrees with the regular *Sarvāstivādin* and *Sautrāntika* doctrines of mind, according to which there can be only one instance of mind in any given moment (*kṣaṇa*) and hence only one mind-series (cf. SCHMITHAUSEN, 1967:113). Hence, the words *citta*, *cetas*, *manas* and *vijñāna* may, of course, emphasize different functions of the mind, but in the final analysis, they would all refer to the same mind-series and thus be

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[262] For an explanation of the word *vipāka*, cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1970:312; transl. LVP, 1923:271-272).

[263] Two examples may be cited for such a use of the term 'capacity' (*sāmarthya*). First, the *Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtaviniścaya* by Daśabalaśrīmitra says when speaking of the purification of negative actions (D3897.163a$_{3-4}$): rten gyi stobs ni dkon mchog gsum la skyabs su 'gro ba'i mtshan ñid daṅ | byaṅ chub kyi sems mi spoṅ ba'i mtshan ñid ni | sdig pa dag mi 'dod pa'i 'bras bu 'byin pa'i nus pa med par byed do | |. Translation: "The power of the support has the characteristic of going for refuge in the three jewels and the characteristic of not abandoning *bodhicitta*. [It] causes negative actions to be without the ability of yielding undesired results (*mi 'dod pa'i 'bras bu 'byin pa'i nus pa med par byed do*)." Secondly, the *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* by Jayānanda says when speaking about the non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*) (D3870.163b$_{1-2}$): de bźin du chud mi za ba yaṅ rnam par smin pa ñams su myoṅ bar byas nas yod dam med kyaṅ ruṅ nor spyad pa'i yi ge bźin du yaṅ rnam par smin pa 'byin par nus pa ma yin no | |. Translation: "Likewise, the non-perishing after having caused the ripening to be experienced is not capable of yielding another ripening whether [still] existing or not, just like a promissory note which has been honoured (*nor spyad pa'i yi ge*)." In both examples, the capacity is ascribed to the action (or the continuation of the action in the form of a non-perishing phenomenon, *avipraṇāśa*; cf. below) and not to the mind itself. Hence, in the present context of Mmk 17.1, the compound 'capacity to yield a ripening' ought *not* be related syntactically to the mind (*cetas*), e.g., "...[it] causes actions to be retained in [the mind's] capacity to yield a ripening." If the mind would possess the capacity to yield a ripening, there could be no liberation from the ripening of action as long as there would be a mind, because mind itself would possess the capacity to yield a ripening. For a discussion on whether the accumulation (*upacaya*) exists separately from the action, cf. *Kathāvatthu* XV.11 (TAYLOR, 1897:520-524; transl. by AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:300-302).

synonymous.[264]

(V304$_1$): Since (*iti*) precisely this (*tad etat*) wholesome (*kuśalam*) self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamakam*) state of mind (*cetas*), which keeps one away from engaging (*pravṛt-tividhārakam*) in killing and so forth (*prāṇātipātādiṣu*), keeps one [away] (*dhārayati*) from going on a bad course [of rebirth][265] (*durgatigamanāt*), [it] is called (*ucyate*) *'dharma' (dharma iti)*.

Having explained the words 'self-restraining' (*ātmasaṃyamaka*) and 'state of mind' (*cetas*), Candrakīrti next explains that this state of mind is *dharma*.[266] While the other commentators do not elaborate on this word, Candrakīrti provides a longer analysis of it. The literal meaning of *dharma* (derived from the verbal root *dhṛ* 'to hold, bear, keep') is here used to justify why a self-restraining state of mind may be called *dharma*.[267] As explained above, this

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[264] Similarly, in AK II.34ab (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:208): cittaṃ mano 'tha vijñānam ekārthaṃ. Translation by LVP (1923:176): "34 a-b. Pensée (*citta*), esprit (*manas*), connaissance (*vijñā-na*), ces noms désignent une même chose." English translation: "34 a-b. Thought (*citta*), mind (*manas*), consciousness (*vijñāna*), these names designate the same." Likewise, at *Viṃśatikā* 1.3 (SCHMITHAUSEN, 1967:119) and partly in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (LAMOTTE, 1936:204$_6$, 261; MUROJI, 1985:55$_{15}$). As indicated by LVP (ibid.), this statement finds scriptural authority in DN 1.21 and SN 2.94. It also appears to be the view of the later *Theravāda*-tradition (cf. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1910:234-235). SCHMITHAUSEN (1967:119-121) explicates that this view is, on the contrary, not fully adopted by the *Yogācāra*-texts, where the three terms are separated as referring to different entities (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*, PRADHAN, 1950:11$_{25}$ff.): *citta* then refers to the *ālayavijñāna*, *manas* to the seventh consciousness called *kliṣṭaṃ manas*, and *vijñāna* refers to the five kinds of sense-consciousness and the thought-consciousness (*manovijñāna*). Candrakīrti's state-ment thus aligns his view of consciousness with that of the *Abhidharma*-genre and sets it apart from the view of the *Yogācāra*-texts, which would also be in agreement with his detailed critique of the *Yogācāra*-concept of *ālayavijñāna* in Mav (6. 46ff.).

[265] Literally, the terms *durgati* and *sugati* respectively mean 'a bad going' or 'a bad path' and 'a good going' or 'a good path'. As will be explained below, they refer to specific states of rebirth and, therefore, they have here been translated respectively as 'a bad course of rebirth' and 'a good course of rebirth'.

[266] As indicated by LINDTNER (1982:100), verses I.6-24 of Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* also present *dharma* in this ethical sense.

[267] Candrakīrti's decision to comment on *dharma* as *dhāraṇa* and *vidhāraṇa* may in part have been inspired by *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403), which, on the one hand, defines

state of mind avoids behaviour urged by the defilements. This behaviour is here specified as killing and so forth (*prāṇātipātādi*) and the self-restraining state of mind is that keeping one away from engaging in these actions (*pravṛttividhārakam*). 'Killing and so forth' refers to the list of the ten unwholesome actions (*daśākuśala*) or the ten unwholesome ways of acting (*daśākuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ*) beginning with killing (*prāṇātipāta*).[268] These unwholesome or impure actions (*akuśala, aśubha*) yield results in the form of suffering and bad courses of rebirth (*durgati*).[269]

As the self-restraining state of mind avoids these unwholesome actions, it may itself be designated by the adjective 'wholesome' (*kuśala*).[270] In *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma*-sources, wholesome action (*kuśala*) is defined as leading to security (*kṣema*) in the sense of having a desirable ripening (*iṣṭavipāka*) and leading to *nirvāṇa*, because it protects from suffering.[271] The

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ātmasaṃyamaka as 'that which holds back the self' (**nir-dharati; bdag ñid ṅes par 'dzin par bstan to)*, and, on the other hand, explains the state of mind associated with these three aspects to be ascertained (**nirdharati; ṅes par bzuṅ bar bstan to)* as *dharma* (*de dag gi sems gaṅ yin pa de ni chos yin par ṅes par bzuṅ bar bstan to*). Thus, the play on the word *dharma* in the commentary is already found in *Akutobhayā* but not in the other extant commentaries.

[268] The standard list of the ten unwholesome actions is: killing (*prāṇātipāta*), taking what has not been given (*adattādāna*), sexual misconduct (*kāmamithyācāra*), lying or false testimony (*mṛṣāvāda*), slander (*paiśunya*), hurtful words (*pāruṣya*), talking nonsense (*saṃbhinnapralāpa*), covetousness (*abhidhyā*), ill will (*vyāpāda*) and wrong view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*)(cf. AYMORÉ, 1995:38, 77). For a detailed explanation of these from *Yogācārabhūmi*, cf. AYMORÉ (1995:38-72+, 79-117). For a detailed canonical description, cf. AN V.264-268 (HARDY, 1900).

[269] Cf. CŚV (D3865.93a$_{6-7}$): mi dge ba ni sdug bsṅal daṅ ṅan soṅ gi rnam par smin pa can yin pa ñid kyi phyir mi dge ba'o. Translation: "Impure actions (**aśubha, mi dge ba*) are unwholesome (**akuśala, mi dge ba*), because of being just that, which ripens in the form of suffering and bad courses of rebirth." That the first *mi dge ba* in the sentence must be a translation for *aśubha* appears in that this passage is a commentary to CŚ 5.5 containing the words *śubhaṃ* and *aśubhaṃ* (cf. LANG, 1986:54).

[270] For studies on the meaning of the word *kuśala*, cf. COUSINS (1996) and SCHMITHAUSEN (1998). The translation 'wholesome' agrees with the view of SCHMITHAUSEN (ibid.).

[271] Cf., e.g., AK 4.45ab and AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:652): kṣemākṣemetarat karma, akuśalākuśaletarat|| 4.45ab ||idaṃ kuśalādināṃ lakṣaṇam| kṣemaṃ karma kuśalam, yad iṣṭavipākaṃ nirvāṇāprāpakaṃ ca; duḥkhaparitrāṇāt| tat kālam atyantaṃ ca akṣemam akuśalam, kṣemapratidvandvabhāvena yasyāniṣṭo vipākaḥ| tābhyām itarat karma naiva kṣemaṃ nākṣemam, yat tat kuśalākuśalābhyām itarad veditavyam| avyākṛtam ity arthaḥ|. Translation (from the Chinese text) by LVP (1924:105-106; also quoted verbatim at LVP, 1927:144-145): "L'acte bon est salutaire, l'acte mauvais est pernicieux, l'acte différent du bon et du mauvais est différent du salutaire et du pernicieux. Telle est la définition de l'acte bon, etc. L'acte bon (*kuśala, śubha*) est salutaire (*kṣema*), parce qu'il est de rétribution agréable (*iṣṭavipāka*) et par conséquent protège de la souffrance pour un temps (: c'est l'acte bon impur, *kuśalasā-srava*);

wholesome state of mind (*kuśalaṃ cetas*) thus keeps one away (*dhārayati*) from going on a bad course of rebirth (*durgatigamana*) and in that sense it is literally, 'that which keeps [one]' (*dharma*). The 'courses of rebirth' (*gati*) will be discussed below.

(V304$_3$): This (*ayam*) word *dharma* (*dharmaśabdaḥ*) is distinguished (*vyavasthāpitaḥ*) in three ways (*tridhā*) in the teachings (*pravacane*): in the sense (*°arthena*) holding (*°dhāraṇa°*) its own characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa°*); in the sense (*°arthena*) of keeping one away (*vidhāraṇa*) from going on a wrong course [of rebirth] (*kugatigamana°*); and in the sense (*°arthena*) of keeping one away (*vidhāraṇa*) from going into *saṃsāra* consisting of the five courses [of rebirth] (*pāñcagatikasaṃsāragamana*).

Candrakīrti next distinguishes three meanings of the word *dharma* in the

ou bien parce qu'il fait atteindre le Nirvāṇa et, par conséquent, protège définitivement de la souffrance (: c'est l'acte bon pur). L'acte mauvais (*akuśala, aśubha*) est pernicieux: c'est l'acte de rétribution dés-agréable. L'acte dont Bhagavat ne dit pas qu'il est bon ou mauvais, l'acte non-défini (*avyākṛta*), n'est ni salutaire, ni pernicieux." English translation: "Good action is wholesome, bad action is harmful, action that is neither good nor bad is neither wholesome nor harmful. Such is the definition of good action, etc. Good action (*kuśala, śubha*) is wholesome (*kṣema*), because it is of a pleasant outcome (*iṣṭavipāka*) and consequently protects temporarily against suffering (: it is an impure good action, *kuśalasāsrava*); or, because it makes one achieve Nirvāṇa and, consequently, protects definitely against suffering (: it is a pure good action). Bad action (*akuśala, aśubha*) is harmful: it is action that is of an unpleasant outcome. Action that the Bhagavat did not declared either good or bad, indeterminate action (*avyākṛta*), is neither wholesome nor harmful." For similar definitions, cf. SCHMITHAUSEN (1998:10-11, incl. notes 71, 72, 73). For glosses on *kusala* in the Pāli-sources, cf. COUSINS (1996:139-143). Candrakīrti's explanation of pure actions (*śubha*) in CŚV (D3865.93a$_7$) agrees more or less with this definition: dge ba yaṅ bde ba daṅ bde 'gro'i rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu can yin du zin kyaṅ skye ba daṅ| rga ba daṅ 'chi ba la sogs pa'i sdug bsṅal sgrub par byed pa ñid kyi phyir na dge legs ma yin no| |. Translation: "Moreover, a pure action (*śubha*) is endowed with a result of ripening in the form of happiness and a good course of rebirth, but is, nevertheless, not the ultimate good (**kuśala?, dge legs;* the word *kuśala* for *dge legs* is attested in AKBh), since it produces the suffering of birth, aging, death and so forth." The word *śubha* is attested in the mūla-verse (CŚ 5.5), on which this passage is a comment (cf. LANG, 1986:54).

teachings: as meaning 'phenomenon', 'wholesome action' and 'nirvāṇa'.[272] The provenance of this threefold distinction of *dharma* remains unknown. Elsewhere, Candrakīrti only distinguishes two senses of *dharma*, viz. 'phenomenon' and 'nirvāṇa',[273] which corresponds to the explanation given on the word *abhidharma* in AKBh.[274] Now each of the three meanings of *dharma* distinguished by Candrakīrti in the present context will be explained in more detail:

(V304$_4$): In the [teachings] (*tatra*),[275] all (*sarve*) factors associated with negative influences (*sāśravāḥ*) and (*ca*) fac-

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[272] This passage of Pras is summarised by PĀSĀDIKA (1996:64-67) in the context of discussing 'universal responsibility'.

[273] Pras 457$_{1\text{-}2}$ (cf. text-critical note by DE JONG, 1978b:238; D3860.149b$_{5\text{-}6}$; MAY, 1959: 402): svalakṣaṇādhāraṇān nirvāṇāgradharmādhāraṇād dharmāḥ|. Translation (MAY, 1959: 186): "Les dharma, de ce qu'ils comportent un caractère propre, ou de ce qu'ils comprennent le dharma suprême, l'extinction." English translation: "Dharmas, because they hold their own characteristics, or because they consist of the supreme dharma, the extinction."

[274] In AKBh (PRADHAN, 1967:2; ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:12; D4090.27a$_{3ff.}$; T1558.1b$_{3ff.}$), the word *abhidharma* is defined as follows: yac ca śāstram [from the *mūla*-text] asyāḥ prāptyartham anāsravāyāḥ prajñāyāḥ tad api tatsambhārabhāvād abhidharmaḥ ity ucyate| nirvacanaṃ tu svalakṣaṇadhāraṇād dharmaḥ| tad ayaṃ paramārthadharmaṃ vā nirvāṇaṃ dharmalakṣaṇaṃ vā pratyabhimukho dharma ity abhidharmaḥ| ukto hy abhidharmaḥ|. Translation by LVP (1923:4): "On donne aussi le nom d'Abhidharma au Traité, car le Traité aussi fait obtenir la prajñā pure: il est donc un facteur de l'Abhidharma au sens propre. Dharma signifie: qui porte (*dhāraṇa*) un caractère propre (*svalakṣaṇa*). L'Abhidharma est nommé *abhi-dharma* parce qu'il envisage (*abhimukha*) le *dharma* qui est l'object du suprême savoir, ou le suprême dharma, à savoir le Nirvāṇa; ou bien parce qu'il envisage les caractères des dharmas, caractères propres, caractères commun". English translation: "The name *Abhidharma* is also given to this treatise, because it enables one to achieve the pure prajñā and is thus a factor of *Abhidharma* in its proper sense. Dharma signifies: that which holds (*dhāraṇa*) its own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*). The *Abhidharma* is called *abhidharma,* because it is directed towards (*abhimukha*) the *dharma* that is the object of highest knowledge, or the highest *dharma*, the knowledge of Nirvāṇa; Or, else, because it is directed towards the characteristics of *dharmas,* the own characteristics and the common characteristics." The passage is explained in some detail in the AK-commentaries **Abhidharmakośaṭīkā Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* (D4093.13a-14a) by Pūrṇavardhana and *Sputārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* by Yaśomitra (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:12-13). The other extant AK-commentaries (D4091, D4094, D4095, D4096, D4421.17a) do not provide any further explanation of this definition. However, none of these texts provides any other etymology or definition of *dharma* than *svalakṣaṇadhāraṇa*. For a Theravāda distinction of four meanings of *dharma* given by Buddhaghosa as doctrine (*pariyatti*), cause (*hetu*), good quality (*guṇa*) and absence of essence (*nissattanijjīvatā*), cf. *Atthasālinī* (MÜLLER, 1897:38; Transl. by TIN & RHYS DAVIDS, 1920:49).

[275] Or *Among these [three usages].*

tors without negative influence (*anāśravāḥ*) are called (*ucyante*) '*dharmas*' (*dharmā iti*) on account of the sense of holding their own characteristics (*svalakṣaṇadhāraṇārthena*).

The word *dharma* may first refer to all entities (*bhāva*) or simply everything, here subsumed under two mutually exclusive, all-encompassing terms: *sāśrava* and *anāśrava* (as spelled in the mss used for this edition, but otherwise often spelled *sāsrava* and *anāsrava*).[276] SCHMITHAUSEN (1987:74-75, especially note 539) explains that a factor associated with a negative influence (*sāśrava*) is anything, which is an object (*ālambana*) or basis (**vastu*) for a negative influence (*āśrava*).[277] As shown by **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (*Tsa a-p'i-t'an hsin lun* 雜阿毘曇心論),[278] the 'negative influences' or 'cankers' (*āśrava* or *āsrava*) equal the defilements (*kleśa*, *fan-nao* 煩惱).[279]

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[276] Cf. AK 1.4 (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:16): sāsravā 'nāsravā dharmāḥ. Translation (LVP, 1923:6): "Les *dharmas* sont 'impurs', 'en relation avec les vices' (*sāsrava*), ou 'purs', 'sans relation avec les vices' (*anāsrava*)." English translation: "*Dharmas* are 'impure', 'connected with the vices' (*sāsrava*), or 'pure', 'without connection to the vices' (*anāsrava*)."

[277] A semantic explanation (*nirukti*) is given in AK 5.40 (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1972:835): āsayanty āsravanty ete haranti śleṣayanty atha| upagṛhṇanti cety eṣām āsravādiniruktayaḥ|| 5.40 ||. Translation (LVP, 1925:79): "Ils fixent et coulent, ils enlèvent, ils attachent, ils saisissent: telle est l'étymologie des termes *āsravas*, etc." English translation: "They fixate and flow, they carry away, they attach, they seize: such are the etymology of the terms *āsravas*, etc."

[278] Various Sanskrit reconstructions have been proposed for the title of this text: **Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, **Kṣudrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*, **Abhidharmasārapratikīrṇakaśāstra*, **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* and **Saṃyuktābhidhar-masāra*. What may be a reference to this text in Candrakīrti's **Pañcaskandhapraka-raṇa* (Tib. text in LINDTNER, 1979:145; D3866.266b_5) could suggest the reconstruction **miśraka* (Tib. *bsres pa*) "mixed" for the first part of the title (雜 *tsa* "mixed") to be correct: rgyas par dbye ba ni chos mṅon pa daṅ bsres pa las śes par bya'o. Translation: "More detailed [sub]divisions can be learned from *Mixed [Selections] from the Abhidharma*." This argument presupposes that the Sanskrit words **saṃ-yukta*, **kṣudraka* and **pratikīrṇaka* probably would be rendered into Tibetan respectively as **'dus pa*, **bsdus pa* and **thor bu* or the like, whereas the Tibetan word *bsres pa* very well could reflect the Sanskrit word **miśraka*. However, the argument also presupposes that the reference in Candrakīrti's **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* is to a concrete title and *not* just a general reference to be translated as "More detailed [sub]divisions can be learned from a mixture of *Abhidharma*-[works]."

[279] T1552.28.871a_{21}: 以彼漏名故 惠者說煩惱. Translation by DESSEIN (1999.I:13): "The wise One speaks of defilement by means of this name 'impurity'." For an explanation of three types of *āśrava*, viz. *kāmāśrava*, *bhavāśrava* and *avidyā-śrava*, cf. Candrakīrti's **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (D3866.263$a_{1\text{-}4}$; LINDTNER, 1979:137-138).

Hence, according to AK, the term *sāśrava* refers to all conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*) with the exception of the elements belonging to the Buddhist path (*mārgasatya*), which are, of course, not associated with the defilements, whereas *anāśrava* refers to all aspects of the path and the three unconditioned phenomena posited by the *Sarvāstivādin*s.[280] In *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*, Jayānanda describes *sāśrava* as that which is included in the relative (*kun rdzob*) and *anāśrava* as the path and reality (*de kho na ñid*).[281]

A *sāśrava* or *anāśrava* may be called a *dharma*, because it holds (*dhāraṇa*) its own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*).[282] The *svalakṣaṇa* refers to the

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[280] AK 1.4-5ac (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:16-19): sāsravā 'nāsravā dharmāḥ saṃskṛtā mārgavarjitāḥ| āsravās teṣu yasmāt samanuśerate|| 1.4 ||anāsravā mārgasatyaṃ trividhaṃ cāpy asaṃskṛtam| ākāśaṃ dvau nirodhau ca. Translation (LVP, 1923:6-8): "Les *dharmas* sont 'impurs', 'en relation avec les vices' (*sāsrava*), ou 'purs', 'sans relation avec les vices' (*anāsrava*). ...Sont impurs les *dharmas* conditionnés (*saṃskṛta*) à l'exception du Chemin; ils sont impurs parce que les vices (*āsrava*) s'y attachent. ...Sont purs la vérité du Chemin et les trois inconditionnés: L'espace (*ākāśa*) et les deux suppressions (*nirodha*)." English translation: "The *dharmas* are 'impure', 'connected with the vices' (*sāsrava*), or 'pure', 'without connection to the vices' (*anāsrava*). ...Are impure, the conditioned *dharmas* (*saṃskṛta*) with the exception of the Path; they are impure, because the vices (*āsrava*) are attached to them. ...Are pure, the Truth of the Path and the three unconditioned: space (*ākāśa*) and the two extinctions (*nirodha*)." In other words, *sāśrava* includes everything subsumed under the two first noble truths and anāśrava subsumes everything included under the two last noble truths.

[281] D3870.I.109b$_{4\text{-}5}$: de la zag pa daṅ bcas pa ni kun rdzob kyi khoṅs su gtogs pa yin no||zag pa med pa ni lam dang de kho na nyid do||de la lam ni kun rdzob kyi bden par ro||de kho na nyid ni don dam pa'i bden par ro||. Translation: "Here, *sāśrava* is that which is included in the relative (*kun rdzob*). *Anāśrava* is the Path (*lam*) and reality (*de kho na ñid*). Among these, the Path [should be understood] as the relative truth (*kun rdzob kyi bden par*), [and] reality as the ultimate truth (*don dam pa'i bden par*)." Notice his skilful distinction between *kun rdzob* and *kun rdzob kyi bden pa*.

[282] A slight variant of this definition is found in verse 25 of Candrakīrti's **Triśaraṇasaptati* (D3971.251b$_7$; SORENSEN, 1986:30), since the definition is there given as 'holding its own-nature' (**svarūpadhāraṇa*), although this is probably due to metrical reasons. The verse says: sṅon med pa las slar byuṅ źiṅ||byuṅ nas kyaṅ ni yaṅ dag med||raṅ gi ṅo bo 'dzin pas chos||don dam par ni mi brjod do||. SORENSEN (1986:31) translates: "[We] repudiate [the existence of] any norm of existence ultimately (*paramārthataḥ*) [according to its orthodox definition:] because it retains its proper nature (*svabhāvagrahaṇāt*); [however, any phenomenon under-goes empirically a transformation:] from previous non-existence (*apurvāt*) [any *dharma*] reappears (**punarutpad-*) and, again (*punar*), having existed (**bhūtvā*) [it] disappears (**asaṃbhāva*)." An attempt at a reconstruction of this verse might be: *apūrvāt punar utpādo bhūtvā punar asaṃbhavaḥ| svarūpadhāraṇenākhyaḥ dharmo na paramārthataḥ||. In that case, a slightly different translation could be: "A phenomenon (*dharmaḥ*) so-called (*ākhyaḥ*) because of holding its own-nature (*svarūpadhāraṇena*), whose arising (*utpādaḥ*) is first (*punar*) out of not having exi-sted before (*apūrvāt*) and then (*punar*)

unique trait or defining character of a phenomenon as opposed to the general traits it shares with all other phenomena. For example, the *svalakṣaṇa* of matter (*rūpa*) is 'being breakable' (*rūpaṇa*), the *svalakṣaṇa* of feel-ing (*vedanā*) is 'experience' (*anubhava*), etc.[283] When *'dharma'* is used in this sense, it is usually translated with 'phenomenon' or 'factor'.[284]

(V304$_5$): The ten wholesome actions and so forth (*daśakuśalādayaḥ*) are called (*ucyante*) *'dharmas'* (*dharmā ity*) on account of the sense of keeping one away from going on a wrong course [of rebirth] (*kugatigamanavidhāraṇārthena*); [for example, as in] "The *dharma*-practitioner (*dharmacārī*) rests (*śete*) happily (*sukham*) [both] in this (*asmin*) world (*loke*) and (*ca*) the next (*paratra*)".

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after having come into existence (*bhūtva*) [is] non-existent (*asaṃbhavaḥ*), does not exist (*na*) ultimately (*paramārthataḥ*)." Thus, I would take the first two *pādas* as qualifying *raṅ gi ṅo bo,* whereas SORENSEN takes these lines as qualifying the predicate *mi brjod do.* I find that SORENSEN's interpretation forces the sense of the instrumental particle in *'dzin pas.*

283 Cf. Mav 6.202-215, where Candrakīrti in connection with explaining the emptiness of own characteristics (*svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā*) enumerates the *svalakṣaṇas* of a long list of phenomena: *rūpa, vedanā, saṃskāra, vijñāna, skandha, dhātu, āyatana, pratītyasamutpāda, dānapāramitā, śīlapāramitā, kṣānti, vīrya, dhyāna, prajñā, dhyāna, apramāṇa, ārūpyasamāpatti, bodhipākṣikadharma, śūnyatā, ānimitta, apraṇihita, vimokṣa, bala, vaiśāradya, pratisamvid, pratibhāna, hitopasaṃhāra, mahākaruṇā, muditā, upekṣa, āveṇikabuddhadharma,* and *sarvākārajñatājñāna.* Occassionally, MavBh provides elucidation of these categories. For a translation, see TAUSCHER (1981:79-99). In AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1972:902), *svalakṣaṇa* is equated with own-being (*svabhāva*): svabhāva evaiṣāṃ svalakṣaṇam|; Translation (LVP, 1925:159): "Le caractère propre, c'est-à-dire la nature propre (*svabhāva*)"; English translation: "Own characteristic, that is to say own nature (*svabhāva*)."

284 This would, for example, be the sense of *dharma* in the following passage from *Dhyāyitamuṣṭisūtra* quoted at Pras 517$_{16\text{-}17}$ (D3860.173a$_1$), although the words *kuśala* and *akuśala* are also mentioned: yena mañjuśrīr evaṃ catvāry āryasatyāni dṛṣṭāni sa na kalpayati| ime dharmāḥ kuśalāḥ, ime dharmā akuśalāḥ, ime dharmāḥ prahātavyāḥ, ime dharmāḥ sākṣātkartavyāḥ, dukhaṃ parijñātavyaṃ, samudayaḥ prahātavyaḥ, nirodhaḥ sākṣātkartavayaḥ, mārgo bhāvayitavya iti||. Translation by MAY (1959:250): "Mañjuśrī, celui qui voit ainsi les quatre vérités saintes ne crée ni hypostases ni distinctions, *dharma* favorables, *dharma* défavorables, *dharma* à éliminer, *dharma* à réaliser; douleur à conaître parfaitement, origine à éliminer, arrêt à réaliser, chemin à créer psychiquement." English translation: "Mañjuśrī, he who thus sees the four Noble Truths is produces neither hypostasizations nor distinctions, favorable *dharmas,* unfavourable *dharmas, dharmas* to be eliminated, *dharmas* to be realised, suffering to be completely recognized, an origin to be eliminated, a stoppage to be realized, a path to be psychologically created."

Secondly, the word *'dharma'* may refer to the ten wholesome actions and the like (*daśakuśalādayaḥ*).[285] The ten wholesome actions (*daśa kuśala*) or the ten white courses of action (*daśa śuklāḥ karmapathāḥ*) are the opposite of the ten unwholesome actions listed above (cf. fn. 268).[286] In CŚV, Candrakīrti defines *dharma* as the ten wholesome ways of acting (*dge ba bcu'i las kyi lam*) in the sense of non-malice or non-violence (*ahiṃsā*, Tib. *mi 'tshe ba*).[287] *Dharma* in this sense may also refer to other kinds of wholesome action (*kuśaladharma*), such as venerating the three jewels, one's parents and others worthy of veneration (*ratnatrayamātāpitṛtadanyapūjyapūjādi*),[288] or

[285] Regarding the shades of meaning of *kuśala*, cf. fn. 270 above.

[286] The standard list of ten wholesome actions (*daśakuśala*) is: abstention from killing (*prāṇātipātavirati*), abstention from taking what has not been given (*adattādānavirati*), abstention from sexual misconduct (*kāmamithyācāravirati*), abstention from lying or false testimony (*mṛṣāvādavirati*), abstention from slander (*paiśunyavirati*), abstention from hurtful words (*pāruṣyavirati*), abstention from talking nonsense (*saṃbhinnapralāpavirati*), abstention from covetousness (*abhidhyāvirati*), abstention from ill will (*vyāpādavirati*) and abstention from wrong view (*mithyādṛṣṭivirati*)(cf. AYMORÉ, 1995:38, 77).

[287] The passage is a commentary on CŚ 12.23, quoted at Pras $351_{13\text{-}14}$ (LANG, 1986:166): dharmaṃ samāsato 'hiṃsāṃ varṇayanti tathāgatāḥ| śūnyatām eva nirvāṇaṃ kevalam tad ihobhayam||. DE JONG (1949:13) translates the verse: "En résumé les Tathāgata disent que le Dharma est la non-nuisance et la vacuité le Nirvāṇa. Dans leur doctrine il n'y a que ces deux concepts." English translation: "In brief, the Tathāgatas say that the Dharma is non-harm and emptiness the Nirvāṇa. There is nothing but these two concepts in their doctrine." A slightly different translation is given by LANG (1986:117): "In brief, the Tathāgatas explain non-violence as virtuous behaviour and *nirvāṇa* as, in fact, emptiness. Here [in our system] there are only these two." A third translation is given by SONAM (1994:249): "In brief Tathāgatas explain virtue as non-violence and emptiness as nirvāṇa – here there are only these two." The issue passage of CŚV (D3865.194a$_{4\text{-}5}$) says: 'tshe ba ni gźan la gnod par [g]źugs pa'i phyir sems can la gnod pa'i bsam pa daṅ| des kun nas blaṅs pa'i lus daṅ ṅag gi las yin la| mi 'tshe ba ni de las bzlog pa'i sgo nas dge ba bcu'i las kyi lam mo||gaṅ yaṅ cuṅ zad gźan la phan 'dogs pa de thams cad kyaṅ mi 'tshe ba'i khoṅs su 'du ba yin no||de bźin gśegs pa rnams kyi chos ni mdor bsdu na mi 'tshe ba de ñid yin no źes bstan to||. Translation: "Because it will cause harm to others (*gźan la gnod par gźugs pa'i phyir*), malice (**hiṃsā, 'tshe ba*) is the thought of harming sentient beings and the actions of body and speech derived there from (*des kun nas blaṅs pa*); because of being the opposite thereof, non-malice (**ahiṃsā, mi 'tshe ba*) is the ten wholesome actions along with their paths (*dge ba bcu'i las kyi lam*). Whatever (*gaṅ yaṅ cuṅ zad*) is benefiting others (**parānugrāhaka, gźan la phan 'dogs pa*), all that is included in non-malice. Put briefly, the *dharma* of the Tathāgatas is such non-malice alone."

[288] Cf. Pras$_{8\text{-}9}$ (D3860.62a$_{3\text{-}4}$): evaṃ daśasv api kuśaleṣu karmapatheṣu kuśalakriyāniṣpādyeṣu ratnatrayamātāpitṛtadanyapūjyapūjādilakṣaṇeṣu ca kuśaladharmaprārambheṣu yojyaṃ||. Translation by MAY (1959:147-148): "On appliquera le même [raisonnement] aux dix chemins favorables des l'acte, à réaliser par des activités favorables, et à la quête des *dharma*

to various mental positive qualities.[289]

As already explained above (p. 190), wholesome actions may thus be called *dharmas*, because they keep one away (*vidhāraṇa*) from going on a wrong course of rebirth (*kugatigamana*). A wrong course of rebirth (*kugati*) is synonymous with a bad course of rebirth (*durgati*). Three courses of rebirth (*gati*)[290] are considered bad: rebirth in hell-realms, as an animal or as a starving ghost.[291] The unwholesome actions (*akuśala*) lead to rebirth in these

favorable, qui se définit par la vénération du triple joyau, des parent et autres objets du vénération, et par un certain nombre d'autres pratiques (°*ādi*)." English translation: "The same [reasoning] applies to the ten favourable paths of action to be realised through favourable activities and to the collection of favourable *dharmas,* which are characterised by veneration of the triple gem, one's parents and other objects of veneration as well as by certain other practices (°*ādi*)."

289 Thus, in MavBh (D3862.222b$_2$; transl. by LVP, 1907-1912:7), the three main causes for becoming a *bodhisattva* (*byaṅ chub sems dpa' rnams kyi gtso bo'i rgyu*), viz. compassion (*sñiṅ rje*), insight into the non-dual (*gñis su med pa'i śes rab*) and the mind bent on enlightenment (*byaṅ chub kyi sems*), are explained as three *dharmas* (*chos gsum po*). Likewise, in MavBh (D3862.231a$_3$; transl. by LVP, 1907-1912:33), the three mental wholesome actions, viz. non-covetousness (*ma chags pa*), non-ill-will (*źe sdaṅ med pa*) and right view (*yaṅ dag pa'i lta ba*), are designated as three *dharmas* (*chos gsum po*).

290 The word *gati* 'going, migration, path, course, destiny' refers to the possible states of existence into which rebirth is possible (EDGERTON, 1953:208). Hence, it is here translated with 'course of rebirth'. The *Āryasarvāstivādibhikṣuṇīprātimokṣasūtravṛtti* (D4112.7b$_3$) comments on the word: de la 'gro ba źes bya ba ni khams gsum na rgyun mi 'chad pa las daṅ ñon moṅs pa'i dbaṅ gis 'khor ba na 'gro ba źes bya ste| 'gro ba lṅa'am drug tu bstan pa rnams so|| (the phrase *'khor ba na* has been emended from *'khor ba nas*). Translation: "In that [verse], what is called *gati* (*'gro ba*) is called *gati* in the sense of incessant wandering (*'khor ba*) in the three world-spheres forced by action and the defilements. They are taught as being five or six." Further, the *Prātimokṣasūtrapaddhati* (D4104.I.6a$_5$) says: 'gro ba źes bya ba ni| 'jig rten de rtag tu 'khor ba'i phyir ro||. Translation: "It is called *gati,* because this world wanders eternally." Both these quotations are commentaries to an intro-ductory verse of the *Mūlasarvāstivādin Prātimokṣasūtra* (D2.1a$_3$; however, not attested in the *Sarvāstivādaprātimokṣasūtra,* cf. SIMSON, 2000).

291 In the quotation, which follows below, the realm of starving ghosts (*preta*) is referred to with the common term 'the world of Yama' (*yamaloka*). These terms are, e.g., equated by Jayānanda (*Madhyamakāva-tāraṭīkā,* D3870.I.85a$_1$: gśin rje'i 'jig rten źes bya ba ni yi dags kyi 'jig rten no| "'The world of Yama' is the world of starving ghosts"), as also confirmed by EDGERTON (1953.II:208, 447). In an unnamed *sūtra*-quotation in CŚV (D3865.57a$_{3-4}$), the two terms are, however, men-tioned side by side perhaps indicating that they there refer to different states (?): 'khor ba'i rgya mtsho ... dmyal ba daṅ yi dags daṅ dud 'gro daṅ| gśin rje'i 'jig rten du skye ba'i klong 'khor rṅa bo che'i sbubs 'dra ba brgya phrag gcig gis dkrugs pa. Translation: "[The *bodhisattvas* saw that] the ocean of *saṃsāra* was ... churned by hundreds of whirlpools (*kloṅ 'khor*), like the kettles (*sbubs*) of kettle-drums (*rṅa bo che*) of rebirth in the hell (*dmyal ba*), as a starving ghost (*yi dags*), as an animal (*dud 'gro*) and in the world of

three bad courses of rebirth, whereas wholesome actions lead to good courses of rebirth (*sugati*) and spiritual development on the Buddhist path, as may be illustrated with the following passage from *Daśabhūmikasūtra* quoted by Candrakīrti in MavBh (D3862.234a$_2$-234b$_2$; LVP, 1907-1912:42-43):

> Moreover, these ten unwholesome courses of action, when done to a high degree, frequently and manifold, are the cause for hell; to a middling degree, the cause of birth as an animal; to a small degree, the cause for the world of Yama. Killing leads to hell, leads to birth as an animal, leads to the world of Yama. Then, when again born among humans, two ripenings are caused to develop: a short lifespan and many illnesses. Taking what is not given leads to hell...(similarly, up to:) few belongings and common property. Sexual misconduct leads to hell...ignoble surroundings and a wife having a lover. Lying leads to hell...many groundless accusations and promises broken by others. Slander leads to hell...divided and mean surroundings. Hurtful words lead to hell...hearing unpleasantries and quarrels. Talking nonsense leads to hell...one's words not being followed and a weak intelligence. Covetousness leads to hell...dissatisfaction and a big desire. Ill will leads to hell...desire for evil and pressure by others. Wrong view leads to hell, leads to birth as an animal, leads to the world of Yama. Then, when again born among humans, two ripenings are caused to develop: falling into wrong views and being deceived. – Thus, the ten unwholesome courses of action bring along an immeasurable mass of suffering.
>
> On the other hand, due to practising the ten wholesome courses of action, one comes to be born [in a superior birth] from the birth as a human, etc., up till the Peak of Existence. Better still, when these ten wholesome courses of action are practised thoroughly with a character of insight, in which the understanding is limited, the

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Yama (*gśin rje'i 'jig rten*)." In the *Saṃmatīya*-section of **Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtaviniścaya* (D3897.219b$_5$-220a$_3$), the *yamaloka* is enumerated as one of the three kinds of hell-realms (*dmyal ba*) whereas *yi dags kyi 'gro ba* is enumerated as a separate *gati*. Moreover, the same text (D3897.219b$_{5-6}$) speaks of four bad courses of rebirth instead of three, because it counts the course of rebirth as a demi-god (*lha ma yin yi 'gro ba*) as a separate bad course of rebirth. Thus, the three bad courses of rebirth seem to be a later standardisation of earlier disparate terms that occassionally appear even in later texts in non-systematic ways.

> attitude is to be fearful of the world with its three spheres, where one is without great compassion, and one adheres to what one has learned from others and what has been proclaimed, they make one turn to the *Śrāvakayāna*. Even better still, when having been fully purified without having been guided by others, conforming only to what has appeared by itself, having awakened on one's own not following a path learned from others, being without great compassion and means, having awakened to the profound conditionality, they make one turn to the *Pratyekabuddhayāna*. Even better still, when having been fully purified by having engende-red vast and immeasurable great compassion, having achieved skill in the means, having made great wishing-prayers, never abandoning all sentient beings, and having the vast Buddha-wisdom as one's objective, they make one turn to the perfect purity of the *bodhisattvabhūmi*, the perfect purity of the *pāramitās*, the extensive activities.[292]

In this passage, the *kugati* or *durgati* are thus enumerated as *niraya* (*sems can dmyal ba*), *tiragyoni* (*dud 'gro'i skye gnas*) and *yamaloka* (*gśin rje'i 'jig rten*). The same designations and order of the *durgati* occur at MavBh (D3862.230a$_3$; LVP, 1907-1912:29$_{19\text{-}20}$) as well as in a quotation from the *Āryavajramaṇḍanāmadhāraṇī Mahāyānasūtra* (T1344, T1345, D139) given at V51$_4$ (D3860.17a$_1$), although, in the latter case, the hell-realm is designated with the more common word, *naraka*, instead of *niraya* (cf. EDGERTON, 1953:208).[293]

Now returning to the present passage of Pras, to illustrate this use of the word *dharma*, a quotation from *Udānavarga* is given above. The quoted lines occur in two verses in *Udānavarga*. The first occurrence is *Udānavarga* 4.35: "One should be diligent and not play around. One should practise the *dharma*, which is good conduct. For the *dharma*-practitioner rests happily

[292] Given the length of this quotation, the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts will not be quoted here. Cf. instead RAHDER (1926:26-27) and LVP (1907:289-291), where a French translation also is found.

[293] For yet another passage in Candrakīrti's writings showing how those, who commit unwholesome actions, fall into the bad courses of rebirth, see CŚV D3865.123a$_{5\text{-}6}$ (commenting on CŚ 7.6).

both in this world and the next."[294] The second occurrence is *Udānavarga* 30.5: "One should practise *dharma*, which is good conduct. One should not practise that, which is bad conduct. For the *dharma*-practitioner rests happily both in this world and the next."[295] In both these verses, *dharma* is equated with 'good conduct' (*sucarita*) and is thus used in the sense of 'right action'. However, as the first use of the word *dharma* was not illustrated with an example and only the second and third uses are illustrated in this manner, it is not certain whether these illustrations are interpolations or were originally placed in the text by Candrakīrti. However, they are attested by both the Sanskrit manuscripts and Tibetan translation.

(V304$_8$) *Nirvāṇa* (*nirvāṇam*) is called (*ucyate*) *'dharma'* (*dharma ity*) on account of the sense (*°arthena*) of keeping one away (*°vidhāraṇa°*) from going into *saṃsāra* consisting of the five courses [of rebirth] (*pāṃcagatikasaṃsāragamana°*), [as] in this case (*ity atra*): "he goes (*gacchati*) for refuge (*śaraṇam*) in the *dharma* (*dharmam*)." In the present context (*iha*), however (*tu*), the word *dharma* (*dharmaśab-*

[294] *Udānavarga* 4.35 (BERNHARD, 1965:137): uttiṣṭen na pramādyeta dharmaṃ sucaritaṃ caret| dharmacārī sukhaṃ śete hy asmiṃ loke paratra ca||. Omitted in the older Tibetan translation (D326) but attested by the later Tibetan translation (D4099.6b$_5$): brtson 'grus ldan źiṅ bag yod daṅ||chos spyod legs par spyod byed pa||'jig rten 'di daṅ pha rol du||chos spyad pa yis bde ba 'thob||. The verse has a parallel in *Dhammapada* 168 (HINÜBER & NORMAN, 1995:48): uttiṭṭhe na-ppamajjeyya dhammaṃ sucaritaṃ care, dhammacārī sukhaṃ seti asmiṃ loke paramhi ca. Transl. by CARTER & PALIHAWADANA (1987:233): "One should stand up, not be neglectful, follow dhamma, which is good conduct. One, who lives dhamma, sleeps at ease in this world and also in the next." As remarked by CARTER & PALIHAWADANA (ibid.), the commentary interprets *uttiṭṭhe* as 'standing for alms', i.e., the monk's going on his daily alms-round. For an example of a similar use of *sukhaṃ supati* 'he sleeps happily', cf. AN 4.150 (HARDY, 1899; transl. by HARE, 1935:103).

[295] *Udānavarga* 30.5 (BERNHARD, 1965:303): dharmaṃ caret sucaritaṃ nainaṃ duścaritaṃ caret| dharmacārī sukhaṃ śete hy asmiṃ loke paratra ca||. Attested by both the Tibetan translations in the same wording (D326.240b$_6$; D4099.29b$_6$): chos spyod legs par spyad bya źiṅ||ñes par spyad pa de mi spyad||'jig rten 'di daṅ pha rol du||chos spyad pas ni bde ba 'thob||. The verse has a parallel in *Dhammapada* 169 (HINÜBER & NORMAN, 1995:48): dhammaṃ care sucaritaṃ na naṃ duccaritaṃ care, dhammacārī sukhaṃ seti asmiṃ loke paramhi ca. Transl. by CARTER & PALIHAWADANA (1987:233): "One should follow dhamma, which is good conduct, not that which is poor conduct. One, who lives dhamma, sleeps at ease in this world and also in the next."

daḥ) is intended (*abhipretaḥ*) only (*eva*) in the [second] sense of keeping one away from going on a wrong course [of rebirth] (*kugatigamanavidhāraṇārthena*).

Thirdly, the word *dharma* may be used to signify *nirvāṇa*, the Buddhist *summum bonum.* The semantic interpretation provided by Candrakīrti in this case is that *nirvāṇa* keeps one away (*vidhāraṇa*) from going into *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāragamana*) consisting of the five courses of rebirth (*pāñcagatika*), and hence *nirvāṇa* is 'something that keeps or holds' (*dharma*). Similar references to *dharma* as designating *nirvāṇa* were mentioned above (see footnotes 273 and 274). While the first and possibly also the second use of *dharma* include phenomena, which are both *sāśrava* and *anāśrava*, this third use of *dharma* only includes phenomena that are *anāśrava.* It, therefore, seems that Candrakīrti would include the use of *dharma* in the common sense of the 'teachings' of Buddha within this third category of *dharma.* This interpretation would also agree with the definitions of *dharma* quoted in footnotes 273 and 274 above.

To illustrate this use, the example given is: "he goes for refuge in the *dharma*" or perhaps "he goes for the refuge which is the *dharma*" (*dharmaṃ śaraṇaṃ gacchati*).[296] Thus, according to Candrakīrti's interpretation (or, as mentioned above, these illustrations could also be interpolations) the word *dharma* should – when speaking of taking refuge – be interpreted as *nirvāṇa*, perhaps also including the Buddhist teachings leading to *nirvāṇa*, because the *dharma* is that, which keeps one away from going into *saṃsāra.* If the word *dharma* is restricted in meaning to the three senses given here by Candrakīrti, clearly the case of taking refuge would thus have to belong to this third category, because *dharmaśaraṇa* not merely leads away from the bad courses of rebirth but also leads to and represents *nirvāṇa.* This would agree with the statement in **Triśaraṇasaptati* that "knowledge of the *dharma* of phenomena (*dharma*) is explained precisely as liberation from aging and death."[297] It would also agree with what is said in AKBh (LVP,

[296] Moreover, mss बदज attest a somewhat unusual compounded form *dharmaśaraṇaṃ gacchati.*

[297] D3971.252a_1 (SORENSEN, 1986:30): rga śi dag las grol ba ñid||chos rnams kyi ni chos śes bśad.

1924:78): "Celui qui prend refuge dans le Dharma prend refuge dans le Nirvāṇa, c'est-à-dire dans le *pratisaṃkhyānirodha.* Il prend refuge dans tout Nirvāṇa, car le Nirvāṇa a pour unique caractère la cessation des passions et de la souffrance de soi et d'autrui."[298]

The equation of *dharma* with *nirvāṇa* and hence with the ultimate may also be illustrated by a passage from the *Āryasarvabuddhaviṣayāvatāra-jñānālokālaṃkāranāmamahāyānasūtra,*[299] which Candrakīrti cites at $V449_{5\text{-}12}$: "Le Tathāgata est toujours de nature non-née. Tous les dharma sont semblables au Sugata. Les sots errent dans ce mond en saisissant des caractères dans dharma inexistant. Le Tathāgata est le reflet de la Loi, bonne et pure. Il n'y a ni vraie nature, ni Tathāgata. Ce ne sont qu'un reflet qui apparaît à tous les hommes" (DE JONG, 1949:86).[300] Although *dharma* in this passage does

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[298] AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:629): yo dharmaṃ śaraṇaṃ gacchati, asau nirvāṇaṃ śaraṇaṃ gacchati pratisaṃkhyānirodham; svaparasantānakleśānāṃ duḥkhasya ca śāntyekalakṣaṇatvāt|. English translation: "He, who takes refuge in the Dharma, takes refuge in Nirvāṇa, namely in the *pratisaṃkhyānirodha.* He takes refuge in all Nirvāṇa, because Nirvāṇa has the cessation of the passions and the suffering of oneself and others as its unique characteristic."

[299] $D100.294b_{3\text{-}5}$; the provenance of this *sūtra*-passage is neither identified in LVP's edition of Pras nor in the translation by DE JONG (1949:86).

[300] Pras $449_{5\text{-}12}$ ($D3860.146b_{5\text{-}6}$; DE JONG 1949:153-154): anupādadharmāḥ satataṃ tathāgataḥ sarve ca dharmāḥ sugatena sādṛśāḥ|| nimittagrāheṇa tu bālabuddhayo 'satsu dharmeṣu caranti loke||tathāgato hi tv eti bimbabhūtaḥ||kuśalasya dharmasya anāśravasya naivātra tathātā na tathāgato 'sti biṃbaṃ ca saṃdṛśyati sarvaloke|| (incl. text-critical note by DE JONG, 1978b:237-238). English translation: "The Tathāgata is always of an unborn nature. All dharmas are similar to Sugata. The fools wander in this world grasping at characters in the non-existent dharmas. The Tathāgata is the reflection of the Law, good and pure. There is neither true nature, nor Tathāgata. It is but a reflection that appears to all the men."

The translation of the original passage of the *sūtra* by Surendrabodhi and Ye śes sde ($D100.294b_{3\text{-}5}$) displays a couple of variants to the translation of Ñi ma grags in Pras (D3860). It may be interesting to note that the first verse also is quoted in **Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* by Jñānagarbha ($D3882.10a_{6}$), where the Tibetan translation, which is again by Śīlendrabodhi and Ye śes sde, astonishingly agrees with the translation found in Pras (except for a single minor variant: D3882 reads *mtshan mar 'dzin pa yis* in lieu of *mtshan mar 'dzin pa rnams*). Likewise, the first verse is quoted in **Buddhānusmṛtyanuttarabhāvanā* by Mahāmati (D3923. $79a_{4\text{-}5}$), where the Tibetan translation by Vinayacandrapa and Chos kyi śes rab (a.k.a. Śe dkar Lo tsā ba) again agrees with the translation found in Pras (this time with two variants: D3923 reads *chos rnams thams cad* in lieu of D3860 *chos rnams kun kyaṅ* and D3923 reads *'jig rten dag na* in lieu of D3890 *'jig rten na ni;* these variants found in D3923, however, agree with D100, the translation of the original *sūtra*-passage). Such variants raises the question of how the Tibetan translators worked with their texts. One may either presuppose that a translator when faced with a sūtra-quotation would search out a translation of the original *sūtra,* and take his translation from there. If this is the case, it is only possible to explain these textual

not appear to be used strictly in the sense of *nirvāṇa*, it certainly is here meant strictly in the sense of *anāśrava* and would thus fall under this third meaning of *dharma*.

Candrakīrti describes *saṃsāra* as consisting of five courses of rebirth (*pāñcagatika*). Generally speaking, there are either five or six courses of rebirth taught by the Buddhist schools.[301] Candrakīrti consequently speaks of

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variants in the way that a different Tibetan translation of the original *sūtra* was available to the Tibetan translators Ye śes sde (c.800 CE), Ñi ma grags (born 1055 CE) and Śe dkar Lo tsā ba (born 11th century) or – less likely – that a separate translation only of these stray verses circulated among the Tibetan translators, thus being a 'migrational verse' belonging to a common stock of often quoted verses. Otherwise, if one presupposes that the Tibetan translator would not search out an original translation when faced with a *sūtra*-quotation but would merely translate the quotation as found in the particular text he was working with, the similarity between these many different translations of these verses must indicate a quite standard way of rendering Sanskrit into Tibetan. In my mind, it is desirable to research this question further, as it would shed more light on how the Tibetan translators worked.

[301] E.g., as stated in *Āryasarvāstivādibhikṣuṇīprātimokṣasūtravṛtti* (D4112. 7b$_3$; cf. fn. 290 above). The five courses of rebirth (*pañcagati*) are enumerated by *Kuśaladeva* in *Bodhisattvacaryāvatārasaṃskāra* (D3874.86b$_7$) with the remark that six courses of rebirth (*ṣaḍgati*) may also occur: 'gro ba rnams źes bya ba dmyal ba daṅ | dud 'gro daṅ | yi dwags daṅ | mi daṅ | lha ste 'gro ba lṅa 'am drug go | |. Translation: "*Gati* is the five or six *gatis* of hell-beings (*dmyal ba*), animals (*dud 'gro*), starving ghosts (*yi dwags*), humans (*mi*) and gods (*lha*)." The same list of *pañcagati* is found at AK 3.1 (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:379; LVP, 1926:1), where the Sanskrit names are given as *naraka, preta, tiryañc, manuṣya* and *ṣaḍ divaukasaḥ*. The doctrine of *pañcagati* is attested by several early canonical sources. Thus, they are listed in the *Saṅgītisutta* (DN 3.234): pañca gatiyo: nirayo, tiracchānayoni, pettivisayo, manussā, devā. MCDERMOTT (1980:172) further mentions AN 4.459, MN 1.73 and *Culanidessa* 2.550. The above-mentioned verse from the *Saṅgītisutta* (DN 3.324) corresponds to *Saṅgītasūtra* 5.5 and is explained in the *Sarvāstivāda*-work *Saṅgītiparyāya* (*A-p'i-ta-mo chi-i-men tsu-lun* 阿毘達磨集異門足論; cf. STACHE-ROSEN, 1968:134-135). Likewise, they are listed in the **Kāraṇa-prajñapti*-section of *Prajñaptiśāstra* (D4087.160b$_3$ff.) along with a more detailed explanation, which in part agrees with the shorter explanation found in *Saṅgītiparyāya*. As shown by BAREAU (1955:280), the *pañcagati*-doctrine was taught by the *Theravādins* (as attested in *Kathāvatthu* VIII.1) and the *Sarvāstivādins* (as indicated by the sources quoted above). It is also taught in the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* (T1548.28.690b$_{15ff.}$, *She-li-fu a-p'i-t'an lun* 舍利弗阿毘曇論; BAREAU, 1955:196), which on this point thus agrees with the *Sarvāstivāda*-doctrine. According to the commentary on *Kathāvatthu* VIII.1 (JAYAWICKRAMA, 1979:104; cf. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:211), the *Andhakas* and *Uttarāpathakas*, on the other hand, taught a doctrine of six *gatis* (*cha gatiyo*)(BAREAU, 1955:280). According to the large *Sarvāstivāda*-compendia, **Vibhāṣā* (*A-p'i-'t'an p'i-p'o-sha lun;* T1546.28.6a) and **Mahāvi-bhāṣā* (*A-p'i-ta-mo ta p'i-p'o-sha lun* ; T1545.27.8b$_{24}$), the *Vatsīputrīyas* also taught six *gatis* (*liu-ch'ü* 六趣)(BAREAU, 1955:120). Six *gatis* are arrived at by counting the course of rebirth of a demigod (*asura, a-su-lo* 阿素洛 in T1545, *a-hsiu-lo* 阿須羅 in T1546) as a separate *gati*. This view is strongly criticised at *Kathāvatthu* VIII.1, which considers the *asuras* to belong to the

pañcagati in all his writings (however, his commentator, Jayānanda, alternates between both forms).[302] Candrakīrti, finally, comments that the word *dharma* in Mmk 17.1 is used in the second sense, i.e., that of 'wholesome action', such as the ten wholesome actions, etc.

(V304$_{10}$): Moreover (*punaḥ*), is (*kim*) the state of mind (*cetas*) *dharma* (*dharmaḥ*) only in as much as (*eva ekam*) it is self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamakam*)? No (*na*), [the interlocutor][303] says (*ity āha*). What (*kim*) then (*tarhi*)? What (*yat*) state of mind (*cetas*) [is] benefiting others (*parānugrāhakam*) and (*ca*) friendly (*maitrañ ca*), that (*asau*) [is] also (*api*) *dharma* (*dharmaḥ*). In the case of *'maitram'* (*maitram ity atra*), one should understand (*veditavyaḥ*) that the word 'and' (*caśabdaḥ*) is elided yet implied (*lupta-nirdiṣṭaḥ*).

The commentary then turns to the other two aspects of the state of mind that is *dharma*, viz. the state of mind, which is 'caring for others' or 'benefiting others' (*parānugrāhaka*) and 'kind' or 'friendly' (*maitra*). It is further clarified that the word 'and' (*ca-śabda*) is elided (*lupta*) after *maitra* in pāda c omitted metri causa.[304] That is to say, the word *maitram* should be read as a third attribute to *cetas*, i.e.: "which (*yat*) state of mind (*cetas*) [leads to being] self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamakam*) and (*ca*) benefiting others

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starving ghosts (*pettivisaya*). As indicated by McDermott (1980:172), the *asuras* are, however, mentioned as a separate category in-between the *pettivisaya* and the *manussā* at DN 3.264. As a digression, it may further be remarked that *Jaina*-texts speak of 4 *gati: devagati, manuṣyagati, tiryaggati* and *narakagati* (Glasenapp, 1915:27, 63-74).

[302] Attested at Pras 218$_3$, 269$_9$, 304$_4$, 323$_5$, 328$_3$, MavBh D3862.329b$_2$, **Yuktiṣaṣṭhikāvṛtti* D3864.6a$_4$, D3864.21b$_2$, CŚV D3865.76a$_{3,7}$. As noted by Scherrer-Schaub (1991:134, fn. 89), there is also a single occurrence of *ṣaḍgati* at MavBh (D3862.274b$_7$; LVP, 1907-1912:175), but this occurs in a quotation from a *sūtra* (which LVP (1910:356) tentatively identifies as *Tattvanirdeśasamādhi*).

[303] Cf. discussion on the interlocutor's speech on p. 173 above.

[304] In *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.60 (Vasu, 1891:55-56), Pāṇini defines elision (*lopa*) as something in the sentence, which is not seen (*adarśanam*) but which is still operational or exerting an influence, for example, on the syntax, etc. That is to say, an elided word or part of a word is an implied word or part of a word.

(*parānugrāhakam*) [and (*ca*)] friendly (*maitram*), that (*saḥ*) [is] *dhar-ma.*" The other commentaries do not comment on this point of the syntactical analysis of the verse. Candrakīrti probably found it necessary to add this explanation to prevent the reader from wrongly joining *maitram* into the correlative clause *saḥ dharmaḥ,* which could be provoked by the *pāda*-break between *pādas* b and c. This is exactly an interpretation found in both the Chinese translations of the verse: (a) "when someone can restrain the mind [and] bring benefit to sentient beings, it is called friendliness [and] wholesome action"[305] and (b) "self-restraint in body, speech and mind and this care for others [are] friendliness [and] dharma."[306] This interpretation is also attested in *Chung lun*'s prose-commentary,[307] which either would indicate that *Ching-mu,* its author, had committed the same error or that *Kumārajīva,* its translator, modified the prose-commentary in his translation to suit his interpretation of the verse.[308]

(V305_1): Among these [two] (*tatra*), 'to benefit (*anugṛhṇāti*) others (*param*)' is (*iti*) a state of mind (*cetas*) benefiting others (*parānugrāhakam*). Which (*yat*) state of mind (*cetas*) has the four bases for gathering (*catuḥsaṃgrahavastu°*) as its activity (*°pravṛttam*) and (*ca*) protection from fear (*bhayaparitrāṇa°*) as its activity (*°pravṛttam*), that (asau) [is] also (*api*) *dharma* (*dharmaḥ*).

First, the compound *parānugrāhaka* is explained by dividing it into its components and verbalising the verbal-adjective *anugrāhaka; thus, parānu-*

[305] *Chung lun,* T1564.21b_{25-26}: 人能降伏心。利益於眾生。是名爲慈善.

[306] *Pang jo teng lun,* T1566.99a_{18-19}: 自護身口思。及彼攝他者。慈法爲種子.

[307] *Chung lun,* T1564.21c_1: "[They] are also called kindness, wholesome action [and] beneficence"; 亦名慈善福德.

[308] Instead of Candrakīrti's interpretation of the verse requiring the reading of an implied 'and' (*ca*) with *maitram* in pada c, it is also possible simply to take *maitram* as an adjective modifying *cetas,* thus reading "Which benevolent (*maitram*) state mind (*cetas*) [is] self-restraining and benefiting others, that is *dharma.*" However, this is not the interpretation preferred by Candrakīrti.

grāhaka means 'to benefit (*anugṛhṇāti*) others (*param*)'.[309] Candrakīrti has adopted this gloss from either *Akutobhayā* (Huntington, 1986:403), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (Saito, 1984.II:220) or *Prajñāpradīpa* (T1566.99a$_{22}$).[310] The form of the gloss in Pras is closest to how it appears in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti*.[311]

Candrakīrti also provides a second gloss of *parānugrāhaka*, which explains its nature by two compounds: it is a behaviour engaging in the four bases for gathering (*catuḥsaṃgrahavastupravṛtti*) and a behaviour of protecting others from fear (*bhayaparitrāṇapravṛtta*). Both compounds have been adopted from *Prajñāpradīpa*, where, however, the four bases for gathering (*catuḥsaṃgrahavastu*) are not mentioned by name but the first two members of this list are given instead.[312] 'The four bases for gathering' consists of four factors that promote gathering a large community or following: generosity

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[309] Cf. e.g., CŚV D3865.68b$_2$, where its opposite, 'benefiting oneself' (*bdag la phan 'dogs pa, *ātmānugrāhaka* or **svārtha?*), is spoken of negatively. At CŚV D3865.194a$_6$ commenting on CŚ 12.23 (cf. LANG, 1986:116), *parānugrāhaka* is said to include all forms of non-violence (*mi 'tshe ba, ahiṃsā*): 'tshe ba ni gźan la gnod par źugs pa'i phyir sems can la gnod pa'i bsam pa daṅ| des kun nas bslaṅg ba'i lus daṅ ṅag gi las yin la| mi 'tshe ba ni de las bzlog pa'i sgo nas dge ba bcu'i las kyi lam mo| |gaṅ yaṅ cuṅ zad gźan la phan 'dogs pa de thams cad kyaṅ mi 'tshe ba'i khoṅs su 'du ba yin no| |. Translation: "Since violence (*'tshe ba, hiṃsā*) causes harm to others, it is the intention of harming sentient beings and the bodily and verbal action aroused thereby. Non-violence (*mi 'tshe ba, ahiṃsā*), by being the opposite thereof, is the ten wholesome courses of action and their paths. Whatever in the slightest way brings benefit to others, all that is included in non-violence." For a similar definition of violence, cf. **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (T1552.893c; transl. by DESSEIN, 1999.I:191). *Parānugraha* also occurs in Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī 1.11 (HAHN, 1982:6).

[310] In *Prajñāpradīpa*, it is attested only by the Chinese translation, but has been omitted in the Tibetan translation. Given that it does not occur in *Chung lun* and hence could not have been interpolated into *Pang jo teng lun* from that source, it seems likely that it must have occurred in the Sanskrit original used for the Chinese translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*.

[311] It must be cautioned that in Ñi ma grags' Tibetan translation of Pras, *anugṛhṇāti* has, however, been translated with *rjes su 'dzin par byed pa*, whereas *anugrāhaka* is translated with *phan 'dogs pa*. In *Akutobhayā* and Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti*, the verbal form is *'dogs par byed pa* (perhaps **gṛhṇāti* without the *upasarga anu*), while *anugrāhaka* is *phan 'dogs pa*. Thus, Ñi ma grags' translation of *anugṛhṇāti* is here more a mechanical than a transparent reproduction of the original text. Further, *Akutobhayā* adds *źes bya ba'i tha tshig go* (**ity arthaḥ*) to the gloss, which is not attested in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* and Pras.

[312] Cf. *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507): gźan la phan 'dogs par źes bya ba ni sbyin pa daṅ sñan par smra ba daṅ| 'jigs pa las yoṅs su skyob pa la sogs pa gźan dag la phan 'dogs par byed pa'o. T1566:99a$_{21\text{-}22}$: 攝他者。謂布施愛語救護怖畏者. Translation from the Tibetan text by AMES (1986:261): "To benefit others is to perform beneficence for others, such as giving and speaking kindly and protecting from danger."

(*dāna*), affectionate speech (*priyavākya*), helpful activity (*arthacaryā*) and equality with regard to the [common] good (*samānārthatā*)(RHYS DAVIDS & STEDE, 1921-1925:666).[313] A detailed explanation is found in *Saṅgīti-paryāya* (STACHE-ROSEN, 1968:109-110). Generosity (*dāna*) is to give useful things to the *śramaṇas, brahmans,* the poor, ascetics and beggars, such as food, medicine, clothes, flower-garlands, balms, perfumes and lodging (ibid.). Affectionate speech (*priyavākya*) is to speak words that cause happiness, are pleasant, smoothen the face, remove worries, bring forth laughter, words of comfort and the like (ibid.). Helpful activity (*arthacaryā*) is to care for those, who are sick or have trouble and are without anyone to help them (ibid.). Equality with regard to the [common] good (*samānārthatā*) is to feel repulsion for killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying and the drinking of alcohol and to inspire one's companions to feel in the same way (ibid.). These four bases for gathering promote solidarity in others and thus aid in the gathering of a large following. The list may be illustrated with this example from the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (transl. by HARE, 1935:147-148):

> Once, while the Exalted One was dwelling in Āḷavī, at Aggāḷava, near the shrine there, Hatthaka, surrounded by some five hundred lay-disciples, came and saluted and sat down at one side. And the Exalted One said to him, seated there: 'This following of yours, Hatthaka, is very large. How do you manage to gather it together?' 'Lord, it is by those four bases of gatherings, which have been declared by the Exalted One, that I gather this following together. Lord, when I realize that this man may be enlisted by a gift I enlist him in this way; when by a kindly word, then in that way; when by a good turn, then so; or when I know that he must be treated as an equal, if he is to be enlisted, then I enlist him by equality of treatment. Moreover, lord, there is wealth in my family, and they know that such (treatment) is not rumoured of a poor man.' 'Well done, well done, Hatthaka! This is just the way to gather together a

[313] The four bases for gathering are enumerated, for example, at AN 4.364 (HARDY, 1899): cattār' imāni bhikkhave saṅgahavatthūni: dānaṃ peyyavajjaṃ atthacariyā samānāttatā. Transl. by HARE (1935:241): "There are these four bases of sympathy: gifts, kindness, doing good and equal treatment." For further references, cf. DN 3.152, DN 3.232, AN 2.32, AN 2.248, *Jātaka* 5.330; see also RHYS DAVIDS & STEDE (1921-1925:666).

large following.'[314]

At AN 4.361, it is said that the generosity is the giving of *Dhamma*, the best friendly speech is to teach the *Dhamma*, the best helpful activity is to instil faith, wholesome action, generosity and wisdom in the unbelievers, the immoral, the mean and the foolish, and the best equality is that, which exists between stream winner and stream winner, between once-returner and once-returner, between non-returner and non-returner, between arahant and arahant.[315]

The second compound used by Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti to describe *parānugrāhaka* is a behaviour of protecting others from fear (*bhayaparitrāṇapravṛtta*). The compound does not seem to refer to a canonical list of behaviour and may just be taken in its verbatim meaning. It should, however, be noted that at AN 4.363-364 a list of four powers is explained, the fourth of which is explained as the four bases for gathering mentioned above. Right after the exposition of these four bases, it is said that he, who possesses these four powers, has passed beyond five fears, which could perhaps indicate a canonical link between *catuḥsaṃgrahavastu* and *bhayaparitrāṇa*.[316] In *Chung lun,* the explanation of *parānugrāhaka* is given in

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[314] AN 4.218-219 (HARDY, 1899): Ekaṃ samayaṃ Bhagavā Āḷaviyaṃ viharati Aggāḷave cetiye. Atha kho Hatthako Āḷavako pañcamattehi upāsakasatehi parivuto yena Bhagavā ten' upasaṅkami, upasaṅkamitvā Bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ nisinnaṃ kho Hatthakaṃ Āḷavakaṃ Bhagavā etad avoca: Mahatī kho tyāyaṃ Hatthaka parisā, kathaṃ pana tvaṃ Hatthaka imaṃ mahatiṃ parisaṃ saṃgaṅhāsī ti? Yān'imāni bhante Bhagavatā desitāni cattāri saṃgahavatthūni, tehāhaṃ imaṃ mahatiṃ parisaṃ saṃgaṅhāmi. Ahaṃ bhante yaṃ jānāmi 'ayaṃ dānena saṃgahetabbo' ti, taṃ dānena saṃgaṅhāmi; yaṃ jānāmi 'ayaṃ peyyavajjena saṃgahetabbo' ti, taṃ peyyavajjena saṃgaṅhāmi; yaṃ jānāmi 'ayaṃ atthacariyāya saṃgahetabbo' ti, taṃ atthacariyāya saṃgaṅhāmi; yaṃ jānāmi 'ayaṃ samānattatāya saṃgahetabbo' ti, taṃ samānattāya saṃgaṅhāmi. Saṃvijjante kho pana me bhante kule bhogā, saṃgaṅhāmidaliddassa kho no tathā sotabbaṃ maññantī ti. Sādhu sādhu Hatthaka, yoni kho tyāhaṃ Hatthaka mahatiṃ parisaṃ saṃgahetuṃ.

[315] Cf. AN 4.364 (HARDY, 1899; transl. by HARE, 1935:241-242).

[316] AN 4.364-365 (HARDY, 1899): Imehi kho bhikkhave catūhi balehi sammanāgato ariyasāvako pañca bhayāni samatikkanto hoti. Katamāni pañca? Ājīvikabhayaṃ asilokabhayaṃ parisasārajjabhayaṃ maraṇabhayaṃ duggatibhayaṃ. Transl. by HARE (1935:242): "Monks, the Ariyan disciple, who is endowed with these four powers, has passed by five fears. What five? The fear of (wrong) livelihood, of ill-fame, of embarrassment in assemblies, of death, of a miserable afterlife." For an explanation of the gift of fearlessness (*wu-wei-shih* 無畏施), see **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (T1552.933a$_{12ff.}$; transl. DESSEIN, 1999.I:511-512).

similar yet slightly different terms: “Benefiting others means almsgiving, holding to the precepts, patience, humility, etc. and not harming others” (BOCKING, 1995:257).[317] Finally, Pras states that a state of mind benefiting others in this way is also to be considered *dharma*.

(V305$_3$): Which (*yat*) state of mind (*cetas*) [is] existing (*bhavam*) in a friend (*mitre*), [i.e.,] that is without hostility (*aviruddham*) towards sentient beings (*sattveṣu*), that (*tat*) [is] a friendly (*maitram*) state of mind (*cetas*). Or (*vā*), friendly (*maitram*) [means] exclusively (*eva*) a friend (*mitram*); [for] which (*yat*) state of mind (*cetas*) [is] benefiting oneself (*ātmānugrāhakam*), that (*tat*) is a friendly (*maitram*) state of mind (*cetas*).

Candrakīrti then explains the word ‘friendly’ (*maitra*). First, this is done by a grammatical explanation (*vyutpatti*) taken from Buddhapālita’s *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:220), which is also repeated in *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; *om.* in T1566).[318] According to this *vyutpatti*, the adjective *maitra* is a derivative from the noun *mitra* ‘friend’ formed by the *taddhita*-affix ‘-a’ (causing vṛddhi of the first syllable), which is here used in the function of showing location: *maitra* is ‘that, which exists in a friend’ (*mitre bhavam*).[319] Buddhapālita’s

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[317] T1564.21b$_{28\text{-}29}$: 利益他者。行布施持戒忍辱等不惱眾生.

[318] It should be noted that the Tibetan translation of Pras as well as the Tibetan translations of *Prajñāpradīpa* and Avalokitavrata’s *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.19b$_{1\text{-}2}$) all contain a corruption or misinterpretation of this phrase. Given the Pāṇinian rule cited below (cf. fn. 319), the form of the phrase must clearly be *mitre bhavam* with *mitre* in the locative case. Nevertheless, almost all the Tibetan translations attest a form involving the ablative case: *mdza’ bśes las ’byuṅ ba* (**mitrād bhavam*). Only the transmitted text of Buddhapālita’s *Vṛtti* attests the correct form *mdza’ bśes la ’byuṅ ba*. The occurrence of this corruption could perhaps be explained by the fact that the verb *’byuṅ ba* often is constructed with an ablative particle and thus it could be understood as a corruption in the Tibetan transmissions of the texts or simply be explained by the possibility that the Pāṇinian background for this *vyutpatti* was not recognized by any these translators and their informants. It could also be based on a corruption in the Sanskrit originals for the Tibetan translations of *mitre bhavam* into the compound *mitrabhavam* as, for example, attested by ms ज of Pras.

[319] For this affix-function, cf. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.3.53 (VASU, 1891:767): tatra bhavaḥ||. The word *tatra* indicates the locative case (*saptamī vibhakti*). VASU (ibid.) explains that *bhava* here is used in the sense of ‘existence’ and not in the sense of ‘arising’. VASU cites an example

Vṛtti further adds a synonymous gloss: "existing [in] a friend, i.e., existing in someone dear."[320] To this *vyutpatti*, Candrakīrti adds a gloss not found in the other commentaries: "[i.e.,] that is without hostility towards sentient beings (*aviruddhaṃ sattveṣu*)."[321]

Next, Candrakīrti gives an alternative explanation for *maitra:* "Or, 'friendly' [means] exclusively a 'friend' (*mitram eva vā maitram*)." That is to say, *maitra* 'friendly' can be taken as a synonym for *mitra* 'friend', perhaps a case of something being designated by its main characteristic, just like designating the moon as 'the hare-holder' (*śaśin*). This is a gloss derived from Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:220), which is repeated by Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:507; omitted in T1566). Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka explain that the *taddhita*-affix 'a' in *maitra* is here a *svārthikapratyaya* (*bdag gi don gyi rkyen*), i.e., forming a derivative having the same sense as the word from which it is derived. Buddhapālita further explains that *maitra* means *mitra* in the sense of 'an affectionate mind' (**snehacitta, sems snum pa*). Candrakīrti, on the other hand, considers *maitra* to mean 'a friend' (*mitra*), because a friendly mind (*maitrañ cetas*) is benefitting oneself (*ātmānugrāhaka*), just like a friend would benefit one. Friendliness benefits oneself in the spiritual sense of being beneficence (*puṇya*), as it is explained, for example, in AKBh and CŚV.[322] Likewise, in Mav 6.211cd, great friendliness (*mahāmaitrī, byams*

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from the *Kāśikāvivaraṇapañjikā:* srughne bhavaḥ sraughnaḥ "A sraugnaḥ is one, who stays (*bhavaḥ*) in Srughna (*srughne*)."

[320] Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:220): mdza' bśes las 'byuṅ ba ste gcugs pa las 'byuṅ ba źes bya ba'i tha tshig go.

[321] There is, however, a slight similarity to the explanation given in *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403): byams pa ni byams pa daṅ ldan pa ste| sems can rnams la phan par 'dod pa źes bya ba'i tha tshig go|. Translation: "*Maitra* is to be endowed with *maitra;* it has the sense of wishing to benefit sentient beings." Regarding the translation of *aviruddha* as being 'without hostility', see *A Critical Pāli Dictionary* s.v. (TRENCKNER, ANDERSEN, SMITH & HENDRIKSEN, 1924-1948:476).

[322] The context in AKBh is a discussion of the beneficiality in making gifts to a caitya; AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:748): yathā maitrādiṣv antareṇāpi pratigrāhakaṃ parānugrahaṃ vā puṇyaṃ bhavati svacittaprabhavam, tathā hy atīte 'pi guṇavati tadbhaktikṛtaṃ svacittāt puṇyaṃ bhavati|. Translation by LVP (1924:245): "Dans la méditation de bienveillance, personne ne reçoit, personne n'est satisfait, et cependant un mérite naît, pour le bienveillant, par la force même de sa pensée de bienveillance. De même, bien que l'Être excellent ait passé (*abhyatīta*), le don au Caitya fait par dévotion à son égard (*tadbhaktikṛta*) est méritoire, en raison de la pensée même du fidèle (*svacittād eva puṇyam*)." English translation: "As nobody receives and nobody is benefitted in a meditation on benevolence, so merit arises for the well-

pa chen po) is defined as 'what brings benefit (*hitopasaṃhāra, phan pa ñer sgrub pa*) to sentient beings'.[323] The word 'benefiting oneself' (**ātmānugrāhaka, bdag la phan 'dogs pa*) is also used to contrast *maitra* with the word *parānugrahaka* from the root-verse.

(V305$_4$): And (*ca*), thus (*etat*), what (*yat*) threefold (*trividham*) state of mind (*cetas*) has been shown (*nirdiṣṭam*), that (*saḥ*) is called (*ucyate*) '*dharma*' (*dharma iti*). On account of being opposite (*viparyayāt*), unrighteous

wisher simply due to his own thought of benevolence. Likewise, as the venerated person has passed away, a gift made to a Caitya with devotion for this person is meritorious due to one's own thought." In **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya-śāstra* (T552.932a$_3$; transl. by DESSEIN, 1999.I: 503), a similar explanation is given on making gifts to a *caitya*, where the words **ātmānugrāhaka* (*tzu-she* 自攝) and **parānugrāhaka* (*she-ta* 攝他) probably were used in the original text. In CŚV (D3865.118b$_{2\text{-}5}$) commenting on CŚ 6.23 (cf. LANG, 1986:68), it is said that cultivation of friendliness results in eight qualities: bzod pa ni phra rgyas khro ba'i gñen po ste| de khro ba'i gnas la bsgoms pa na byams pa'i tiṅ ṅe 'dzin sgom pa 'dren par 'gyur ro| |de la gal te ba 'jos tsam gyi dus su bsgoms pas goms par byed na de'i tshe sgom pa po la yon tan brgyad 'dren par 'gyur ro| |'di lta ste| lha daṅ mi rnams la sdug par 'gyur ro| |de rnams kyis bsruṅ bar yaṅ 'gyur ro| |bde ba daṅ yid bde ba maṅ bar 'gyur ro| |de'i lus la dug gis mi tshugs so| |mtshon gyis mi tshugs so| |de'i nor rnams 'bad pa med par rgyas par 'gyur ro| |lus źig nas śi ba'i 'og tu bde 'gro tshaṅs ma'i 'jig rten du skye bar yaṅ 'gyur ro| |de ltar byams pa'i yon tan brgyad thob par 'gyur ro| |phra rgyas khro ba spaṅs pas rñed par bya ba bsam gtan daṅ tshad med pa daṅ| gzugs med pa dag kyaṅ 'thob par 'gyur ro| |. Translation: "Patience is the remedy against anger. If it has been cultivated with regard to the causes of anger, it will lead to the cultivation of the absorption of friendliness (*maitra*). With regard to that, if one cultivates [it] with cultivation just for the time it takes to milk a cow (*ba 'jo tsam gyi dus su*), then it will cause eight qualities for the practitioner. These are as follows: one will be pleasing to gods and men; they will also protect one; one will have many pleasures and much happiness; one's body cannot be harmed by poison; it cannot be harmed by weapons; one's wealth will grow effortlessly; after the body has been destroyed, one will, when dead, also be born in a good course of rebirth, [such as] the world of Brahman; thus, eight qualities of friendliness will be obtained. By abandoning the disposition of anger, one will also attain the meditation, the immeasurable states and [the absorptions belonging to] the immaterial states, which are to be acquired." Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:220) also makes a brief reference to these eight qualities of *maitrī* in his *Vṛtti*.

[323] Mav 6.211cd (D3861.214b$_3$; LVP, 1907-1912:321): 'gro la phan ñer sgrub pa| |byams pa chen po źes bya'o| | "What brings benefit to sentient beings is called great friendliness." As indicated by TAUSCHER (1981:153, note 281), this definition is based on *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* (GHOSA, 1902:1411,1): hitopasaṃhāralakṣaṇā mahāmaitrī| "Great friendliness has the characteristic of bringing benefit."

action (*adharmaḥ*) should be furnished (*yojyaḥ*) [with a corresponding definition].

The explanation of the three aspects of a wholesome state of mind that constitute *dharma* is then completed. Finally, Candrakīrti states that one should furnish its opposite, unrighteous action (*adharma*), with a correspondingly opposite explanation. This statement derives from *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:507; T1566:99a_{26}). It means that *adharma* should be defined as an unwholesome state of mind leading to not being self-restraining, not benefiting others and being unfriendly (according to Avalokitavrata D3859.III. 18$b_{3\text{-}4}$). That such states of mind do not correspond to the Buddhist path may be shown by AN 5.222-223 (transl. by WOODWARD, 1936:155): "And what are not-dhamma and not aim? Wrong view, wrong thinking, [wrong] speech, [wrong] action, [wrong] living, [wrong] effort, [wrong] mindfulness, [wrong] concentration, wrong knowledge and [wrong] release. These are called 'not-dhamma and not-aim'." [324] In Prajñāpradīpa (AMES, 1986:507-508; T1566.99a_{26}-99b_2), Bhāvaviveka adds a small presentation of whole-some, unwholesome and indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) actions, which is not found in the other commentaries.

(V305$_5$): And thus (*caitat*): which (*yat*) state of mind (*cetas*), whose divisions have been shown [above] (*nirdiṣṭaprabhedam*), ***"that (tat) [is] the seed (bījam) for a result (phalasya)."*** Which (*yat*) [is] the specific (*asādhāraṇam*) cause (*kāraṇam*) in the production of a result (*phalābhinirvṛttau*), that (*tat*) alone (*eva*) is called (*ucyate*) the 'seed' (*bījam iti*), just like (*tadyathā*) a rice-seed (*śālibījam*) for a rice-sprout (*śālyaṅkurasya*); but (*tu*) what (*yat*) [is] common (*sādhāraṇam*), such as the earth and so forth (*kṣityādi*), that (*tat*) is not (*na*) a seed (*bījam*), that (*tat*) [is]

[324] AN 5.222-223 (HARDY, 1900): Katamo ca bhikkhave adhammo ca anattho ca? Micchādiṭṭhi micchāsaṅkappo micchāvācā micchākammanto micchā-ājīvo micchāvāyāmo micchāsati micchāsamādhi micchāñāṇaṃ micchāvimutti. Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave adhammo ca anattho ca.

only (*eva*) a cause (*kāraṇam*). Like this (*yathaitad*), so (*evam*) in this case as well (*ihāpi*), the threefold (*trividham*) state of mind (*cetas*) is (*bhavati*) the seed (*bījam*) in the production (*abhinirvṛttau*) of a desired (*iṣṭasya*) ripening (*vipākasya*), whereas (*tu*) the effort by the person and so forth (*puruṣakārādayaḥ*) [is] only (*eva*) a cause (*kāraṇam*).

Candrakīrti then comments on the last *pādas* of the root-verse (Mmk 17.1), which say that this state of mind is a seed (*bījam*) for a result (*phalasya*). From this statement, it is also clear that Candrakīrti takes the word *cetas* as the subject of the pronoun *tat* in the root-text and not the noun *dharma*. Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:220) and Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:507; T1566.99a$_{25\text{-}26}$) both say that a state of mind is called a seed, because it arouses the bodily and verbal actions. Buddhapālita adds a *Sūtra*-reference of unknown provenance stating that the intellect (**manas, yid*) precedes a *dharma* (*chos kyi sṅon du 'gro*). This explanation, however, is not adopted by Candrakīrti. On the other hand, Buddhapālita (ibid.) and Bhāvaviveka (ibid; T1566.99a$_{23}$) equate the word 'seed' with the word 'cause' (**kāraṇa, rgyu*), which is adopted in Pras. While neither Buddhapālita nor Bhāvaviveka elaborate on this point, Candrakīrti discusses the meaning with which the word 'cause' should be understood here.

Candrakīrti defines a 'seed' as the specific cause of something (*asādhāraṇaṃ kāraṇam*). It should be noted that this terminology does not correspond to the standard *Sarvāstivāda*-terminology of six causes (cf. AK 2.49; LAMOTTE, 1980:2163-2164). As indicated by LVP (1923:293, fn. 3), *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* remarks that the comparison of a cause with a seed is associated with the *Sautrāntika*-school.[325] As an example for a specific

[325] ŚĀSTRĪ (1970:339): tasya bījabhāvopagamanād iti| tasya hetubhāvo-pagamanād ity upamā| sautrāntikaprakriyaiṣā| kvacit pustake nāsty evam pāṭhaḥ|. Translation: "'because of becoming the seed-entity thereof' is a comparison meaning 'because of becoming the cause-entity thereof'. This [comparison] is a *Sautrāntika*-use, [and] thus it is not a reading found in any book." Perhaps Yaśomitra intends to say that the seed-comparison of a cause is not commonly found in the *Sarvāstivāda-Abhidharma*-literature, but has been introduced by the *Sautrāntikas*, who are known to have relied solely on the *Sūtras*, from a Sūtra-source, such as the *Sūtra*-passages quoted above on p. 177. Cf. also the use of *bīja* with reference to the 'dispositions' (*anuśaya*) in AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:215; LVP, 1923:185).

cause (*asādhāraṇaṃ kāraṇam*), Candrakīrti gives a rice-seed (*śālībīja*), which is the specific cause for a rice-sprout (*śālyaṅkura*). As will be shown below, the rice-metaphor is expressly used in Mmk 17.7-8 in connection with the *santāna*-theory. The specific cause is distinguished from what is called a common cause (*sādhāraṇaṃ kāraṇam*), viz. a cause being common for all kinds of phenomena belonging to a general kind. An example is given of earth and so forth, which is a common condition or factor for the production of any sprout and not specific to the production of a rice-sprout.[326] When it is said that this state of mind, which is self-restraining, benefiting others and friendly, is a seed, it means that it is the specific cause of a desired (*iṣṭa*) ripening (*vipāka*). Thus, the particular kind of mind in question is a wholesome mind, and its particular result is a desired result, not an undesired result, just as the specific result of a rice-seed is a desirable rice-shoot and not the shoot of a *nimba*-tree yielding a bitter fruit. As will be shown by Mmk 17.11, it is significant to notice that it is the state of mind, i.e., the intention (*cetanā*), that is identified with the seed or the specific cause and not the actual bodily or verbal action, i.e., actions done following intention (*cetayitvā*). When experiencing a given desirable result, such as good health or wealth, it is said that one's personal effort (*puruṣakāra*) is only a

[326] These common causes are, for example, explained in the *Śālistambasūtra* (SCHOENING, 1995:704-705): kathaṃ bāhyasya pratītyasamutpādasya pratyayopanibandho draṣṭavyaḥ? ṣaṇṇāṃ dhātūnāṃ samavāyāt| katameṣāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ dhātūnāṃ samavāyāt? yad idaṃ pṛthivyaptejovāyvākāśṛtusamavāyāt bāhyasya pratītyasamuptādasya pratyayopanibandho draṣṭavyaḥ| tatra pṛthivīdhātur bījasya saṃdhāraṇakṛtyaṃ karoti| abdhātur bījaṃ snehayati| tejodhātur bījaṃ paripācayati| vāyudhātur bījam abhinirharati| ākāśadhātur bījasyānāvaraṇakṛtyaṃ karoti| ṛtur api bījasya pariṇāmanākṛtyaṃ karoti| asatsu eṣu pratyayeṣu bījād aṅkurasyābhinirvṛttir na bhavati| yadā bāhyaś ca pṛthivīdhātur avikalo bhavati, evam aptejovāyvākāśṛtudhātavaś ca avikalā bhavanti, tadā sarveṣāṃ samavāyāt bīje nirudhyamāne aṅkurasyābhinirvṛttir bhavati|. For the Tibetan translation, cf. SCHOENING (1995:400-402). Translation by SCHOENING (1995:281): "How is dependence on conditions [of] external dependent arising to be seen? Because of the assemblage [of] the six elements. Because of the assemblage [of] what six elements? That is: from the assemblage of the earth, water, fire, air, space, and season elements is to be seen the dependence on conditions [of] external dependent arising. In that [connection], the earth element performs the function of supporting the seed. The water element moistens the seed. The fire element matures the seed. The air element opens the seed. The space element performs the function of not obstructing the seed. Season performs the function of transforming the seed. Without these conditions, the sprout will not be produced from the seed. However, when the external earth element is not deficient – and likewise water, fire, air, space, and season are not deficient – when all are assembled, should the seed cease, from that the sprout would be produced."

secondary factor, i.e., a common cause. That is to say, personal effort in this life is a condition, which must be present in order to produce the outcome of good health or wealth, but it is not the specific or direct cause thereof. The specific cause is rather a wholesome state of mind, which one had in a former lifetime. A more detailed explanation of the specific and common causes is given by Candrakīrti in ŚSV commenting on ŚS verse 3 (translation by ERB, 1997:68):

> In diesem [Vers bedeutet] **Ursache** das, was die Wirkung hervorbringt (**niṣpādaka*); und insofern [nur] sie eine [ihr] ähnliche Wirkung hervorbringt, ist sie spezifisch (**asādhāraṇa*); z.B. der Reissame [ist ausschließlich Ursache] des Reisschößlings.
>
> Die **Bedingung** hingegen (*ni*) ist gemeinsam, wie z.B. die Erde usw. [gemeinsame Bedingung ist für das Heranwachsen des] Reisschößlings. Denn, wie [die Erde usw.] als Faktor bei der Erzeugung des Reisschößlings fungiert, so [tut sie es] auch bei [der Erzeugung] eines Gerstenschößlings usw. Die Frucht [in Gestalt des reifen Reiskorns], die [schließlich] aus dem [Reis]schößling usw. entsteht (*skyes pa*), richtet sich nicht nach der Gestalt [der Bedingungen wie] Erde usw., sondern nach der Gestalt des Reissamens. Weil somit (*źes bya'o*) [die Erde] als bloßer Kausalitätsfaktor (*rgyu'i dṅos por*) [bei der Hervorbringung der Wirkung] fungiert, definiert man sie als Bedingung (*pratyaya*). Wenn, um damit zu beginnen, etwas (*gaṅ*) als Ursache und Bedingung von [irgend]etwas (*'di'i*) fungiert, so ist es, insofern es [die Wirkung] hervorbringt, als Ursache bestimmt. Wohingegen (*..la/gaṅ du...ni*) die Bedingung [als Oberbegriff] nicht [nur] die bestimmende (*ṅes pa*) [d.h. entscheidende, die Wirkung erzeugende] Ursache ist, wie z.B. mit den Worten: "*Es gibt zwei Ursachen, zwei Bedingungen [für die Entstehung der korrekten Ansicht]*", die Worte "Ursache" (*hetu*) und/oder "Bedingung" (*pratyaya*) für denselben Gegenstand (*yul*) verwendet.
>
> Was die **Kombination** anbelangt, so entsteht sie aus dem vollständigen Bereitstehen (*ñe bar gnas pa *sāṃnidhya*) dieser beiden Kategorien [von Faktoren] (*dṅos po*), nicht aber aus dem Bereitstehen, selbst unmittelbar, anderer [Faktoren als Ursache und Bedingungen]. Deshalb soll man verstehen, daß in diesem [Vers] die

Kombination von Ursache u. Bedingungen [gemeint] ist.[327]

Besides the parallels in the simile of the rice-seed, rice-sprout and earth, which this passage of ŚSV shares with the present passage of Pras, it must also be noted that Candrakīrti in the ŚSV-passage uses the term 'common condition' (*sādhāraṇaḥ pratyayaḥ) in lieu of the expression 'common cause' (*sādhāraṇaṃ kāraṇam*) used in Pras.

(V305₉): [Someone] says (*āha*): When (*kasmin kāle*), moreover (*punaḥ*), [is] there emergence of the result (*phalaniṣpattiḥ*) of the seed (*bījasya*)? ***"Both (ca) after passing away (pretya) and (ca) here (iha)."*** "After passing away" (*pretyeti*) means (*ity arthaḥ*) 'in a future life' (*adṛṣṭe janmani*); "here" (*iheti*) [means] 'in the present life' (*dṛṣṭe janmani*). And (*ca*) this (*etat*) is to be understood (*boddhavyam*) in detail (*vistareṇa*) from the scriptures (*āgamāt*).

Candrakīrti finally explains the last words of verse Mmk 17.1 as meaning that

[327] English translation: "In this [verse] a cause [means] that which produces (**niṣpādaka*) an effect; and in [only] producing an effect similar to itself, it is specific (**asādhāraṇa*); e.g., a rice-seed [is only the cause] of the a rice-sprout. A condition, on the other hand (*ni*), is common, such as the earth, etc., is a common condition for the growth on a rice-sprout. Because as [the earth, etc.] functions as a factor in the production of a rice-sprout, [it functions] likewise in [the production] of a barley-sprout, etc. The fruit [in the form of the ripe rice-grain], which [at the end] arises (*skyes pa*) from the [rice]-sprout, etc., does not agree in form with [the conditions, such as] earth, etc., but agrees in form with the rice-seed. As (*źes bya'o*) [the earth] only functions as causal factor (*rgyu'i dṅos po*) [in the production of the effect], it is defined as a condition (*pratyaya*). If, to begin with, something (*gaṅ*) functions as the cause and condition for something (*'di'i*), then it is determined as the cause, in that it produces it [i.e., the effect]. On the other hand (*..la/ gaṅ du...ni*), a condition [in general] is not the determining (*ṅes pa*) cause [i.e., the decisive cause that produces the effect]; for example, in the saying "There are two causes, two conditions [for the engendering of the right view]," the words 'cause' (*hetu*) and/or 'condition' (*pratyaya*) are used with regard to the same object (*yul*). Concerning the combi-nation, it arises from the complete availability (*ñe bar gnas pa *sāṃnidhya*) of both these categories [of factors] (*dṅos po*), but not, even directly, from the availability of other [factors as causes and conditions]. One should, therefore, understand that in this [verse] the combination of cause and condition is [intended]." For a critical edition of the Tibetan text, see ERB (1997:233-234). For detailed annotations to this passage, see ERB (1997:68, 168-169). Regarding ERB's note 676, see also my fn. 325.

the result of a wholesome state of mind emerges both in this lifetime as well as in a future life. A similar explanation is found in *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; T1566:99a$_{24\text{-}25}$), whereas both *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403) and *Chung lun* (T1564.21c$_{1\text{-}2}$) speak of 'this world' and 'another world'. Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:220) is not specific on this point. Generally, it may be noted that the phrase "after passing away and in this world" (*pretya ceha ca*) in pāda d of Nāgārjuna's verse may reveal a Brāhmaṇical influence on his text, because the phrase is relatively common in Brāhmaṇical texts of the *Dharmaśāstra*-genre, but absent in early Buddhist texts, such as the Pāli canon.[328]

HINÜBER (1994:47) shows that the twofold division of the consequences of actions as ripening in the present life and ripening in a future life has a solid canonical basis, e.g. AN 1.48, AN 4.382, SN 2.68, MN 2.143. The division appears to refer to the immediate benefits one reaps from having integrity or a wholesome attitude, such as praise and respect from others, and the future result in the form of a desirable rebirth or experience within a future rebirth (cf. AN 3.41). Oppositely, *adharma* causes reproach and fear of reproach in this life along with an undesirable rebirth or experience within a rebirth in the future (cf. AN 1.47-49). A more detailed description of this twofold principle is found at MN 1.310-317, where four undertakings of *dhamma* (*dhammasamādāna*) are distinguished on the basis thereof: (1) that *dhamma*-undertaking, which is happiness in the present but resulting in suffering in the future, (2) that, which is suffering in the present but resulting in happiness in the future, (3) that, which is happiness in the present as well

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[328] *Pretya ceha ca* is, e.g., attested once in *Kauṭilīyaṃ Arthaśāstram* 1.3 (edition by R.S. SASTRI, 1909:8; translation by SHAMASASTRY, 1929:7), once in *Vāsiṣthadharmaśāstra* 6.1 (edition by FÜHRER, 1914:19; translation by BÜHLER, 1882:34), 12 times in *Mānavadharmaśāstra* (2.26c, 2.146c, 3.143c, 3.175a, 4.199a, 6.80c, 8.111c, 8.171c, 8.172c, 9.25c, 12.19c, 12.86a; for edition and translation, cf. OLIVELLE, 2005), and 18 times in *Mahābhārata* (cf. the *Pratīka-index of the Mahābhārata,* vol. IV; VAIDYA, 1970:2629). I am indebted to Patrick OLIVELLE for most of these references. As a digression, it may further be remarked that, according to POTTER (1980:244), Patañjali's *Yogasūtras* similarly speak of actions, whose ripening will occur (*niyatavipāka*) in the present lifetime (*dṛṣṭajanman*) and those, whose ripening is not limited in this manner and so may mature in another life (*adṛṣṭajanman*)(ibid.). HALBFASS (1980:284) mentions that in the Brāhmaṇical tradition one finds a "threefold division of sacrifices into those which bear fruit after death (e.g., *jyotiṣṭoma*), those which bear fruit irregularly (e.g., *citrā*), and those which bear fruit in this life (e.g., *kārīrī*)."

as happiness in the future, and, finally, (4) that, which is suffering in the present and also suffering in the future.

HINÜBER (1994:41-42) explains that a threefold classification of action also occurs in the canon (MN 3.214, AN 1.134, AN 5.292 and AN 3.415) into (1) that, which is to be experienced in this life (*diṭṭhadhamma-vedaniya*), (2) that, which is to be experienced in the next life (*upapajjaveda-niya*) and (3) that, which is to be experienced in some subsequent period (*aparāpariyavedaniya*). This threefold distinction is also taught in several post-canonical sources.[329] In several post-canonical *Theravāda* -sources (cf. references in HINÜBER, 1994:39-40), a fourth member called *ahosikamma* is added to this threefold list.[330]

(V305$_{11}$): Thus (*evam*), first (*tāvat*), having established (*vyavasthāpya*) *dharma* (*dharmam*) [which is] the one only (*evaikam*) of a mental nature (*cittātmakam*), also (*punar api*) a twofold (*dvividham*)

> ***"action (karma) was taught (uktam) as intention (cetanā) and (ca) [action] following intention (cetayitvā) by the highest seer (paramarṣiṇā),"*** the Exalted one (*bhagavatā*). (Mmk 17.2ab)

Because of [his] understanding (*°gamanāt*) of the highest object (*paramārtha°*), [he is] ***"a seer" (ṛṣiḥ)***. Since (*iti*) he (*asau*) [is] both (*ca*) highest (*paramaḥ*) and (*ca*) a seer (*ṛṣiḥ*), [he is] ***"the highest seer" (paramarṣiḥ)***. Because of surpassing (*utkṛṣṭatvāt*) even (*api*) the listeners and the self-awakened ones (*śrāvakapratyekabuddhebhyaḥ*) due to [his] understanding of the highest object (*paramārthagama-nāt*) in each and every aspect (*sarvvākāratayā*), the fully

[329] HINÜBER (1994:40-41) mentions *Nettipakaraṇa*. It is also found in the *Sarvāstivāda*-text **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (T1552.895c$_{15ff.}$; transl. by DESSEIN, 1999.I.207).

[330] For a discussion of this fourfold division with several illustrations from the canon, see LVP (1927:177-179).

Awakened one (*sambuddhaḥ*), the Exalted one (*bhagavān*), [is] the highest seer (*paramarṣiḥ*). By that (*tena*) ***"highest seer (paramarṣiṇā) action (karma) was taught (uktam)"*** in a *sūtra* (*sūtre*) ***"as intention"***-action (*cetanākarma*) ***"and (ca)"*** action ***"following intention"*** (***cetayitvā*** *karma*).

In Mmk 17.1, Nāgārjuna established what constitutes *dharma* in the sense of wholesome action. It was shown that *dharma* in this sense is strictly of a mental nature (*cittātmakam*) and refers to the state of mind (*cetas*) having three qualities. In Mmk 17.2ab, action is then explained as twofold.

The obvious distinction that Mmk 17.2 teaches action as twofold is already introduced by Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:221) and Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:508; T15566. 99b$_{2\text{-}3}$).[331] This twofold division is indicated to be canonical, since it is said to have been taught by the Exalted one (*Bhagavant*) in a *sūtra*. The *Bhagavant* is here called 'the highest seer' (*paramarṣi*), an epithet of Buddha, which Candrakīrti also uses at V159$_6$ (D3860.53b$_7$). The word *ṛṣi* (Pāli *isi*) is occasionally used in the canon with reference to the Buddha, and so it is not surprising that it is used as an accolade in this verse by Nāgārjuna.

Candrakīrti gives a semantic explanation (*nirukti*) for the word *ṛṣi:* 'because of understanding the highest object' (*paramārthagamanāt*). As also indicated by the Tibetan translation (D101b$_7$: *thugs su chud pas na*), the word *gamana* should here be taken in the sense of 'understanding'. In *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:508), the word *ṛṣi* is explained in slightly different

[331] In the Chinese translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, it is said that this twofold division was taught "in [Abhidharma]kośaśāstra" (T1566.99b$_{2\text{-}3}$: *chü-she-lun chung i yo erh chung* 俱舍論中亦有二種), a specification not attested by the Tibetan translation. Given that *Pang jo teng lun* is the earliest witness of *Prajnāpradīpa*, it is, of course, technically possible that this statement would have belonged to the original Sanskrit text from which *Pang jo teng lun* was translated. Nevertheless, the division into *cetanā* and *cetayitvā* is, as will be shown below, canonical and is thus only repeated in *Abhidharmakośa* from its canonical sources. Hence, it would seem strange if a scholar as learned as Bhāvaviveka would state this division to be taught in *Abhidharmakośa*. The phrase *chü-she-lun chung* (俱舍論中) "in [Abhidharma]-kośaśāstra" must, therefore, rather be taken as an interpolation in the Chinese transmission of the text; most likely a marginalia from a learned hand that has subsequently been copied into the text itself. Perhaps the marginalis was inspired by *Chung lun*, which states that this twofold division has been explained in the *Abhidharma* (T1564.21c$_{5\text{-}6}$).

terms as "because of having understood without remainder what is to be understood" (**gantavyam niḥśeṣaṃ gamanāt, bgrod par bya ba ma lus par bgrod zin pa'i phyir*). Bhāvaviveka's *nirukti* is thus basically the same explanation as that given by Candrakīrti, since both indicate that *ṛṣi* should be taken in the sense of *gamana* and hence should be understood as a derivative of the verbal-root *ṛṣ* in its first sense of 'to go, move, approach' (APTE, 1890:491). Due to the word's Vedic sense of 'seer', the root *ṛṣ* has been suggested (e.g. by MONIER-WILLIAMS, 1899:226) to be an archaic variant of the verbal-root *dṛś* 'to see'. This is interesting in the present context given the variant reading attested by mss बद्जल: *paramārthadarśanād* 'because of seeing the highest object', which could perhaps indicate that a native reader at some early stage of the Nevārī-transmission of the text found *°darśanād* to be an appropriate *nirukti* for *ṛṣi*.

That, which is understood (*gamana*) by the *ṛṣi*, is the 'highest object' (*paramārtha*), which is to say the 'ultimate' or the 'absolute'. In MavBh (D3862.253a$_6$), *paramārtha* is explained as the object (**viṣaya, yul*) for an instance (**viśeṣa, khyad par*) of knowledge in those possessing the perfect vision.[332] Such a definition of *paramārtha* also agrees with that given elsewhere by Bhāvaviveka.[333]

In the verse, the Buddha is not only called a 'seer' but 'the highest seer' (*paramārṣi*), which Candrakīrti lays out in his *vigraha* as a *karmadhāraya*-compound (*paramaś cāsāv ṛṣiś ceti*). He here follows Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:508) in explaining the superlative 'highest' to mean that the fully Awakened one (*sambuddha*), the Exalted one (*bhagavant*), surpasses the listeners (*śrāvaka*) and the self-awakened ones (*pratyekabuddha*). In *Prajñā-*

[332] MavBh D3862.253a$_{6\text{-}7}$ (LVP, 1907-1912:102$_{16ff.}$): de la don dam pa ni yaṅ dag par gzigs pa rnams kyi ye śes kyi khyad par gyi yul ñid kyis bdag gi ṅo bo rñed pa yin gyi | raṅ gi bdag ñid kyis grub pa ni ma yin te |. Transl. by LVP (1910:300): "La véritable est constituée par le fait qu'elle est l'objet de cette sorte de savoir qui appertient à ceux qui voient just: mais elle n'existe pas en soi." For a commentary to the Sanskrit text, see the *Ṭīkā* of Jayānanda (D3870. I.141a$_{1\text{-}3}$), where the word *khyad par* clearly in understood as a nominal form modified by *ye śes* and not as an adjectival form modifying *yul*. A retranslation into Sanskrit could perhaps be: tatra paramārthaḥ saṃyagdṛśāṃ jñānaviśeṣaviṣayatvena labdhātmabhāvaḥ | na tu svātmatvena siddhaḥ |. For another definition, cf. MavBh D3862.255a$_{5\text{-}6}$ and MavBh D3862.243b$_1$.

[333] Cf. *Prajñāpradīpa* (D3853.240b$_7$): don dam pa ni gñis su med pa'i ye śes kyi spyod yul yin pa'i phyir |. Transl.: "Because of *paramārtha* being the object (**gocara, spyod yul*) for a non-dual knowledge."

pradīpa (ibid.), this point is made very nicely by saying that the *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas* and *bodhisattvas* also are 'seers', since they all have realised what is to be realised, but among the seers the *Bhagavant* is supreme. Bhāvaviveka, however, does not give any reason for why the *Bhagavant* is the highest among these seers. Candrakīrti, on the other hand, adds the reason that the *Bhagavant* surpasses the *śrāvakas* and *pratyeka-buddhas*, because he has realised the highest object in every aspect (*sarvvākāratā*).[334]

This highest seer, the Bhagavant, is then said to have taught a twofold kind of action: intention-action (*cetanākarman*) and action following intention (*cetayitvā karman*, lit. 'action after having intended'). Candrakīrti does not provide any particular explanation of this twofold division besides saying that it was taught 'in a *sūtra*' (*sūtre*). *Prajñāpradīpa* likewise provides no explanation thereon. *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:404) and *Chung lun* (T1564.21$c_{5\text{-}6}$) simply state that the subdivisions of actions already have been clearly explained in the *Abhidharma*, and they, therefore, are not going to expand further. Yet after verse Mmk 17.3, *Chung lun* gives a short explanation. It stated there that *cetanā* is a mental phenomenon, which initiates that, which is done and thus is the basis of action.[335] Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:221) also gives a little clarification, since he devotes a single sentence to this division, in which he calls *cetanā* a seed (*sa bon du gyur pa*) and *cetayitvā* 'that which subsequently is carried out' (*dus phyi ma la rtsom par byed pa gaṅ yin pa*).

As will be shown below, *cetanā* refers to a mental action. It is usually translated with 'intention' or 'volition', while VETTER (2000:30) suggests the translation 'decision'. The choice of translation is, of course, a question of

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[334] Regarding Candrakīrti's particular view on the realisation of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* and how it compares with the realisation of a *bodhisattva*, cf. Mav. 1.8 and the issue explanation in MavBh (D3862.226$b_1$ff.; LVP, 1907-1912:19-23).

[335] Cf. T1564.21$c_{9ff.}$: 思是心數法。諸心數法中能發起有所作故名業。因是思故起外身口業。雖因餘心心數法有所作。但思爲所作本。故說思爲業. Transl. by BOCKING (1995:258): "Conception is one of the dharmas of mental configurations. Amongst the mental configurations, it has the capacity to initiate that which is done, and this is why it is called karma. External actions of body and speech arise on the account of conception. Although there are things which are done through the other configurations of the mind, it is conception which is the basis of action, and this is why conception is said to be karma."

nuance of meaning.[336] Fundamentally, *cetanā* seems to mean "mental activity" in general, simply as a derivative of *cetas* formed with the *taddhita*-affix *ana.* This must also be its sense when it occasionally is used in the canon as a synonym for *saṃskāra,* in the case of the fourth *skandha.*[337] In the slightly later literature, *cetanā* is certainly given a more specialised meaning and in the *Abhidharma*-literature finally it comes to be counted as one among the 46 or 51 mental factors (*mahābhūmika* or *caitta*).

In *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa,* Candrakīrti provides an explanation of *cetanā* in this specialised sense, where *cetanā* is defined as a mental action that conditions or forms (**abhisaṃskāra*) [the mind].[338] This definition is

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[336] Cf., e.g., AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS (1910:235-236), LVP (1927:135-138) and MCDERMOTT (1980:181-182; 1984:26-27).

[337] Cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:48). For canonical references, see PĀSĀDIKA (1989:22).

[338] Cf. LINDTNER (1979:106): de la sems pa ni mṅon par 'du byed pa yid kyi las te| ji ltar rgyal po rnams blon pos bya ba de daṅ| de la 'jug par byed pa de bźin du sems kyaṅ sems pas bya ba daṅ bcas pa'i ṅo bor de daṅ der ston par byed do| |de ni 'du byed rnams 'byuṅ ba la sa bon gyi ṅo bor gnas te| 'gro ba sna tshogs las las skyes la de ni las kyi ṅo bo ñid kyi phyir ro| |yaṅ de ni rnam pa gsum te| dge ba daṅ| mi dge ba daṅ| luṅ du ma bstan pa'o| |yaṅ dbye na sems pa'i tshogs drug tu 'gyur te| mig gi rnam par śes pa daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa nas yid kyi rnam par śes pa daṅ mtshung par ldan pa'i bar du'o| |. Translation: "*Cetanā* is 'that, which forms' (**abhisaṃskāra*), [it is] a mental action (**manaskarman*). Just as kings make the ministers engage in this or that action, likewise intention (*sems pas*) also causes the mind (*sems kyaṅ*) to be shown as this or that (*de daṅ der ston par byed*) in the form of a state associated with an action (*bya ba daṅ bcas pa'i ṅo bor*). It exists in the way of being the seed for the arising of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskāra*), since the various courses of rebirth (**gati*) are arisen from action and it possesses the nature of an action. Moreover, it is threefold: wholesome, unwholesome and undetermined. When divided further, there are six groups of *cetanā*: [those] concomitant with the eye-consciousness up to [those] concomitant with the mental consciousness." The latter six-fold division of *cetanā* is attested in *Saṅgītisūtra* and *Saṅgītiparyāya* (cf. STACHE-ROSEN, 1968:161-162). In that context, *cetanā* seems simply to mean 'to become aware'. Cf. also AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:48) on how this sixfold division has been related to the fourth *skandha.* At Pras 543_1 (D3860.182b_3), Candrakīrti also refers briefly to a similar definition of *cetanā:* kuśalādicetānāviśeṣāṃs te [punar-bhavābhisaṃskārāt] saṃskārāḥ| te ca trividhāḥ kuśalā akuśalā āneñjyāś ca, yadi vā kāyikā vācikā mānasāś ceti| (the compound in the square bracket is emended by LVP on the basis of the Tibetan translation; cf. Pras 543, fn. 1). Transl. by MAY (1959:252): "Ces volitions sont de composants, car elles effectuent la composition (*°abhisaṃskārāt*) de la nouvelle existence. Les composants sont également de trois espèces: favorables, défavorables, à lieu de rétribution déterminé. On peut aussi les répartir en corporels, vocaux et mentaux." English translation: "Intentions are conditioned phenomena, because they effect a conditioning (*°abhisaṃskārāt*) of the new existence. Conditioned phenomena are also of three kinds: favorable, unfavourable, and indeterminate with regard to their fruition. One can also divide them into bodily, vocal and mental." In *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.21b_1), Avalokitavrata adds the comparison that the

also found in AKBh and, particularly, in *Abhidharma-samuccaya.*[339] In AKBh, a *sūtra*-quotation is given in the same form as that given above by Candrakīrti: "intention-action and action following intention".[340] PĀSĀDIKA (1989:73) identifies the quotation as stemming from *Madhyamāgama* (*Chung a han ching* 中阿含經)[341] and **Itivṛttakasūtra* (*Pen-shih-ching* 本事經).[342] It has a well-known parallel in AN 3.415, which VETTER (2000:30)

mind (*manas*) is moved by *cetanā,* just like iron is moved by a magnet. This comparison may have been adopted from Sthiramati's Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya (LÉVI, 1925:21$_4$; BUESCHER, 2002.I:*11).

339 Cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:187): cetanā cittābhisaṃskāro manaskarma. Transl. by LVP (1923:155): "La *cetanā* est ce qui conditionne, informe, modèle la pensée." English translation: "*Cetanā* is that which conditions, informs or models the mind." Likewise, in *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049.48a-b): sems pa gaṅ źe na| sems mṅon par 'du byed pa yid kyi las te| dge ba daṅ mi dge ba daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa rnams la sems 'jug par byed pa'i las can no||. Translation: "What is *cetanā*? A mental action, which conditions the mind. It has the function of engaging the mind in wholesome, unwholesome or undetermined [actions]." For the Sanskrit text, cf. *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (TATIA, 1976:4): tatra cetanāyāḥ cittābhisaṃskāro manaskarmeti lakṣaṇanirdeśaḥ| kuśalākuśalāvyākṛteṣu cittapreraṇakarmaketi karmanirdeśaḥ| tathā hi yathābhisaṃskāraṃ kuśalādiṣu dharmeṣu cittasya pravṛttir bhavatīti|. Both these definitions seem ultimately to be based on an early form of this definition attested in the **Karmaprajñapti*-section of *Prajñaptiśāstra* (D4088. 175a$_{2\text{-}4}$): ched du byas pa źes bya ba la de la sems pa'i las daṅ| bsam pa'i las daṅ gñis yod de| sems pa'i las gaṅ źe na| smras pa| sems pa daṅ| mṅon par sems pa daṅ| sems par gyur ba daṅ| sems par gtogs pa daṅ| sems mṅon par 'du byed pa daṅ| yid kyi las gaṅ yin pa 'di ni sems pa'i las źes bya'o|| bsam pa'i las gaṅ źe na| smras pa| bsam pa'i lus kyi las daṅ bsam pa'i ṅag gi las 'di ni bsam pa'i las źes bya'o||. Translation: "Deliberate action (**abhisaṃskārika, ched du byas pa*) is twofold: intention-action and action following intention. What is intention-action? Answer: intention, what is directed towards the mind, what is the mind, what is included in the mind, what conditions the mind, mental action, those are called 'intention-action'. What is action following intention? Answer: a bodily action following intention or a verbal action following intention, those was called 'action following intention'." It may be questioned whether the implied genitive in the Sanskrit *tadpuruṣa*-compound *cittābhisaṃskāra,* 'conditioning of the mind', should be interpreted as a subjective genitive, i.e., 'impulse belonging to the mind', or an objective genitive, i.e., 'that which conditions the mind'. All the Tibetan translations clearly adopt the second interpretation, since they all translate *citta* as the direct object of *abhisaṃskāra,* i.e., *sems mṅon pa 'du byed pa,* which is also the interpretation adopted here.

340 Cf. ŚĀSTRĪ (1971:567): sūtra uktam "dve karmaṇī cetanākarma cetayitvā ca" iti|.

341 T26.1.600a$_{24}$: 謂有二業思・已思業。是謂知業. Translation: "It is said that there are two action-intentions: after having intended an action, there is what is called knowing-action."

342 T765.17.663b$_6$: 謂或思業。或思已業. Translation: "It is called either intention-action or action following intention."

suggests is a rather late passage.[343] The division between *cetanā* and *cetayitvā* recurs in all the subsequent *Abhidharma*-literature, which would be too lengthy to investigate here. It here suffices to say that Nāgārjuna includes this division in his brief presentation of *karman*, and its meaning will become clearer by the following verse-lines.

(V306$_3$): And (*ca*) as to (*yat*) this (*etat*) action (*karma*) said (*uktam*) to be twofold (*dvividham*),

> ***"A manifold division (anekavidhaḥ) of that (tasya) action (karmaṇaḥ) is made known (parikīrttitaḥ)."*** (Mmk 17.2cd)

How (*kathaṃ kṛtvā*)?

> ***"Among these (tatra), which (yat) action (karmma) was called (uktam) intention (cetaneti), that (tat) is traditionally taught (smṛtam) as mental (mānasam), and (ca) which (yat), on the other hand (tu), was called (uktam) following intention (cetayitvā), that (tat) [traditionally taught] oppositely (tu) as bodily and verbal (kāyikavācikam)."*** (Mmk 17.3)

"Mental" (mānasam) [means] that, which exists (*bhavam*) in the mind (*manasi*). Because of its (*tasya*) being completed (*niṣṭhāgamanāt*) only (*eva*) by means of the mind (*manodvāreṇa*) and (*ca*) because of [its] being independent (*°nirapekṣatvāt*) of the activity of body and speech (*kāyavākpravṛtti°*), ***"intention" (cetanā),*** which only (*eva*) is concomi-

[343] AN 3.415 (Hardy, 1897): Cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā. Translation by HARE (1934:294): "Monks, I say that determine thought is action. When one determines, one acts by deed, word or thought."

For further references, see Vetter (2000:30). For a passage speaking of *manas* preceding actions, cf. AN 1.11 (MORRIS, 1885).

tant with the mental consciousness (*manovijñānasamprayuktā*), is said to be (*ity ucyate*) 'mental (*mānasam*) action (*karma*)'. The word ***"tatra" (tatra**śabdaḥ*) [is used] in [the sense of] specifying (*nirddhāraṇe*).

"And (ca)," which (*yat*) second type (*dvitīyam*), ***"on the other hand (tu),"*** is called (*ity ucyate*) action (*karma*) ***"following intention (cetayitvā), that (tat),"*** again (*punaḥ*), is to be understood (*veditavyam*) as ***"bodily (kāyikam)"*** and (*ca*) ***"verbal (vācikam)."*** What (*yat*) is done (*kriyate*) after having thought (*sañcintya*) with the mind (*cetasā*) like this (*ity evam*): "I will act (*pravarttiṣye*) in this or that way (*evaṃ caivañ ca*) with the body and speech (*kāyavāgbhyām*)", that (*tat*) is said to be (*ity ucyate*) action following intention (*cetayitvā karma*). That (*tat*) [is] again (*punaḥ*) twofold (*dvividham*), [namely] bodily (*kāyikam*) and (*ca*) verbal (*vācikam*), because of existing (*bhavatvāt*) in the body and speech (*kāyavācoḥ*) and (*ca*) because of being completed (*niṣṭhāgamanāt*) by means of them (*taddvāreṇa*). And (*ca*) thus (*evam*) [it is] threefold (*trividham*): bodily (*kāyikam*), verbal (*vācikam*) and (*ca*) mental (*mānasam*).

Having presented the twofold division of action into intention and action following intention, Mmk 17.2cd states that a variety of divisions of action has been taught. This statement has a parallel in the **Karmaprajñapti*-section of *Prajñaptiśāstra*, where a *sūtra*-passage (*āgama*) is quoted stating that the Buddha taught various kinds of action.[344] Likewise, in **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (which most likely is a work later than Mmk), it is said that "such actions have been divided in manifold [forms] by the world-

[344] *Prajñaptiśāstra* (D4088.185a$_{2\text{-}3}$): 'dul mchog kha lo sgyur ba tshaṅs ba'i gsuṅ daṅ ldan| |sku mdog gser 'dra kha lo sgyur ba rnams kyi mchog| |rnam par 'dren par mdzad pa byuṅ ba gaṅ yin te| |'jigs pa med par las rnams tha dad ston par mdzad| |. Transl.: "The supreme subduer, the charioteer endowed with pure speech, whose body is like gold, the best among charioteers, who has appeared as a guide, fearlessly teaches various kinds of action."

honoured one" (transl. by DESSEIN, 1999.I:186).[345] Both Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti treat Mmk 17.2cd merely as an introductory statement to the following verse and do not comment on it. Within the structure of the verses in Mmk 17, the first verse, Mmk 17.1, seems to be concerned with outlining the doctrine of *karmaphala* by using the positive example of wholesome action rather than being concerned with presenting a particular division of action. Mmk 17.2ab, on the other hand, presents the first division of action into *cetanā* and *cetayitvā*, and Mmk 17.2cd adds that this division is just one of the many divisions of action found in the scriptures. Mmk 17.3-17.5 further present two other divisions, as will appear below.

The next verse, Mmk 17.3, divides action into three types: bodily, verbal and mental action (*kāyikam, vācikam* and *mānasam*). This threefold division is correlated with the twofold division into intention and action following intention, because intention is said to correspond to mental action and action following intention is said to correspond to bodily and verbal action. Divisions relating to body, speech and mind occur often throughout the canonical scriptures, especially in AN,[346] and the division into bodily, verbal and mental actions is also attested a few times.[347] The correlation of bodily, verbal and mental actions with *cetanā* and *cetayitvā* is rarer. Thus, in the passages from *Madhyamāgama* and *Itivṛttakasūtra* quoted above (cf. notes 341 and 342), *cetanā* and *cetayitvā* are mentioned without correlating them to the bodily, verbal and mental actions, but at AN 3.415 (cf. fn. 343) these two divisions are correlated in the same manner as here.[348] Among the

[345] T1552.893a3-4: 如此業世尊種種分別.

[346] Cf. e.g., AN 1.49 (MORRIS, 1885), AN 1.50, AN 1.102, AN 1.104-105, AN 1.112-113, AN 1.114, AN 1.122-123 and AN 1.154. For a debate with the *Jainas* on whether bodily or mental actions are more important, see BRONKHORST (1986:29).

[347] E.g., MN 1.206 (TRENCKNER, 1888; transl. by HORNER, 1954:258), MN 1.373 (TRENCKNER, 1888) and AN 3.415 (cf. fn. 343 above). As a digression, it may be remarked that a threefold division of action into those of mind (*manas*), speech (*vāc*) and body (*deha, kāya*) is also found in *Dharmaśāstra* (ROCHER, 1980:62-63).

[348] It should be remarked that the *Theravādins* interpret this passage differently and hence posit all actions to be *cetanā*. Thus, the first sentence *cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi* "Monks, I say that *cetanā* is action" is taken verbatim to mean that all actions are *cetanā*. In the second sentence, *cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā*, the gerund (*tvānta*) *cetayitvā* is not interpreted as a technical term (practically as a noun, as done, for example, in AK, *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and Pras, i.e., "[*cetanā*] creates a *cetayitvā*-action by body, speech of mind") but is taken as a proper gerund: "After having intended (*cetayitvā*),

early *Abhidharma*-works, the correlation is found in *Prajñaptiśāstra* (cf. fn. 339).[349] In the later *Abhidharma*-literature, the correlation occurs in several works.[350] Thus, Nāgārjuna may have adopted this correlation from a canonical source or an early *Abhidharma*-work, such as *Prajñaptiśāstra*.

Regarding the commentary on this verse, *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:404) does not elaborate. *Chung lun* provides the explanation mentioned above (cf. fn. 335). Buddhapālita's explanation is quite short (see below), whereas Bhāvaviveka provides more detail, most of which is adopted by Candrakīrti. First, Candrakīrti explains the word 'mental' (*mānasam*) by means of a grammatical explanation (*vyutpatti*) similar to that given on *maitra* above (cf. p. 209 above, in particular fn. 319): "mental [means] that which exists in the mind (*manasi bhavam*)." That is to say the taddhita-affix -*a* added to the noun *manas* has a locative-function showing that the action called 'mental' exists or resides (*bhavam*) 'in the mind' (*manasi*). In the case of the similar grammatical explanation of *maitra* given above, Candrakīrti adopted his explanation from either Buddha-pālita's *Vṛtti* or *Prajñāpradīpa*, since it occurred in both these earlier sources. Here, however, this explanation is clearly adopted from *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509; *om.* T1566), since it is not given by Buddhapālita.

Next, Candrakīrti says that intention (*cetanā*) only is concomitant (*saṃprayukta*) with the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*). The same is said in *Prajñāpradīpa* (T1566.99$b_{13\text{-}14}$), although this has been omitted in the Tibetan translation. The fact that the sentence also occurs in Pras indicates

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[*cetanā*] creates an action by body, speech or mind." Hence, the *Theravāda*-interpretation differs considerable from that of Pras on this point. For the *Theravāda*-view, cf. *Atthasālinī* §250 (MÜLLER, 1897:88; transl. TIN & RHYS DAVIDS, 1920:117-118). Cf. also *Kathāvatthu* VIII.9 (transl. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:221-226), MCDERMOTT (1980:182). For more on the sectarian discussions on bodily, verbal and mental actions, cf. BAREAU (1955:264).

[349] In another early *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma*-work, namely *Saṅgītiparyāya*, *cetanā* and *cetayitvā* are not correlated with bodily, verbal and mental action, but a division of bad and good behaviour (*duśċarita* and *sucarita*) into bodily, verbal and mental actions (corresponding to the ten unwholesome and wholesome actions) is given (cf. STACHE-ROSEN, 1968:63-64) as well as a division of *saṃskāra* into those of bodily, verbal and mental actions (cf. STACHE-ROSEN, 1968:73-74).

[350] Cf., e.g., AK 4.1cd (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:568) and *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (D4049.85$a_{6\text{-}7}$). In **Abhidharma-hṛdayaśāstra* and **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*, action is divided into bodily, verbal and mental, but these are not correlated with *cetanā* and *cetayitvā* (cf. RYOSE, 1987:45-47).

that *Pang jo teng lun* here attests a genuine variant, which can be ascribed to the Sanskrit original (thus showing the occasional value of the Chinese translation in the study of *Prajñāpradīpa*). In the *Abhidharma*, intention is included within the list of mental factors that are concomitant with the mind (*cittasaṃprayukta*).[351] Concomitant with the mind (*cittasaṃprayukta*) means that the phenomenon in question operates together with the mind (*citta*) in that they share the same basis (i.e., faculty), object, image, time and entity.[352] In Pras, *cetanā* is said to be concomitant with the mental consciousness (*manovijñānasaṃprayukta*),[353] and it is therefore a more specific expression than 'concomitant with the mind' (*citta*~). Thus, *cetanā* is here said to be a mental factor functioning inseparably from the mental consciousness and is, in that sense, considered a mental action (*mānasam karma*). Candrakīrti gives two arguments for why intention is mental. The first argument, which is also found in *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509; T1566.99b$_{14}$), states that intention is completed (*niṣṭhāgamana*) or carried out by the mind alone (*manodvāreṇaiva*). The second argument merely complements the first by stating the opposite: intention does not depend on the activity of the body or speech. Thus, *cetanā* should be understood as a purely mental process, which functions independently of body and speech and which only is associated with the mental consciousness.

Having explained the first two *pādas* of the verse, Candrakīrti adds that the word *tatra* ('among these') in *pāda a* is used in the sense of 'specifying' or 'particularizing' (*nirddhāraṇe*), i.e., it refers back to *cetanā* and *cetayitvā* and among these it specifies (*nirdhāra*) the first. This explanation of *tatra* is likewise found in *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509; *om.* T1566).

Pādas cd identify action following intention (*cetayitvā karman*) with bodily (*kāyikam karman*) and verbal action (*vācikam karman*). To explain

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[351] Cf., e.g., AK 2.24 with AKBh.

[352] Cf. Candrakīrti's **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (D3866.245a$_4$; LINDTNER, 1979:105): de la rten daṅ| dmigs pa daṅ| rnam pa daṅ| dus daṅ rdzas mtshuṅs pas sems daṅ mñam du rab tu 'jug pas sems daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa ste|. Also found at AK 2.34 with AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:208-209; transl. by LVP, 1923:177-178). The same explanation of *saṃprayukta* is here given by Avalokitavrata in *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.21b$_{2ff.}$).

[353] The mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) is defined with the standard definition in *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (D3866.266a$_7$; LINDTNER, 1979:144) as that, which arises on the basis of the mental faculty.

this, Candrakīrti shows that intention precedes a bodily or verbal action, since one first mentally decides that one will act in a particular manner with the body and speech. What is consequently carried out by the body and speech is then called the 'action following intention' (*cetayitvā karman*, as mentioned above, literally meaning 'action after having intended'). This is an explanation introduced by Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:221) and repeated in modified form by Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:509; *om.* T1566). Since the action following intention is completed by either the body or speech, it is further subdivided into these two types: bodily (*kāyika*) and verbal (*vācika*). Candrakīrti applies the same grammatical explanation (*vyutpatti*) to these terms as he did to mental action (*manasi*): 'bodily' and 'verbal' means respectively that, which exists or resides (*bhavam*) in the body and in the speech (*kāyavācoḥ*). This argument and grammatical explanation is also found in *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509; T1566.99b_{17}).

(V307$_4$): Subdividing (*bhidyamānam*) further (*punaḥ*) also (*api*) this (*etat*) threefold (*trividham*) action (*karma*), a sevenfold [action] (*saptavidham*) is brought about (*saṃjāyate*). In this manner (*ity evam*), the division (*bhedaḥ*) of that (*tasya*) action (*karmaṇaḥ*) has been explained (*anuvarṇnitaḥ*) by the Exalted One (*bhagavatā*) as being of many types (*bahuprakāraḥ*). How (*katham kṛtvā*)?

> ***"Speech (vāc), motion (viṣpandaḥ) and (ca) those without abstinence (aviratayaḥ), which (yāḥ) [are] designated non-intimation (avijñaptisaṃjñitāḥ), those others (anyāḥ) [involving] abstinence (viratayaḥ), [which] likewise (tathā) are taught (smṛtāḥ) [to be] just (eva) non-intimation (avijñaptayaḥ);"*** (Mmk 17.4)

> ***"beneficence (puṇyam) that is an issue of utilization (paribhogānvayam) and (ca) non-beneficence (apuṇyam) of a similar kind (tathāvidham), and (ca) intention (cetanā) – (iti) these (ete) seven (sapta) pheno-***

mena (dharmāḥ) are taught (smṛtāḥ) as having action as their mark (karmāñjanāḥ)." (Mmk 17.5)

Having explained the threefold division of action into bodily, verbal and mental action, the text continues with presenting a sevenfold division of action. Candrakīrti remarks that the Exalted One thus has presented various divisions of action. This refers back to Mmk 17.2cd.

If put into a simple scheme, this sevenfold division of action may be said to consist of the following elements: (1) (intimation that is a) verbal action (*vāgvijñapti*), (2) (intimation that is a) bodily action (*kāyavijñapti*), (3) non-intimation not involving abstention from what is unwholesome (*aviraty-avijñapti*), (4) non-intimation involving abstention from what is unwholesome (*viratyavijñapti*), (5) beneficence (*puṇya*), (6) non-beneficence (*apuṇya*) and (7) intention (*cetanā*). It does not seem that this division occurs elsewhere in the extant Buddhist scriptures. There are, however, certain clues in this division that indicate that it belongs to the *Saṃmatīya*-tradition, namely the use of the words 'motion' (*viṣpanda*) and 'issue of utilization' (*paribhogānvaya*). The statement that non-intimations (*avijñapti*) can be both with and without abstinence involves, however, a problem in terms of ascribing these verses to the *Saṃmatīya*-tradition. To avoid repetition, these details will be discussed below when analysing Candrakīrti's commentary.

(V307$_{10}$): Among these (*tatra*), ***"speech"*** (*vāc*) [is] the distinct articulation of phonemes (*vyaktavarṇṇoccāraṇam*). Movement of the body (*śarīraceṣṭā*) [is] ***"motion"*** (*viṣpandaḥ*). As to these (*tatra*), each and every (*sarvaiva*) wholesome (*kuśalā*) or (*vā*) unwholesome (*akuśalā*) speech (*vāc*) that brings about non-intimation having abstinence or non-abstinence as its trait (*viratyaviratilakṣaṇāvijñaptisamutthāpikā*)[354] is included (*gṛhyate*) generally (*sāmānyena*) [in the category] 'speech' (*vāg iti*). In the same way (*evam*), [each

[354] Alternatively, it could also be read: "As to these, each and every wholesome or unwholesome speect having abstinence or non-abstinence as its trait (*viratyaviratilakṣaṇā*) [and] that brings about non-initimation (*avijñaptisamutthā-pikā*)..."

and every] wholesome (*kuśalaḥ*) or (*vā*) unwholesome (*akuśalaḥ*) motion (*vispandaḥ*) that brings about non-intimation having abstinence or non-abstinence as its trait (*viratyaviratilakṣaṇāvijñaptisamutthāpakaḥ*) is included (*gṛhyate*) generally (*sāmānyena*) [in the category 'motion'].

The first aspect among the sevenfold action is 'speech' (*vāc*). Candrakīrti explains speech as the distinct (*vyakta*) articulation (*uccāraṇa*) of phonemes (*varṇa*). This is an explanation first found in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:222) and which is repeated in *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:510; T1566.99b$_{22}$). *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405) and *Chung lun* (T1564. 21c$_{17}$), on the other hand, explain speech as the four kinds of verbal action, i.e., either the unwholesome actions lying, slander, hurtful words and talking nonsense (cf. fn. 268 above) or the wholesome actions of avoiding these four (cf. fn. 286 above). The definition of *vāc* as *vyaktavarṇṇoccāraṇa* does not seem to be found elsewhere. In AKBh, for example, *vāc* is defined variously as 'the articulation of speech' (*vāgdhvani;* AK 4.3d, ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:578), 'sounding' (*ghoṣa;* ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:271), 'purposeful sounding' (*ghoṣaṇārtha;* op.cit:272) or 'that, which produces a phoneme' (*vyañjanaṃ janayati;* op.cit.: 273).[355] Thus, the exact source for Buddhapālita's definition remains unknown. The meaning of the definition should, however, be clear enough: speech has the function of articulating (*uccāraṇa*); that, which is articulated, consists of phonemes (*varṇa*), i.e., vowels and consonants; the way, in which these are articulated, is distinct (*vyakta*), i.e., clearly so that nonsense is avoided (*vyakta* could thus also be translated with 'intelligible').

The second type among the sevenfold action is 'motion' (*vispanda*). Candrakīrti explains motion to mean 'movement of the body' (*śarīraceṣṭā*). In the Mmk-commentaries, this explanation ultimately derives from *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405). *Akutobhayā* (ibid.) adds to this explanation that motion refers to the three kinds of bodily action, i.e., either the unwholesome actions of killing, taking what is not given and sexual

[355] In *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (LAMOTTE, 1936:203-204, 260; MUROJI, 1985:55), one also finds the definition "La voix (*vāc*) est une prononciation de sons (*ghoṣoccaraṇa*)" (English translation: "Speech (*vāc*) is an articulation of sounds (*ghoṣoccaraṇa*)"): ṅag ni tshig ste| dbyaṅs kyi khyad par gaṅ gis don go bar byed pa'o| |.

misconduct (cf. fn. 268 above) or the wholesome actions of avoiding these unwholesome actions (cf. fn. 286 above). In *Chung lun* (T1564.21c_{17}), on the other hand, motion is merely explained as these three kinds of bodily action without mentioning 'movements of the body'. Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II: 222) and Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:510; T1566.99b_{23}) both adopt the explanation of motion as 'movements of the body' but omit the reference to the three bodily types of action.

Bodily action is thus referred to as motion (*viṣpanda*) or movement (*ceṣṭā*).[356] The use of these words probably provides one clue for establishing the sectarian affiliation of this sevenfold list, because the word motion for bodily action points to a particular doctrinal position on the nature of bodily action. The definition of bodily action is discussed in AK 4.2 and *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, both works by Vasubandhu.

In AK 4.2 (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:568; LVP, 1924:4), the definition of bodily action as motion (*gati*) is given as the opinion of an opponent, which is rejected by the *Sarvāstivādin* on the grounds that motion involves a time span, which contradicts the momentary nature of the body as a conditioned phenomenon. Instead, the *Sarvāstivāda*-position is that bodily action should be defined as 'configuration' (*saṃsthāna*), which would not involve any duration. In AKBh, the opponents, who hold the view that bodily action is motion, are only identified as 'others' (*apare*).[357] Yet, as indicated by LVP (1924:4, fn. 2), in Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* the word *apare* is

[356] In Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (LVP, 1901:120; D3872.96a_5; commenting on *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 5.48), the word *calana* is also used in this sense of bodily movement: raktaṃ dviṣṭaṃ vā svacittaṃ yadā paśyet| tadā hastapadādicalanamātrakam api na kartavyaṃ| nāpi vacanodauraṇaṃ| anyathā tadutthāpite kāyavāgvijñaptau api saṃkliṣṭe syātāṃ|; transl.: "When one's mind should be observed as attracted or repelled, then neither even a simple movement, such as of the hand or foot, should be made, nor an articulation with the speech. Otherwise, the two intimations of body and speech brought about thereby would also be defiled."

[357] ŚĀSTRĪ (1971:568): gatir ity apare| prasyandamānasya hi kāyakarma, no 'prasyandamānasyeti|; transl. by LVP (1924:4), who has inserted the words 'the Vātsīputrīyas': "D'après une autre école, les Vātsīputrīyas, la *vijñapti* corporelle est déplacement (*gati*), car elle a lieu lorsqu'il y a mouvement [(*prasyandamāna*)], non pas lorsqu'il n'y a pas mouvement." English translation: "According to another school, the Vātsīputrīyas, the bodily *vijñapti* is displacement (*gati*), because it takes place when there is movement [(*prasyandamāna*)] and not when there is no movement."

identified with the *Vātsīputrīyas.*[358]

In *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, the position that bodily action is 'configuration' (**saṃsthāna*, Tib. *dbyibs*, Chin. *hsing-hsiang* 形相 or *hsing-se* 形色) is first presented and criticised.[359] Thereafter, the position that bodily action is 'motion' (**gati*, Tib. *'gro ba*, Chin. *t'ung* 動) is then presented and criticised.[360] Finally, a third position that bodily action is 'motion' caused by the wind-element (*rluṅ gi khams*, *fen-chieh* 風界) is presented and criticised.[361] Thus, Yaśomitra identifies the definition of bodily action as movement as belonging to the *Vātsīputrīya*-tradition, while Sumatiśīla identifies it as belonging to the *Saṃmatīya*-tradition. As indicated by LAMOTTE (1936:212-213, fn. 21), this does not necessarily have to constitute a contradiction, because these two traditions were closely related.[362]

It is, however, quite problematic to apply these doxographic school labels found in the later *Abhidharma*-commentaries to terms and concepts mentioned in sources as early as Mmk and to use such identifications for determining how a term such as *viṣpanda* might have been intended in Mmk. First, the most obvious problem is the relatively large time span between Mmk and Yaśomitra and Sumitaśīla, which is at least several centuries. This time span is a source of uncertainty as to whether the sectarian identifications proposed by Yaśomitra and Sumatiśīla are precise. In fact, when looking more closely at the earlier *Abhidharma*-sources, it appears that what

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[358] ŚĀSTRĪ (1971:568): gatir ity apara iti| vātsīputrīyāḥ|. Translation: "That 'others say *motion*' refers to the Vātsīputrīyas."

[359] In Vasubandhu's text, the speaker of this position is only identified as 'someone', but in Sumatiśīla's *Karmasiddhiṭīkā* the speaker is identified as a *Vaibhāṣika* (D4071.64a_1: *bye brag smra ba*). For a brief introduction to *Karmasiddhiṭīkā*, cf. MUROJI (1984).

[360] Again, in Vasubandhu's text the opponent is only called 'someone', but in Sumatiśīla's *Ṭīkā* the speaker is identified as a *Saṃmatīya*-follower (D4071.68$a_{2\text{-}3}$: *'phags pa maṅ pos bkur ba'i sde pa rnams*).

[361] This third position is explicitly identified as associated with the *Sauryodayika*-tradition in Vasubandhu's text (D4062.137a_3: *ñi ma 'char ka ba dag;* T1608.31.778b_{12} *jih-ch'u-ti-tzu* 日出弟子; T1609.31. 782b_{14} *jih-ch'u-lun-che* 日出論者). In the *Ṭīkā*, Sumatiśīla identifies this tradition as a sub-school of the *Sautrāntika*-tradition (D4071.75a_2: 'dir mdo sde pa'i khyad par rnams las| ñi ma 'char ka pa źes bya ba...). He also explains (ibid.) that this sub-school has been so designated, because it adheres to a treatise (*śāstra*) entitled *ñi ma 'char ka* (**Sūryodaya*) written by the Sthavira Kumāralāta (*gnas brtan gźon nu len*). This sub-school is not mentioned by BAREAU (1955). For this school, cf. LAMOTTE (1936:219, fn. 31).

[362] According to BAREAU (1955:30, 121), the *Saṃmatīya* is the third or fourth sub-school to have issued from the *Vātsīputrīya*-tradition.

later came to be regarded as fixed sectarian positions were rather common ideas also appearing in works, where they are not supposed to appear. As an example, one may quote the **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*, supposedly a *Sarvāstivāda*-work, in which action also is defined as bodily movement – although the *Sarvāstivāda*-position assumed by the later tradition is that of bodily action as 'configuration'.[363] Secondly, it is also not possible to know whether Nāgārjuna might also have intended the word 'motion', e.g., in the sense of 'motion caused by the wind-element'. Again, in spite of such a sectarian ascription of this view by Vasubandhu, one of Vasubandhu's commentators on AK, namely Pūrṇavardhana, does not hesitate to involve the element of wind when explaining bodily action as configuration.[364] Thirdly, it must be underlined that the actual word used for motion by Nāgārjuna is *viṣpanda,* being a term not found in any of the other treatises, which actually all use the word *gati*. It is reasonable to assume that *viṣpanda* and *gati* refer to the same notion in that they both can mean 'motion', but it is by no means an established fact. In conclusion, it may be said that the identification by Yaśomitra and Sumatiśīla that the definition of bodily action as motion can be ascribed to a *Vātsīputrīya*- or *Saṃmatīya*-position is possible. However, it must be cautioned that it only rests on very slippery ground and not on any solid philological proof, where reference can be given to an actual *Vātsīputrīya*- or *Saṃmatīya*-scripture.

After having mentioned the brief explanations of speech and motion, which Candrakīrti adopted from the earlier Mmk-commentaries, Candrakīrti further offers two sentences clarifying the sense of speech and motion, which are not found in any of the other commentaries. The first sentence, defining speech, tells that all aspects of speech are included generally in the category 'speech'; that is to say, 'speech' is a general term including any sub-

[363] Cf. **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (T1552.28.888b_{18}): 作者。身動身方便身作. Transl.: "Regarding intimation (**vijñapti*, 作), bodily movement (身動), [i.e.,] body-effort (身方便), [is] bodily intimation (**kāyavijñapti*, 身作)." Likewise, in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*, which is, of course, a *Theravāda*-work, bodily action is also said to be caused by the wind-element (cf. DOWLING, 1976:213), a position ascribed above to the *Sauryodayika-tradition.*

[364] Cf. Pūrṇavardhana's **Abhidharmakośaṭīkā Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* (D4093. II.3b_7): rnam par smin pa'i rluṅ gi dbaṅ gis kyaṅ lus kyi dbyibs de daṅ de ltar 'gyur bas|. Transl.: "Because such and such a bodily configuration is created precisely by the power of the wind, which is a ripening [of action]..."

type of speech. The term speech thus includes both wholesome speech (*kuśala*) and unwholesome speech (*akuśala*). Likewise, the term 'motion' includes any wholesome or unwholesome motion.

It is also stated that speech and motion bring about (*samutthāpika*) non-intimations (*avijñapti*). It does not seem that this is always the case, so that every instance of speech or motion would bring about non-intimation. Rather, it means that an instance of speech or motion may bring about non-intimation. The term non-intimation (*avijñapti*) refers to a durative action that remains active without being evident to others, as will be explained below. Such an *avijñapti* must usually be preceded by an intimation (*vijñapti*),[365] i.e., a bodily or verbal action that manifests the intention to commit a certain action. In the time following the intimation, this intention remains as a non-intimation.

Speech and motion are thus intimations (*vijñapti*, also sometimes translated as 'information'), because they make the intention, which has given rise to these actions, known (i.e., they exhibit the intention behind the action).[366] In the *Theravāda* commentarial literature,[367] however, intimation (*viññatti*) is not considered identical with the body or speech producing the action; rather, *viññatti* is the impression (*ākāra*) created in the minds of others when perceiving the bodily or verbal action, and hence *viññatti* is included in the *dhammāyatana* and not in the *rūpāyatana* (DOWLING, 1976: 210ff.). In AK and other *Sarvāstivāda*-works, on the other hand, bodily and

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[365] This is expressed in Candrakīrti's explanation below (Pras 308_{11}), in which he says that the non-intimation begins from the moment of an intimation (*kāyavāgvijñaptiparisamāptikālakṣaṇāt prabhṛti*). It is also stated in AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1970:39: *samāsatas tu vijñaptisamādhisambhūtaṃ kuśalākuśalaṃ rūpam avijñaptiḥ*| |), where it is said that *avijñapti* is a kind of matter arisen from *vijñapti* or from absorption (*samādhi*).

[366] Cf. **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (D3866.243a_7-243b_1; LINDTNER, 1979:102): de la dmigs pa'i sems kyis bskyed pa'i lus kyi de daṅ de lta bu'i dbyibs kyi khyad par ni lus kyi rnam par rig byed do| |ṅag gi rnam par rig byed ni de la dmigs pa'i sems kyis bskyed pa'i brjod par bya ba brjod pa'i tshig ste| de lta bu de gñis ni kun nas sloṅ ba'i sems rnam par rig par byed pas na rnam par rig byed do| |. Transl.: "This or that particular configuration of the body, which has been generated by the mind focusing thereon, is bodily intimation. Verbal intimation is a word articulating that, which is to be articulated, being generated by the mind focusing thereon. Thus, these two are intimations, because they make the mind, which brings [them] about, known."

[367] For a summary of the Theravāda-presentation of intimations (*viññatti*), cf. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS (1910:264-265) and DOWLING (1976:209-215).

verbal *vijñaptis* are said to belong to the *rūpāyatana*, i.e., they consist of physical matter and thus must be identical to the matter of the body and speech. An early definition of intimation is found in the **Karmaprajñapti*-section of the *Sarvāstivāda*-work *Prajñaptiśāstra*:

> What is intimation (**vijñapti, rnam rig byed*)? It is answered: Here someone might either order 'kill that being' and one answers 'I will' or order 'do not kill' and one answers 'I will kill'. In any case, no matter whether one has killed a being in the past or is going to kill a being in the future, at the time when actually killing a being, then that, which is the bodily action, is called intimation (**vijñapti, rnam par rig byed*).[368]

Thus, the visible bodily action of killing is here identified as intimation.

Bodily and verbal intimations may also generate non-intimations (*avijñapti*). As will be shown below, non-intimations may be characterised as abstention (*virati*) from unwholesome action (*akuśala*) or non-abstention (*avirati*) from unwholesome action. When the Sanskrit mss are here interpreted according to the Tibetan translation, *viratyaviratilakṣaṇāvijñaptisamutthāpikā* should be taken as a compound, and thus the division into abstention and non-abstention concerns non-intimations (*avijñapti*). It is, however, also possible to break up this compound into two separate compounds, as has been indicated in the critical edition of the Sanskrit text. In that case, the text would read *viratyaviratilakṣaṇā 'vijñaptisamutthāpikā*, and thus the division into abstention and non-abstention would become an attribute of speech (*vāc*) rather than of non-intimation (*avijñapti*). Such an interpretation is not particularly supported by the verse (Mmk 17.4), where the division is attributed to non-intimation. Yet, there are two occurrences in AKBh implying that the division into abstention and non-abstention may

[368] *Prajñaptiśāstra* (D4088.189b$_{3\text{-}5}$): rnam par rig byed gaṅ źe na | smras pa | ji ltar 'di na kha cig la la źig 'di skad du srog chags kyi srog chod cig ces bsgo la des kyaṅ gcad par bya'o źes smras kyaṅ ruṅ | ma bcad cig ces bsgo bźin du gcod do źes smras kyaṅ ruṅ ba las | phar soṅ ste srog chags kyi srog bcad kyaṅ ruṅ | phyir 'oṅs te srog chag kyi srog gcod kyaṅ ruṅ ste | gaṅ gi tshe srog chags kyi srog gcod pa de'i tshe | lus kyi las gaṅ yin pa de ni rnam par rig byed ces bya'o | |.

also be used with regard to intimations.[369] In that case, wholesome speech would have the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) that it involves abstention (*virati*) from the four unwholesome types of speech, i.e., abstention from lying, slander, hurtful words and speaking nonsense. This is reflected in the four kinds of verbal, wholesome actions, which all are affixed with the word abstention (*virati;* cf. fn. 286 above). Oppositely, unwholesome speech would have the characteristic that it involves non-abstention (*avirati*) from the four unwholesome types of speech, i.e., it can be defined in contradistinction to wholesome speech. Likewise, the same distinctions may be applied to bodily action.[370]

(V308$_3$): And (*ca*), just as (*yathā*) this (*eṣaḥ*) two-fold (*dvidhā*) division (*bhedaḥ*) of intimation (*vijñapteḥ*) [has been made], in the same way (*evam*) [a twofold division] has likewise (*api*) been made (*kṛtvā*) of non-intimation (*avijñap-*

[369] First, cf. ŚĀSTRI (1971:673): api khalu kāyavākkarmaṇī viratisvabhāvam, na manas-karma; cittāvijñaptyabhāvāt |; transl. by LVP (1924:134): "Mais, dirons-nous, l'acte du corps, l'acte de la voix propres à l'Arhat (*aśaikṣa*) sont 'abstention' (*virati*) de leur natur, tandis que l'acte de l'esprit n'est pas 'abstention' de sa nature, parce qu'il n'y a pas d'*avijñapti* de la pensée." English translation: "But we will say that actual bodily and verbal action for the Arhat (*aśaikṣa*) are 'abstention' (*virati*) in their nature, whereas mental actions are not 'abstention' in their nature, because there is no *avijñapti* of the mind." Secondly, cf. ŚĀSTRI (1971:749): sa punar viratiḥ - dvidhā | yayā ca viramyate vijñaptyā, yac ca tadviramaṇam avi-jñaptiḥ |; transl. by LVP (1924:247): "Le renoncement (*virati*) est *vijñapti*, l'acte par lequel on renonce, et *avijñapti*, le fait de s'abstenir." English translation: "Abstention (*virati*) is *vijñapti*, namely the action through which one abstains, and *avijñapti*, the fact of abstaining."

[370] Candrakīrti does actually not specify what the object for the abstention is. Here its object has been interpreted in a general sense as meaning 'unwholesome action' (*akuśala*) and would thus refer to the bodily and verbal unwholesome actions. However, as will be shown below in the discussion of non-intimations (*avijñapti*), the word abstention (*virati*) is strongly connected with the concept of a religious vow (*saṃvara*). Hence, as appears in AK 4.15 along with AKBh, abstention (*virati*) may also be taken in the sense of referring to abstention from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, alcohol, perfume, garlands, dance, music and so forth, i.e., in the sense of *saṃvara* (cf. ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:608-609; transl. by LVP, 1924:46-47). As a digression, it may be mentioned that the term *avirati* also occurs in Jainism (cf. GLASENAPP, 1915:73); GLASENAPP translates *avirati* as 'mangelnde Selbstzucht, d.h. Nichtbeachten der Gebote' (English translation: 'lacking self-discipline, i.e., not keeping the vows'). In the *Jaina*-scriptures, *avirati* is one of the four causes for *karman* to be bound (*bandha*) to the soul; the four causes are: wrong beliefs (*mithyātva*), non-abstention (*avirati*), passion (*kaṣāya*) and activity (*yoga*)(ibid.).

teḥ), namely (*iti*) the non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) having non-abstention as their trait (*aviratilakṣaṇāḥ*) and (*ca*) [those] having abstention as their trait (*viratilakṣaṇāḥ*).

Among these (*tatra*), the non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) having non-abstention as their trait (*aviratilakṣaṇāḥ*) [are] for example (*tadyathā*) [to think] (*iti*) "from today on (*adyaprabhṛti*), I (*mayā*) shall earn (*parikalpayitavyā*) a livelihood (*jīvikā*) by killing (*hatvā*) living beings (*prāṇinam*) [and] committing (*kṛtvā*) theft (*cauryam*)." Starting (*prabhṛti*) from the moment of assenting to [such] unfor-tunate actions (*pāpakarmābhyupagamakṣaṇāt*), non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*), which have assent to [those] unwholesome actions as their cause (*akuśalakarmābhyupagama-hetukāḥ*), are continuously (*satatasamitam*) generated (*samupajāyante*) even (*api*) for someone, who [eventually] does not perform that [action] (*tadakāriṇaḥ*).

And (*ca*), starting (*prabhṛti*) from the moment of the preparatory action, such as fishermen and so forth [making their] nets (*kaivarttādīnāṃ jālādiparikarmakālāt*), which (*yāḥ*) non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) are generated (*upajāyante*) even (*api*) for those, who [eventually] do not perform that [action] (*tadakāriṇām*), precisely these (*tā etā*) are called (*ity ucyante*) 'non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) having non-abstention as their trait (*aviratilakṣaṇā*)'.

And (*ca*) similar to (*yathā*) these (*etāḥ*), so also (*tathā*) [are] those other (*anyāḥ*) non-intimations (*avijñap-tayaḥ*) having abstention as their trait (*viratilakṣaṇāḥ*), [i.e., those] having a wholesome nature (*kuśalasvabhāvāḥ*). For example (*tadyathā*), [one might think] (*iti*) "from today on (*adyaprabhṛti*) I abstain (*prativiramāmi*) from killing and so forth (*prāṇātipātādibhyaḥ*)." Which (*yāḥ*) non-intima-tions (*avijñaptayaḥ*) having an accumulation of what is wholesome as their nature (*kuśalopacayasvabhāvāḥ*) that are

generated (*upajāyante*) throughout the time (*taduttarakālam*) starting (*prabhṛti*) from the moment in time when a [wholesome] intimation of body or speech has been completed (*kāyavāgvijñaptiparisamāptikālakṣaṇāt*), even (*api*) when [the person] is in a state of distraction and so forth (*pramattādyavasthasya*), precisely these (*tā etāḥ*) are called (*ity ucyante*) 'non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) having abstention as their trait (*viratilakṣaṇāḥ*)'.

(V309$_1$): Just these (*tā etāḥ*) [are] thus (*evam*) non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*), because (*iti*) although (*api*) they have (*satyaḥ*) matter and action as their nature (*rūpakriyāsvabhāvāḥ*), they do not (*na*) make themselves known (*vijñaptayanti*) to others (*parān*), as intimations [do] (*vijñaptivat*).

Similar to the possible division of bodily and verbal intimations into two kinds, namely those characterised by non-abstention and those characterised by abstention, the next two elements of the sevenfold list of action, viz. non-intimations (*avijñapti*), are divided into two kinds, namely those characterised by non-abstention (*aviratilakṣaṇa*) and those characterised by abstention (*viratilakṣaṇa*).

The explanation found thereon in *Chung lun* (T1564.21c$_{18\text{-}20}$) is very rudimentary and in that way differs from the explanations given in the other commentaries. *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405) provides a simple definition of non-intimation characterised by non-abstention: it is other instances of body and speech, which arise beginning from the time of having fabricated an unwholesome action, yet the non-intimation is without motion. The non-intimation characterised by abstention is defined oppositely.[371]

[371] For another very early definition of *avijñapti*, cf. *Prajñaptiśāstra* (D4088.189b$_5$): rnam par rig byed ma yin pa gaṅ yin źe na | smras pa | srog gcog pa las phyir mi log ciṅ phyir ma nur la ma btaṅ ma spaṅs pas | ji ste na lus kyis kyaṅ rnam par rig par mi byed pa 'di ni | rnam par rig byed ma yin pa źes bya'o | | . Transl.: "What is *avijñapti*? Answer: For example, what is not made evident with the body in that killing is not turned away from and is not withdrawn from and [thus] is not abandoned, [i.e.,] not abstained from, that is called non-intimation (*avijñapti*)."

Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:222) gives a similar definition but elucidates that the unwholesome action, which is fabricated before the non-intimation begins to arise, entails the giving rise to a *mental* unwholesome action, such as thinking that one wants to commit such and such an unwholesome action.[372] He also adds that the non-intimation will arise even for someone who eventually does not perform that action. Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:510-520; T1566.99b$_{24-29}$) provides the same explanation.

Candrakīrti does not directly adopt the explanations found in the earlier commentaries, but instead furnishes the two kinds of non-intimation with illustrations. For the non-intimation characterised by non-abstention (*aviratilakṣaṇā avijñapti*), the illustration is someone, who decides to lead a life of stealing and killing. First, the person needs to make a decision, such as saying or thinking that he from now on will earn his livelihood by killing and stealing (or 'trickery', another meaning of *caurya*). More concretely, an example is given of fishermen (*kaivartta*) tying their nets (*jāla*).[373] The tying of the net is a bodily intimation informing others of an intention to kill fish. From the point of making this decision, non-intimations characterised by non-abstention are continuously generated by these fishermen. This generation of unwholesome non-intimations occurs even for someone, who eventually does not go to sea to kill fish, because the initial decision to kill fish has not been abandoned but still lies latent within him.

The concept of non-intimation (*avijñapti*) is thus used to explain actions involving duration, since there is a span of time from the point of forming the decision until actually carrying out the action. A discussion about the duration of bodily intimations defined as movement was recounted above. Since intimations are said not to have duration, the concept of *avijñapti* is needed to explain actions involving longer duration. A

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[372] This explanation that a non-intimation can arise merely from a mental action and does not require a preceding intimation does not accord with the *Sarvāstivāda*-view, according to which an intimation always must precede the non-intimation (cf. *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā*, D3859. III22b$_5$). Candrakīrti mentions in **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* that there are also those, who hold that the *avijñapti* can be generated from a mental action (D3866.242b$_{4-5}$; LINDTNER, 1979:101).

[373] This is here called the preparation (*parikarman*). Regarding this term, cf. AKBh on *prayoga* (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:680-681; transl. LVP, 1924:141-142). For a canonical passage in which the profession of fishermen is denounced as wicked, cf. AN 3.301-303 (HARDY, 1897; transl. by HARE, 1934:216-217).

decision to act in a certain way involves a longer series of action. First, the decision has to be formed, either by performing a concrete intimation, such as making a statement about one's intentions, or simply by forming that decision in the mind (according to Buddhapālita's explanation). The action that one has decided to do may then be carried out later once or repeatedly, but throughout this time, the decision lies latent within one. During this time, the decision is not directly evident to others. It is not expressed in any concrete act, but is still present whether one thinks of it or not. Thus, the latent decision constitutes a kind of action, which does not appear and is said to involve non-intimation or a series of non-intimations.[374]

The non-intimation lasts until it is replaced by an opposite decision or action or for as long as one has initially decided it should last. In Candrakīrti's example of earning a livelihood by killing or stealing, the non-intimation would thus continue to be generated as long as one lives or, at least, until one consciously decides not to earn one's livelihood in this manner, because earning a livelihood is not completed by performing an action once but involves a repeated pattern of actions.[375] Likewise, when deciding to abstain from something, such as from killing and so forth, the decision is not completed by carrying it out, since the decision is rather *not* to perform certain actions.[376] A religious vow (*saṃvara*), therefore, lasts for the period for which is has been taken (such as a day and a night or for the rest of one's life), unless it is broken by an action contrary to the vow or by a conscious decision to abandon the vow.[377] In this context, Candrakīrti gives the illustration of someone taking the Buddhist vow (*saṃvara*) not to kill and so forth. In fact, the concept of *avijñapti* seems to be strongly related to the issue of religious vows and probably has its origin in that context.[378]

A vow or mental decision might be expected to constitute a latent mental action, but such a position would not explain how the vow could last

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[374] Cf. AK 1.11 (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:38; transl. LVP, 1923:20).

[375] Cf. AKBh on AK 27cd (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:611-612; transl. LVP, 1924:63-64).

[376] On *viratilakṣaṇā 'vijñapti* as non-action, cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:609; transl. LVP, 1924:48).

[377] Regarding the duration of the *avijñapti*, cf. Candrakīrti's **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (D3866.243a$_{6\text{-}7}$; LINDTNER, 1979:102); also discussed in AK 4.19 and AK 4.27.

[378] This may be illustrated with the extensive discussion of vows as non-intimations in chapter four of AK and AKBh.

without breaking it when becoming unaware of it, e.g., when fainting, becoming mad, entering a deep meditative absorption, etc.[379] To avoid this problem, non-intimation is explained instead as a physical action consisting of physical matter and associated with the body and speech, but not evident to others.[380] Thus, whether being aware of the vow or not, the vow can be said to remain as long as the body remains. Candrakīrti, therefore, also mentions that a non-intimation has a physical nature, but does not appear to others in the same way that an intimation does.[381] This explanation is adopted by him from *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:511; T1566.99b_{29}-99c_1).[382]

The existence of such physical non-intimations, however, was not accepted by all schools. It was rejected by the *Theravādins, Sautrāntikas* and *Dārṣṭāntikas* (BAREAU, 1955:157, 163, 275).[383] It was admitted at least by the *Mahāsaṅghikas, Sāṃmatīyas* and *Sarvāstivādins* (BAREAU, 1955:70, 149, 197, 275). The explanations on *avijñapti,* which are extant today, are those belonging to the *Sarvāstivāda*-tradition. Yet from the commentary on *Kathāvatthu* X.10-11 (TAYLOR, 1897:440-443; transl. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:251-252), it is known that the *Mahāsaṅghikas* and *Sāṃmatīyas* understood non-intimation (*aviññatti*) as referring only to bad discipline (*dussīlya*) and intimation (*viññatti*) as referring only to proper discipline (*sīla*)

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[379] Cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:39; transl. LVP, 1923:20-21).

[380] On the physical nature of the *pratimokṣa* vows, see, e.g., the extensive discussion in chapter four of AK and AKBh.

[381] The definition of *avijñapti* as 'having a nature of matter and doing' (*rūpakriyāsvabhāva*) is partly comparable with AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1971:109; transl. LVP, 1924:48), where *kriyāsvabhāva* is given as a definition of action (*karman*).

[382] For other explanations on *avijñapti,* cf. LVP (1927:131-133), LAMOTTE (1936:156-158), DOWLING (1976:66-148, 206-228), MCDERMOTT (1980:182-184; 1984:133-139) and RYOSE (1987:47-58). DOWLING's explanation suffers, however, from the basic misunderstanding that *avijñapti* is responsible for the ripening (*vipāka*) of the result of the action, a misunderstanding he might have derived from STCHERBATSKY (cf. DOWLING, 1976:69). For primary sources, cf., for example, *Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* with commentaries (T1550. 28.812b_{26}-812c_7, T1551.28. 840$a_{3\text{-}12}$, T1552.28.888b_{13}-888c_2; transl. by RYOSE, 1987:123-128), AK 1.11 (AK 1.11; ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:38-39, transl. by LVP, 1923:20-21), AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:578ff; transl. LVP, 1924:14ff.), and *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (LAMOTTE, 1936: §14 in text and translation; MUROJI, 1985:14-15).

[383] LAMOTTE (1936:165-166) explains that the *Sautrāntikas* rejected the existence of a physical *avijñapti* but explained it instead as a type of intention (*cetanā*). LAMOTTE (op.cit: 172) also mentions that the *Vijñānavādin-Yogācāra*-school only accepted *avijñapti* as a nominal designation for a decision and not as a physically existing phenomenon.

(BAREAU, 1955:70, 125, 226). However, elsewhere in the commentary to *Kathāvatthu* (VIII.9 and XVI.7), the opposite is stated, namely that the *Mahāsaṅghikas* and *Sāṃmatīyas* assert that intimations (*viññatti*) can be both wholesome and unwholesome (cf. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:221, 308). From this it may be supposed that the *Mahāsaṅghikas* and *Saṃmatīyas* also asserted *avijñapti* (as did the *Sarvāstivādins*), but the precise nature of their assertion remains vague. It must also here be underlined that the philological basis for connecting this assertion to particular schools is again very weak, since it is only found in the commentarial literature, which is rather late (cf. HINÜBER, 2000:73). Thus, the mention of *avijñapti* in the sevenfold list of action in Mmk 17.4-5 might be a *Mahāsaṅghika-*, *Saṃmatīya-* or *Sarvāstivāda*-list of terms, but concrete evidence is unfortunately wanting.

($V309_2$) So also (*tathā*), ***"beneficence (puṇyam) that is an issue of utilization (paribhogānvayam),"*** i.e., (*arthaḥ*), 'wholesome action' (*kuśalam iti*). ***"An issue of utilization (paribhogānvayam)"*** means (*ity arthaḥ*) '[there is] succession (*anvayaḥ*) of it (*asya*) due to utilization (*paribho-gena*)'. ***"Utilization" (paribhogaḥ)*** [is] the use (*upabhogaḥ*) by the monastic community and so forth (*saṅghādibhiḥ*) of a donated article (*parityaktasya vastunaḥ*). ***"Issue" (anvayaḥ)*** means (*ity arthaḥ*) 'succession (*anugamaḥ*), [i.e.,] an accumulation of wholesome action (*kuśalopacayaḥ*) generated in the series of the giver (*dāyakasantānajaḥ*)'.

The fifth element in the sevenfold list of action is 'beneficence' (*puṇya*).[384] *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405) simply states that 'beneficence that is an issue of utilization' (*paribhogānvayam puṇyam*) means an issue (**anvaya,*

[384] Although such a translation of *puṇya* does not agree with the semantic explanation (*nirukti*) provided here by the commentaries (to be discussed immediately below), it agrees with the canonical and pre-canonical sense of the word; cf. FILLIOZAT (1980:101-108), COUSINS (1996:153-156) and SCHMITHAUSEN (1998:12) for semantic analyses. For a presentation of threefold *puṇya* derived from giving, discipline and mental cultivation, cf. AN 4.239-241 (HARDY, 1899; transl. by HARE, 1935:164-167) and *Saṅgītiparyāya* (STACHE-ROSEN, 1968:81).

rgyu las byuṅ ba) from utilization (**paribhoga, yoṅs su loṅs spyod pa'i*). Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:222) repeats the explanation of *Akutobhayā* and adds a semantic explanation (*nirukti*): "'issue' [means] 'following' (**anugama, rjes su 'gro ba*), 'consequence' (**anubandha/*anugata, rjes su 'brel pa*) and 'to accumulate the series' (**santānam puṇati, rgyun 'phel ba*), [and thus] precisely 'beneficence' (**puṇya, bsod nams*)."[385] Buddha-pālita thus indicates with the verb **puṇati* (*'phel ba*) that he derives *puṇya* from the verbal-root *puṇ* 'to gather, accumulate' (related to the verbal-root *pūl* having the same meaning). The word 'issue' (*anvaya*) is then taken as representing a semantic equivalent of *puṇya*, because both to ensue as well as an accumulation involve a succession or consequence (*anugama, anu-bandha*). The etymology provided by Buddhapālita here is very old, for it also occurs in Pāli-sources. Yet Buddhapālita most probably interprets the verb **puṇati* (*'phel ba*) in a somewhat twisted way and hence the expression 'to accumulate the series' (**santānam puṇati, rgyun 'phel ba*) makes little sense.[386] As indicated by RHYS DAVIDS & STEDE (1921-1925:464), Dhammapāla gives partly the same *nirukti* in the *Theravāda*-commentary *Vimānavatthu-aṭṭhakathā* as 'that, which purifies (*punāti*), [i.e.,] cleans (*visodheti*), the series (*santānaṃ*)'.[387] Dhammapāla thus uses the verb *punāti* 'to purify' derived from the verbal-root *pū* to explain *puṇya*, whereas Buddhapālita uses the verb **puṇati* from the verbal-root *puṇ* 'to gather, accumulate'.

Dhammapāla's *nirukti* for *puṇya* as a derivative from *pū* is quite

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[385] *Buddhapālitamūlamadhyamakavṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:222): rgyu las byuṅ ba źes bya ba ni | rjes su 'gro ba daṅ rjes su 'brel pa daṅ rgyun 'phel ba ste bsod nams ñid do | |.

[386] The Tibetan translation, of course, interprets **puṇati* in the sense of 'to increase' (*'phel ba*), but how Buddhapālita intended the word may have been different. Yet judging from the rest of the sentence and its flow of logic, it seems plausible that Buddhapālita also took **puṇati* in the sense of 'to accumulate, increase'.

[387] *Vimānavatthu-aṭṭhakathā* (HARDY, 1901:19): kim akāsi puññan ti kiṃ dānasīlādippabhedesu kīdisaṃ pujjabhāvaphalanibbattanato, yattha sayaṃ uppannaṃ, taṃ santānaṃ punāti visodhetīti ca "puññan" ti laddhanāmaṃ sucaritaṃ kusalakammaṃ akāsi, upacini nibbattesīti attho. Transl. by MASEFIELD (1989:25): "*What meritorious deed you did (kim akāsi puññaṃ):* what, amongst those com-prising of giving and morality and so on, what sort of skilled deed of good conduct that has acquired the name of a 'meritorious deed' (*puññaṃ*), since its fruit comes into being in a condition worthy of worship (*pujja-*) and since it purifies in that it cleanses (*punāti*) the life-continuum wherein one is oneself arisen, you did, you heaped up, meaning you brought into being."

common.[388] According to the Tibetan translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, it is also given by Bhāvaviveka: "it is *puṇya*, because it purifies (**punāti, dag par byed pa*)."[389] Before giving this *nirukti*, Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:511; *om.* T1566) first repeats the explanation of *puṇya* found in *Akutobhayā*, to which he adds (ibid; T1566.99c$_{5\text{-}6}$) the clarification that 'issue of utilization' could, for example, be the utilization of a thing given to the three jewels.[390] Yet, Bhāvaviveka (ibid; *om.* T1566) also repeats Buddhapālita's *nirukti* in the form of a list of synonyms (**paryāya, rnam graṅs*).

Candrakīrti does not directly adopt any of the explanations given in the earlier commentaries but writes his own short commentary to the passage. He begins by stating that the general meaning of 'beneficence that is an issue of utilization (*paribhogānvayam puṇyam*) is 'wholesome action' (*kuśala*),[391] which agrees with a remark found in *Prajñāpradīpa*.[392] It is a question whether *puṇya* and *kuśala* simply can be glossed as synonyms as is done here. As remarked by COUSINS (1996:154-155) and SCHMITHAUSEN (1998:12), there is a difference between the two terms in that *kuśala* refers to what is

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[388] For references, cf. FILLIOZAT (1980:101) and COUSINS (1996:153). It is also attested in **Āryaprajñāpāramitāsaṃgrahakārikāvivaraṇa* by Triratnadāsa (D3810.315a$_4$).

[389] Cf. *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:511): bsod nams źes bya ba ni dag par byed pas bsod nams te| dge ba źes bya ba dag gi rnam graṅs so; transl. by AMES (1986:265-266): ""Merit" (*puṇya*) [is called] "merit" because it purifies (*punāti*); it is a synonym of "the wholesome". The Chinese translation of *Prajñāpradīpa* (T1566.99c$_{6\text{-}8}$) here varies slightly from the Tibetan translation: 云何名福。謂撈漉義。見諸眾生沒溺煩惱河中。起大悲心。漉出眾生。置涅槃岸故名爲福. First, it presents the etymology differently in explaining *puṇya* as meaning 'to fish out' (*lao-lu* 撈漉). For an example of the Chinese use of this compound, cf. T441. 14.208c$_{26}$, where it is used as a verb having a list of sea-animals, pearls and so forth as its direct object. This might be explained as an interpretation of **punāti* on part of the Chinese translator, because a secondary meaning of the verbal-root *pū* (or *pu*) is 'to filter, strain or purify water' as in the Sanskrit noun *pavitra* or it may be explained as a completely differing etymology taking *puṇya* as a derivative from the verbal-root *pṛ* 'to bring out, rescue', which is also attested in certain early Pāli-sources (cf. COUSINS, 1996:153). To explain this use, an illustration is added in the Chinese translation, which seems to be a short *sūtra*-quotation of unknown prove-nance: "Seeing all sentient beings lost and drowning in the river of defilements, [the bodhisattva] engenders a heart of great compassion; fishing out (*lu* 漉) and freeing all beings, establishing them on the shore of *nirvāṇa*, therefore it is called *puṇya*."

[390] A list of things that can be donated is added to the sentence in *Pang jo teng lun.*

[391] Regarding the meaning of *kuśala*, cf. above p. 190.

[392] See fn. 389. Likewise, in AK 4.46ab (ŚĀSTRI, 1971:652; transl. LVP, 1924:106), *puṇya* is simply equated with pure action (*śubhaṃ karma*) belonging to the desire-world-sphere (*kāmadhātu*).

wholesome, including the Buddhist path,[393] while *puṇya* refers more narrowly to actions intended to bring about a pleasant result in the future, such as a good rebirth. That is to say, *kuśala* can have a spiritual sense, whereas *puṇya* probably is limited to a worldly sense, i.e., serving to bring about a desirable *saṃsāric* rebirth.[394]

Secondly, Candrakīrti explains that *paribhogānvayam* is to be read as a *bahuvrīhi*-compound based on an instrumental *tadpuruṣa*-compound by stating that it means '[there is] issue of it due to utilization'. In other words, the particular kind of beneficence explicated here (*paribhogānvayam puṇyam*) is that, whose succession (*anvaya*) is caused by utilization. What is then meant by utilization (*paribhoga*)? Candrakīrti glosses it with *upabhoga*, meaning 'consummation, use or enjoyment'.[395] An illustration thereof is the consummation or utilization (*upabhoga*) by the monastic community (*saṅgha*) of food or an article (*vastu*), which has been donated (*parityakta*) to them.[396] This is an example that Candrakīrti has adopted from *Prajñāpradīpa*, which refers to the three jewels instead of the *saṅgha* (cf. above).

The words *parityakta* and *paribhoga* point to the possible canonical roots of *puṇya*. In the *Vinaya*, a distinction is introduced between *puṇya* arising from the donation of an article (**parityāgānvayapuṇya* or *tyāgānv-*

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[393] And in the case of the *Sarvāstivāda*-interpretation also including *nirvāṇa* as the ultimate security (*kṣema;* cf. above p. 184 and SCHMITHAUSEN, 1998:12-13).

[394] In that sense, the Buddhist use of *puṇya* would agree with the *Brahmaṇical* sense that the Vedic sacrifice generates *puṇya*, whereby a divine world is brought about (cf. GONDA, 1966). Nevertheless, an explanation of *puṇya* as only leading to good rebirth does not satisfactorily solve the problem of how *puṇya* then came to serve a central role in the *Mahāyāna* Buddhist path leading out of *saṃsāra*, a path said to consist of two accumulations: the accumulation of beneficence (*puṇyasambhāra*) and the accumulation of knowledge (*jñānasaṃbhāra*). The closest answer to this problem is given by SCHMITHAUSEN (1998:12), who says that *kuśala* marks the goal (*nirvāṇa*), while *puṇya* marks the means. This point, however, remains to be explained in proper detail. Perhaps a clue to the *Mahāyāna*-interpretation can be found in the view expressed by Candrakīrti in Mav 6.7-8 along with MavBh that beneficence is practised by the aspirant-*bodhisattva* in order to obtain a proper rebirth and condition of life for cultivating and realising the understanding of emptiness, which is said to require many life-times of practice; cf. also Candrakīrti's view on wholesome action cited above in fn. 271.

[395] On the meaning of *paribhoga*, cf. also AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS (1915:389-390).

[396] The word *parityakta* is here used in its Buddhist sense of 'donated, bestowed, given out, given away'; for this sense, cf. the Pāli-forms *pariccajana* and *pariccatta* (RHYS DAVIDS & STEDE, 1921-1925:424).

ayapuṇya) and *puṇya* arising from the utilization of that article (*paribhogā-nvayapuṇya*).[397] This distinction is precisely the explanation given to *puṇya* and *apuṇya* (see below) on the line of the present verse (Mmk 17.5) in *Chung lun*, which here thus deviates from all the other extant Mmk-commentaries.[398] As explained by LVP (1927:133), the giver obtains *puṇya* from the mere fact of giving, such as giving rice to a monk, whether or not the monk actually eats the rice.[399] The act of giving constitutes intimation (*vijñapti*), which is thus wholesome (*kuśala*) or beneficial (*puṇya*). Being intimation, it may thus be included in the categories 'motion' or 'speech'. However, if the monk then eats the rice, the giver obtains further *puṇya* from this consummation or utility of his gift. This aspect of *puṇya* is not intimation on behalf of the giver nor is it non-intimation (*avijñapti*), because it arises independently of his intention. Therefore, the beneficence arising from utilization is here counted as a separate category of action. Like *avijñapti*, it also involves a kind of duration. While *avijñapti* involves dura-tion on part of the person doing the action, *paribhogānvayapuṇya* involves duration on part

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[397] Cf., e.g., *Vinayavibhaṅga* (D3.II.113a_6): khyim bdag 'di ni khyod la yoṅs su btaṅ ba las byuṅ ba'i bsod nams ni yod na yoṅs su loṅs spyad pa las byuṅ ba'i bsod nams ni med de|. Transl.: "Although this householder has *puṇya* arisen from donating (*yoṅs su btaṅ ba las byuṅ ba'i bsod nams*) to you, he does not have *puṇya* arisen from the utilization [thereof] (*yoṅs su loṅs spyad pa las byuṅ ba'i bsod nams*)." The same distinction occurs several times in *Vinayavibhaṅga* (D3.I.79$a_{4\text{-}5}$; D3.II.116b_7, D3.II.117a_1, D3.II.206a_5, D3.II.207a_3 and D3.II. 207$b_{4\text{-}5}$). The distinc-tion subsequently occurs in the *Abhidharma-* and commentarial literature; cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:747): dvividhaṃ hi puṇyaṃ - 1. tyāgānvayam, tyāgād eva yad upapad-yate; 2. paribhogānvayaṃ ca, deyadharmaparibhogād yad utpadyate; transl. LVP (1924:244): "Le mérite du don est de deux sortes: 1. mérite produit par l'abandon (*tyāgānvaya*), le mérite qui résulte du seul fait d'abandonner; 2. mérite produit par la jouissance (*paribhogānvaya*), le mérite qui résulte de la jouissance, par la personne qui reçoit, de l'objet donné." English translation: "Merit of a gift is twofold: 1. merit produced by giving (*tyāgānvaya*), i.e., the merit that results merely from the fact of giving; 2. merit produced by utilization (*paribhogānvaya*), i.e., the merit that results from the utilization by the person who has received the thing given." It is likewise discussed by Buddhaghosa in *Visuddhimagga* (RHYS DAVIDS, 1920-1921:43). Further, the terms are involved in a discussion in Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatarapañjikā* (D3872.215$a_{1\text{-}5}$).

[398] Cf. *Chung lun* (T1564.21c_{20}-22a_2; transl. by BOCKING, 1995:259), where an example of giving is used for *puṇya* and an example of shooting someone with an arrow is used for *apuṇya*.

[399] As a further example may be mentioned the discussion on *puṇya* found in AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1971:747; transl. by LVP, 1924:244), where it is said that a gift given to a *caitya* or the meditation on friendliness entail *tyāgānvayapuṇya*, since they are given, but not *paribhogān-vayapuṇya*, since no one receives them.

of the receiver of the object of that action.[400]

Like Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka, Candrakīrti then glosses the word 'issue' (*anvaya*) with 'succession' (*anugama*) and elucidates its meaning by saying that an accumulation of wholesome action (*kuśalopacaya*) is born in the mental series of the giver (*dāyakasantānaja*). The word 'issue' thus means that the *paribhogānvayapuṇya* follows or succeeds from the utilization or consummation of the gift. It does not follow merely from giving the gift. The *puṇya* constitutes an accumulation of wholesome action (*kuśalopacaya*) on the part of the giver. The consequence of this view is that the concept of *puṇya* becomes a fluid concept in that its amount does not remain fixed. A certain amount of *puṇya* is generated by the intimation of giving, but the amount of *puṇya* (or perhaps as a separate *puṇya*) may accumulate when there is utility of the gift.[401] Hence, there is the distinction between *puṇya* derived from giving and *puṇya* derived from utilization.

This fluid *puṇya*-concept, however, was not accepted by all Buddhist schools (BAREAU, 1955:107, 109, 122, 124). Thus, in *Kathāvatthu* (VII.5, TAYLOR, 1897:343; transl. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:200-203), it is discussed whether *puṇya* related to utilization increases (*paribhogamayaṃ puññaṃ vaḍḍhati*). The *Theravādins* rejected this view, while according to the commentary (JAYAWICKRAMA, 1979:97) the *Rājagirikas, Siddhattikas* and *Sammitiyas* accepted this view. The view is also admitted in AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1971:584-585; transl. LVP, 1924:20) with reference to earlier sources, which, however, have not been identified (PĀSĀDIKA, 1989:75). Thus, the mention of *paribhogānvayapuṇya* in Mmk's list of the seven-fold action may indicate a *Saṃmatīya*-association of the list, but again such an identification rests on a relatively late witness, i.e., *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā* attributed to Buddhaghosa (circa 370-450 CE; cf. HINÜBER, 2000:§207, pp. 102-103).

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[400] This explanation of mine does not agree with the explanation found in Avalokitavrata's *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.24a_6-24b_5), where *paribhogānvaya-puṇya* is explained as just another kind of *avijñapti*. Likewise, in Candrakīrti's **Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa* (D3866.242b_7-243a_2 ; LINDTNER, 1979:101$_{13\text{-}22}$) *paribhogānvayam puṇya* and *apuṇ-ya* are also explained in the section presenting *avijñapti*.

[401] Such a view of *puṇya* illustrates another shade of meaning in that *puṇya* sometimes is not really the action itself but perhaps a kind of 'beneficial stuff' generated by a wholesome action; this is again related to the Vedic view of *puṇya;* cf. fn. 384 and 394 above.

(V310$_2$): ***"And non-beneficence of a similar kind" (apuṇyañ ca tathāvidham)*** [also] means (*arthaḥ*) 'issue of utilization' (*paribhogānvayam iti*). For example (*tadyathā*), the erection of a temple or the like (*deva-kulādipratiṣṭhā-panam*), wherein (*yatra*) sentient beings (*sattvāḥ*) are killed (*hanyante*); for (*hi*) to the extent (*yathā yathā*) that living beings (*prāṇinaḥ*) are killed (*hanyante*) in a memorial [temple built in the name of] someone (*tatkīrttau*), to that extent (*tathā tathā*) non-beneficence (*apuṇyam*) that is an issue of utilization (*paribhogānvayam*) is generated (*upa-jāyate*) in the series (*santāne*) of the makers of that [memorial] (*tatkarttṝṇām*) due to the use of their temple and so forth (*taddevakulādyupabhogāt*). Thus (*ity evam*), there is (*bhavati*) [root-text] "and non-beneficence of a similar kind (*apuṇyañ ca tathāvidham*)."

The sixth element in the list of seven-fold action is non-beneficence (*apuṇ-ya*), which is said to be of a similar kind, i.e., also an issue of utilization (*paribhogānvaya*).[402] *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:222) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:511; T1566. 99c$_{8-11}$) hardly explain this point. Candrakīrti, on the other hand, provides an illustration, namely the erection of a temple for animal-sacrifice.[403] Someone has such a temple built as a memorial (*kīrtti*) for himself or his family.[404] This

[402] This explanation of *tathāvidham* from the root-text is found in all the commentaries from *Akutobhayā* onwards, except *Chung lun.*

[403] In **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (D3866.243a$_1$; LINDTNER, 1979:101$_{20}$), Candrakīrti specifically mentions the construction of a temple for the goddess *Durga* as an example of this type of *apuṇya.* This could perhaps fit well with SCHERRER-SCHAUB's assertion that Candrakīrti was born in the Bengal (SCHERRER-SCHAUB, 1991:xxxi-xxxii), where *Durga*-worship at least nowadays is widespread.

[404] As indicated by DE JONG (1978b:220), VOGEL (1906) has shown the meaning of the words *kīrti* (or *kīrtti*) and *kīrtana* in such contexts to be 'a memorial'. VOGEL (1906) refers to a private communication from BHANDAKAR, who has given the meaning of *kīrti* as 'a temple' or "any work of public utility calculated to render famous the name of the constructor of it" (op.cit.:345). According to VOGEL (op.cit.), this would correspond to the basic meaning of *kṝt* 'to mention, commemorate, praise'. *Kīrti* must thus be derived from the roots *kar* or *kṛ* 'making mention of', homonymous but not synonymous with the root *kṛ* 'to do'. From the

action would constitute an intimation (and probably also involve a non-intimation from the time at which the founder decides to build the temple and then orders his workers to carry out the construction). It is not quite clear whether Candrakīrti would consider the intimations and non-intimations involved in constructing the temple to be beneficence or non-beneficence, but they would presumably be considered non-beneficence given the intention to use the temple for animal-sacrifice. Once the memorial temple is put to use and animals are sacrificed therein, non-beneficence is continuously produced for the persons, who originally caused this temple to be erected (as a memorial for them), to the extent to which animals are being slaughtered therein (the killing as such constitutes unwholesome intimations on behalf of the priests and their assistants). Thus, there is a successive production of non-beneficence for the temple-founders, even after constructing the temple, due to the unwholesome utilization of that temple and no matter whether or not the founders participate in the ceremonies (or, for that matter, are still alive). The mention of the word *memorial* (*kīrtti*) in this context probably only serves to underline the illustration that there remains some sort of relationship between the temple and its founders. It must be presumed that Candrakīrti would still consider the erection of the temple for animal-sacrifice to entail non-beneficence for the founders of the temple, even if the temple had not specifically been declared as a memorial for its founders.

(V311$_1$): ***"And (ca) intention (cetanā)"*** [is] characterised as a mental action, which conditions the mind (*cittābhisaṃskāramanaskarmalakṣaṇā*).

In brief (*saṃkṣepeṇa*), this (*etat*) action (*karma*) is (*bhavati*) sevenfold (*saptavidham*): (1) wholesome and unwholesome (*kuśalākuśalā*) speech (*vāc*), (2) {wholesome and unwholesome (*kuśalākuśalaḥ*)} motion (*viṣpandaḥ*), (3) wholesome action (*kuśalam*) characterised as non-intimation (*avijñaptilakṣaṇam*), (4) unwholesome action (*akuśa-*

latter root one also finds the word *kṛti* 'creation, work', which could also be related to *kīrti* as 'memorial'. For references to inscriptions attesting this use of *kīrti*, cf. VOGEL (op.cit.).

lam) characterised as non-intimation (*avijñaptilakṣaṇam*), (5) beneficence (*puṇyam*) that is an issue of utilization (*paribhogānvayam*), (6) non-beneficence (*apuṇyam*) that is an issue of utilization (*paribhogānvayam*), and (7) intention (*cetanā ceti*).

And (ca) ***"these (ete) seven (sapta) phenomena (dharmāḥ) are taught (smṛtāḥ) as having action as their mark (karmāñjanāḥ),"*** [i.e.,] distinct (*abhivyaktāḥ*) by being actions (*karmatvena*), having action as their characteristic (*karmalakṣaṇāḥ*).

The seventh aspect of the sevenfold action is intention (*cetanā*), which was already explained above (cf. the exegesis to Mmk 17.2 above). Candrakīrti here explains *cetanā* as 'that which conditions the mind' (*cittābhisaṃskāra*), a gloss also found in *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405-406), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:222) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986: 511; T1566.99$c_{11\text{-}13}$).[405] *Cetanā* is also characterised as mental action (*°manaskarmalakṣaṇā*), a gloss which Candrakīrti probably adopts from *Prajñāpradīpa* (ibid.).[406]

Having summed up the sevenfold action in the form of a list, the final line of the root-verse (Mmk 17.5) is quoted saying that these seven phenomena are taught as being marked by action (*karmāñjanāḥ*). The use of the word *añjana* in the verse is unusual, and LAMOTTE (1936:269), therefore, emends it to *vyañjana* in his translation probably based on the Tibetan translation (*las su mṅon pa*), and translates it with *des modes d'acte*. It is, of course, possible that *vyañjana* was shortened to *añjana* in the verse *metri causa*.

The general meaning of *añjana* is 'ointment', 'pigment' or

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[405] The gloss *cittābhisaṃskāra* for *cetanā* is a standard explanation also occurring, for example, in AKBh and *Abhidharmasamuccaya;* cf. fn. 339 above. In Avalokitavrata's *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III25$a_{5\text{-}6}$), intention is explained as *abhisaṃskāra* in the sense that it conditions the mind (*citta*) to assume a positive nature (*raṅ bźin*) of being without covetousness, ill will and wrong views or a negative nature of having covetousness, ill will and wrong views.

[406] For intention explained as mental action, cf. Mmk 17.3 and commentary above.

'collyrium'.[407] However, the verbal-root *añj* can also carry the meaning 'to make clear, show, represent, characterise or manifest' (cf. APTE, 1890:34), which is attested in Mmk 9.5-6 (Pras 194; DE JONG, 1977:13; transl. by MAY, 1959:160-161) and Mmk 25.16 (Pras 533; DE JONG, 1977:39). Thus, as a noun it would here mean 'that, which marks, represents, characterises' or simply 'mark, characteristic, trait, manifestation'.[408] The word *liṅga* 'mark, characteristic, sexual attributes' is explained as meaning *vyañjana* in AKBh when discussing the various male and female forms of the words for monk, nun, etc.[409] Candrakīrti explains the compound *karmāñjana* as meaning 'distinct (*abhivyakta*) by being actions (*karmetvena*)'. He thus glosses *añjana* with *abhivyakta* 'distinct, manifest' and indicates that the compound is an instrumental *tadpuruṣa* , which thus should be interpreted as 'characterised by action' or if *vyañjana* is taken as a noun then 'having action as its mark' rather than to interpret it as a genitive *tadpuruṣa* meaning 'the manifestations of action'.

As a further gloss, Candrakīrti says that they are 'having action as their characteristic' (*karmalakṣaṇa*), a gloss he adopts from Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* or *Prajñāpradīpa*. Here *añjana* is equated with *lakṣaṇa*, which is also how *karmāñjana* has been translated in both the Chinese translations of Mmk (*yeh-hsiang* 業相). Although the meaning of *añjana* is clear so far, it

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[407] For a discussion of *añjana* as collyrium in *Vinaya*, cf. ZYSK (1998:88-90).

[408] Cf. here also Candrakīrti's use of the word *nirañjana* at Pras 286_1: yaś ca anupādāno nirañjano 'vyakto nirhetukaḥ kaḥ sa na kaś cit saḥ| nāsty eva sa ity arthaḥ|. Transl. by SCHAYER (1931b:92): "[Ein solcher *ātman*], welcher frei von dem *upādāna* ist, welcher sich in der Sphäre der empirischen Wirklichkeit gar nicht manifestiert (*nirañjana*), welcher also individuelle Existenz nicht in Erscheinung tritt (*avyakta*) und ohne Ursache ist, wer ist er? – Ein Niemand! Er existiert überhaupt nicht, das ist der Sinn." English translation: "[Such an *ātman*], which is free of the *upādāna,* which does not at all manifest itself (*nirañjana*) in the sphere of the empirical reality, which thus does let its individual existence appear (*avyakta*) and which is without cause, who is it? - No one! It does not at all exist, that is the meaning." SCHAYER (ibid., fn. 61) notes: "*nirañjana* = ohne *nimitta* = ohne *lakṣaṇa* = ohne empirische Funktion." English translation: "*nirañjana* = without *nimitta* = without *lakṣana* = without empirical function."

[409] AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1971:606): liṅgam iti vyañjanasyākhyā. Transl.: "*Liṅga* is a name for *vyañjana.*" The normal grammatical use of *vyañjana* as 'consonant' or even more broadly 'diacritical sign' could perhaps be related to this sense of *añj.* For *vyañjana* in the sense of 'phoneme', cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1970:271): vyañjanakāyas tadyathā – ka, kha, ga, gha, ṅety evam ādi|. For *vyañjana* in the sense of 'diacritical sign' (including vowels), cf. VERHAGEN (2000:5ff.).

remains unknown why Nāgārjuna chose to use the expression *karmāñjana* to characterise this sevenfold division of action.[410]

So ends the brief presentation of *karmaphala* in Mmk 17.1-5. As noted above, these verses could be seen as belonging to the interlocutor's objection raised at the beginning of this chapter. Candrakīrti, however, does not mark the text at this point with an *iti* or the like to indicate the end of the *pūrvapakṣa.* In *Akutobhayā* and *Chung lun,* one also does not find any explicit mention of the end of the interlocutor's speech at this point, but Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka clearly indicate this to be the case. Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:223) remarks that because these seven kinds of action are connected with a result, *saṃsāra* is justifiable and the faults of eternality and cutting off are not incurred. In this manner, he refers back to the interlocutor's position outlined at the beginning of the chapter. Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:512) formulates the same idea in a slightly longer passage, which in *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.25b$_{4\text{-}5}$) explicitly is stated to constitute the concluding summary of the interlocutor's argument.

3.3 A Critique of Karmaphalasaṃbandha

Having completed the compact overview of *karmaphala* presented in Mmk 17.1-5, the text now turns to a debate on the connection between action and result (*karmaphalasaṃbandha*), which is the topic of the rest of the chapter.

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[410] Given the similarity of the words *añjana* 'mark' and *cihna* 'mark', it could perhaps be conjectured that Nāgārjuna's use of *karmāñjana* is somehow related to the 'result-mark' (*phalacihnabhūta*) said by some to exist as a non-concomitant phenomenon in the mind-series, apparently functioning as a *karmaphalasaṃbandha;* cf. AKBh (ŚASTRI, 1970:345): anye punar āhuḥ - phalacihnabhūtaḥ sattvānāṃ santatau cittaviprayuktaḥ saṃskāraviśeṣo 'sti, yaṃ vyavalokya bhagavān āgataṃ jānāty asammukhī-kṛtvāpi dhyānam abhijñāṃ ceti; transl. by LVP (1923:304): "D'après d'autres maîtres, il y a dans la séries des êtres certain *dharma* qui est l'indice (*cihna=liṅga*) des fruit qui naîtront dans l'avenir, à savoir certain *saṃskāra* dissocié de la pensée. Bhagavat le contemple et il connaît les fruits futurs, sans qu'il doive pour cela pratiquer les *dhyānas* et les *abhijñās.*" English translation: "According to other masters, there is in the continua of beings a certain *dharma,* which is the indication (*cihna= liṅga*) of the result that will come into being in the future, viz. a certain *saṃskāra* non-associated with the mind. The Bhagavat comtemplates it and knows the future results without having to practice the *dhyānas* and the *abhijñās.*" For further references, cf. LVP (ibid. fn. 2) and LAMOTTE (1936:230, fn. 57). LAMOTTE (ibid.) suggests that this phenomenon might be a form of the *avipraṇāśa* postulated by the *Sāṃmatīyas,* which is to be discussed below.

An objection is first raised in the form of a question concerning how it may be possible for the action to be connected with its future result.

(V311$_6$): Here (*atra*) some (*eke*) object (*paricodayanti*): This (*etat*) action (*karma*), which (*yat*) was explained (*uktam*) to be of many kinds (*bahuvidham*), does it (*tat kim*) remain (*avatiṣṭhate*) until the time of the ripening (*āvipākakālam*) or (*atha*) does [it] not (*na*) remain (*tiṣṭhati*) due to perishing right after arising (*utpattyanantaravināśitvāt*)?

> ***"If** (yadi...cet)*," in the first case (*tāvat*), ***"the action (karmma) remains (tiṣṭhati) until the time of ripening (ā pākakālāt), it (tat) would continue (iyāt) eternally (nityatām). If (cet) [it has] ceased (niruddham), [then,] having (sat) ceased (niruddham), how (kim) could [it] produce (janayiṣyati) the result (phalam)?"*** (Mmk 17.6)

Candrakīrti introduces Mmk 17.6 as an objection raised by some unnamed scholars (*eke*). While all the commentaries introduce the verse as an objection, none of the texts identify by whom this objection is raised. In *Akutobhayā*, Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:512; T1566. 99c$_{18}$), the objection is introduced with the verb *ucyate* (*bśad pa*), thus indicating that this passage is not spoken by the interlocutor.[411] Conversely, this would indicate that the verse is to be interpreted as spoken by the *Mādhyamika*. This is also confirmed by Avalokitavrata (D3859.III.28b$_7$), who explains this objection to be raised by the author of the *[Madhyamaka]vṛtti* (**vṛttikāra, 'grel pa byed pa*), thereby either indicating Nāgārjuna or Bhāvaviveka. As suggested above (p. 179), verses Mmk 17.1-5 could be interpreted as spoken by the same *santāna*-proponent, who below is going to present his view in verses Mmk 17.7-11. If that is accepted, this proponent is here interrupted by an unnamed opponent (perhaps a *mādhyamika*), who

[411] Cf. discussion of the verbs *āha* and *ucyate* above, p. 164.

questions the fundamental logic of the *karmaphala*-notion.

Candrakīrti presents the objection in the form of a question concerning the functioning of *karmaphala* in time. Two options are given: either the action would remain until it produces its result, or – being transitory – would cease right after having appeared.[412] Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:267; T1566.99c$_{18-21}$) presents the same option, but in the form of a statement and not in the form of a question, whereas Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:223) jumps straight to the conclusion by stating that since action entails the faults of eternality and cutting off, a connection between action and result is not justifiable.

Having thus introduced the objection, the verse (Mmk 17.6) expresses the two options in the form of a consequence (*prasaṅga*) and a rhetorical question. The first option is that the action remains until the time when it produces its result. This carries the consequence (*prasaṅga*) that the action would continue forever and thus would be eternal. The second option is that the action stops or ceases immediately after having been performed and thus would be impermanent. In that case, the action has ceased and no longer remains at the time when its result is supposed to be produced. Hence, the rhetorical question is asked: if the action has ceased, how could it then produce the result?

Clearly, neither of these options is viable. The relationship between action and result is a causal relationship. For two phenomena to interact in a causal relationship, they must be present at the same time in the sense that the cause must exist immediately before the result, i.e., in two moments following immediately upon each other. This principle may be illustrated with a quotation from the *Śālistambasūtra* (transl. by SCHOENING, 1995:285):

> How is [external dependent arising] not eternalism? Because the sprout is one thing and the seed is another, precisely that which is the sprout is not the seed. After the seed has ceased, the sprout does not arise; when [the seed] has not ceased, [the sprout] does not arise, but at the precise time the seed ceases, the sprout arises. Thus, [ex-

[412] A position that the mind (though not explicitly action) perishes right after arising was admitted by the interlocutor already at the beginning of this chapter; cf. Pras 302$_6$, transl. and commentary above on p. 170.

ternal dependent arising] is not eternalism.

How is [it] not annihilation? The sprout is not born from a seed that has already ceased, nor is [the sprout] born from [a seed] that has not ceased. However, at the precise time the seed ceases, the sprout arises in the manner of the high and low [ends] of a balance beam. Therefore, [external dependent arising] is not annihiliation.[413]

The causal relationship between a seed and a sprout is here compared to the movement of the balance beam of a scale (*tulādaṇḍa*): as there is upward movement (*unnāma*) of the beam's one end, there is downward movement (*avanāma*) of its other end; likewise, as the result comes into existence, the cause simultaneously disappears. Such a model for causality functions only when the cause exists immediately before the result and thus ceases to exist simultaneously with the coming into existence of the result. However, in the case of action and result, the action, which is the cause, is separated from its result by a long time span, possibly even an extremely long time (cf. fn. 233). Therefore, the problem is here raised how it can be possible to unite the causality of the action and the result with the duration of time involved in the process of transmigration (*saṃsaraṇa*).

(V311$_{10}$): If (*yadi*) it is thought (*parikalpyate*) that (*iti*) ***"the action (karma)"*** having (*sat*) arisen (*utpannam*) ***"remains (avatiṣṭhate) until the time of the ripening (āvipākakālam)"*** by its own-nature (*svarūpeṇa*), [then] ***"eternality (nityatā)"*** thereof (*asya*) would result (*āpadyate*) throughout the time

[413] The Sanskrit text of this passage from the *Śālistambasūtra* is partly quoted in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* and *Madhyamakaśālistamba* (SCHOENING, 1995:706): kathaṃ na śāśvatata iti? yasmād anyo 'ṅkuro 'nyad bījam, na ca yad eva bījaṃ sa evāṅkuraḥ| atha vā punaḥ - bījaṃ nirudhyate, aṅkuraś cotpadyate| ato na śāśvatataḥ| kathaṃ nocchedataḥ? na ca pūrvaniruddhād bījād aṅkuro niṣpadyate, nāpy aniruddhād bījāt, api ca, bījaṃ ca nirudhyate, tasminn eva samaye 'ṅkura utpadyate, tulādaṇḍonnāmāvanāmavat| ato nocchedataḥ|. For the Tibetan transla-tion, cf. SCHOENING (1995:405). The passage continues with discussing three other aspects of the causal relationship: that it is not transmigration (*na saṃkrāntitaḥ*), that a great result is produced from a small cause (*parīttahetuto vipulaphalābhi-nirvṛttitaḥ*) and that there is a continuity in that there is similarity in kind between the cause and the result (*tatsadṛśānuprabandhataḥ*).

(*kālam*) ***"it (tad) continues (iyantam),"*** because it is devoid of perishing (*vināśarahitatvāt*).

All the commentaries comment on the verse by expressing its idea in prose-form. The first *pāda* presents the first option, namely that the action remains until the time of its ripening. Candrakīrti gives this option in the form of a hypothetical thought: "if it is thought that the action having arisen remains until the time of the ripening due to its own-nature." Obviously, intimation is only seen to exist for the brief moment in which it is being performed. Nevertheless, if the theory of *karmaphala* is accepted, the action is somehow required to exist as a cause for its result at a much later time. Hence, it may be necessary to posit that the action itself continues to exist as a causal entity, although no longer perceptible, as the causal relationship requires the simultaneous presence of the cause and effect, as illustrated above.

In principle, a view of this kind was formulated early in the history of Buddhism by the *Sarvāstivādins* (later also referred to as *Vaibhāṣikas*), who segregated themselves from the *Sthavira*-tradition in ca. 244 or 243 BCE (BAREAU, 1955:131).[414] In order to account for causal relationships, such as the relationship found in perception and *karmaphala*, the *Sarvāsti-vādins* posited that all past, present and future phenomena coexist. A pheno-menon remains in existence throughout the three times without any change to its own-nature (*svarūpa*) or own-being (*svabhāva*).[415] This is also expres-sed by Candrakīrti, who says above that the action remains due to its own-nature

[414] For a general overview of the history and theses of the *Sarvāstivādins*, cf. BAREAU (1955:131-152). For a study of the *Sarvāstivāda*-thesis that past, present and future phenomena exist simultaneously as presented in *Vijñānakāya*, cf. LVP (1925b). For a study of this thesis according to two later *Sarvāstivāda*-sources, viz. *Mahāvibhāṣā* (T1545.27.393a$_{9}$-396b$_{23}$) and **Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (T1562.29.621c$_{5}$-636b$_{16}$), cf. LVP (1937) and COX (1995:134-158). LVP (1937) provides further references to primary and secondary literature. For a summary of their theses as presented in AKBh, cf. SANDERSON (1994).

[415] *Svabhāva* thus constitutes the enduring nature of a phenomenon. It is identified with the phenomenon's own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*); cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1972:602; transl. LVP, 1925:159): svabhāva evaiṣāṃ svalakṣaṇam |. For example, the *svalakṣaṇa* of earth is support (*dhṛti*), the *svalakṣaṇa* of water is cohesion (*saṃgraha*), etc. (AKBh, ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:42; transl. LVP, 1923:22). Other partial synonyms for *svabhāva* (*tzu-hsing* 自性) attested in **Mahāvibhāṣā* (T1545. 27.393c$_{5-6}$, transl. LVP, 1937:11) are **ātman* (*wo* 我), **dravya* (*wu* 物), **svarūpa* (*tzu-t'i* 自體), **ālambana* (*hsiang-fen* 相分); LVP (1937:130) further lists *vastu, artha, ātmabhāva, ātmalābha* and *mūlabhāva* as other synonyms.

(*svarūpa*). As a phenomenon passes through time, it merely changes in its mode of existence (*bhāva*).[416] What distinguishes whether the pheno-menon is future, present or past may be explained by whether or not it performs its own particular operation (*kāritra*). Thus, when not performing its operation, a phenomenon is called 'future' (*anāgata*); when performing it, it is called 'present' (*pratyutpanna*); and when having ceased to perform it, it is called 'past' (*atīta*).[417]

When a present action is performed, it triggers off (*ākṣepa*) its future result, which thus comes into existence as a future entity.[418] When the result ripens, the action still exists as a past entity acting as the condition for the ripening of the result.[419] Therefore, the action may function as the direct

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416 Regarding the distinction between *bhāva* and *svabhāva*, cf. LVP (1937:132).

417 Cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1972:808; transl. LVP, 1925:55): yadā sa dharmaḥ kāritraṃ na karoti tadā anāgataḥ| yadā karoti tadā pratyutpannaḥ| yadā kṛtvā niruddhas tadā atīta iti| parigatam etat sarvam|. This explanation is attributed to Vasumitra (AKBh, ŚĀSTRĪ, 1972:806-807; transl. LVP, 1925:53-54). Cf. also **Mahāvibhāṣā* (T1545.27.393$c_{15\text{-}27}$; transl. LVP, 1937:12). Three other models of explaining the three times proposed by Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣaka and Buddhadeva are also mentioned in the *Sarvāstivāda*-sources; cf. **Mahāvibhāṣā* (T1545.27.396a_{13}-396b_{23}; transl. LVP, 1937:22-25), AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1972:805-807; transl. LVP, 1925:53-55) and **Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (T1562.29.631a_{12}-631c_1; transl. LVP, 1937:89-94).

418 Cf. *Mahāvibhāṣā* (T1545.27.393c_{27}-394a_2): 答彼雖無有見等作用。而決定有取果作用。是未來法同類因故諸有爲法在現在時皆能爲因取等流果。此取果用遍現在法無雜亂故。依之建立過去未來現在差別. Transl. by LVP (1937:12-13): "Cette activité lui manque; mais ne lui manque pas l'activité qui consiste à "prendre un fruit" (ou à projeter, *ākṣepa, grahaṇa*, Kośa, ii, p. 293), car il est "cause semblable" de *dharmas* futurs (*sabhāgahetu*, ii, p. 255); les conditionnés, résidant le présent, sont tous "cause qui prend un fruit d'écoulement" (*niṣyandaphala*, ii. p. 289). Cette activité de "prendre le fruit" s'étendant à tous les "presents", pour éviter la confusion des époques, c'est de ce point de vue qu'on établit la distinction des passé, présent et futur." English transl.: "It is without this activity, but it is not without the activity that consists in "taking a fruit" (or to project it, *ākṣepa, grahaṇa,* Kośa, ii, p. 293), because it is the "similar cause" for the future *dharmas* (*sabhāgahetu,* ii. p. 255); the conditioned, residing in the present, are all "causes that take a fruit of flow" (*niṣyandaphala,* ii. p. 289). This activity of "taking the fruit" extends itself to all present [phenomena], in order to avoid confusion of the times, [and] it is from this point of view that one establishes the distinction between past, present and future." Cf. also fn. 232 above.

419 Cf. **Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (T1562.29.629a_{26}-629b_2): 又已謝業有當果故。謂先所造善不善業。待緣招當愛非愛果。思擇業處已廣成立。非業無間異熟果生。非當果生時異熟因。現在若過去法其體已無。則應無因有果生義。或應彼果畢竟不生。由此應知過去實有; transl. by LVP (1937:77): "Le passé-futur existe, parce que l'acte passé a un fruit futur (*phalāt*). L'acte bon ou mauvais fait antérieurement, en dépendance des conditions nécessaires, produit un fruit agréable ou désagréable, ainsi que nous l'avons exposé en traitant de l'acte. – Or le fruit de rétribution na naît pas immédiatement après l'acte et, lorsque naît le futur fruit, la cause de rétribution n'est plus actuelle. Si le *dharma* passé

cause for its result and the *Sarvāstivādins* thus have no need for positing a third phenomenon to function as the connection (*saṃbandha*) between the action and its result.[420]

Candrakīrti thus explains the first option to be that the action remains due to its own-nature (*svarūpa*), although without making any explicit reference to the *Sarvāstivāda*-theory. This option can simply be seen as one logical alternative rather than a reference by Nāgārjuna to a concrete theory. Candrakīrti then explains the consequence (*prasaṅga*) of this view, namely that the action by remaining would be eternal (*nityatā*), because it is devoid of perishing (*vināśa*) for the time it remains. In this *prasaṅga*, the property of the proposition (*pakṣadharma*) is that the action is devoid of perishing. The premise (*anvayavyāpti*) is: what is eternal, that is devoid of perishing for as long as it remains. The counter-premise (*vyatirekavyāpti*) is:

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n'existe plus en réalité, il faut que le fruit naisse sans cause ou ne naisse absolument pas. Par conséquent le passé existe réellement." English transl.: "The past-future exists, because a past action has a future fruit (*phalāt*). A good or bad action done earlier, produces in dependance on the required conditions a pleasant or unpleasant fruit, just as we have shown it when explaining action. – But the resulting fruit does not come into existence right after the action, and when the future fruit comes into existence the cause of the result is no longer present. If a past *dharma* no longer exists in reality, it would be necessary for the fruit to come into existence without a cause or not to come into existence at all. Therefore, the past really exists."

[420] Concerning the *Sarvastivāda*-entity termed 'possession' (*prāpti*), which ensures the relation between doer of the action (*kartṛ*) and its future result, cf. COX (1995:79-105, 185-228). It must be underlined that *prāpti* is not directly related to the problem of *karmaphalasaṃbandha* but to the problem of 'substratum' (*āśraya*, cf. below); cf. SCHMITHAUSEN (1986:229-230, footnotes 136-137). Nevertheless, Candrakīrti (MavBh, D3862.260a$_3$; LVP, 1907-1912:126) mentions **prāpti* (*thob pa*) in a list of various types of *karmaphalasaṃbandha*. Concerning this *prāpti*, while it constitutes no problem for the *Sarvāstivādins* to account for the causal relationship between the action and the result, their theory does entail a problem with accoun-ting for how the action as a present and past entity and the result as a future and present entity remain related to the person, who performs the action and later experiences its result. The relationships between action (*karman*) and doer (*kartṛ*) and again between result (*phala*) and consumer (*bhoktṛ*) do not constitute causal relationships but relationships of possession. The doer possesses the act, which he has committed, and likewise possesses the result, which he is going to experience. A possession-relation is more difficult to account for than a causal relation, and the *Sarvāstivādins* had to posit a separate entity, viz. the so-called 'possession' (*prāpti*), in order to explain this relation. A *prāpti* is a separate entity that constitutes the relation between a thing and its owner, such as an action and its doer. The *prāpti*-entity, however, has no real importance in terms of explaining the causal relationship between action and result as posited by the *Sarvāstivādins* and therefore does not need to be considered further here.

what is not devoid of perishing for as long as it remains, that is not eternal. The premise and counter-premise would be acceptable to Candrakīrti, whereas the property of the proposition is clearly only acceptable to the opponent holding the view that the action remains.[421] Thus, the undesirable consequence of the view that the action remains in order to act as the direct cause for its result is that the action becomes eternal, which gives rise to further negative consequences to be explained below.[422]

(V311$_{11}$): If (*cet*) it is thought that (*iti*) there is no (*na*) eternality (*nityatvam*), because there later (*paścāt*) is

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[421] Cf. e.g., **Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (T1562.29.632a$_{7\text{-}8}$): 以體雖同而性類別. Transl. by LVP (1937:97): "La nature propre est constante, mais les manières d'être (*sing-lei* 性類) sont différentes." English transl.: "The own-nature is constant, but its modes of being are different." Also, cf. **Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (T1562.29.632c$_{20\text{-}25}$): 我宗亦爾法體雖住而遇別緣。或法爾力於法體上差別用起本無今有有已還無。法體如前自相恒住。此於理教有何相違。前已辯成體相無異。諸法性類非無差別。體相性類非異非一。故有爲法自相恒存。而勝功能有起有息. Transl. by LVP (1937:103-104): "De même dans ma doctrine: la nature proper du *dharma* dure (*tiṣṭhati*); cependant, soit par la rencontre de conditions différentes, soit par la force de la nature des choses, « sur » cette nature propre se produit une activité spécifica-trice qui d'abord n'existe pas, ensuite existe, retourne enfin à la non-existence après avoir existé; cependant que la nature propre reste, comme devant, immuable en son caractère propre. – Rien, dans cette théorie, qui contredise l'Écriture ou la raison. Nous avons ci-dessus établi que le caractère de la nature propre (*t'i-siang* 體相) ne subit pas de modification; que la manière d'être (*bhāva, sing-lei* 性類) du *dharma* n'est pas sans différenciations; que le caractère de la nature propre et la manière d'être ne sont ni différents ni identiques (*eka, anya*). Le caractère propre des conditionnés est permanent, mais le pouvoir éminent [qu'on nomme activité] a commencement et fin." English transl.: "Similarly in my doctrine: a *dharma's* own-nature remains (*tiṣṭhati*); however, either by encountering different conditions or by force of the nature of things, 'above' this own-nature a specific activity takes place, which did not exist before, then exists and in the end returns to non-existence after having existed; nevertheless, the own-nature remains, as before, immutable in its own character. –Nothing in this theory contradicts scripture or reason. We established above that the character of the own-nature (*t'i-siang* 體相) does not undergo modification; that a *dharma's* mode of being (*bhāva, sing-lei* 性類) is not without differentiations; that the character of the own-being and the mode of being are neither different nor identical (*eka, anya*). The own character of what is conditioned is permanent, but the eminent capacity [that one calls activity] has a beginning and an end."

[422] Although the consequence of eternality may logically be implied by the *Sarvāstivāda*-view, the *Sarvāstivādin* does not accept this consequence and hence does not abandon his view. The consequence of eternality is thus rejected in **Mahāvibhāṣā* and **Nyāyānusāraśāstra* with reference to the change in the mode of existence (*bhāva*) due to the phenomenon's loss of performing its operation (cf. LVP, 1937:131-132).

perishing (*vināśasadbhāvāt*), [then] this is not (*naitat*) so (*evam*), because what earlier (*pūrvam*) has avoided perishing (*vināśarahitasya*), like space and so forth (*ākāśādivat*), does also (*api*) not have a connection (*sambandhābhāvāt*) with perishing (vināśena) later on (*paścāt*).

Moreover (*ca*), since what is devoid of perishing (*vināśarahitasya*) entails the consequence of unconditionality (*asaṃskṛtatvaprasaṅgāt*) and (*ca*) it would [thus] remain (*avasthānāt*) forever (*sadaiva*) without any ripening (*avipākatvena*) because ripening (*vipāka°*) of unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛtānām*) is not seen (*°adarśanāt*), [therefore] a full admission of the eternality (*nityatābhyupagama eva*) of actions (*karmaṇām*) follows (*āpadyate*). Thus (*ity evam*), in the first case (*tāvat*), [there is] the fault of eternality (*nityatvadoṣaḥ*).

While the earlier commentaries do not provide any further explanation for the first two lines of the verse, Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:512-513; T1566. $99c_{24}$-$100a_{7}$) and Candrakīrti contribute with further discussion of the logic of these lines. Candrakīrti does so in the form of presenting further consequences (*prasaṅga*), whereas Bhāvaviveka provides a series of independent reasonings (*svatantrānumāna*).

First Candrakīrti mentions a variant of the opponent's position: the action is not eternal, although it remains until the time of its ripening, because it perishes after having acted as the cause for its ripening. This view could possibly be identified with the *Vibhajyavādin*-position stating that only the present and certain past phenomena exist, namely those past actions, which have not yet brought about their results. Having generated its result, the past action perishes.[423] Bhāvaviveka presents a similar objection by the

[423] Cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1972:805; D4090.I.239b_{2-4}): ye hi sarvam astīti vadanti atītam anāgataṃ pratyutpannaṃ ca, te sarvāstivādāḥ| ye tu ke cid asti yat pratyutpannam adattaphalaṃ cātītaṃ karma, kiñ cin nāsti yad dattaphalam atītam anāgataṃ ceti vibhajya vandanti, te vibhajyavādinaḥ|. Transl. LVP (1925:52): "Le docteur qui affirme l'existence de tout, passé, présent, futur, est tenu pour *Sarvāstivādin*. Celui qui affirme l'existence du présent et d'une partie du passé, à savoir de l'acte qui n'a pas donné son fruit; et l'inexistence du futur et d'une

opponent, wherein the concept that the action ceases after having carried its fruit is compared to certain aquatic plants (**kalada, chu śiṅ*), reeds (**naḍa, 'dam bu*) and bamboo (**vaṃśa/*phalānta, smyig ma*) that die after having blossomed.[424]

Candrakīrti gives three arguments for rejecting such a notion. The first argument is: what earlier has avoided perishing would also later not have a connection with perishing. Stated more clearly: that, which earlier has avoided perishing, is permanent, because a connection with later perishing is not found; just like space (*ākāśa*) and so forth. In this case, the property of the proposition (*pakṣadharma*) would be: what earlier has avoided perishing, that does not have a connection with later perishing. The premise (*anvaya-vyāpti*) is: what is eternal, that does not have a connection with later perishing. The counter-premise (*vyatirekavyāpti*) is: what has a connection with later perishing, that is not eternal. While the premise and counter-premise here are easy to understand, the property of the proposition requires comprehension of its implicit logic. Bhāvaviveka (ibid.) devotes the rest of his commentary on these *pādas* to explain their logic. A thing may either be impermanent or permanent by nature. If impermanent by nature, it would naturally cease as soon as it arises, because it does not depend on any condition apart from itself for its perishing. If it is permanent by nature, it could not be destroyed even by an external cause of destruction later on, because it is permanent by nature.[425] Since conditioned phenomena are seen

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partie du passé, à savoir de l'acte qui a donné son fruit, il est tenu pour *Vibhajyavādin*." English transl.: "He who posits the existence of all past, present and future is considered a *Sarvāstivādin*. He who posits the existence of the present and a part of the past, namely of actions that have not yet produced their fruit, and posits the nonexistence of the future and a part of the past, namely of actions that have already produced their fruits, he is considered a *Vibhajyavādin*." In other words, the *Vibhajyavādin* position (lit. 'those who say that a portion [of phenomena of the three times exist]') is thus presented as a variant of the *Sarvāstivādin* position (lit. 'those who say that all phenomena [of the three times] exist'). For further information on the *Vibhajyavāda*, cf. BAREAU (1955:167-180). Cf. also *Kathāvatthu* I.8 (TAYLOR, 1894:151-155; transl. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:101-104).

[424] Exact botanical identification must remain unanswered here. Avalokitavrata (D3859.III.26b$_1$) explains that these are examples of plants that are 'uprooted' (*druṅs phyuṅ*) after having carried their fruit.

[425] As examples for such external causes of destruction, Avalokitavrata (D3859.III.27b$_4$) mentions snow or heat for a flower or the sun or a lamp for darkness. These cannot be causes of destruction, because they are different (**anya, gźan*) from that, which is to be destroyed (ibid.).

to perish, they must be their own cause of destruction, which means that they cease moment by moment.[426]

The example given for a phenomenon that perishes neither earlier nor later is space (*ākāśa*), which is one of the three unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛta*), according to *Sarvāstivāda*-doctrine.[427] A conditioned phenomenon (*saṃskṛta*), such as an action, is something that has been created by a combination of causes.[428] It has three general characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), with which any conditioned phenomenon is endowed: arising (*utpāda*), remaining (*sthiti*) and breaking (*bhaṅga*).[429] An unconditioned phenomenon,

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[426] Cf. Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:267-268). A similar argument is found in AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1971:572-573; transl. LVP, 1924:4-6). For a very concise explanation of this logic (however, in a much later Tibetan source), cf. chapter six entitled *'brel pa brtag pa'i rab tu byed pa* in *tshad ma rigs pa'i gter* by Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rGyal mtshan (1182-1253); in the edition from mi rigs dpe skrun khang, see pp. 146-159. For an elaborate study of the arguments of momentariness in the writings of Dharmakīrti, cf. OETKE (1993).

[427] Cf. AK 1.5c and AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1970:19; transl. LVP, 1923:7-8) and Candrakīrti's *Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa* (D3866.266b$_{3-4}$; LINDTNER, 1979:145).

[428] Cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1970:26): sametya sambhūya pratyayaiḥ kṛtvā iti saṃskṛtāḥ|. Transl. LVP (1923:11): "*Saṃskṛta*, conditionné, s'explique étymologi-quement: « qui a été fait (*kṛta*) par les causes en union et combinaison (*sametya, saṃbhūya*) »." English transl.: "*Saṃskṛta,* conditioned, is explained etymologically: *that which was made (kṛta) by causes that have united and come together* (*sametya, saṃbhūya*)."

[429] Cf. Pras 146$_{3-7}$: atrāha| vidyanta eva saṃskṛtasvabhāvāḥ skandhāyatanadhātava upādādisaṃskṛtalakṣaṇasadbhāvāt| uktaṃ hi bhagavatā trīṇīmāni bhikṣavaḥ saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni, saṃskṛtasya bhikṣava utpādo 'pi prajñāyate, vyayo 'pi sthityanyathātvam api, iti| na cāvidyamānasya kharaviṣāṇasyeva jātyādilakṣaṇam asti| tasmāt saṃskṛtalakṣaṇopadeśād vidyanta eva skandhāyatanadhātava iti||. Transl. by MAY (1959:106-107): "Objection: Les ensembles, les domaines de la connaissance et les éléments existent en eux-mêmes en tant que composés (*saṃ-skṛtasvabhāvāḥ*), parce que les caractères de composé, production, etc., existent réellement. Le Bienheureux dit en effet: « Voici, ô moines, les trois caractères du composé, [qui sont eux-mêmes des] composés: on discerne au composé une production, ô moines, une disparition, et une hétérogénéité dans la durée ». Or, un inexistant, la corne d'un âne par exemple, ne peut présenter les caractères de naissance, etc. Par conséquent, puisque les caractères de composé sont ensignés, les ensembles, les domaines de la connaissance et les éléments existent." English transl.: "Objection: The aggregates, the domains of perceptions and the elements do exist with a nature of being conditioned (*saṃskṛ-tasvabhāvāḥ*), because the characteristics of being conditioned, such as being compounded, truly exist. For it was stated by the Bhagavān: "These, oh monks, are the threefold characteristics of being conditioned [which in themselves are] conditioned: one discerns in the conditioned a coming into existence, oh mnks, a disappearence and a heterogeneity in its duration." The nonexistent, such as the horn of an ass, cannot, however, display the characte-ristics of being born, etc. Therefore, in as much as the characteristics of being conditioned are found, the aggregates, the domains of perception and the elements do exist."

such as space, does not have any of these characteristics; it neither arises at a certain time nor breaks at a later time, and therefore also does not remain. A conditioned phenomenon, on the other hand, possesses all three characteristics at the very moment it arises; it is not possible that it could first arise without remaining and breaking, then remain for some time without breaking, and finally break after some time.[430] Therefore, if the action would remain until the time of its ripening, it would be unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) and eternal by nature. This is the second consequence (*prasaṅga*) raised by Candrakīrti.

The third consequence is that if the action would be unconditioned and eternal, it would be unable to produce any result, because only conditioned phenomena can perform an operation.[431] An operation (*kriyā*), such as producing a result, necessarily involves change, since a distinction can be drawn between before and after the result is produced. As an unconditioned phenomenon is eternal and unchanging, it cannot perform an operation.[432]

Finally, Candrakīrti sums up his list of consequences by stating that the view that the action remains until the time of its ripening in order to act as its cause necessarily leads to an admission of the action being eternal in the sense that it must remain forever without producing any ripening at all.

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[430] Cf. Pras $146_{9\text{-}10}$: tatra vyastā lakṣaṇakarmaṇi na yujyante| |yady utpādakāle sthitibhaṅgau na syātāṃ, tadā sthitibhaṅgarahitasyākāśasyeva saṃskṛtalakṣaṇatvenānupapadya evotpādaḥ|. Transl. by MAY (1959:108): "Séparés, ils sont impro-pres à la caractérisation. Si la durée et la destruction n'existaient pas au moment de la production, celle-ci, en tant que caractérisant comme composée une [entité] dépourvue de durée et de destruction, pareille à l'espace, serait irrationnelle." English transl.: "Taken separately, they are not suitable as characteristics. If duration and destruction would not exist at the time of production, it would be irrational to characterize it as a conditioned phenomenon, in as much as it would be devoid of duration and destruction, just like space." The same argument is found in CŚV (D3865.223$a_{2\text{-}5}$).

[431] Cf. Pras 280_{12}: tatra na nityāḥ saṃsaranti niṣkriyatvād anityānāṃ ca ghaḍādīnāṃ sakriyatvopalambhāt|. Transl. by SCHAYER (1931b:82): "Als etwas Beharrliches wandern [die *saṃskāras*] nicht, weil [das Beharrliche] nicht aktions-fähig ist (*niṣkriyatvād*). Denn nur an dem nicht Beharrlichen, wie es [die empirischen Gegenstände wie] Töpfe usw. sind, wird die Aktionsfähigkeit (*kriyā*) [als Eigenschaft] postuliert (*upalambhāt*)." English translation: "[The *saṃskāras*] do not wander being permanent, because [the permanent] is not capable of action (*niṣkriyatvād*). For only with the impermanent, such as [empirical objects such as] pots and so forth, can the capability to act (*kriyā*) be postulated (*upalambhāt*) [as a quality]." For further references to primary and secondary sources, see SCHAYER (ibid, fn. 57).

[432] For an explanation of this type of argument, cf. Śāntarakṣita's *Madhya-makālaṃkāra* verse 2 (D3884.53a_2) and his *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (D3885.57a_7-57b_1).

Any version of this view thus involves the fault of eternality (*nityatvadoṣa*).

(V311$_{15}$): But if (*atha*) the perishing (*°vināśitvam*) of actions (*karmaṇām*) right after [their] arising (*utpādānantara°*) is admitted (*abhyupeyate*), then [this] being (*sati*) so (*evam*), it may be asked (*nanu*):

> ***"if (cet) [it has] ceased (niruddham), [then,] having (sat) ceased (niruddham), how (kim) could [it] produce (janayiṣyati) the result (phalam)?"*** (Mmk 17.6cd)

The sense (*abhiprāyaḥ*) is that (*iti*) the action (*karmma*) having become (*sat*) something non-existent (*abhāvībhūtam*) by no means (*naiva*) can produce (*janayiṣyati*) a result (*phalam*), because of the non-existence of [its] own-being (*avidyamānasvabhāvatvāt*).

Having shown the consequence of eternality connected with the first logical option that the action would remain until the ripening of its result, the second option is now rejected in the form of a rhetorical question. If the action does not remain, it must cease. Since it must be impermanent by itself as explained above, it perishes by itself as soon as it arises (*utpādānantaravināśitvam*). Although this option would avoid the undesirable consequence of eternality, it entails another problem. If the action has ceased or gone out of existence right after being performed, it can no longer act as the direct cause for its future ripening. Hence, the consequence of this view would be that either the ripening never arises at all, because it has no cause, or – if it would arise – it would arise causelessly and thus be completely unrelated to whatever action the person might have done in the past. This would constitute the fault of cutting off or 'nihilism' (*uccheda*), viz. a denial of *karmaphala*, which will be explained in more detail below. Candrakīrti here presents this option only briefly. Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:513-514; T1566. 100a$_{7\text{-}13}$), on the other hand, further considers and rejects two variations of

this view, namely that the action might be in the process of ceasing (**nir-udhyamāna, 'gag bźin pa*) or that it is not possible to say whether the action has ceased or not (**avaktavya, brjod par bya ba ma yin pa*).

3.4 Santāna as Karmaphalasaṃbandha

The latter view that the action ceases upon having been performed agrees with the Buddhist doctrines of impermanence and momentariness, and is the view adopted by several Buddhist schools. Although the action ceases and therefore cannot function as the direct cause for its ripening, it is still possible to maintain that a third phenomenon can function as a connection or link (*saṃbandha*) between the action and its ripening.[433] This is what has here been called 'the problem of *karmaphalasaṃbandha*': how can *karma-phala* function, when the action is impermanent and must cease immediately upon arising?[434]

As shown above, it was not necessary for the *Sarvāstivādins* to posit a phenomenon that could act as the *saṃbandha* between the action and its result, because they considered the action to be the direct cause of its result due to their particular doctrine that all future, present and past phenomena coexist. Discussions on *karmaphalasaṃbandha,* therefore, are not found in the numerous extant *Sarvāstivāda*-sources. The problem of *karmaphalasaṃ-bandha* also does not seem to have attracted any interest in the *Theravāda*-commentarial literature; at least, discussions of it do not occur in these sources. Yet for a number of Buddhist schools, which did not accept the *Sarvāstivāda*-doctrine of the coexistence of phenomena in the three times,

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[433] For a brief presentation of the term *saṃbandha* based on Dharmakīrti's *Saṃbandha-parīkṣa* with Prabhācandra's commentary, cf. JHA (1990).

[434] The term *karmaphalasaṃbandha* is attested nine times in the writings of Candrakīrti: Pras 302_3 (D3860.100b_6), Pras $302_{6\text{-}7}$ (D3860.D100b_7-101a_1), Pras 303_2 (D3860.101a_1), Pras 360_4 (D3860.116b_3), MavBh D3862.260a_3, MavBh D3862.260a_6, MavBh D3862.261b_5, MavBh D3862.298a_4 and **Yuktiṣaṣṭhikāvṛtti* D3864.4a_5. The problem of *karmaphalasaṃbandha* is also briefly discussed in *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 6.71-72 along with its various commentaries, such as Prajñākaramati's *Pañjikā* (LVP, 1901-1914:467-471; D3872.232$b_1$ff.) and Vibhūticandra's *Pañjikā* (D3880.269$a_5$ff.), as well as in chapter 14 of Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgrahakārikā* (D4266.-19a_3-21b_3) along with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* (ŚĀSTRI, 1968:207-230; D4267.246a_6-257a_4; transl. by JHA, 1937:283-317).

the problem of *karmaphalasaṃbandha* was an important issue.[435] Three theories are attested in the extant Buddhist sources that propose solutions to this problem: (1) the theory of a 'series' (*santāna*), (2) the theory of an indestructible phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*), and (3) the theory of 'seeds' (*bīja*) or 'impressions' (*vāsana*).

The theories of *santāna* and *avipraṇāśa* are presented in Mmk (Mmk 17.7-12 and 17.13-20 respectively). The *santāna*-theory is in other sources ascribed to the *Sautrāntika*-school, but only seems to be attested as a developed theory by sources later than Mmk (cf. below for a brief discussion). The *avipraṇāśa*-theory is in other sources ascribed to the *Saṃmatīya*-school, of whose literature only a small portion is extant. Thus, in both cases Mmk is an early and important source for the study of these theories. Candrakīrti's commentary, of course, post-dates the extant *Sautrāntika*-sources, such as the descriptions of this view found in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* and AKBh, and is thus of less importance in the study of the *santāna*-theory. Nevertheless, it provides a welcome support for interpreting the Mmk-verses and can occasionally provide historical information when its comments are based on the explanations given in the earlier Mmk-commentaries. In the case of the *avipraṇāśa*-theory, the Mmk-commentaries, including Pras, are all of great importance given the severe difficulty in reconstructing this theory from the available bits of information found in Mmk and the few other extant sources.

The *bīja*-theory, which is here distinguished from the *santāna*-theory for reasons, which will become apparent below, is associated with the late *Sautrāntika*-school (as presented in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*) and the *Yogācāra*-tradition. It seems to be a later development of the *santāna*-theory and involves an *ālayavijñāna* posited as the locus for the *karmaphalasaṃbandha*. What is here referred to as the *bīja*-theory is not presented in Mmk and, therefore, is also not discussed in Pras. Candrakīrti, however, has discussed this theory in detail in Mav and MavBh, which will be briefly referred to

[435] As a digression, it may be mentioned that the problem of *karmaphala-saṃbandha* also was treated in the Brāhmaṇical sources. To solve this problem, the *Vaiśeṣika* and *Nyāya*-schools posited an 'invisible force' (*adṛṣṭa;* cf. HALBFASS, 1980:284-290; and KRISHAN, 1997:149-151), while the *Mīmāṃsa*- and *Vedānta*-schools postulated an 'unprecedented efficacy' (*apūrva;* cf. POTTER, 1980:258; HALBFASS, 1980:274-284,; and KRISHAN, 1997:163-165).

below.

It is noteworthy that Mmk first presents the *santāna*-theory and thereafter presents the *avipraṇāśa*-theory. This order of presentation is the opposite of that found in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, the other important source for these theories. The order in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* may be explained by the fact that this text propagates some form of the *santāna*- or *bīja*-theory, and therefore considers this theory superior to the *avipraṇāśa*-theory. Mmk, on the other hand, explicitly rejects the *santāna*-theory, but does not explicitly reject the *avipraṇāśa*-theory. The order of presentation in Mmk could thus indicate that Nāgārjuna considered the *avipraṇāśa*-theory superior to the *santāna*-theory. This point will also be raised again below. Now follows the discussion of the *santāna*-theory presented as first in Mmk.

($V312_1$): Now (*atra*) some (*eke*) followers of another school (*nikāyāntarīyāḥ*) express (*varṇṇayanti*) a response (*parihāram*): "First (*tāvat*), the fault of eternality (*nityatvadoṣaḥ*) does not apply (*nāpadyate*) to us (*asmākam*),[436] because conditioned phenomena (*saṃskārāṇām*) perish immediately upon arising (*utpattyanantaravināśitvāt*).

Secondly (*cāpi*), also with regard to (*ity atrāpi*) [the lines], which (*yat*) said (*uktam*) "if (*cet*) [it has] ceased (*niruddham*), [then] having (*sat*) ceased (*niruddham*), what (*kim*) could produce (*janayiṣyati*) the result (*phalam*)", we give (*brūmaḥ*) the response (*parihāram*):

> ***"Which (yaḥ) series (saṃtānaḥ), beginning with a shoot (aṅkuraprabhṛtiḥ), evolves (abhipravarttate) from a seed (bījāt), thence (tataḥ) [evolves] the fruit (phalam); but (ca) without (ṛte) the seed (bījāt) it (saḥ) does not evolve (nābhipravarttate)."*** (Mmk 17.7)

[436] LAMOTTE (1936:271) here translates *anityatvadoṣaḥ «l'impermanence des conditionnés»* based on LVP's Pras edition, but this Sanskrit reading has been rejected by DE JONG (1978b:221) and in the present edition. DE JONG's and my edition both read *nityatvadoṣaḥ* "the fault of eternality" rather than *anityatvadiṣaḥ* "the fault of impermanence".

In this case (*iha*), although (*api*) being (*sat*) momentary (*kṣaṇikam*), the seed (*bījam*) ceases (*nirudhyate*) after having become the cause (*hetubhāvam upagamya*) for a series (*santānasya*) called shoot, internode, tiller, panicle and so forth (*aṅkurakāṇḍanālapattrādyabhidhānasya*), which alone (*eva*) is endowed with the {unique} ability of producing a particular future fruit of its own kind (*svajātīya-bhāviphalaviśeṣaniṣpattisāmarthya{viśeṣa}yuktasya*).

And (*ca*) just (*ayam*) ***"which (yaḥ) series (santānaḥ), beginning with a shoot (aṅkuraprabhṛtiḥ), evolves (pravar-ttate) from the seed (bījāt),"*** even (*api*) ***"from that (tas-māt)"*** tiny (*svalpāt*) cause (*hetoḥ*) a mass of abundant ***"fruits"*** (*vipula**phala**pracayaḥ*) is gradually (*krameṇa*) born (*upajāyate*), when there is (*sati*) no deficiency in the co-operative causes (*sahakārikāraṇāvaikalye*).

"But (ca) without the seed (ṛte bījāt)," [i.e.,] with no seed (*vinā bījāt*), ***it (saḥ),*** [i.e.,] the series of the shoot and so forth (*aṅkurādisantānaḥ*), ***"does not evolve (nābhipravartta-te)."*** Thus (*tad*), by the fact that [the shoot] comes into existence (*bhāvitvena*) when it (the seed) exists (*tadbhāve*) and (*ca*) by the fact that [the shoot] does not come into existence (*abhāvitvena*) when it does not exist (*tadabhāve*), it is in this manner (*evam*) demonstrated (*upadarśitaṃ bhavati*) that the seed is the cause (*bījahetukatvam*) for the fruit (*phala-sya*) belonging to the series beginning with the shoot (*aṅku-rādisantānasya*).

Candrakīrti introduces the next verse (Mmk 17.7) as a response (*parihāra*) raised by 'some followers of another school' (*eke nikāyāntarīyāḥ*). None of the commentaries identify to which school these proponents might belong. Avalokitavrata (D3859.III.29b$_1$) merely echoes the expression used by Candrakīrti (*sde pa gźan dag rnam pa gźan*). The Chinese translation of *Prajñā-*

pradīpa refers to them as **ābhidharmikas* (T1566.100a$_{14}$: *ā-p'i-t'an-jen* 阿毘曇人). Thus, a sectarian identification is not established in the commentaries.

LAMOTTE (1936:270) identifies this position as a *Sautrāntika*-theory, which is possible, given that the position of a *santāna* is presented as their view in the following verses. Nevertheless, it may be slightly anachronistic to use the term *sautrāntika* for this position presented in Mmk, since it was probably written in the second century CE. BAREAU (1955:155) considers *Sautrāntika* to be the designation for a late school that split off from the *Sarvāstivāda*-tradition somewhere around the 4th century AD. The *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* considers the *Sautrāntika* and *Saṃkrāntivādin* to be two separate schools, whereas other sources consider them to be identical (BAREAU, ibid.). In his introduction to AK, LVP (1971:lii-lv) argues for the identity of the *Sautrāntika* and *Dārṣṭāntika.* The positions of the *Dārṣṭāntikas* are mentioned several times in **Mahāvibhāṣa* and certainly resemble many of the *Sautrāntika*-views taught in AKBh.[437] Hence, such an identification would give the *Sautrāntikas* a longer historical tradition, since the **Mahāvibhāṣā* probably derives from the 2nd century CE; moreover, it may then be more correct to use the name *Dārṣṭāntika* for the early tradition than the name *Sautrāntika.* In AKBh, the *santāna*-view of *karmaphalasaṃbandha* is presented twice,[438] although in neither case is it identified with a school. One must turn to the Chinese AKBh-commentaries by Fa-pao (法寶) and P'u-kuang (普光), two disciples of Hsüan-tsang (玄奘, 600-664 CE), to find them explicitly identified as *Sautrāntika*-positions. The *santāna*-view is also presented twice in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa.*[439] The first is identified in Sumatiśīla's commentary (D4071.82b$_4$) as belonging to the *Sautrāntikas* (*mdo sde pa dag*). This agrees with the presentation of *cittasantāna* found in Mmk. LAMOTTE (1936:163) identifies a number of names with the *Sautrāntika: Saṃkrāntivādin, Sūtrāntavādin, Sauryodayika, Dārṣṭāntika* and *Sūtraprāmāṇika.* Although all refer to schools sharing certain views, some of

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[437] For a discussion of the names *Dārṣṭāntika* and *Sautrāntika* in **Mahāvibhāṣa* and AKBh, cf. COX (1995:37ff.).

[438] Cf. AKBh chapter II (ŚĀSTRI, 1970:217-218; transl. by LVP, 1923:185) and chapter IX (ŚĀSTRI, 1987:1229-1231; transl. LVP, 1931:296). See also the comments thereon in **Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (T1562.29a$_{26}$-630a$_{11}$; transl. by LVP, 1937:77-82).

[439] LAMOTTE (1936:192-193, §§20-21; transl. 232-233; MUROJI, 1985:21-23) and LAMOTTE (1936:197-202, §§30-40; transl. 244-255; MUROJI, 1985:37-51).

which include a *santāna*-theory, it is not established whether they form a cluster of separate traditions holding similar views or whether these names are synonymous. Clearly, more thorough research on the history of the *santāna*-theory is required in order to conclude on this point.

In the commentary of Pras introducing Mmk 17.7, the *santāna*-proponents state that the consequences raised above do not apply to their position. The consequence of eternality of the action, which was associated with the first option that the action remains until the time of its ripening, does not apply to their position, because they admit that the action does not remain, and instead – as a conditioned phenomenon – perishes immediately upon arising. Rather, they admit the second option, viz. that the action ceases. Nevertheless, the consequence associated with this choice, namely that the action has ceased and therefore cannot produce its result, does not apply to their position, because they assert a third phenomenon, namely a 'series' (*santāna*), which can act as a connection (*saṃbandha*) between the action and its result. Their position is first presented by means of an illustration in Mmk 17.7-17.8.

The illustration is that of the growth of a plant. The seed (*bīja*) is the cause for the fruit (*phala*) of the plant, but it is not the direct cause thereof. There is a series (*santāna*) of stages in the growth of the plant between the seed and the fruit. The seed produces a shoot (*aṅkura*), which again leads to other steps of the series in the growth of the plant, until finally the fruit appears. The series has a unique ability (*sāmarthya*) to produce a fruit, which is of the same kind or species (*jātīyaviśeṣa*) as the seed, not a fruit that is of another kind.[440]

In spite of the series acting as the intermediary between the seed and the fruit, the seed can still be said to be the cause (*hetu*) of the series and ultimately of the fruit. The reason is that if the seed is absent, the series does not occur and so the fruit does not appear. Oppositely, when the seed is present (together with the necessary conditions), the series appears and so

[440] The word 'unique' (*viśeṣa*) is explained in AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1987:1230; D4090. II.94b$_4$): sa punar yo 'ntaraṃ phalotpādanasāmarthyaḥ so 'ntyapariṇāma-viśiṣṭatvāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ |. Transl.: "Moreover, this [evolution] is that, which possesses the ability to produce a result at the end; because of the evolution being distinguished [by a particular result] at the end, it is a unique evolution."

does the fruit. The logic that is that x may be established to be the cause of y, if y appears when x is there and y does not appear when x is not there.[441]

In his commentary to this verse, Candrakīrti explains that it is here admitted that the seed ceases. However, although the seed's nature is momentary, i.e., impermanent, it becomes the cause for a series before it ceases. From this series, the fruit is then born. Thus, there is continuity between the cause and the fruit in spite of the fact that the cause has ceased.

It is not specified in Mmk which kind of seed or fruit the illustration concerns. Candrakīrti, who here follows Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:514-515; T1566.100a$_{18\text{-}19}$), interprets it as a rice-plant (*śāli, oryza sativa*). Although this is not said explicitly, it is evident from the stages mentioned in the series of the plant. Candrakīrti mentions the stages: seed (*bīja, sa bon*), shoot (*aṅkura, myu gu*), internode (*kāṇḍa, sdoṅ bu*), tiller (*nāla, sbubs 'chas pa*) and panicle (*pattra, lo ma*). Bhāvaviveka (ibid.) provides a slightly longer list of stages: seed (**bīja, sa bon*), shoot (**aṅkura, myu gu*), leaf (**pattra?, 'dab ma*), internode (**kāṇḍa, sdoṅ bu*), node (**gaṇḍa, sbu gu*), ear (**sñe ma*), chaff (**tuṣa, sbun pa*), awn (**śūka, gra ma*), unripe awns (*srus*) and husked grain (**taṇḍula, 'bras thug po che*).[442]

The stages refer to the growth of a rice-plant as follows.[443] The seed

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[441] This principle agrees with the general statement of dependent arising expressed, for example, in the *Śālistambasūtra* (SCHOENING, 1995:393): rten ciṅ 'breld par 'byuṅ ba gaṅ źe na| 'di lta ste 'di yod pa'i phyir 'di 'byuṅ| 'di skyes pas 'di skye ba ste|| (transliteration modified to the system used here). Transl. by SCHOENING (1995:220): "In that connection, if you ask what is dependent arising, it is as follows: because this exists, this occurs; because this arose, this arises." This principle is expounded at SN 2.28: Iti ismasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti. Imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati. Imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti. Imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati; transl. by RHYS DAVIDS & WOODWARD (1922:23): "So 'this' being, 'that' becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not being, that becomes not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases." It is repeated at SN 2.65.

[442] The Sanskrit list is attested in a quotation from the *Śālistambasūtra* given in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (LVP, 1901:577; D3872.276a$_{4\text{-}5}$; SCHOENING, 1995:703): *bījād aṅkuraḥ| aṅkurāt pattraṃ| pattrāt kāṇḍaṃ| kāṇḍān nālaṃ| nālād gaṇḍaḥ| gaṇḍād garbhaṃ| garbāc chūkaḥ| śūkāt puṣpaṃ| puṣpāt phalam iti|* Transl.: "...from the seed (*bīja*) [grows] a shoot (*aṅkuraḥ*), from the shoot a leaf (*pattra*), from the leaf an internode (*kāṇḍa*), from the internode a tiller (*nāla*), from the tiller a node (*gaṇḍa*), from the node a chaff (*garbha*), from the chaff a spikelet (*śūka*), from the spikelet a flower (*puṣpa*), from the flower the fruit (*phala*, i.e., the awns)." For the passage in the Tibetan translation of the *Śālistambasūtra*, cf. SCHOENING (1995:399). For the same passage in the Chinese translation of the *Śālistambasūtra*, cf. T710.16.819b$_{12\text{-}14}$.

[443] For a botanical description with illustrations, cf. http://www.riceweb.org/ Plant.htm

(*bīja*) first germinates into a shoot (*aṅkura*), also called the seedling (*stamba*), which is planted in water. The shoot grows into a usually 60-180 cm high, round stem having 13-16 internodes (*kāṇḍa*). From each node grows a tiller (*nāla*), from which secondary and tertiary tillers develop. On the tillers are nodes (*gaṇḍa*) bearing panicles (*pattra*), which each bear a single flower (*puṣpa*). The panicle consists of the chaff (*garbha, *tuṣa*), inside of which are the fruits (*phala*), i.e., the awns (*śūka*). After harvesting, the awns are husked and the husked grains (*taṇḍula*) are then ready for consumption. If the awns are not husked, they can be used as seeds for planting new seedlings.[444]

These growth-stages constitute a process or a series (*santāna*) of individually connected phenomena, which all belong to the continuum of the same plant. This model of explanation does not have the flaw that a single phenomenon, such as the action, must remain throughout time to ensure the ripening of the fruit, but each phenomenon in the series perishes immediately upon arising yet always generates a new phenomenon in the series as it perishes. It is therefore neither fraught with the error of eternality nor with the error of cutting off as will now be explained.

The word 'series' (*santāna*) occurs in several semi-canonical scriptures, where it is not necessarily used in the technical sense with which the *santāna*-proponents use the word.[445] Likewise, examples of seeds and sprouts

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[444] Regarding the question whether the result of action becomes the seed for a new result, just like the fruit of a plant becomes seeds used for planting new plants yield new fruits, cf. AKBh (Śāstri, 1973:1230-1231; D4090.II.94b$_7$ff; transl. LVP, 1931:298-299).

[445] Cf., for example, *Milindapañha* (Trenckner, 1880:72): Rājā āha "bhante nāgasena, iminā nāmarūpena kammaṃ kataṃ kusalaṃ vā akusalaṃ vā, kuhiṃ tāni kammāni tiṭṭhantī"ti? "Anubhandeyyuṃ kho, mahārāja, tāni kammāni chāyāva anapāyinī"ti. "Sakhā pana, bhante, tāni kammāni dassetuṃ 'idha vā idha vā tāni kammāni tiṭṭhantī'"ti? "Na sakhā, mahārāja, tāni kammāni dassetuṃ 'idha vā idha vā tāni kammāni tiṭṭhantī"ti. "Opammaṃ karohī'"ti. "Taṃ kiṃ maññasi, mahā-rāja, yānimāni rukkhāni anibattaphalāni, sakkā tesaṃ phalāni dassetuṃ 'idha vā idha vā tāni phalāni tiṭṭhantī'"ti? "Na hi, bhante"ti. "Evam eva kho mahārāja, abbocchinnāya santatiyā na sakkā tāni kammāni dassetuṃ 'idha vā idha vā tāni kammāni tiṭṭhantī'"ti. "Kallosi, bhante nāgasenā"ti. Transl. by Horner (1964:98-99): "The King said: "Revered Nāgasena, a deed that is either skilled or unskilled has been done by this name-and-shape: where do these deeds remain?" "Those deeds would follow it, sire, 'like a shadow that never leaves it'." "Is it possible to point to those deeds, revered sir, and say that they remain either here or there?" "It is not possible, sire, to point to those deeds and say that they remain either here or there." "Make a simile." "What do you think about this, sire? Is it possible to point to the fruits of a tree that has not yet borne fruit and say that the fruits are either here or there." "O no, revered sir." "In the same way, sire, so long as the (life-)continuity (*santati*) is

occur often throughout the early canonical scriptures. Thus, from the mere mention of *bīja, aṅkura* and *santāna* in the *mūla*-verse, nothing conclusive can be said about the scriptural provenance of these words, their context or the type of plant intended. However, Nāgārjuna's use of 'begin-ning with the shoot' (*aṅkuraprabhṛti*) indicates that he had several stages in mind, most likely the well-known list of growth-stages of the rice-plant. Hence, Bhāvaviveka's and Candrakīrti's interpretation of Nāgārjuna's refe-rence as referring to the list of the growth-stages of a rice-plant seems likely.

The list of the growth-stages of a rice-plant does not occur in the early canon, but is apparently first found in the *Śālistambasūtra*, an early *Mahāyāna*-work.[446] In this sūtra, the growth-stages are used to illustrate what is termed 'outer dependent arising' (*bāhyaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ*). This is presented in contrast to 'inner dependent arising' (*ātmikaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ*) consisting of the twelve causes or links (*nidāna*) of dependent arising. The same growth-stages are attested in a couple of other canonical sources as an external illustration of dependent arising. Thus, it occurs in the large **Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* (*cheng-fa nien-ch'u ching* 正法念處經), wherein they are given as the object for a meditation (*hsiu-hsing* 修行, **bhāvanā*) called an externally oriented *vipaśyanā* (*wai-kuan* 外觀, **bāhya-vipaśyanā*).[447] In the **Buddhābhidharmasūtra* (*fo a-p'i-t'an ching* 佛阿毘曇經), the passage from the *Śālistambasūtra* is evidently echoed.[448] In the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, they are mentioned in connection with dependent arising.[449]

not cut off, it is not possible to point to those deeds and say that they remain either here or there." "You are dexterous, revered Nāgasena." For a brief study of the word *santāna* including reference to several sources earlier than Mmk, cf. LVP (1902:283-286).

[446] Cf. the passage quoted above in fn. 442.

[447] Cf. T721.17.398c$_{12\text{-}13}$: 如種生芽。從芽生莖。從莖生葉。從葉生花。從花生實。是名外觀. Transl.: "Like this, the seed (*chung* 種, **bīja*) produces the shoot (*ya* 芽, *aṅkura*). From the shoot arises an internode (*hsing* or *ching* 莖, **kāṇḍa*). From the internode arises a leaf (*sheh* 葉, **pattra*). From the leaf arises a flower (*hua* 花, **puṣpa*). From the flower arises the grain (*shih* 實, **taṇḍula* or **phala*). This is called external analytical meditation (*wai-kuan* 外觀, **bāhya-vipaśyanā*)." Its opposite, 'inner analytical meditation', relates to dependent arising.

[448] Cf. T1482.24.958a$_{14ff}$, in particular T1482.24.958a$_{22\text{-}24}$: 同說如是以從種生芽。從芽生葉。從葉生節。從節生莖。從莖生幹。從幹生枝。從枝生萼。從萼生花。從花生子.

[449] Cf. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (D107.98b$_{1\text{-}2}$): laṅka'i bdag po sa bon gcig las byuṅ yaṅ myu gu daṅ| ljaṅ bu daṅ| sog ma daṅ| tshigs daṅ| lo ma daṅ| yal ga daṅ| me tog daṅ| 'bras bu daṅ| gra ma'i bye brag yod pa de bźin du phyi naṅ gi chos skye ba'i chos can| ma rig pa las rab tu byuṅ ba|. Transl.: "Lord of Laṅka, although arisen from a single seed, there are several

In the *śāstra*-literature, the growth-stages also appear as illustrations in contexts other than dependent arising. Thus, in the **Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā* attributed to Nāgārjuna,[450] they appear as an illustration of the arising of the ten *bhūmis*.[451] In **Mahāvibhāṣa* (T1545.27.51b$_3$), they are used as an illustration for the workings of conditions (*pratyaya*). Moreover, in **Mahāvibhāṣā* (T1545.27.217b$_{15-16}$ & 941a$_{6-8}$) and **Buddhadhātuśāstra* (T1610.31.793a$_{25}$), they are used as an illustration for the process of listening to, contemplating and cultivating the teachings. In none of these cases are the growth-stages said to constitute a series (*santāna*). An exception is found in *Yogācārabhūmi* (T1579.30.501c$_{1-2}$; T1581.30.903a$_{25-26}$), where they are mentioned as a series (*santāna*) and are used as an external illustration when explaining the ten types of causes (*hetu*).[452] Although the *Yogācārabhūmi*, as one of the few early sources, speaks of the growth-stages as a series, it does not mention this series as an illustration of the mind-series (*cittasantāna*), as does Nāgār-juna below. The use of the series of the growth-stages as an illustration for the *cittasantāna* is attested, for example, in chapter nine of AKBh (cf. ŚĀSTRI, 1987:1229$_{14}$ff), but it does not seem to be attested in any source earlier than Mmk. Thus, it remains very problematic to explain the provenance of Nāgārjuna's presentation of the *santāna*-view.

(V312$_{12}$) Therefore (*tad*), in the same way (*evam*):

particular [stages] of the shoot, the seedling, the leaf, the internode, the node, the tiller, the flower, the fruit and the awns. Likewise, that, which has the nature of arising as outer and inner phenomena, is arisen from ignorance..."

[450] LINDTNER (1982:14) classifies this attribution as dubious, yet gives four arguments indicating that the authorship could be authentic.

[451] Cf. **Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā* (T1521.26.90c$_{12-14}$): 十地道亦如是。根名深心所愛。如有根故則生芽莖枝葉等及諸果實. Transl.: "The path of the ten *bhūmis* is also like this: a root (*ken* 根) called the profound mind, which is tenderness (**vatsala?, ai* 愛). Thus, due to the presence of this root, there arises a shoot (芽), an internode (莖), a tiller (*chih* 枝), a leaf (葉) and all the fruit and grain (諸果實)." For the use of the word *bīja* in *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, cf. KRITZER (1999: 159-160, especially fn. 413; for another possible canonical source to the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*-passage not mentioned by KRITZER, cf. my fn. 242 above). Regarding the further development of the *bīja*-image away from its literal, botanical meaning, cf. KRITZER (1999:162).

[452] For a discussion of the ten *hetus* in *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, cf. KRITZER (1999:155-165, particularly fn. 415).

"Both (ca) since (yasmāt) the series (santānaḥ) [arises] from the seed (bījāt) and (ca) [since there is] arising of the fruit (phalodbhavaḥ) from the series (santānāt), [and] the fruit (phalam) [is thus] preceded by the seed (bījapūrvvam), therefore (tasmāt) [the seed] is neither (na) cut off (ucchinnam) nor (nāpi) eternal (śāśvatam)." (Mmk 17.8)

{In this case (*iha*)}, if (*yadi*) the seed (*bījam*) due to the presence of an obstructing condition (*°virodhipratyaya-sānnidhyāt*), such as a flame or embers (*jvālāṅgārādi°*), should cease (*nirudhyeta*) without having brought forth (*aprasūya*) the series beginning with the shoot (*aṅkurādi-santānam*), then (*tadā*) there would be (*syāt*) the viewpoint of cutting off (*ucchedadarśanam*), because there is not seen the development of a series, which results from it (*tatkārya-santānapravṛttyadarśanāt*).

If (*yadi*), on the other hand (*ca*), the seed (*bījam*) would not cease (*na nirudhyeta*) and (*ca*) the series beginning with the shoot (*aṅkurādisantānaḥ*) evolves (*pravartta-te*), then (*tadā*) there would be (*syāt*) the viewpoint of eternal[ity] (*śāśvatadarśanam*), because [there would be] admission of the non-ceasing (*anirodhābhyupagamāt*) of the seed (*bījasya*). But (*ca*) since (*iti*) this (*etat*) is not (*na*) so (*evam*), therefore (*atas*) there is no (*nāsti*) consequence {of the viewpoints} of eternal[ity] and cutting off (*śāśvatoc-chedaprasaṅgaḥ*) for the seed (*bījasya*).

Having presented the illustration of the series of growth-stages of a plant in Mmk 17.7, verse 17.8 explains how this illustration does not involve either of the undesirable consequences raised in Mmk 17.6, namely that if the seed remains until the ripening of its result, it would be eternal or if the seed ceased upon arising, there would remain no cause for the arising of its result.

In the verse, two counter-arguments are offered by the *santāna*-proponents: (1) the seed is not cut off, because its result arises from its series; and (2) the seed is not eternal, because its result is only preceded by the seed. In the first argument, disproving the consequence of cutting off (*ucchedaprasaṅga*), the property of the proposition (*pakṣadharma*) is that the seed has a result, which arises from its series. The premise (*anvayavyāpti*) is: what has a result arising from its series, that is not cut off. The counter-premise (*vyatireka-vyāpti*) is: what is cut off, that does not have a result arising from its series. In the second argument, disproving the consequence of being eternal (*śāśvata-prasaṅga*), the property of the proposition (*pakṣadharma*) is that the seed has a result, which is only preceded by the seed. The premise (*anvayavyāpti*) is: what only precedes its result, that is not eternal. The counter-premise (*vyatirekavyāpti*) is: what is eternal, that does not only precede its result. In the latter argument, the word 'precede' (*pūrvam*) should be understood in the sense that the seed precedes its fruit, but it does not succeed it; that is to say, although the seed exists prior to its result, it ceases before the result comes into existence.[453] In *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:407-408), these arguments are explicated by saying "since the series does not arise after the seed has completely ceased, but the series continues (**anuvṛtti, rjes su 'jug pa*) [after the seed], therefore [the seed] is not cut off; since the seed ceases and does not remain, therefore [it] is also not eternal."[454]

While the earlier commentaries are similar in their comments, Candrakīrti here presents his own comments to the verse. First, Candrakīrti presents two scenarios in which the *santāna*-proponents would admit the consequences of the seed being cut off or eternal. These proponents would

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[453] In AKBh, the word 'precede' or 'antecedent' (*pūrva*) is in a similar context rather interpreted as meaning that because the fruit has the seed as its antecedent it resembles the seed in genus; cf. ŚĀSTRĪ (1973:1230; D4090.II.94b$_2$; transl. by LVP, 1931:296).

[454] Repeated in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:224). A similar logic is presented in *Chung lun* (T1564.22a$_{21-22}$): 從相續有果。先種後有果。故不斷亦不常. Transl. by BOCKING (1995:261): "From the suc-cession comes the fruit. Since formerly there was the seed, and subsequently there is the fruit, there is neither severance nor permanence." Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:515), however, connects the arguments differently. He takes both *santānāt phalodbhavaḥ* as well as *bījapūrvam phalam* to be arguments proving that the seed is not cut off and then has to introduce a third argument not found in the *mūla*-verse to prove that the seed is not eternal, namely the argument that when the sprout arises the seed has ceased. The Chinese translation thereof (T1566.100a$_{24-25}$) is a somewhat free rendering.

admit the consequence of the seed being cut off, if the seed would cease without having generated a series, just as if the seed had been damaged by fire or heat. Oppositely, the *santāna*-proponents would have to admit the consequence of eternality, if the series of the growth-stages of the plant would arise without the ceasing of the seed. However, neither of these scenarios is accepted by the *santāna*-proponents. According to their view, the series does arise from the seed, and, therefore, the seed is not cut off. Oppositely, the seed ceases simultaneously with generating its series, and, therefore, the seed is not eternal. In this way, the *santāna*-proponents show that their illustration of the series of the growth-stages of a plant is a causal model that does not involve the undesirable consequences raised in Mmk 17.6. Having thus explained their illustration, the *santāna*-proponents present their interpretation of *karmaphalasaṃbandha*, which corresponds to their illustration of the growth-stages of a plant.

(V313$_6$): Just as (*yathā*) this (*ayam*) procedure (*kramaḥ*) has been explained (*anuvarṇṇitaḥ*) with regard to a seed (*bīje*), in the same manner (*evam*):

> ***"Which (yaḥ) mind-series (cittasantānaḥ) evolves (abhipravarttate) from that (tasmāt) state of mind (cetasaḥ), thence (tataḥ) [evolves] the result (phalam); but (ca) without (ṛte) the mind (cittāt) it (saḥ) does not evolve (nābhipravarttate)."*** (Mmk 17.9)

"Which (yaḥ) mind-series (cittasantānaḥ)," having that [state of mind] as its cause (*taddhetukaḥ*), ***"evolves (pravarttate) from that (tasmāt)"*** mind (*cittāt*), [i.e.,] [one which is] concomitant with a particular wholesome {or unwholesome} intention (*kuśal{ākuśal}acetanāviśeṣasaṃprayuktāt*), ***"from that (tasmāt)"*** mind-series (*cittasantānāt*), [i.e., one which is] impregnated by the wholesome {or unwholesome} intention (*kuśal{ākuśal}acetanāparibhāvitāt*), a desired (*iṣṭam*) {[or] undesired (*aniṣṭam*)} ***"result (pha-***

lam)" is born (*upajāyate*) {in [the form of] good and bad courses of rebirth (*sugatidurgatiṣu*)} when there is (*sati*) no deficiency with regard to the presence (*°saṃnidhānāvaikalye*) of [the necessary] co-operative causes (*sahakārikāraṇa°*). Without (*ṛte*) that (*tasmāt*) mind (*cittāt*), [i.e.,] devoid of (*antareṇa*) that (*tat*) mind (*cittam*), it, [i.e., the series],[455] does not evolve (*nābhipravarttate*).

Similar to how a series of growth-stages evolves from a seed and results in a fruit as presented in Mmk 17.7, likewise Mmk 17.9 presents how a mind-series (*cittasantāna*) evolves from the state of mind (*cetas*), by which the action is performed. The result of the action (*phala*) derives from this mind-series. It is established that the state of mind (*cetas*) is the cause of the mind-series, because the mind-series does not come into existence without it.

In *Akutobhayā*, the state of mind (**cetas, sems pa*)[456] from which the mind-series evolves is said to be the state of mind 'designated as action' (**karmoktam, las su brjod pa*).[457] In *Chung lun* (T1564.22a$_{22}$), this state of mind is called 'the initial mind' (*ch'u-hsin* 初心). Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:515; T1566.100a$_{29}$) adds to the explanation given by *Akutobhayā* that 'the state of mind designated as action' is a state of mind being friendly or not friendly (*byams pa daṅ byams pa ma yin pa'i sems pa, tzu-hsin pu-tzu-hsin* 慈心不慈心). Avalokitavrata (D3859.III.30b) does not offer any comment on this expression, and so it remains a question precisely what Bhāvaviveka has in mind with this gloss. He may be referring to *cetas* in Mmk 17.1, where *cetas* was explained as having three aspects, viz. a state of mind being self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamaka*), benefiting others (*parānugrahaka*) and friendly (*maitra*). If this is the case, one wonders why he only mentions

[455] Attested by the Tibetan translation (D104a$_3$: *rgyun de yaṅ*).

[456] It seems that *sems pa* in all the earlier Tibetan commentaries in this instance is not a translation for 'intention' (*cetanā*) but rather stands for 'state of mind' (*cetas*), because *sems pa* reproduces the word *cetas* from the *mūla*-verse (Mmk 17.9).

[457] *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:408): "sems kyi rgyun gaṅ yin pa ni sems pa las su brjod pa gaṅ yin pa 'gag bźin pa de las mṅon par 'byuṅ źiṅ..." Transl.: "As the state of mind, which was designated as an action, is ceasing, that which is the mind-series evolves therefrom..." The comments of *Akutobhayā* are repeated verbatim in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:225) throughout this passage.

'friendly' and not the other two aspects. Alternatively, Bhāvaviveka may simply be elucidating the meaning of the word *cetas* in this verse (Mmk 17.9) by implying that all states of mind can be divided into two sorts: friendly and not friendly. It must, of course, be underlined here that the threefold state of mind (*cetas*) was stated in Mmk 17.1 to be a seed (*bīja*) for a result both after passing away as well as in this world (*tad bījam phalasya pretya ceha ca*), which agrees with the present comparison of *cetas* to a seed.

Candrakīrti does not repeat the word 'state of mind' (*cetas*) in his commentary to Mmk 17.9, but replaces it with the word 'mind' (*citta*). This agrees with his statement above ($V304_1$) that the words *citta, manas* and *vijñāna* are synonyms of *cetas,* and agrees with *pāda* c of the verse (Mmk 17.9), where the word *cittāt* is used metri causa in lieu of *cetasaḥ.* The mind, which would correspond to the seed, is explained by Candrakīrti to be a mind concomitant with a particular wholesome or unwholesome intention (*cetanā*).[458] As explained above (p. 227), the word concomitant means that two phenomena occur together. Candrakīrti does not imply that intention (*cetanā*) equals the mind (*citta*), but that the mind from which the mind-series evolves is a mind concomitant with a particular intention. Candrakīrti thus maintains the standard *Abhidharma*-separation between mind (*citta*) and conditioned phenomena concomitant with the mind (*cittasaṃprayukta*).[459]

From this explanation, it is possible to pinpoint – according to Candrakīrti's interpretation – exactly which aspect of an action would correspond to the seed mentioned in the illustration of the growth-stages of a plant. The seed (*bīja*) is that from which the growth-stages of the plant evolves. When this illustration is transferred to the causality of *karmaphala*, the seed does not correspond to the action (*karman*) as such. That is to say, the seed does not correspond to the concrete bodily or verbal actions. Bodily and verbal actions are merely 'actions following intention' (*cetayitvā karman*), brought about by a mental action (*manaskarman*), which is the intention (*cetanā*). The intention is concomitant (*saṃprayukta*) with a mo-

[458] It should here be noticed that the Tibetan translation does not attest the references to the unwholesome intention and its undesired result throughout this passage.

[459] Cf., for example, Candrakīrti's **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (D3866. $245a_3$ff.; LINDTNER, 1979:105ff.).

ment of mind (*citta*). It is from this moment of mind that the mind-series (*cittasantāna*) evolves. The *cittasantāna* is not said to evolve from the intention itself (which would actually make it an intention-series (**cetanā-santāna*) rather than a *cittasantāna*).[460] That the seed refers to the mind and not to the action agrees with the SN-passage, which compares the consciousness to a seed and action to a field, which is repeated in the *Śālistambasūtra* (cf. fn. 244 and 568).

Since the concomitant intention and the mind share the same aspect (*ākāra,* cf. fn. 352), the mind is wholesome (*kuśala*) when the intention is wholesome and unwholesome when the intention is unwholesome. Thus, from a mind, which is concomitant with a wholesome intention, a *cittasantāna* evolves, which is impregnated or embraced by that wholesome intention (*kuśalacetanāparibhāvita*), that is to say the *cittasantāna* is itself wholesome in nature, because it stems from a wholesome state of mind.

When the right conditions are present, the wholesome *cittasantāna* generates a desired result (*iṣṭam phalam*), which constitutes the ripening of the result of the action (*karmaphalavipāka*). In this manner, the result of the action is brought about without the action remaining until the time of the ripening of its result and without the action being cut off before engendering a result.

Just like the series of the growth-stages of a plant consists of a number of different steps, such as the shoot, internode, tiller and so forth, it is implicit in the present explication that the *cittasantāna* consists of a number of separate steps, namely the individually existing moments of mind, which each perishes as soon as it arises while simultaneously giving rise to a new moment of mind belonging to the same *cittasantāna*.[461]

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460 This explanation that the series (*santāna*) only issues from the mind agrees with the explanation thereon found in AKBh (Śāstri, 1987:1230;D4090. II.94b$_3$): yaḥ karmapūrva uttarottaracittaprasavaḥ sā santatiḥ|. Transl.: "What is preceded by action and carried on by the subsequent instances of mind, that is a series (*santatiḥ*)."

461 An explanation of the momentary nature of mind is given by Candrakīrti in CŚV on CŚ 1.10 (Lang, 1986:28): dmigs pa las myur du 'pho ba ñid kyi phyir na sems kyi skad cig mar 'jig pa rtogs par ha caṅ yaṅ mi dka' ste| 'di ltar yi ge ā la sogs pa'i yig 'bru rnams ches skyen par brjod pa na| yig 'bru re re źiṅ dus daṅ rnam pa tha dad pas de la dmigs pa'i sems daṅ dus daṅ rnam pa tha dad pa rtogs la| dus daṅ rnam pa tha dad pa las kyaṅ sems skad cig ma ñid du grub po| |skad cig ces bya ba ni dus 'grib ba'i mthar thug par gyur pa la bya la| skyes bu stobs daṅ ldan pas se gol gtogs pa tsam gyis skad cig ma drug cu rtsa lṅa 'da' ste| rnam pa de lta bu'i

The decisive point in the theory that a *cittasantāna* constitutes the *karmaphalasaṃbandha* is that the mind itself is the link between the action and its result. Thus, although the concrete action disappears as soon as one stops performing it, continuity may be postulated in the form of the *cittasantāna*, which ensures the ripening of the future result of the action. Since this series is of a mental nature, it does not terminate at the person's death. Rather, since the *cittasantāna* continues after death and into the next life of the person, continuity can be maintained without admitting any permanent phenomenon, such as a Self (*ātman*). The *cittasantāna* is not permanent in itself, because it consists of numerous individual moments of mind. In this way, the *santāna*-proponents present a viable *karmaphalasaṃbandha* as will now be explained.

(V313$_{12}$): Therefore (*tad*), in the same way (*evam*):

"Both (ca) since (yasmāt) the series (santānaḥ) [arises] from the mind (cittāt) and (ca) [since there is] arising of the result (phalodbhavaḥ) from the series (santānāt), [and] the result (phalam) [is thus] preceded by the action (karmapūrvam), therefore (tasmāt) [the action] is neither (na) cut off (ucchinnam) nor (nāpi) eternal (śāśvatam)." (Mmk 17.10)

skad cig gis rnam par śes pa skad cig ma yin no| |. Transl.: "Destructibility in the form of the moments of the mind in that it transpires faster than perception is not extremely difficult to understand. It is like this: if one says a series of letters, such as the letter ā and so forth, very quickly, each letter would be different with regard to its time and kind. Therefore, the mind that perceives each [letter] is [also] understood to be different with regard to its time and kind. And merely from this difference in time and kind, the mind is established to be momentary. A 'moment' (**kṣaṇa, skad cig*) refers to the ultimate diminua-tion of time. There are more than 65 moments within [the time of] a fingersnap [produced by] a strong person. By this type of moment, the moment of mind is [explained]."

If (yadi) that (*tat*)[462] wholesome (*kuśalam*) mind (*cittam*) were to cease (*nirudhyeta*), like (*iva*) the final [moment of] mind of an arhant (*arhaccarama-cittam*), without having become the cause (*hetubhāvam anupagamya*) for a future (*bhāvinaḥ*) mind-series (*cittasaṃtānasya*), which proceeds as an uninterrupted progression of successive causes and results (*hetuphalapāraṃparyāvicchinnakramavarttinaḥ*), then (*tadā*) that (*tat*) action (*karma*) would be (*syāt*) cut off (*ucchinnam*).

If, however (*athāpi*),[463] [the action] would be (*syāt*) undeprived (*apracyutam*) of its own-nature (*svarūpāt*) after having become the cause (*hetubhāvam upagamya*) for the future series (*anāgatasantānasya*), then (*tadānīm*) the action (*karmma*) would indeed be (*syāt*) eternal (*śāśvatam*).

But (*ca*) since (*iti*) this (*etat*) is not (*na*) so (*evam*), therefore (*tasmāt*), even (*api*) when there is admission of the action as being momentary (*kṣaṇikakarmābhyupagame*), there is not (*nāsti*) the consequence of the {twofold} [wrong]

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[462] The *tat* is problematic. It is difficult to make sense of it, if it is connected as a part of the following compound. Eventually, it could then be interpreted as meaning 'of that mind' (*tasya cittasya*) and connect it with *pāramparya*, i.e., '...of a succession of causes and results of that [mind]'. On the other hand, in the Tibetan translation *tat* is not attested in the compound but is attested as a definite pronoun connected with *kuśalañ cittam* later in the sentence. There seems to be two possible explanations for this. First, it is possible that the Tibetan translator chose to interpret a *tat* located in the same place as in the extant Sanskrit manuscripts as a definite pronoun to be connected with *kuśalañ cittam* later in the sentence. Of course, this would be a problematic construction, given the distance in the sentence between the pronoun and the phrase to which it refers, and could thus reflect the difficulty, which the Tibetan translator had with interpreting this construction. Secondly, it is possible that the *tat* was placed elsewhere in the Sanskrit text that was used as the basis for the Tibetan translation, which would justify the Tibetan interpretation of the *tat*. In that case, it remains a problem to explain why the *tat* was then moved to its present location in the extant Sanskrit mss. It could perhaps have been omitted in the mss-tradition and then added as a marginalia, which later was re-inserted in the wrong place. In the English translation above, the Tibetan interpretation of *tat* as connected with *kuśalañ cittam* has been adopted.

[463] The word *atha* or the phrase *athāpi* is commonly used in the writings of Candrakīrti to introduce a second alternative.

view of cutting off and eternal[ity] (*ucchedaśāśvatadarśana-{dvaya}prasaṅga*)({*iti*}).[464]

Just like in Mmk verse 17.8, where the consequences of being cut off and being eternal did not apply to the seed in the illustration of the growth-stages of plant, so also here the same reasoning is applied to the mind, which is the cause for the *cittasantāna.* The verse presents the same two arguments, which were already discussed above: (1) the mind is not cut off, because its result arises from its series, and (2) the mind is not eternal, because its result is only *preceded* by the mind. The earlier commentaries discuss Mmk 17.10 in the same way as Mmk 17.8. Likewise, Candrakīrti's comments on Mmk 17.10 resemble those on Mmk 17.8.

In his commentary on Mmk 17.8, Candrakīrti compared the seed that would cease without first giving rise to a series of growth-stages to a seed that has been damaged by an obstructing condition, such as a flame or hot embers. Now when commenting on Mmk 17.10, he compares the mind that would cease without giving rise to another moment of mind to the last moment of mind of an *arhant.* The *arhant* has eradicated the required co-operative causes, the defilements (*kleśa*) and in particular craving (*tṛṣṇā*), for the mind to function as the direct cause of another moment of mind. Therefore, when the *arhant* passes into *nirvāṇa,* his mind-series ends and he is thus liberated from *saṃsāra.*[465]

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[464] The *iti* at the end of the sentence, which is not attested by the Tibetan translation, most likely indicates the end of the explication of the two verses presenting the illustration (Mmk 17.7-8) and the two parallel verses presenting the *cittasantāna* based thereon (Mmk 17.9-10). Or else, it might indicate the end of the *santāna*-proponents' statement begun at Pras 312_1 "Now some followers of another school express a response: "First, since [we admit] the perishing of conditioned phenomena..."" (*atraike nikāyāntarīyāḥ parihāraṃ varṇṇayanti| utpattyanantaravināśitvāt...*). The latter possibility, however, is contradicted by the fact that the following verse (Mmk 17.11) also expresses the doctrine set forth by the *santāna*-proponents.

[465] This is also stated in AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1987:1230; D4090.II.94$b_{6\text{-}7}$): akliṣṭānāṃ cittasantānātyantavinivṛtter yadā parinirvāti|. Transl.: "...because there is a complete end of the mind-series for those, who are without defilements, at which point one passes into parinirvāṇa." It is not quite clear from the explanation given by Candrakīrti whether he by the expression 'last moment of the mind of an *arhant'* refers to the attainment of *nirvāṇa* with remainder (*sopadhiśeṣa*) or without remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣa*); that is to say, does the *saṃsāric* mind-series terminate when the *arhant* attains the state of an *arhant* but is still alive

In his comments to Mmk 17.10, Candrakīrti also clarifies what constitutes the *cittasantāna*. It is an uninterrupted progression (*avicchinna-krama*) of moments of mind, wherein each moment is the successive result of the preceding moment and becomes the cause of the next moment. The mind, by which the action is performed, is thus admitted to be momentary and, therefore, the consequence of eternality does not obtain. Nevertheless, since the mind-series evolving from that moment of mind ensures the arising of the result of the action, the consequence of cutting off also does not obtain.

($V314_7$): Thus (*tad*), the ten wholesome courses of action (*daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ*) have {also}[466] been explained (*vyākhyātāḥ*) here (*atra*) in the explanation of the divisions of action as they have been described [above] (*yathoditakarmaprabhedavyākhyāne*), and (*ca*) these (*te*)

> ***"ten white courses of action (śuklāḥ karmmapathā daśa) [are] the means for the accomplishment (sādhanopāyāḥ) of dharma (dharmasya). The fruit (phalam) of dharma (dharmmasya) [is] the five (pañca) kinds of sensual pleasure (kāmaguṇāḥ) both after passing away and in this world (pretya ceha ca)."*** (Mmk 17.11)

The meaning is (*ity arthaḥ*) that just these (*ta ete*) ***"ten"*** wholesome ***"courses of action"*** (***daśa*** *kuśalāḥ* ***karma-pathāḥ***) [are] ***"the means for the accomplishment*** (***sādhano-pāyāḥ***)," [i.e.,] constitute the cause for the production (*niṣ-pattihetubhūtāḥ*), ***"of dharma (dharmasya)."***

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yet without any defilements or does it terminate when he dies and passes into *parinirvāṇa*? For a debate on whether an *arhant* can fall down from his state due to having earlier calumniated an *arhant*, cf. *Kathāvatthu* VIII.11 (TAYLOR, 1897:398-399; transl. by AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:228-229).

[466] The word 'also' is attested only by the Tibetan translation (*yaṅ*).

In Mmk 17.11, the ten wholesome courses of action (*daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ*) are said to be the means for the accomplishment (*sādhanopāya*) of *dharma.* A distinction is thus drawn between the ten wholesome courses of action and *dharma*, which will be discussed below. It is also said that the fruit of *dharma* is the five kinds of sensual pleasure (*pañca kāmaguṇāḥ*), which will be experienced both in the present life as well as in later lives, a statement which is partly similar to what was said in Mmk 17.1cd.

Candrakīrti provides an extensive explanation to this verse. On the other hand, apart from the Chinese translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, the commentary given to this verse by all the earlier commentaries is quite brief.[467] *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:409) and Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* merely state that the means for the accomplishment of *dharma* has been taught by the Exalted One as the ten wholesome courses of action, and its result has been taught as the five kinds of sensual pleasure both after passing away and in this world.[468] Ching-mu adds the standard list of the ten wholesome courses of action in *Chung lun* (T1564.22a_{29}-22b_{2}), which is repeated in the Chinese translation of *Prajñāpradīpa* (T1566.100$b_{17\text{-}19}$). He also adds (T1564.22$b_{4\text{-}5}$) that there are other kinds of wholesome action, such as almsgiving and reverence, which are also implied by the ten wholesome courses of action.[469]

[467] In the Chinese translation of *Prajñāpradīpa,* various elements from *Chung lun* as well as a number of later interpolations are here inserted into text. This is even done to the extent that Mmk 17.1 is here quoted in *Pang jo teng lun* (T1566.100$b_{22\text{-}23}$) in the translation of the verse as given by *Chung lun* (T1564.21$b_{25\text{-}26}$, only attesting a minor variant in *pāda* c) and not as the verse was earlier translated in *Pang jo teng lun* (T1566.99$a_{18\text{-}19}$). Given this interpolation of the verse, it seems likely that these interpolations were not made by Prabhākaramitra, the translator of *Pang jo teng lun,* since one would expect him to use his own translation of the verse rather than to insert the translation of the verse found in *Chung lun.* It must be underlined that Prabhākaramitra's translation of the verse (T1566.99$a_{18\text{-}19}$) is a refinement of the translation of the verse found in *Chung lun* (T1564.21$b_{25\text{-}26}$). None of the explanations given in *Pang jo teng lun* to Mmk 17.11 correspond to the explanations found in Pras. They are thus neither attested by the later Tibetan translation of *Prajñāpradīpa* nor having parallels in Pras.

[468] Repeated verbatim in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:226).

[469] Cf. here also the explanation of *parānugrāhaka* in *Chung lun* (see above, p. 208) and the various kinds of *dharma* mentioned above (p. 196).

(V314$_{10}$): Moreover (*punaḥ*), what (*kaḥ*) [is] this (*asau*) so-called (*nāma*) *dharma* (*dharmaḥ*), which is distinct from the wholesome courses of action (*kuśalakarmapathavyatiriktaḥ*), [and] of which (yasya) these [wholesome courses of action] (*ete*) are established (*vyavasthāpyante*) as the means for the accomplishment (*sādhanopāyatvena*)?

It is answered (*ucyate*) that a particular mind alone (*cittaviśeṣa eva kaś cid*) is meant (*uktaḥ*) by the word '*dharma*' (*dharmaśabdena*), {because it was said}[470] by this [verse] (*ity anena*): ***"Which (yat) state of mind (cetas) [leads to being] self-restraining (ātmasaṃyamakam) and (ca) benefiting others (parānugrāhakam) [and] friendly (maitram), that (saḥ) [is] dharma (dharmaḥ)"*** (Mmk 17.1ac)."

The ten wholesome courses of action are the three bodily, the four verbal and the three mental wholesome actions.[471] The verse (Mmk 17.11) states that these courses of action are the means for the accomplishment (*sādhanopāya*) of *dharma*. In that case, the word '*dharma*' does not refer to the same phenomenon as 'the ten wholesome courses of action', and this naturally raises the question of what the difference between these terms might be. Candrakīrti first explains the difference by giving a reference to Mmk 17.1. In that verse, *dharma* was defined as a threefold state of mind (*cetas*), namely a state of mind leading to being self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamaka*), benefiting others (*parānugrāhaka*) and friendly (*maitra*).

Above it was said that the seed *(bīja)* for the result of the action is not the bodily or verbal action carried out following intention (*cetayitvā*), but it is the mind (*citta*), which is concomitant with the wholesome intention (*kuśalacetanāsaṃprayukta*) of deciding to do a particular wholesome action. Therefore, the word *dharma* here refers to this mind, which is concomitant with the wholesome intention, and in that sense "it is a seed for result both after passing away and in this world" (*tad bījam phalasya pretya ceha ca*, Mmk 17.1cd).

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[470] This phrase is inserted in the Tibetan translation (*brjod pa'i phyir ro*).
[471] For a list, cf. fn. 286.

(V315$_1$): Or rather (*atha vā*), [when] having the nature of having been accomplished (*parinisṭhitarūpāḥ*) these (*ete*) ten wholesome courses of action (*daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathā*) are (*bhavanti*) what is meant by the word '*dharma*' (*dharmaśabdavācyāḥ*), whereas (*tu*) [when] having the nature of being in the process of being performed (*kriyamāṇarūpāḥ*) [they] are (*bhavanti*) what is meant by the words 'wholesome courses of action' (*kuśalakarmma-pathaśabdavācyāḥ*).

{Therefore (*tad*),} these (*ete*) ten wholesome courses of action (*daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ*) are established (*vya-vasthāpyante*) as the cause (*hetutvena*) in the production (*niṣpattau*) of this [dharma] (*asya*) having the mentioned characteristics (*uktalakṣaṇasya*).

Clearly, the *santāna*-proponent's explanation of *dharma* (as interpreted by Candrakīrti) is somewhat unusual given that *dharma* in this case would not refer to any concrete wholesome action, such as abstaining from killing and so forth, but only to a state of mind. Hence, in order to underline that this explanation does not directly exclude the ten wholesome courses of action from what is signified by the word *dharma*, the *santāna*-proponent adds a clarification to this point. Since the ten wholesome courses of action are the means for the accomplishment of *dharma*, i.e., the wholesome state of mind, they must precede the *dharma*. Thus, when the ten wholesome courses of action are in the process of being performed, they are referred to as 'the ten wholesome courses of action' (*daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ*), whereas when they have been accomplished, i.e., brought to completion, they are referred to as *dharma*.

The need for such an explanation illustrates a fundamental problem in the theory of *karmaphala*. A wholesome action involves a physical aspect, such as the bodily or verbal action. How can a physical action be aligned with a theory, in which a result is produced in a future life? What aspect of the physical wholesome action would be accumulated in order to produce its

future result? The *santāna*-proponent answers these questions by saying that it is the mind, by which the physical action is done, which is responsible for generating the future result, not the physical action itself, which perishes immediately after having been executed. Based on such a theory, it is therefore necessary to clarify which terms refer to which aspect of the action. Since the terms *kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ* include the physical aspects of action, it is taken as referring to the concrete performance of the action. The word *dharma*, on the other hand, then refers to the mental aspect. The interpretation of the word *dharma* as referring to the mind thus becomes an hermeneutical strategy, whereby the *santāna*-theory may be secured a canonical basis, because the word *dharma* in the sense 'wholesome action' has numerous occurrences in the *sūtras*.

The explanation of *kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ* and *dharma* thus indicates the nuance in meaning, with which each term is imbued. The phrase *kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ* is taken as emphasizing the concrete performance of a wholesome action, whereas the term *dharma* is seen as underlining the accumulative aspect of the wholesome action in the sense that it carries a desirable result in the future, thus setting it akin to the term 'beneficence' (*puṇya*).

(V315$_3$): Furthermore (*punaḥ*), how (*katham*) [do] the ten wholesome courses of action (*daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ*) [fit] into the division of action (*karmmavibhāge*) laid out (*prakrānte*) here?

It is answered (*ucyate*): The three (*trayaḥ*) bodily (*kāyikāḥ*) [and] the four (*catvāraḥ*) verbal (*vācikāś*) {courses of action (*karmapathāḥ*)} have been explained (*vyākhyātāḥ*) by [the verse] beginning with (*ity ādinā*) ***"Speech (vāc), motion (viṣpandaḥ) and (ca) those without abstinence (aviratayaḥ), which (yāḥ) [are] designated non-intimation (avijñaptisaṃjñitāḥ)..."*** (Mmk 17.4). The three (*trayaḥ*) mental [courses of action] (*mānasāḥ*) termed non-covetousness, non-ill-will and right view (*anabhidhyāvyāpādāsamyagdṛṣṭyākhyāḥ*) have been explained (*vyākhyātāḥ*) by this

[line] (*ity anena*) ***"and intention"*** (*cetanā ca*) (Mmk 17.5c). Thus (*ity evam*), all the ten wholesome courses of action (*daśāpi kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ*) have in this case been explained (*atra vyākhyātāḥ*), and (*ca*) they (*te*) are (*bhavanti*) the causes for the production (*niṣpattihetavaḥ*) of *dharma* (*dharmasya*), as has been described above (*yathoditasya*).

Having shown how *dharma* was explained as the threefold state of mind in Mmk 17.1, the *santāna*-proponent goes on to show how *kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ* have likewise already been explained in Mmk 17.2-5. The tenfold *kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ* consists of three groups of action: three bodily (*kāyika*), four verbal (*vācika*) and three mental (*mānasa*). This threefold division of action was presented in Mmk 17.3, where the mental actions were explained as equalling 'intention-action' (*cetanākarman*) and the bodily and verbal actions were explained as equalling 'action following intention' (*cetayitvā karman*). If this threefold division of the tenfold *kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ* were further joined with the sevenfold division of action presented in Mmk 17.4-5, the divisions would interrelate as follows. The three bodily and the four verbal wholesome courses of action are included in the elements (1) speech and (2) motion, being actions that constitute intimations (*vijñapti*) as well as in the element (4) abstention being a non-intimation (*viratayo 'vijñapti*). Since (5) 'beneficence' (*puṇya*) was also explained as a type of wholesome action (*kuśala*), it may be presumed that the three bodily and four verbal wholesome courses of actions would also be included therein. Of course, these wholesome courses of action would not be included in the elements (3) non-abstention being a non-intimation (*aviratayo 'vijñapti*) and (6) 'non-beneficence' (*apuṇya*), because these were explained as unwholesome actions (*akuśala*). The three mental wholesome courses of actions are included in the element (7) intention (*cetanā*).

In this manner, the *santāna*-proponent subsumes all the ten *kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ* under the categories listed and explained in Mmk 17.2-5. According to this interpretation, Mmk 17.1 would therefore constitute a presentation of *dharma* referring to the mind by which the wholesome action is done and from which the mind-series (*cittasantāna*) evolves eventually bringing about the result. Mmk 17.2-5, on the other hand, would constitute a

presentation of the concrete actions carried out by this mind, which as such are not responsible for the generation of the action's result but which only represent various forms in which the wholesome mind displays itself in action. These actions are not just 'actions following intention' (*cetayitvā*), but they are also means (*upāya*) by which a wholesome state of mind (*kuśalacetas*) is accomplished. Thus, these actions are the causes for the production of a wholesome state of mind called *dharma* and it is this *dharma,* which brings about the future desirable result via the mental series (*cittasantāna*).

(V315$_9$): And (*ca*) ***"the result (phalam)"*** of this (*asya*) ***"dharma (dharmasya)"*** [is] ***"the five (pañca) kinds of sensual pleasure (kāmaguṇāḥ),"*** characterised as form, sound, smell, taste and physical sensation (*rūpaśabdagandharasa-spraṣṭavyalakṣaṇāḥ*), [which] is enjoyed (*upabhujyate*) ***"both after passing away (pretya ca),"*** i.e., (*ity arthaḥ*) in another, invisible world (*adṛṣṭe paraloke*), ***"and here (iha ca),"*** i.e., (*ity arthaḥ*) here in [this] world (*ihaloke*)(*iti*)."[472]

Finally, Candrakīrti turns to explaining what constitutes the result of the wholesome state of mind called *dharma.* If related to the presentation of *karmaphala* in Mmk 17.1-5, this would be an explanation of Mmk 17.1cd, in which it was said that the wholesome state of mind called *dharma* is a seed for a result both after passing away and in this world (*tad bījam phalasya pretya ceha ca*). This explanation thus rounds off the *santāna*-proponent's position by completing his cross-referencing to Mmk 17.1-5.

While the result (*phala*) of *dharma* was not specified in Candrakīrti's commentary on Mmk 17.1, it is here defined as the five kinds of sensual pleasure (*pañca kāmaguṇāḥ*). This fivefold division refers to the five

[472] The *iti* at the end of the sentence indicates the end of the answer, which began at Pras 315$_4$ff "It is answered: "the three bodily [and] the four verbal..." (*ucyate| vāg viṣpando 'viratayo...*) and simultanously indicates the end of the presentation by the *santāna*-proponent, which began at Pras 312$_1$.

sense-objects, i.e., form, sound, smell, taste and physical sensation.[473] In CŚV, Candrakīrti likewise defines the desirable sense-objects (*viṣaya iṣṭaḥ*), which are attained by means of wholesome action (*śubha*), as referring to the afore-mentioned five sense-objects.[474] As already explained in the commentary to Mmk 17.1, the result of *dharma* ripens in both the present life as well as in future lives. This is more clearly defined in *Chung lun:* "[Some]one who produces such results in body, speech and mind attain name and wealth in this world, and in the next world is born into a place of honour amongst gods and men" (transl. by BOCKING, 1995:262).[475]

3.5 A Refutation of Santāna as Karmaphalasaṃbandha

(V315$_{12}$): In that such (*evam*) a response to the objection (*ākṣepaparihāre*) has first (*tāvat*) been expressed (*varṇṇite sati*) by some (*ekīyair*), others (*apare*), who are going to extend (*varṇṇayantaḥ*) a response to the objection in another way (*anyathākṣepaparihāram*) after having [first] revealed (*udbhāvya*) the fault (*doṣam*) to them (*tān prati*), say (*ahuḥ*):

"The faults (doṣāḥ) would be (syuḥ) both (ca) many (bahavaḥ) and (ca) great (mahāntaḥ), if (yadi) this

[473] For a detailed presentation of the five sense objects, cf. AK 1.10 with AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1970:32-37; transl. LVP, 1923:16-18).

[474] Cf. CŚV (D129a$_7$) commenting on CŚ 7.20 (cf. LANG, 1986:76), where he, however, also underlines the need for those seeking liberation to abandon these: yul yid du 'oṅ ba gzugs daṅ sgra daṅ dri daṅ ro daṅ reg bya źes bya ba 'dod pa'i yon tan lṅa'i bdag ñid can gaṅ yin pa de ni dge ba'i las kyis 'thob na| de ñid thar pa 'dod pa'i sems can rnams kyis mi gtsaṅ ba bskus pa'i khyim ltar smad par 'gyur ro| |. Transl.: "Although (*na*) the desirable objects called form, sound, smell, taste and physical sensation, which have the five kinds of sensual pleasure as their trait, will be attained by means of wholesome action, they are looked down upon by persons seeking liberation, just like a house stained with impurity." A longer explanation of why they are rejected along with an illustrative story follows in the text. In certain other sources, the five sensual pleasures are understood as dancing (*nāṭya*), singing (*gīta*), speaking (*vādita*), playing instruments (*tūrya*) and [enjoying] women (*striyo*) (cf. EDGERTON, 1953.II:177 *s.v.*).

[475] *Chung lun* (T1564.22b$_{2-4}$): 從身口意生是果報者。得今世名利。後世天人中貴處生. For canonical references to similar explanations, cf. p. 217 above.

> ***(eṣā) idea (kalpanā) would be [the case] (syāt). Therefore (tena), this (eṣā) idea (kalpanā) does not at all (naiva) obtain (upapadyate) here (atra)."*** (Mmk 17.12)

"If (yadi) there would be (syāt)" a response to the consequences of the faults {consisting of the two faults} of eternal[ity] and cutting off (*śāśvatoccheda{doṣadvaya}doṣa-prasaṅgaparihāraḥ*) in the form of a mind-series (*citta-santāne*) due to similarity with a seed and a shoot (*bījāṅku-rasādharmyeṇa*), then (*tadā*) ***"faults (doṣāḥ)"*** are found in the opponent's position (*parapakṣe prāpnuvanti*) that are ***"both (ca) many (bahavaḥ),"*** due to being numerous (*saṃ-khyābahutvena*), ***"and (ca) great (mahāntaḥ),"*** due to contradicting what is seen and what is not seen (*dṛṣṭādṛṣṭa-virodhena*).

The *santāna*-theory was introduced at V312$_1$ as a response (*parihāra*) to the objection (*ākṣepa*) in Mmk 17.6, which shows the consequences (*prasaṅga*) that if the action remains until the time of the ripening of the result, it will go on eternally, whereas if it ceases, it is cut off and cannot produce the result. The *santāna*-theory provided a response to this objection by admitting that the action ceases immediately upon arising but, as it ceases, the mind by which the action is performed produces a mind-series, which ensures the ripening of the result. Its presentation used the growth-stages of a plant as an analogy.

This response will now be refuted by another group of opponents, who are going to give their own response to the objection. None of the commentaries specifies which opponents are intended, but they all merely refer to these opponents as 'others' (*apare, gźan dag*).[476] LAMOTTE (1936: 274) identifies them as belonging to the *Saṃmatīya*-tradition given that they

[476] Except the Chinese translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, where the following refutation is attributed to the author of the [*Madhyamaka*]-*śāstra* (T1566.100b$_{26}$: 論者).

below assert *karmaphalasaṃbandha* in the form of a non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*). LAMOTTE (1936:230, fn. 57) bases this identification on LVP (1929:71), who refers to a mention in *Ch'eng wei-shih-lun shu-chi* (成唯識論述記, T1830.43) stating that that the *Sāṃmatīyas* (*cheng-liang-pu* 正量部) assert a 'non-perishing phenomenon' (**avipraṇāśa, pu-shih* 不失) or 'accumulation' (**upacaya, tseng-chang* 增長) as a non-concomitant phenomenon (**viprayukta, pu-hsiang-ying* 不相應).[477] *Avipraṇāśa* is also briefly explained in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (LAMOTTE, 1936:192, §18; transl. 230-231; MUROJI, 1985:19), which Sumatiśīla in his commentary (D4071. 81b$_{4-5}$) identifies as a view belonging to the **Sāṃmatīya*s (*'phags pa maṅ pos bkur ba'i sde pa dag*). Sumatiśīla (D4071.81b$_4$), however, also says that the **Mahāsaṅghikas* (*dge 'dun phal chen sde pa rnams*) held the same view, using the designation **upacaya* (*bstsags pa*).[478] A stronger argument for identifying the *avipraṇāśa*-thesis particularly with the *Saṃmatīya*-school is that **avipraṇāśa* (*pu-mieh* 不滅) is briefly mentioned in the introduction of the **Saṃmitīyanikāyaśāstra* (**san-mi-ti pu lun* 三彌底部論, T1649. 462a$_{6ff.}$) as will be discussed below, which CHÂU (1999:116-117) with reasonable certainly identifies as a genuine *Saṃmatīya*-treatise. Thus, as the criticism of the *cittasantāna*-theory given in the present verse is linked up with the following presentation of the *avipraṇāśa*-theory, and as this term is linked with the *Saṃmatīya* school, LAMOTTE identified the speaker of this criticism as belonging to that school, although this never is made explicit in the text itself.

In Mmk 17.12, the concept of *santāna* is explicitly rejected by stating that it is unjustifiable, because it entails many and great faults. The root-text, however, does not explain what these faults might be. This could either imply that the refutation of *santāna* was presumed to be well known to the reader or else that the explanation of the faults of the *santāna*-view belonged to

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477 Cf. T1830.43.277a$_7$: 正量部等所說不失增長; transl.: "…the Sāṃmatīyas, who assert a non-perishing phenomenon [or] accumulation." The *Ch'eng wei-shih-lun shu-chi* (T1830) was completed in 651 CE by K'uei-chi (窺基), a disciple of Hsüan-tsang. In his description of the *Saṃmatīya*-school, BAREAU (1955:126) only provides the same reference with regard to *avipraṇāśa*.

478 This is also confirmed by the *ṭīkā* (D3396.123b$_4$; MUROJI, 1985:20) to Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, which states that the *avipraṇāśa* is asser-ted by the **Sāṃmatīyas* (*kun gyis bkur ba*) and **upacaya* is asserted by the **Mahā-saṅghikhas* (*dge 'dun phal chen po*).

an oral commentarial tradition on text. In the latter case, one would expect to find at least a hint thereto in the earliest commentaries. However, both *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:410) and *Chung lun* (T1564.22b$_{8-9}$) state that they are not going to explain these faults. Two faults are, nevertheless, explained in some detail in *Chung lun* (possibly as a later interpolation?). The two faults stated by *Chung lun* differ from the faults mentioned in the later commentarial tradition. The first fault mentioned in *Chung lun* (T1564.22b$_{10-13}$) is that the example does not apply, because a seed is tangible, has shape, is visible and involves a series, but this does not apply to the mind. Secondly, a consequence (*prasaṅga*) is raised (T1564. 22b$_{13-18}$), stating that the problem of whether the cause remains or has ceased at the time of the arising of its result also applies to the example of a seed and shoot.[479]

(V316$_5$): How (*kathaṃ kṛtvā*)? For (*hi*) if (*yadi*) in the example of the seed-series (*bījasaṃtānadṛṣṭānte*) only (*eva*) a series of the rice-shoot and so forth (*śālyaṅkurādisantānaḥ*) evolves (*pravarttate*) from the rice-seed (*śālibījāt*) [and] not (*na*) a [series] of a different kind (*vijātīyaḥ*), and (*ca*) only (*eva*) the rice-fruit (*śāliphalam*) is produced (*upajāyate*) from the series of the rice-shoot and so forth (*śālyaṅkurādi-santānāt*) [and] not (*na*) a *nimba*-fruit (*nimbaphalam*), since it is of a different kind (*bhinnajātīyatvāt*), [then] in the same manner (*evam*) also in this case [of the mind-series] (*ihāpi*) there would be (*syāt*) only (*eva*) a wholesome series (*kuśala-santānaḥ*) from a wholesome mind (*kuśalacittāt*), because [they are] of the same kind (*samānajātīyatvāt*), [and] not (*na*) an unwholesome or indeterminate series (*akuśalāvyākṛta-santānaḥ*), because [they are] of a different kind (*vijātīya-tvāt*). Likewise (*evam*), there would be (*syāt*) only (*eva*) an unwholesome or indeterminate series (*akuśalāvyākṛta-santānaḥ*) from an unwholesome or indeterminate mind

[479] The latter argument occurs in a number of *Madhyamaka*-texts in other contexts, cf. LVP (1931:295).

(*akuśalāvyākṛtacittāt*), [and] not (*na*) any other (*anyaḥ*), on account of it being of a different kind (*bhinnajātīyatvāt*).

Candrakīrti then provides a longer explanation of the faults that follow from the *santāna*-view. This explanation combines the comments found in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* and Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*. Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:226-227) criticises the *santāna*-theory by pointing to the similarity of species that is required in the illustration of the seed and the shoot. Thus, he says, if one plants a mango-seed (*āmra*), there will be a mango-tree and mango-fruits, whereas if one plants a *nimba*-seed, there will be a *nimba*-tree and *nimba*-fruits. The same explanation is adopted by Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:517-518; T1566.100c$_{9\text{-}14}$).[480] In this manner, there are two different kinds of fruit: the mango, which is sweet and delicious, and the *nimba,* which is bitter coming from the *Azadirachta Indica.*[481] The seed thus always belongs to a particular species and will always produce its fruit accordingly.[482] Candrakīrti gives the same explanation, but changes the example of a mango-seed to that of a rice-seed (*śālibīja*). This is undoubtedly done to align the explanation with the illustration used by the *santāna*-proponents above, although it somewhat disturbs the clear botanical contrasts between a mango and a *nimba* found in Buddhapālita's explanation.

In Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* this explanation of the illustration is first applied to the species of the mind-series, i.e., whether the *cittasantāna* is that of a human or another being, whereafter it is stated also to apply to whether the *cittasantāna* is wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate. In *Prajñāpradīpa*, the order of this application is reversed, so that the explanation of the illustration is first applied to whether the *cittasantāna* is wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate. Candrakīrti has adopted *Prajñāpradīpa*'s order of explanation.

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[480] In *Pang jo teng lun*, the explanation attested in *Chung lun* is interpolated before the actual explanation of *Prajñāpradīpa.*

[481] For the *nimba*-plant used as a bitter illustration of *akuśala*, cf. AN 5.211-212 (HARDY, 1900; transl. WOODWARD, 1936:150), echoed at AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1971:749; transl. LVP, 1924:246). For a botanical description of this tree with illustrations, cf. http://www.hear.org/pier/azind.htm

[482] Cf. also the statement of the identity in species of the seed and the sprout in **Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (fn. 240 above).

Just as the seed is of a particular species, the mind from which the *cittasantāna* evolves must be of a particular kind, namely wholesome (*kuśala*), unwholesome (*akuśala*) or indeterminate (*avyākṛta*). This distinction is required in order to justify which states of mind would lead to desirable results and vice versa, since a wholesome mind is defined as that which yields a desirable result, etc.[483] As explained above (p. 281), the intention (*cetanā*) with which the mind is concomitant determines whether the mind (*citta*) is wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate. From a rice-seed only a rice-plant and its fruit can evolve and never another plant or fruit. Similarly, from a wholesome mind only a wholesome mind-series and its desirable fruit can evolve, never an unwholesome or indeterminate mind-series.

This critique might not constitute a problem, if it were not for the fact that the early *Sautrāntikas*, as almost all other early Buddhist schools,[484] only accept the possibility of one instance of mind (*cittakṣaṇa*) in any given moment. Mind is here understood very concretely as referring to the five sense perceptions or the processing of perception by the *manas*, and therefore only involves the theory of six types of consciousness (*vijñāna*). The consequence of this is that any given individual only can have a single mind-series.[485] If there would be two simultaneous mind-series, it would follow that there would be two separate individuals, each having his or her own series of perceptions. This point seems so obvious to Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti in the given context that it did not even need to be mentioned in their comments. Thus, if a given moment of wholesome mind (*kuśalacitta*) can only produce a wholesome mind-series (*kuśalacitta-santāna*), it follows that this individual can never acquire an unwholesome or indeterminate mind or mind-series as long as the wholesome mind-series remains. In this sense, the *santāna*-theory contradicts the distinctions between wholesome, unwholesome, indeterminate and unobscured states of

[483] Cf. the explanation of *kuśala* given above on p. 190, particularly fn. 271.

[484] The *Mahāsaṅghikas* may perhaps constitute an exception; cf. SCHMITHAUSEN (1967:113, fn. 19); cf. also SCHMITHAUSEN (1969a:817).

[485] SCHMITHAUSEN (1967:113) has referred to this as the view of a single-layered mind-stream (*ein 'einschichtigen' Erkenntnisstrom*). SCHMITHAUSEN (ibid.) argues that this is also implicit in the *Sautrāntika*-explanation found on *santāna* in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (for textual references, cf. the former passage mentioned above, fn. 439).

mind and the variety of states in which these result.[486]

(V316$_9$): From the minds of [beings in] the desire-, material or immaterial world-spheres or those that are without negative influence (*kāmarūpārūpyāvacarānāśravacittebhyaḥ*) there would be (*syāt*) arising (*utpādaḥ*) only (*eva*) of similar (*sadṛśānām*) minds (*cittānām*) of the desire-, material or immaterial world-spheres or that are without negative influence (*kāmarūpārūpyāvacarānāśravāṇām*), not (*na*) [arising] of those of a different kind (*bhinnajātīyānām*).

Having explained, as the first consequence, that the *santāna*-theory would contradict the distinction of *kuśala, akuśala* and *avyākṛta*, Candrakīrti mentions, as a second consequence, that it would also contradict the change between states of mind associated with each of the three spheres (*dhātu*) of *saṃsāra* as well as states of mind not associated with *saṃsāra*, i.e., states without negative influence (*anāśrava*).[487] In other words, the *santāna*-view would contradict transmigration and liberation. Candrakīrti adopts this consequence from Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:518; T1566.100c$_{14\text{-}16}$), who added it to the explanation given by Buddhapālita.

The logic applied to this consequence is the same as that applied to the first consequence of *santāna*. Since the cause and result must be of a similar kind, a *cittasantāna* evolving from a mind belonging to the desire-world-sphere (*kāmadhātu*) can only belong to the desire-world-sphere; a *cittasantāna* evolving from a mind belonging to the material world-sphere (*rūpadhātu*) can only belong to the material world-sphere, and so forth. This consequence again implies the premise that an individual can only have a single mind-series at any given moment.

[486] JAINI (1959:238-239) also raises this problem in general terms, but then – without taking the *santāna*-problem into account – explains what he calls the *Sautrāntika*-theory of seeds (*bīja*) as their solution to this problem.

[487] For a list of the three world-spheres of *saṃsāra* along with their subdivisions, cf. Candrakīrti's **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (D259a$_6$-259b$_6$; LINDTNER, 1979:131$_{1\text{-}29}$).

($V316_{11}$): From a human mind (*manuṣyacittāt*) there would be (*syāt*) only (*eva*) a human mind (*manuṣyacittam*) [and] not (*na*) the mind of another [kind of being], such as a god, hell-being, starving ghost or an animal (*devanārakapreta-tiryagādyanyacittam*).

A third consequence applying the same logic is that a *cittasantāna* evolving from the mind of a human can only be human, etc. That is to say, the *santāna*-view would also contradict transmigration within the five or six courses of rebirth (*gati*) within the desire-world-sphere (*kāmadhātu*).

Candrakīrti adopts this consequence from *Prajñāpradīpa*, where it is mentioned in the same order as found in Pras. Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:227), which is the first among the extant commentaries to mention this consequence, explains it as its first consequence.

($V316_{11}$): And (*ca*), therefore (*tataḥ*), who (*yaḥ*) [is] a god (*devaḥ*), he (*saḥ*) would be (*syāt*) only (*eva*) a god; who (*yaḥ*) [is] a human (*manuṣyaḥ*), he (*saḥ*) would be (*syāt*) only (*eva*) a human (*manuṣyaḥ*) and so forth (*ityādiḥ*). And (*ca*), therefore (*tataḥ*), even (*api*) for gods and men (*devamanuṣyā-ṇām*), who are doing (*kurvatām*) what is unwholesome (*akuśalam*), there would be (*syāt*) neither (*na*) diversity in terms of [their] course of rebirth, type of birth, class, intelligence, faculties, strength, beauty, wealth and so forth (*gatiyonivarṇṇabuddhīndriyabalarūpabhogādivaicitryam*) nor (*ca*) downfall into a state of misery (*apāya-patanam*).

Summing up the undesired consequences, Candrakīrti then states that each kind of sentient being would always have to remain the same, life after life, because his or her *cittasantāna* would always be of that particular kind. This would contradict the entire doctrine of *karmaphala*, because even someone committing unwholesome actions would neither experience any change in his next lives with regard to his course of rebirth (*gati*), type of birth (*yoni*), class (*varṇṇa*), intelligence (*buddhi*), sense- and other faculties (*indriya*),

physical strength (*bala*), beauty (*rūpa*), wealth (*bhoga*) and so forth nor would he experience downfall into a state of misery (*apāyapatana*), i.e., a bad course of rebirth (*durgati*).[488] This list of diversity (*vaicitrya*) is based on a similar list found in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:227). It is not given by Bhāvaviveka, but is interestingly mentioned by Avalokitavrata (D3859.III.33b$_{5-6}$) in the same form as found in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti*.

(V316$_{14}$): However (*ca*), all this (*etat sarvam*) is not (*na*) accepted (*iṣyate*). Hence (*iti*), since (*yasmāt*) in this manner (*evam*) both (*ca*) many (*bahavaḥ*) and (*ca*) great (*mahāntaḥ*) faults (*doṣāḥ*) follow (*prasajyante*) when one conceives [of a mind-series] as analogous to the series [coming from] a seed (*bījasantānasādharmyakalpanāyām*), therefore (*tasmāt*) ***"this (eṣa) idea (kalpanā) is not (na) tenable (upapadyate) in this case (atra)."***

Such consequences, which contradict fundamental tenets of *karmaphala*, transmigration and the various states of *saṃsāra*, are obviously unacceptable to Buddhists. Hence, since the *santāna*-theory would entail such consequences, the root-verse states that it is untenable.

As stated above, the root-text and the earliest commentaries do not specify the faults incurred by the *santāna*-theory. It is, therefore, not possible to know for sure, whether the consequences described by Buddhapālita and elaborated by Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti are the faults intended by Nā-

[488] For an explanation of *gati*, cf. above fn. 290. There are four types of birth (*yoni*, *skye gnas*). These are listed in the *Saṅgītisuttanta* (DN 3.230; transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1921:222): egg-born (*aṇḍaja*), womb-born (*jalābuja*), moisture-born (*saṃsedaja*) and spontaneous [birth] (*opapātika*). For some further references to the Pāli-literature, cf. RHYS DAVIDS & STEDE (1921-1925:559). For an explanation of these four types of birth, cf. *Saṅgītiparyāya* 4.29 (STACHE-ROSEN, 1968:110). As indicated by DIETZ (1994:303-304), the explanation found in *Saṅgītiparyāya* is repeated in *Kāraṇaprajñaptiśāstra* (D4087.159b$_2$-160b$_2$) and AK 3.8cd with AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1971:401-402; transl. LVP, 1926:26-28). 'Class' (*varṇa*, lit. 'colour') may both signify race or species within a given kind of rebirth, such as various kinds of animals, or social group (caste) within the human realm (cf. RHYS DAVIDS & STEDE, 1921-1925:596-597, s.v. *vaṇṇa*).

gārjuna.[489] Buddhapālita (c. 470-540 CE)[490] could perhaps have adopted his *santāna*-critique from Saṅghabhadra (4^{th}-5^{th} century CE)[491], who provides an extensive and partly similar *santāna*-critique in **Nyāyānusāraśāstra.*[492] The context of the *santāna*-critique in **Nyāyānusāraśāstra* is a defense of the *Sarvāstivāda*-entity called 'possession' (*prāpti*),[493] which is a conditioned phenomenon not concomitant with the mind (*cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra*). It may be noted that the non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*), which the *Sāṃmatīyas* are going to assert below (Mmk 17.14) is also considered to be non-concomitant with the mind (*viprayukto dharmaḥ,* V317$_{7-8}$).[494]

This particular form of argument in defence of the non-concomitant phenomena (*viprayukta*) can also be found in a much older source, namely *Kathāvatthu* (DOWLING, 1976:62). In *Kathāvatthu* XI.1 and XIV.4, the *Sāṃmatīyas* and *Mahāsaṅghikas* argue that *kuśala* and *akuśala* could not follow one upon the other, unless it is admitted that they are independent from or non-concomitant with the mind (*cittavippayuttā*).[495]

As argued above, the *santāna*-critique found in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti*, *Prajñāpradīpa* and Pras is directed against the 'single-layered' *santāna*-model associated with the early *Sautrāntika*-school, for it entails the premise that an individual can only possess a single mind-series. The mind with which an action is performed functions as the seed (*bīja*) for a mind-series (*citta-santāna*), and only the mind-series constitutes the connection between the action and the result (*karmaphalasaṃbandha*). Another way for the *Sau-*

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[489] SCHAYER (1931b:85, fn.) suggests another logically possible critique of the *santāna*, which partly seems to agree with the critique raised in *Chung lun* (cf. p. 295 above), namely that it is not possible to establish unity between the individual moments of the series.

[490] Date according to SAITO (1984.I:ix).

[491] Date according to COX (1995:53).

[492] T1562.29.397c$_6$ff; transl. by COX (1995:191-193). As also indicated by JAINI (1959:243), this passage is partly extant as a Sanskrit-quotation in *Sputārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (ŚĀSTRI, 1970:218$_{16-23}$; WOGIHARA, 1932:147$_{8f.}$).

[493] Regarding *prāpti*, cf. fn. 420 above.

[494] Yet, *Saṅghabhadra* (T1562.29.398b$_{28-29}$; transl. COX, 1995:197), as a *Sarvāstivādin,* considers his refutation of *santāna* equally to refute other types of *karmaphalasaṃbandha*, including **avipraṇāśa* (*pu-shih* 不失) and **upacaya* (*tseng-chang* 增長).

[495] Cf. *Kathāvatthu* XI.1 (TAYLOR, 1897:445ff.; transl. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:253-255) and *Kathāvatthu* XIV.4 (op.cit:491-493; transl. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:282-283). The former passage is in the commentary (JAYAWICKRAMA, 1979:129) attributed to the *Mahāsaṅghikas* and *Sammitiyas*, while the latter passage (op.cit:147) is attributed to the *Mahāsaṅghikas.*

trāntikas to explain the same process is to say that the intention (*cetanā*) functions as an influence (*vāsana* or *bhāvanā*) on the mind-series, whereby the impregnated mind-series functions as the connection between the action and the result.[496] Since this theory suggests that it is the mind-series, which functions as the *karmaphalasaṃbandha*, it was referred to above (p. 267) as 'the *santāna*-theory'.

Instead of positing that the mind itself in the form of the 'single-layered' *cittasantāna* functions as the *karmaphalasaṃbandha*, it is also possible to assert that each action generates a separate phenomenon, which can serve as the *karmaphalasaṃbandha*. In that case, this phenomenon (*dharma* may be either non-concomitant with the mind (*cittaviprayukta*) or concomitant with the mind (*cittasaṃprayukta*). One such theory positing a phenomenon that is non-concomitant with the mind, namely a non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*), will be discussed below.[497] This theory was referred to above (p. 267) as the *avipraṇāśa*-theory. Given that the *santāna*- and *avipraṇāśa*-theories are mentioned side by side in Mmk (being an early extant source for the *karmaphalasaṃbandha*-problem), and that both these theories receive occasional mention in various early sources, it seems plausible that these two theories developed simultaneously within different Buddhist doctrinal traditions.

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[496] Cf. for example *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (LAMOTTE, 1936:192, §20; transl. 232; MUROJI, 1985:21).

[497] At least three other names for such phenomena that function as *karmaphalasaṃbandha* are attested in the extant sources. The first is a 'subsidiary element' (**anudhātu, sui-chieh* 隨界). **Anudhātu* is, for example, mentioned in a list of phenomena functioning as *karmaphalasaṃbandha* in Saṅghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (T1562.29.398b$_{28}$; transl. COX, 1995:197; cf. fn. 494 above). The second is 'accumulation' (*upacaya, tseng-chang* 增長, *brtseg* or *bstsag*). It is also mentioned in the list found in **Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (cf. fn. 494). It is stated in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* that some call this phenomenon **upacaya*, while others call it **avipraṇāśa*, and Sumatiśīla states to this in his commentary that the *Mahāsaṅghikas* posited such a non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa, chud mi za ba*) using the designation *upacaya* (cf. p. 294 above). *Upacaya* is discussed in *Kathāvatthu* XV.11, where, according to the later commentary (JAYAWICKRAMA, 1979:158), the *Andhakas* and *Sammatiyas* are said to distinguish *kamma* from *kammūpacaya* (cf. fn. 263 above). The third is called 'the mark of the result' (*phalacihnabhūta, kuo-yin hsien-hsiang* 果因先相, T1562.29.333b$_{24}$, or *kuo-yin hsien-chao* 果因先兆, T1558.2936c$_{28}$). It is attested in **Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (T1562) and AKBh (cf. fn. 410 above). It is uncertain exactly what these terms signify in early Buddhism and whether they refer to different theories or are wholly or partly synonymous.

There were also Buddhist scholars, who asserted that a separate phenomenon generated by each action is associated with the mind (*cittasaṃprayukta*). Thus, certain late *Sautrāntikas* and the *Yogācāras* claimed that each action generates a seed (*bīja*) or 'impression' (*vāsana*), which functions as the link between the action and its result (*karmaphalasaṃbandha*). Above (p. 267), this view was referred to as the *bīja*-theory. The *bīja*-theory differs from the *santāna*-theory in that it is not the *santāna*, which functions as *karmaphalasaṃbandha*, but it is a separate phenomenon called *bīja* that functions as such.

The *bīja*-theory raises what may perhaps be referred to as the *āśraya*-problem, viz. the problem of the basis (*āśraya*) for the action and the result (*karmaphala*) or **karmaphalāśraya*. The *saṃbandha*-problem concerns the connection between the action and the result. The *āśraya*-problem, on the one hand, concerns the unity between the doer of the action (*kartṛ*) and the enjoyer of its result (*bhoktṛ*) and, on the other hand, in some theories, also concerns the locus for the *karmaphalasaṃbandha*. In the brāhmiṇic *Vaiśeṣika-* and *Nyāya*-traditions, the *karmaphalasaṃbandha* is explained as an 'invisible force' (*adṛṣṭa*), and the *āśraya*, which provides the unity of the doer (*kartṛ*) and enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*), is the Self (*ātman*). In the brāhmiṇic *Mīmāṃsa-* and *Vedānta*-schools, the *karmaphalasaṃbandha* is the 'unprecedented efficacy' (*apūrva*), and the *āśraya* is again the Self (*ātman*).[498] Thus, here it may be indicated that the *saṃbandha*-problem was actual for the Brahmans, whereas the *āśraya*-problem was of little relevance given their basic tenet of a Self. In Buddhism, on the other hand, both problems required explanation, since a Self was rejected by most Buddhist schools.[499]

In the *santāna*-theory, the problems of *saṃbandha* and *āśraya* are not clearly distinguished. The *cittasantāna* constitutes both the *karmaphalasaṃbandha* as well as the *karmaphalāśraya*. That is to say, the *cittasantāna* serves both as the connection between the action and the result and simultaneously ensures the unity or continuity between the doer and the enjoyer. In the *Saṃmatīya avipraṇāśa*-theory, the non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*), which is non-concomitant with the mind (*cittaviprayukta*), serves as the *karmaphalasaṃbandha*, whereas either the mind-series or the 'indivi-

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[498] Regarding these Hindu-theories, cf. fn. 435 above.

[499] Regarding *karmaphala* and no-self (*anātman*) in Buddhism, cf. fn. 226 above.

dual' (*pudgala*), which is the entity constituting the person, who is neither the same as nor different from the five aggregates (*skandha*), serves as the basis (*āśraya*) for *karmaphala*.[500] That is to say, it is the mind-series or the *pudgala*, which ensures the unity between the doer and the enjoyer. As will be shown below, the series of the aggregates or the mind-series serves as the locus for the *avipraṇāśa*.

In the *bīja*-theory, the *bīja* serves as the *karmaphalasaṃbandha*, whereas the mind-series (*cittasantāna*) serves as the basis (*āśraya*) for *karmaphala*. Thus, according to the late *Sautrāntika* and the *Yogācāra*-view, the mind-series ensures the individual's unity or continuity between the doer and the enjoyer. Simultaneously, the mind-series serves as the ontological basis for the *bījas*, because the mind-series offers a locus for the *bījas*, i.e., the mind-series is the container for the *bījas*. Since the five types of sense-consciousness and the mental consciousness cannot ensure this unity in that they are not constantly present, a separate aspect of mind is asserted by these schools to explain the function of *āśraya*, namely the base-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*).[501] The *ālayavijñāna* is that, which possesses the *bījas* (*sarvabījaka*), i.e., it is the receptacle for the *bījas*. In this context, it must be underlined that *ālayavijñāna* is not a type of *karmaphalasaṃbandha*, but *ālayavijñāna* serves as the basis or container for *karmaphalasaṃbandha*.[502] Given the terminological similarity, it seems plausible that the *bīja*-theory developed diachronically from the *santāna*-theory, although this is very difficult to establish with certainty. In early *Yogācāra*-works, such as *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Viṃśatikā*,[503] and in late *Sautrāntika*-works, such as *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*,[504] both theories occur.

The *bīja*-theory is not discussed in Mmk and, therefore, Candrakīrti does not mention or discuss it in chapter 17 of Pras, for which reason it is also not treated in detail here. At the end of chapter 17 of Pras, Candrakīrti states that Mav may be consulted for further refutations regarding *karma*-

[500] Regarding the *pudgala*, cf. chapter nine of AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1987:1189-1233; transl. LVP, 1931:227-302).

[501] Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN (1987:111) and KRITZER (1999:206).

[502] Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN, (1967:133; 1987:110-111).

[503] Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN (1967:129), SCHMITHAUSEN (1969a:817-818), SCHMITHAUSEN (1987:178) and KRITZER (1999:99).

[504] Cf. LAMOTTE (1936:198-202, §§33-40; transl. 247-255; MUROJI, 1985:39-51).

phalasaṃbandha. This seems to be a reference to Candrakīrti's *karmaphala-saṃbandha*-critique in Mav 6.39-97 (MavBh, D3862.260a$_2$-283a$_4$; LVP, 1907-1912:125$_{19}$-202$_5$). The major part of the critique found in Mav concerns the *bīja*-theory and a refutation of the *ālayavijñāna*.

3.6 Avipraṇāśa as Karmaphalasaṃbandha

> (V317$_1$): ***"I will instead (punaḥ) explain (pravakṣyāmi) the following (imām) idea (kalpanām), which (yā) [can be] applied (yojyate) in this case (atra) [and which is] taught (anuvarṇṇitāṃ) by the awakened ones (buddhaiḥ), the self-awakened ones (pratyekabuddhaiḥ) and (ca) the listeners (śrāvakaiḥ)."*** (Mmk 17.13)

Having refuted the *santāna*-theory, it is stated in Mmk 17.13 that the proper explanation now will be given. This is the explanation, which was taught by the *buddhas, pratyekabuddhas* and *śrāvakas*. None of the commentaries comments on this verse. However, it seems that it may be interpreted in at least two ways. First, it could be presumed that this verse is spoken by the opponent, i.e., the *avipraṇāśa*-proponent, who is probably a *Sāṃmatīya* as stated above. This is how the verse is interpreted by all the commentaries, because all the commentaries introduce Mmk 17.21 as a refutation of the preceding verses presenting the *avipraṇāśa*-view. In that case, it may be asked why the opponent needs to refer to the *buddhas, pratyekabuddhas* and *śrāvakas* when introducing his view. A reasonable explanation would be that he makes this reference to lend authority to his view, since he could not allow himself simply to take it for granted that the reader knew this view to be taught in the *sūtras*. In other words, the opponent's reference to scriptural authority (*āgama*) could indicate that his view was not commonly accepted. This would also be supported by the extreme lack of sources describing this view, which will be discussed below.

Secondly, it could be presumed that this verse is not spoken by an

opponent but by Nāgārjuna himself.[505] Such an interpretation could be supported by the use of the first person in this verse, but this is not supported by the commentaries. The verse-structure in the remainding part of the chapter does not necessarily imply a refutation of the *avipraṇāśa*-view as it is interpreted by the commentaries. Verses Mmk 17.13-20 merely present the *avipraṇāśa*-concept in general terms. Mmk 17.21 onwards show that actions can be non-perishing only if they are unarisen. It is thus possible to read the latter part of the chapter in such a way that the *avipraṇāśa*-view is not rejected but merely (re)interpreted in a way, which agrees with the *Madhyamaka*-view. In that case, the reference to the *buddhas, pratyekabuddhas* and *śrāvakas* in the present verse (Mmk 17.13) would merely serve to alert the reader that the author now is going to present his own view. However, such an interpretation is quite conjectural. It is very difficult to interpret the verses of Mmk as to who says what and perhaps it is also of little consequence. It may be established as a fact that all the commentaries imply verses Mmk 17.13-20 to be spoken by an opponent and this was the interpretation, which became important for the ensuing textual tradition.

(V317$_3$) [The interlocutor] says (*ity āha*): "And (*ca*) what (*kā*) [is] this (*asau*) idea (*kalpanā*)?"

> ***"As (yathā) a promissory note (patram),[506] so (tathā) [is] the non-perishing (avipraṇāśaḥ), and (ca) the action (karma) [is] like (iva) a debt (ṛṇam). It (saḥ) [is] fourfold (caturvidhaḥ) in terms of world-sphere (dhātutaḥ) and (ca) it (saḥ) [is] indeterminate (avyākṛtaḥ) by nature (prakṛtyā)."*** (Mmk 17.14)

All the commentaries introduce verse Mmk 17.14 with a phrase similar to that found in Pras, namely that the verse is an answer to the question of what this idea (*kalpanā*) could be. The verse introduces the term 'the non-peri-

[505] This is, for example, how the verse is interpreted by KALUPAHANA (1986:249).

[506] On its own, *patra* or *pattra* only means 'document' but it is explained in the commentary below to have the specified meaning of 'promissory note' (*ṛṇapatra*).

shing' (*avipraṇāśa*),[507] which as shown above (p. 293) is a concept associated with the *Saṃmatīya*-school.

It is often stated in the canonical scriptures that actions are non-perishing.[508] The most often-quoted scriptural authority (*āgama*) in this context is this verse from *Vinayavastu:* "Actions do not perish (*na praṇaśyanti*) even after hundreds of aeons. Having reached completeness [of the right conditions] and the [right] time, [they] certainly yield fruit for the incarnate beings."[509] Likewise, it is stated in *Vinayavastu* that the result of action will be experienced, because actions are non-perishing.[510] Further, it is repeatedly stated in various *Mahāyānasūtras* and *–śāstras* that wholesome or unwholesome actions (*kuśalākuśala*) are non-perishing.[511] There is thus an

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[507] *Avipraṇāśa* is translated in at least three ways into Chinese: *pu-shih* (不失), *pu-mieh* (不滅) and *pu-shih-huai* (不失壞). In Tibetan, it is translated as *chud mi za ba* or *rnam par ma źig pa.*

[508] For a number of references to the Pāli-canon, cf. MCDERMOTT (1984:17).

[509] The verse occurs at least twice in the Sanskrit text of the *Vinayavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādins* (BAGCHI, 1967:67, 241): na praṇaśyanti karmāṇi api kalpaśatair api| sāmagrīṃ prāpya kālaṃ ca phalanti khalu dehinām||. In the Tibetan version of *Vinayavastu,* it occurs 19 times (D1.I.41a$_{2}$, 44b$_{7}$-45a$_{1}$, 90a$_{7}$-90b$_{1}$, 114b$_{4\text{-}5}$, 116a$_{5}$; D1.II.7a$_{6}$, 44b$_{5\text{-}6}$, 192b$_{6}$; D1.III.110b$_{2\text{-}3}$, 208b$_{3\text{-}4}$, 228b$_{7}$-229a$_{1}$; D1.IV.50a$_{4}$, 75b$_{1\text{-}2}$, 110b$_{2}$, 140b$_{2}$, 141a$_{5}$, 210a$_{2}$, 217a$_{1}$, 217a$_{7}$-217b$_{1}$; critical edition by EIMER, 1983.II:107, 112, 117, 235, 295, 299): las rnams bskal pa brgyar yaṅ ni||chud mi za ba'aṅ tshogs daṅ dus||rñed na lus can rnams la ni||'bras bu dag tu 'gyur ba ñid||. The *Divyāvadāna,* which generally incorporates certain materials from *Vinayavastu,* attests the Sanskrit-verse nine times, wherein the reading *kalpakoṭiśatair api* is attested in lieu of *api kalpaśatair api* (COWELL & NEIL, 1886:54, 131, 141, 191, 282, 311, 504, 582, 584; VAIDYA, 1959:33, 82, 88, 118, 175, 192, 439, 490, 491). The verse is often quoted in the later *śāstra*-literature, e.g., *Vinayavastuṭikā* (D4113.232b$_{6}$), *Āgamakṣudrakavyākhyāna* (D4115.73b$_{5}$), *Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣyaratnālokālaṃkāra* (D3935.228b$_{4\text{-}5}$), *Madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarkajvālā* (D3856.188b$_{5}$), Parahita's **Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti* (D3868.355a$_{7}$), ŚSV (D3867.314a$_{5\text{-}6}$), Pras 324$_{1\text{-}2}$, CŚV (D3865.150b$_{1\text{-}2}$), *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (LVP, 1901-1914:468), *Munimatālaṃkarā* (D3903.110a$_{7}$-110b$_{1}$) and *Karmavibhaṅga* (D3959.312b$_{1\text{-}2}$).

[510] This is stated in five verses, wherein *pādas* ab differ but *pādas* cd remain the same. The first occurrence is at *Vinayavastu* D1.II.290a$_{2}$: btsun pa bdag gis sdig pa ni||gaṅ bgyis dran pa 'di lags te||las rnams chud mi za bas na||de yi 'bras bu ñams su myoṅ||. Transl.: "Venerable sir, which unfortunate action has been done by me, that is recollected. Since actions are non-perishing, their result will be experienced." The same verse occurs at D1.II.295a$_{4}$ reading *mi dge ba* in lieu of *sdig pa ni* in pāda a. The other versions of this verse, wherein *pādas* ab differ, occur at D1.II.302b$_{6}$, 305b$_{4\text{-}5}$ and 307a$_{4}$.

[511] Some examples now follow, but the list is not exhaustive. *Āryapitāputrasamāgamasūtra* (D60. 140b$_{3\text{-}4}$): las rnams chud mi za źiṅ rnam par smin pa myoṅ bar mṅon pa yaṅ yod de|; T310.11.417c$_{12\text{-}13}$: 見所作業及受果報皆不失壞; transl.: "Actions are non-perishing and the experiencing of their ripening is also evident." The sentence is repeated with minor variants several times in the *sūtra.* *Āryalalitavistarasūtra* verse 26.33d (VAIDYA, 1958:304;

abundance of canonical references for the view that actions are non-perishing (*avipraṇāśa*), although the word 'non-perishing' never seems to have been used in the technical sense, in which it is here employed by the *Sāṃmatīyas*. As will be explained below, non-perishing (*avipraṇāśa*) for the *Sāṃmatīyas* is a separate phenomenon created by the action, which func-

D95.201a$_7$, in the ACIP-edition folio 327a$_6$): na ca karma naśyati kṛtaṃ hy aśubhaṃ śubhaṃ vā| |; transl.: "And a performed white or non-white action does not perish." *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (RAHDER, 1926:74): sa karmaṇāṃ ... svarasakṣaṇakṣīṇabhaṅgopacayāvipraṇāśaphalānusandhitāṃ ...[prajānāti]; transl.: "He [knows] the actions' connections with non-perishing results, accumulations [issue] from moments that are ceasing and destroyed by their own inclination." *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra* (D176.275a$_2$): dge sdig las ci'aṅ chud mi za źes gsuṅ gis ston| |; transl. by LAMOTTE (1962:106): "...mais, bon (*kuśala*) ou mauvais (*akuśala*), aucun acte (*karman*) ne périt: tel est ton enseignement." English translation: "...but whether good (*kuśala*) or bad (*akuśala*), no action (*karman*) perishes; such is your teaching." *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (D106.81a$_{3-4}$; LAMOTTE, 1935:156): ...las dge ba daṅ| mi dge ba chud mi za ba de la...; transl. (LAMOTTE, 1935:263): "[Le *tadāśritya pratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa* (inference) consiste à saisir]...la persistence des actes purs et impurs...". English translation: "[The *tadāśritya pratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa* (inference) consists of knowing the non-perishing of pure and impure actions." As indicated by CABEZÓN (1992:504, note 984), *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* verse 20-21.10b (LÉVI, 1907:177; BAGCHI, 1970:169; the Sanskrit text is corrected here according to the Otani-mss): śūnyatāṃ paramām etya karmanāśe vyavasthitiḥ|; transl.: "After he has understood the highest emptiness [on the first *bhūmi*], he establishes himself in [the idea of] the non-perishing of action [on the second *bhūmi*]" (for a transl. based on the Sanskrit-text of LÉVI, cf. LÉVI, 1911:289). The prose-commentary to the verse explains *pāda* b (LÉVI, ibid; BAGCHI, 1970:170): dvitīyāyāṃ [bhūmau] karmaṇām avipraṇāśavyavasthānaṃ kuśalākuśalakarmapathatatphalavaicitryajñānāt|; transl. LEVI (1911: 290): "Dans la seconde [Terre], on classe les Actes au point de vue de la non-perdition; on connait toutes les nuances des Sentiers d'Actes bons ou mauvais et des fruit afférents." English translation: "On the second bhūmi, one determines actions from the point of view of non-perishing; one knows all the nuances of the courses of good or bad action and their related results." *Sūtrasamuccaya* (D3934.151a$_{4-5}$) quoting from *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* (PĀSĀDIKA, 1997): de dkar po daṅ| nag po'i las rnams kyi rnam par smin pa chud mi za bar rig nas srog gi phyir yaṅ mi bya ba mi byed do źes gsuṅs so| |; transl.: "Knowing that the ripening of white and black actions does not perish, [they] do not do what should not be done even for the sake of [their own] lives" (for a different transl., cf. PĀSĀDIKA, ibid.). *Śālistambakārikā* (SCHOENING, 1995:538): rgyu daṅ de bźin rkyen rnams ni| |ṅar 'dzin la sogs bral ba ste| |rgyu daṅ rkyen ni tshogs pa las| |las kyi 'bras bu chud za med| |; transl. by SCHOENING (1995:345-346): "Causes and likewise conditions are devoid of grasping at "I" and so forth; from a complex of causes and conditions the result of karma is not barren." Finally, in **Bodhisattvacaryāvatārasaṃskāra* (D3874.77a$_5$), *Kuśaladeva* comments on Śāntideva's *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* 6.72cd by saying that actions were taught as non-perishing (before producin their results) to explain the connection between the earlier and later moments of the mind-series: da ni sems skad cig ma'i rgyun du gnas pa sṅa phyi'i 'brel pa la dgoṅs nas las chud mi za bar ston par mdzad pa yin no| |. Translation: "Having considered the connection between the earlier and later moments that exist in the mind-stream, action are now shown to be non-perishing."

tions as the link between the action and its result (*karmaphalasaṃbandha*).

In the verse (Mmk 17.14), the non-perishing is compared to a promissory note (*ṛṇapatra*), i.e., the document (*patra*) that is signed when taking a loan (*ṛṇa*). The action (*karman*), on the other hand, is compared to a debt or loan (*ṛṇa*). This comparison also has a canonical basis. In the Chinese translation of the **Siṃhacandrajātaka* (T176, *shih-tzu-yüeh fu-pen-sheng-ching* 師子月佛本生經), an *arhant* compares action to a shadow that always follows one's body,[512] where after he says the following verse: "Action can adorn the body; it follows one from here or there into any course of rebirth. The non-perishing phenomenon is like a promissory note; action is like a creditor."[513] In this verse, the non-perishing phenomenon (*pu-shih fa* 不失法) is compared to a promissory note (*hsüan* 券), while action (*yeh* 業) is compared to a creditor (*fu-ts'ai-jen* 負財人), which is very close to Mmk 17.14's comparison of *avipraṇāśa* to a promissory note and action to a debt.[514] Mmk 17.14 finally states that the *avipraṇāśa* is fourfold in terms of the world-sphere (*dhātu*) with which it is associated and that it is indeterminate or morally neutral (*avyākṛta*) by nature.

While there thus is a relatively strong canonical basis for *avipraṇāśa* in its non-technical use, there is only very meagre scriptural basis for

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[512] The comparison of *karman* to a shadow is also known from *Milindapañha;* cf. fn. 445 above.

[513] T176.3.444c$_{11-12}$: 業能莊嚴身 處處隨趣趣 不失法如券 業如負財人. The *jātaka* was translated into Chinese in the same period as *Chung lun* (early 5th century). The *jātaka* does not elsewhere speak of the non-perishing phenomenon (*pu-shih fa* 不失法), which either indicates that the author presumes the reader to be familiar with this term or that the passage is an interpolation. If it is an interpolation, it could have been incorporated into the Sanskrit original of the text, possibly adapted from the same source used by Nāgārjuna in Mmk or even from Mmk itself, or it could have been interpolated into the Chinese recension of the text. Without further evidence, the source or eventual provenance of the verse cannot be established.

[514] A verse is quoted in **Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (T1509.25.100a$_{26-27}$), which also compares action to a creditor (*tse-wu -hu* 責物主):諸業久和集 造者自逐去 譬如責物主 追逐人不置; transl. by LAMOTTE (1944:347): "Les actes longtemps accumulés (*upacita*) poursuivent leur auteur a la façon d'un créancier pursuivant son débteur sans le lâcher." English translation: " The actions accumu-lated (*upacita*) over long time pursue their doer in the same way that a creditor pursues his debtor without letting him go." The verse could be based on the verse from **Siṃhacandrajātaka*, but could also be freely based on Mmk 17.14, since **Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* generally incorporates material from Mmk.

explanations of *avipraṇāśa* as a technical term in the extant sources.[515] In fact it seems that there are only three passages in the extant scriptures, wherein the *avipraṇāśa*-phenomenon, as postulated by the *Sāṃmatīyas,* is described, i.e., *avipraṇāśa* as a non-concomitant phenomenon.[516] The earliest passage is the description found in Mmk 17.14-20 along with the explanations there-on given in the various extant Mmk-commentaries. This passage also provi-des the most detailed explanation of *avipraṇāśa.* The second description is a brief passage found in Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa,*[517] along with

[515] Generally, *avipraṇāśa* is merely an action-noun (as indicated by its male gender) meaning 'not getting lost' or 'non-perishing'. However, in certain sources *avipraṇāśa* has been hypostasized into an entity, which is posited as a *karmaphala-saṃbandha.*

[516] Thus, the descriptions of the *Saṃmatīya*-view found in the doxographi-cal works, such as Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarkajvālā* (D3856), do not mention the *avipraṇāśa.* The somewhat later work **Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtaviniścaya* (D3897), wherein chapters 16-21 (D3897.205a-241a) contain a presentation of *Saṃmatīya*-doctrines, likewise does not at all mention the *avipraṇāśa* (for two studies on this text, cf. SKILLING, 1987, 1994). Among the four known *pudgalavādin*-works in the Chinese canon (cf. CHÂU, 1999:33), only the *Saṃmatīya*-compendium entitled **Saṃmitīyanikāyaśāstra* (*san-mi-ti pu lun* 三彌底部論, T1649.32), having the alternative title **Āśrayaprajñaptiśāstra* (*i-shuo lun* 依說論), contains a brief reference to *avipraṇāśa*, which, however, does not provide any further information. The sentence in **Saṃmitīyanikāyaśāstra* says (T1649.32.462a$_{15\text{-}16}$): 是不滅。何以故。受故。此顯現故。此世作業不滅故. A very tentative Sanskrit reconstruction, given that this is a very early and difficult Chinese translation, could perhaps be: *na praṇaśyati tat| kutaḥ| paribhogāt| tadabhinirvṛttatvāt| iha kṛtānāṃ karmaṇāṃ avipraṇāśatvāc [ca]|. Transl.: "It (i.e., *karman*) does not perish. Why? Because of experiencing [the result], because [action] brings about this [result] [and] because of actions done in this life being non-perishing (*avipraṇāśa*)." For a description of the text, cf. CHÂU (1999:101, 189); CHÂU's interpretation of *sheng* (生) in the preceding passage of the text as meaning 'accumulation' (**upacaya*) does, however, not seem very likely.

[517] Cf. LAMOTTE (1936: 192, §18; MUROJI, 1985:19): 'o na ni dge ba daṅ| mi dge ba'i lus daṅ| ṅag gi las kyi[s] phuṅ po'i rgyud la sems daṅ mi ldan pa'i chos gźan źig skyed de| kha cig na re bstsags pa źes zer ba daṅ| gźan dag na re chud mi za ba źes zer ba gaṅ las tshe phyi ma la 'bras bu yid du 'oṅ ba'am mi 'oṅ ba mṅon par 'grub pa gaṅ yin pa de yin no| |gal te sems kyi rgyud la chos gźan źig mi skyed na sems gźan du skyes na log pa'i yid kyi las kyaṅ ji ltar tshe phyi ma la 'bras bu mṅon par 'grub par 'gyur te| gdon mi za bar de 'dod par bya'o źe na|. T1609.783b$_{20\text{-}26}$: 若爾應許由善不善身語二業。蘊相續中引別法起。其體實有心不相應行蘊所攝。有說此法名爲增長。有說此法名不失壞。由此法故能得當來愛非愛果。意業亦應許有此法。若不爾者餘心起時此便斷滅。心相續中若不引起如是別法。云何能得當來世果。是故定應許有此法. For the earlier Chinese transl. by Vimokṣaprajñā, cf. T1608.778c$_{18\text{-}29}$. Transl. by LAMOTTE (1936:230-231): "En ce cas, il faut admettre que les deux actes corporel et vocal bons ou mauvais, déposent (*ādadhati*) dans la séries psycho-physique (*skandhasaṃtāna*) un Dharma à part, existant en soi (*dravyasat*) et classé parmi les dissociés de la pensée (*cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra*). Par certains, ce Dharma est nommé accroissement (*upacaya*); par d'autres « sans destruction » (*avipraṇāśa*). En raison de ce Dharma, on réalise

its *ṭīkā* by Sumatiśīla (D4071.81b$_{2-7}$). The third passage is a brief mention in Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* (D3995.20b$_7$-21a$_1$) along with its *ṭīkā* (D3996.123b$_{3-7}$).[518] A very tentative presentation of the *avipraṇāśa*-ex-

(*abhinivṛt-*) le futur fruit agréable ou désagreable. Pour ce qui est de l'acte mental (*manaḥ-karman*) également, il faut admettre l'existence de ce Dharma. Sinon (*anyatra*), quand une autre pensée naît et que l'acte mental a disparu (*nivṛtta*), si n'était pas déposé dans la séries mentale (*cittasaṃtāna*) ce Dharma particulier, comment pourrait-on réaliser le fruit futur? Donc il faut nécessairement (*niyatam*) admettre l'existence d'un tel Dharma." English translation: "In this case, it should be admitted that that both bodily and vocal actions – good or bad – deposit (*ādadha-ti*) a separate Dharma in the psycho-physical series (*skandha-saṃtāna*), which exists as such (*dravyasat*) and is classified among the phenomena non-associated with the mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*). For some, this Dharma is called 'accumulation' (*upacaya*); for others, it is called 'non-perishing' (*avipraṇāśa*). Due to this Dharma, one obtains (*abhinivṛt-*) the future pleasant or unpleasant result. Likewise, with regard to mental actions (*manaḥkarman*), one must admit the existence of this Dharma. Otherwise (*anyatra*), when another thought comes into existence and the mental act has disappeared (*nivṛtta*), if this particular Dharma had not been deposited in the mind-series (*cittasaṃtāna*), how could one obtain its future result? Hence, it is definitely necessary (*niyatam*) to admit the existence of such a Dharma."

518 Cf. *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* (D3995; MUROJI, 1985:20): yaṅ gźan dag na re 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par śes pa yin par brjod kyaṅ 'das pa'i las las de byuṅ ba ma yin te| 'on kyaṅ kha cig na re de'i rgyu can rnam par ma źig pa las yin no źe'o| |kha cig na re bstags pa las yin no źe'o| |rnam par ma źig pa źes bya ba 'di ci yin| bstsags pa yaṅ ci yin źe na| sems daṅ mi ldan pa'i chos gźan nam 'bras bu byin pa'i bar du rjes su 'jug pa de yin źes grags so| de las skyes pa'i ñiṅ msthams sbyor ba'i rnam par śes pa ni 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis źes ston te|; transl.: "Moreover, others say that although the consciousness (**vijñāna*) [undergoing] transition [to a new rebirth] is said to have dispositions (**saṃskāra*) as its condition [in the context of dependent arising], it has not arisen from a past action. Rather, some say that it is [arisen] from 'the non-perishing [phenomenon]' (**avipraṇāśa, rnam par ma źig pa*), [which] has that [action] as its cause; others say that it is [arisen] from 'accumulation' (**upacaya, bstags pa*). What is this, which is called 'the non-perishing'? What is this, which is called 'accumulation'? It is known to be a separate phenomenon not concomitant with the mind or that, which ensues (**anuvaya, rjes su 'jug pa*) until the yielding of the result. Thus, the consciousness [undergoing] transition [to a new rebirth] is taught as having dispositions as its condition." This is commented upon in the *ṭīkā* (D3996; MUROJI, 1985:20): 'on kyaṅ kha cig na re de'i rgyu can rnam par ma źig pa las yin no źes bya ba ni bsod nams la sogs pa'i 'du byed kyi rgyu can yin pa'i phyir ro źes bya ba'i don to| |kha cig na re rnam par ma źig pa las yin no źe'o źes bya ba ni 'phags pa kun gyis bkur ba yin no| |kha cig na re bsags pa la yin no źe'o źes bya ba ni dge 'dun phal chen po'o| |sems daṅ mi ldan pa'i chos gźan źes bya ba ni gzugs daṅ sems daṅ sems las byuṅ bas ma bsdus pa'i 'du byas ni sems daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa ma yin pa'i phyir sems daṅ mi ldan pa yin par gźag ste| ṅogs par rnam par bzlog pa'i phyir ro| |nam 'bras bu 'byin pa'i bar du rjes su 'jug pa de yin źes bya ba ni sems daṅ mi ldan pa'i chos gźan no| |; transl.: "«Rather, some say that it is [arisen] from 'the non-perishing [phenomenon]', [which] has that [action] as its cause» means "because it is having dispositions as its cause, such as beneficial [dispositions] and so forth." « Some say that it is

planation, found in Mmk and Pras, will now be given, but it must be borne in mind that it suffers greatly from the lack of extant sources. The discussion of this passage, therefore, must rest almost solely on the information provided by the extant Mmk-commentaries.

(V317$_6$): In this case (*iha*), a wholesome (*kuśalam*) action (*karma*) being (*sad*) done (*kṛtaṃ*), ceases (*nirudhyate*) just (*eva*) immediately upon arising (*utpādānantaram*), and (*ca*) there is not (*na*) the consequence that there will be no result (*phalābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ*) when it (*tasmin*) has ceased (*niruddhe*), since (*yasmāt*) just when (*yadaiva*) that (*tat*) action (*karma*) arises (*utpadyate*), right then (*tadaiva*) a non-concomitant (*viprayuktaḥ*) phenomenon (*dharmaḥ*) called 'the non-perishing' (*avipraṇāśākhyaḥ*), comparable to a promissory note (*ṛṇapatrasthānīyaḥ*), is born (*samupajāyate*) of that (*tasya*) action (*karmaṇaḥ*) in the series (*santāne*) of the doer (*kartuḥ*).

In Pras, the *avipraṇāśa*-proponent begins by addressing the objection raised in Mmk 17.6. First, this proponent admits that the action ceases immediately upon arising, i.e., that the action is impermanent. The *avipraṇāśa*-proponent, therefore, does not hold the view that the action remains until the time of the ripening of its result, which would entail the consequence of eternality of the action, as explained above.

Although the action is admitted to cease, there is not the consequence that it is cut off without giving rise to its result due to the action having ceased, because the action generates a separate phenomenon (*dharma*) called 'the non-perishing' (*avipraṇāśa*), which can function as the connection between the action and its result (*karmaphalasaṃbandha*). Pras does not ex-

[arisen] from 'the non-perishing [phenomenon]'», they are the *Sāṃmatīyas*. «Others say that it is [arisen] from 'accumulation'», they are the *Mahāsaṅghikas*. «A separate phenomenon not associated with the mind» means that it is established as being non-concomitant with the mind, because it is a conditioned phenomenon not consisting of matter, mind or mental factors, which is not concomitant with the mind, because it is its opposite. «Or that, which ensues until the yielding of the result» means a separate phenomenon non-concomitant with the mind."

plicitly state that this phenomenon is separate from the action, although this is clearly implied. This is stated, however, in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, which says that it is a different phenomenon (*chos gźan źig, pieh-fa* 別法), which arises.[519]

Akutobhayā (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411) states here that although the momentary action ceases, the result of the doer's action is non-perishing, because a separate phenomenon called *avipraṇāśa* arises due to the action. Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:228) adds the information that while the action is momentary (**kṣaṇika, skad cig ma*), the *avipraṇāśa*, which arises due to the action, is a non-momentary phenomenon (**akṣaṇika, skad cig ma ma yin pa*). Logically, this would be a possible explanation for how the *avipraṇāśa* can remain until the ripening of the result, but it would involve the view on part of the *Sāṃmatīyas* that some conditioned phenomena are momentary, while others are not momentary and remain for some time. Otherwise, it would involve the view that the *avipraṇāśa* is an unconditioned phenomenon, although this is highly unlikely, since it is said that the *avipraṇāśa* arises due to the action.[520]

That the *Sāṃmatīyas* asserted some conditioned phenomena to be non-momentary is perhaps supported by the doxographical treatise **Samayabhedoparacanacakra*, which states that the *Vātsīputrīyas*, of which the *Sāṃmatīyas* constitute a sub-school, asserted some conditioned phenomena to endure for while, whereas other disappear instantaneously (CHÂU, 1999:188, fn. 713).[521] It is also confirmed by *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, which

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[519] Cf. fn. 517 above.

[520] In Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation of *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (T1609. 31.783b_{21}), the *avipraṇāśa* is explicitly stated to be a conditioned phenomenon (**saṃskṛta, hsing* 行).

[521] Cf. Hsüan-tsang's translation of the **Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (T2031.49.16c_{15-16}): 諸行有暫住。亦有刹那滅; transl.: "Among all conditioned phenomena, there are such that remain for a while (*chan-chu* 暫住) and there are also such that cease after a moment (*ch'a-na-mieh* 刹那滅)." Paramārtha's two Chinese translations of the same text do not seem to confirm this, but rather say that all conditioned dharmas cease from moment to moment (T2032.19b_4: 一切陰刹那不住; transl.: "all aggregates [last only for a] moment [and] do not remain"; T2033.21c23: 一切有爲法刹那刹那滅; transl. "all conditioned phenomena cease from moment to moment"). The Tibetan translation (D4138.145b_4) is rather problematic at this point if not corrupt: 'du byed thams cad ni dus gźan la skad cig dag go||. An uncertain attempt to translate this sentence might be: "All conditioned phenomena [are] different in time and (*la*) momentary." Also, LVP (1937:136-137) indicates that the *Sāṃmatīyas* and

mentions the *Saṃmatīya*-view that a material phenomenon (*rūpa*), such as a pot, is not momentary but remains for a while until it meets with its cause of destruction, such as a hammer, whereas mental phenomena are momentary.[522] Although Buddhapālita's claim that *avipraṇāśa* is asserted as a non-momentary phenomenon is possible, it is not supported by any of the other Mmk-commentaries.

Candrakīrti qualifies the *avipraṇāśa* as a non-concomitant phenomenon (*viprayukta*), i.e., a phenomenon that is neither matter nor mind (cf. COX, 1995:69-70).[523] This information is not provided by the other Mmk-commentaries, but is supported by *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (cf. fn. 517 above), which states that the *avipraṇāśa* is not concomitant with the mind (**citta-viprayukta, sems daṅ mi ldan pa, hsin-pu-hsiang-ying-hsing* 心不相應行).[524] It is also supported by K'uei-chi's mention of *avipraṇāśa* being asserted by the *Sāṃmatīyas* as a non-concomitant phenomenon.[525] That *avipraṇāśa* is non-concomitant means that it does not share the nature and qualities of the mind (*citta*). Thereby, the *avipraṇāśa*-proponent avoids the consequence raised for the *santāna*-proponent that a wholesome *santāna* could only be wholesome and only produce desirable results thus contradicting the possibility of co-existence of wholesome and unwholesome actions for the same individual. If the *avipraṇāśa* would be concomitant with the mind, the mind would be wholesome if the *avipraṇāśa* was wholesome and so forth, because they would share the same aspect. If the *avipraṇāśa*, on the other hand, is non-concomitant with the mind, such problems do not arise, because the *avipraṇāśa* exists independently of the mind.

Vātsīputrīyas possibly held the view that certain physical phenomena are enduring and non-momentary.

[522] Cf. *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* ad. AK 2.46ab (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:266; WOGIHARA, 1933:179): yo 'pi āha nikāyāntarīya iti | āryasammatīyaḥ | sa ghaṭāder mudgarādikṛto vināśa iti manyate | kālāntarāvasthāyi hi tasya rūpam | cittacaittānāṃ ca kṣaṇikatvam |; transl.: "*A follower of another school says* means the *āryasaṃma-tīya.* He thinks that the perishing of a pot and so forth is created by a mallet or the like, for its matter remains for some time, whereas there is momentariness of the mind and mental factors."

[523] For a general presentation of 'non-concomitant conditioned phenome-na' or 'non-associated conditioned phenomena' (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*), cf. chapter four by COX (1995:67-78).

[524] Regarding the meaning of the term 'concomitant', cf. p. 228 above.

[525] Cf. p. 294 above.

Candrakīrti then states that the *avipraṇāśa* arises just when the action is born. This statement is not directly supported by any of the other sources, but, of course, would be in line with the momentary nature of the action. It is also said in Pras that the *avipraṇāśa* arises in the series (*santāna*) of the doer (*kartṛ*). That is to say, it remains connected with the doer of the action, which echoes the *Sarvāstivāda*-doctrine of *prāpti* that ensures that the action and its result remain connected with the particular individual, who performed that action. It also indicates that this series is the locus for the *avipraṇāśa*.

Candrakīrti does not specify which type of series (*santāna*) is intended. It could refer specifically to the mind-series (*cittasantāna*), but could also be taken more broadly to refer to the series of the five aggregates (*skandhasāntana*) or the series of name and matter (*nāmarūpasantāna*). *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (cf. fn. 517 above) supports an interpretation as *skandhasantāna* (*phuṅ po'i rgyud, yün hsiang-hsü* 蘊相續) as well as *cittasantāna* (*sems kyi rgyud, hsin hsiang-hsü* 心相續). It is noteworthy that neither text in this context mentions the *pudgala*, which is also asserted by the *Sāṃmatīyas*, but each speaks of a series (*santāna*). To sum up, the *avipraṇāśa*-proponent thus asserts a separate, non-concomitant phenomenon called *avipraṇāśa*, which is caused to arise in the series of doer through his actions, ensuring the arising of the action's result. In this way, it functions as a *karmaphalasaṃbandha*.

(V317$_8$): Therefore (*tad*), in this manner (*evam*), ***"as (yathā) a promissory note (patram) so also (tathā) the non-perishing (avipraṇāśaḥ)"*** should be understood (*veditavyaḥ*), ***"and (ca)"*** that (*tat*) ***"action (karma),"*** of which (*yasya*) this (*asau*) phenomenon (*dharmaḥ*) called 'the non-perishing' (*avipraṇāśākhyo*) arises (*utpadyate*), should be understood (*veditavyam*) [to be] ***"like (iva) a debt (ṛṇam)."*** Further (*ca*), just as (*yathā*), due to the remaining of the promissory note (*ṛṇapatrāvasthānāt*), a creditor (*dhaninaḥ*) does not (*na*) have (*bhavati*) a loss of [his] money (*dhananāśaḥ*) even (*api*) when the money (*dhane*) has been spent (*upayukte*), [but]

he (*saḥ*) surely (*eva*) [stays] connected (*sambadhyate*) with the amount of money (*dhanaskandhena*) together with the interest (*sopacayena*) until some other time (*kālāntare*), so also (*tathā*), due to the remaining of the separate phenomenon called 'the non-perishing' (*avipraṇāśākhyadharmāntarāvasthānāt*), the doer (*karttā*) surely (*eva*) [stays] connected (*abhisambadhyate*) with a result (*phalena*) having that [non-perishing] as its cause (*tannimittakena*), even (*eva*) when the action (*karmaṇi*) has ceased (*vinaṣṭe*).

Candrakīrti then explains the comparison given in Mmk 17.14. The non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*) is like a promissory note (*ṛṇapatra*), i.e., an instrument of debt. The action, which creates the *avipraṇāśa*, is like a debt (*ṛṇa*).[526] Candrakīrti explains this comparison in terms of a creditor. This raises a question about the intent of the illustration. If action is a debt, does it mean that the doer is like a debtor or a creditor? It would seem that Candrakīrti considers the doer to be like a creditor (in opposition to the verse from **Siṃhacandrajātaka*, where the doer is clearly viewed as a debtor; cf. fn. 513 above), because he only mentions the creditor in the following explanation. Perhaps both interpretations are possible: if the action is wholesome, the doer could be viewed as a creditor, because he receives a desirable result, whereas if the action is unwholesome, the doer could be viewed as a debtor, because he receives an undesirable result. If that is the case, Candrakīrti's explanation, which only mentions the creditor, would be in line with his explanations throughout chapter 17, where he always uses positive examples of wholesome action (of course, apart from his explanations of *aviratyavijñapti* and *apuṇya* in Mmk 17.4-5, where negative examples were called for by the *mūla*-verse).

[526] As a digression, it may be mentioned that in AK 4.39cd, a monk's transgression of his vows is also compared to a debt (*ṛṇa*); ŚĀSTRI (1971:644): dhanarṇavat tu kāśmīrair āpannasyeṣyate dvayam||; transl. by LVP (1924:95): "Le Kāśmīrien croit que le pécheur possède moralité et immoralité, comme un homme peut avoir des richesses et des dettes." English translation: "The Kāśmirians believe that the sinner possesses morality and imorality just like a person has wealth and debts." Although this verse contains such a comparison between action and debt, it seems unrelated to the *Sāṃmatīya*'s use of this comparison.

The explanation of the illustration given in Pras stems from *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411), and is repeated by Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:228) and Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:519; T1566100c$_{26\text{-}28}$). In Avalokitavrata's citation of *Prajñāpradīpa* (D3859.III.34a$_6$), the word action (*las*) appears as 'the seal, which is action' (**karmamudrā, las kyi phyag rgya*). However, this seems either to be an interpolation using tantric terminology or *phyag rgya* is a corruption for *dpaṅ rgya* (*pattra*). If taken as it stands, the interpolation would seem to mean that the action is like the stamp (**mudrā, phyag rgya*) that seals the promissory note (*ṛṇapatra*), which is the non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*).

Just as a promissory note ensures the return of the loan even after the borrowed money is spent and gone, the *avipraṇāśa* ensures the ripening of the result after the action has perished. The promissory note constitutes the creditor's connection with his money until the money is returned along with an interest (*upacaya,* literally 'increase' or 'accumulation'). Likewise, the *avipraṇāśa* constitutes the *karmaphalasaṃbandha* until the abundant result of the action is yielded.[527] A wholesome action is thus like lending money and its doer is like a creditor. The wholesome action generates a non-perishing phenomenon stored in the series of the doer, which is like a promissory note stored in a safe. As the promissory note ensures the creditor the return of his money along with interest, the *avipraṇāśa* ensures the ripening of the abundant desirable result of the wholesome action. Oppositely, an unwholesome action is like borrowing money and its doer is like a debtor. In this manner, the commercial illustration of a promissory note could be interpreted with regard to the *avipraṇāśa.*

(V318$_2$): Moreover (*ca*), just as (*yathā*) the promissory note (*ṛṇapatram*) having been honoured (*nirbhuktaṃ sat*)[528] after having caused the return of the creditor's (*dātuḥ*)

[527] The accrued interest in the comparison may perhaps reflect the statement that a great result may ripen from a small action given the right circumstances. When describing five points of external dependent arising, the *Śālistambasūtra* also says that a great result can be obtained from a small cause, namely that abandunt fruit is obtained from a small seed (cf. SCHOENING, 1995:285, 287, 406, 495, and my earlier fn. 413 above on this *sūtra*).

[528] Literally, 'being used up' (*nirbhuktaṃ sat*).

money (*dhanābhyāgamaṃ kṛtvā*) is not (*na*) capable (*samartham*) of returning the money (*dhanābhyāgame*) once again (*punar api*) whether [still] existing or not existing (*vidyamānaṃ vā 'vidyamānaṃ vā*), thus (*evam*) also the non-perishing (*avipraṇāśaḥ*) having yielded a ripening (*dattavipākaḥ san*) is not (*na*) able (*śaknoti*) once again (*punar api*) to create (*kartum*) a connection with a ripening (*vipākasambandham*) for the doer (*kartuḥ*) whether [still] existing or not existing (*vidyamāno vā 'vidyamāno vā*), just like an honoured promissory note (*nirbhuktapatravat*).

Next, Candrakīrti raises the question whether the *avipraṇāśa* would not repeatedly yield the result of the action, because it is non-perishing. This discussion stems from *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411) and is repeated by Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:228) and Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:519; T1566.100c_{26f}).

The answer to the question is that it only has the power to yield a ripening once and it is, therefore, irrelevant whether or not it continues to exist after having yielded its ripening. This is explained by means of the promissory note-comparison. A promissory note only has the legal force to ensure the return of the debt once. Even if the annulled promissory note would still exist after the return of the debt, it can no longer be used to reclaim the money. Similarly, the *avipraṇāśa* can only yield its ripening once. Yet, the details as to what constitutes the power of the *avipraṇāśa* to yield its result and how this power is annulled when its result is yielded are not explained here.

(V318$_6$): Further (*ca*), this (*ayam*) non-perishing (*avipraṇāsaḥ*), which (*yaḥ*) was spoken of by us (*asmābhir uktaḥ*), ***"that (saḥ)"*** was mentioned in another *sūtra* (*sūtrāntaroktaḥ*)[529] ***"as fourfold (caturvidhaḥ) in terms of***

[529] It is a question how to interpret the phrase 'spoken of in another sūtra' (*sūtrāntaroktaḥ*). The first question is whether *antara* should be understood as 'another' or as a 'certain' and whether *sūtra* should be taken as singular or plural: 'in another *sūtra*', 'in other

world-sphere (dhātutaḥ), because of being divided into those associated with the desire-, material or immaterial [world-spheres] and those without negative influence (*kāmarūpārūpyāvacarānāśravabhedāt*).

Pāda c of the verse (Mmk 17.14), wherein it was said that *avipraṇāśa* is fourfold in terms of world-sphere (*dhātu*), is then explained. All the commentaries starting from *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411-412) and *Chung lun* (T1564.21c_6) enumerate this fourfold division in the same way, namely that *avipraṇāśa* is associated with the three world-spheres of *saṃsāra* (*dhātu*) called the desire-world-sphere (*kāmadhātu*), the material world-sphere (*rūpadhātu*) and the immaterial world-sphere (*ārūpyadhātu*),[530] or *avipraṇāśa* is without negative influence (*anāsrava* or *anāśrava*). Candrakīrti says that this fourfold division is mentioned in another *sūtra*, although it is not clear which *sūtra* he may have had in mind (cf. fn. 529).

As the *mūla*-text (Mmk 17.14c) states that *avipraṇāśa* is fourfold in terms of world-sphere (*dhātutaḥ*), it may be considered whether the *Sāṃmatīyas* would possibly assert a fourth world-sphere without negative influence (**anāśravadhātu* or *anāśravo dhātuḥ*). LAMOTTE (1936:162-163) indicates that this division would indeed entail four world-spheres: "Elle [viz. *avipraṇāśa*] est quadruple, car elle peut exiger le fruit de l'acte dans un des quatre mondes: monde du désir, de la forme, de la non-forme, ou monde pur."[531]

SCHMITHAUSEN (1969b:82-83, fn. 7) explains that the word *dhātu* in

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sūtras', 'in a certain *sūtra*' or 'in certain *sūtras*'. If interpreted as 'another *sūtra*', it remains unclear which *sūtra* is intended. If interpreted as 'a certain *sūtra*' or 'certain *sūtras*', it could refer back to the canonical reference made in Mmk 17.13. Secondly, another question is whether *sūtrāntaroktaḥ* should be linked with *asmābhir uktaḥ* in the relative clause or inserted into the correlative clause as done above. The Tibetan translation links it with the relative clause and inserts 'and' (*śiṅ*), which would have to be translated: "Further, this *avipraṇāśa*, which was spoken of by us <u>and</u> in another *sūtra*..." If linked with the relative clause, the Sanskrit text could also be interpreted: "...mentioned by us [as] taught in certain *sūtras*..."

[530] For an explanation of these three world-spheres or 'realms' of *saṃsāra*, cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1971:379-386; transl. LVP, 1926:1-5).

[531] English translation: "It (viz. *avipraṇāśa*) is fourfold, because it can assure the result of the action in either of the four worlds: the world of desire, the world of form, the world of no form, or the pure world."

such a case does not indicate a realm in any physical sense, but rather indicates a state, including the spiritual states associated with the Buddhist path. As mentioned elsewhere by SCHMITHAUSEN (1969b:117-118, fn. 58), Sthiramati thus explains *anāśravo dhātu* to mean 'that, which is the cause of the qualities of the noble ones'.[532] In Daśabalaśrīmitra's **Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛta-viniścaya*, a world-sphere free of negative influence (*zag pa med pa'i khams*) is mentioned. Conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*) are there distinguished in terms of the three world-spheres of *kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu* and *ārūpyadhātu*, whereas unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛta*) are associated only with the *anāśravo dhātu*.[533] Unconditioned phenomena should here be understood in a general sense as referring to *nirvāṇa*,[534] and thus *avipraṇāśa* associated with *anāśravo dhātu* must be seen as referring to the elements of the path that lead to *nirvāṇa*.

Instead of interpreting *anāśrava* as here referring to a separate *dhātu*, it is also possible to interpret the fourfold division of *avipraṇāśa* as meaning that there is one kind of *avipraṇāśa* for each of the three world-spheres and a fourth kind, which is *anāśrava*, that is not connected with any world-sphere. Such an interpretation would agree with AKBh, where it is said that action free of negative influence destroys black, white and black-

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[532] Cf. *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya* (LÉVI, 1925:44; BUESCHER, 2002:*53) explaining *anāsravo dhātuḥ* from *Triṃśikā*, verse 30a: āryadharmahetutvād dhātuḥ| hetvartho hy atra dhātuśabdaḥ|; transl.: "Because of being the cause for the qualities of the noble ones, [it is] *dhātu*, for the word *dhātu* has here the meaning of cause (*hetu*)."

[533] **Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtaviniścaya* (D3897.109a$_7$-109b$_1$): yaṅ 'dus byas ni 'dod pa'i khams kyi rnam graṅs su gtogs pa daṅ gzugs kyi khams kyi rnam graṅs su gtogs pa daṅ gzugs med pa'i khams kyi rnam graṅs su gtogs pa'o| |'dus ma byas ni zag pa med pa'i khams kyi rnam graṅs su gtogs pa kho na'o| |; transl.: "Moreover, conditioned phenomena [are] those included in the category of the desire-world-sphere (**kāmadhātuparyāyāvacarāḥ*), those included in the category of the material world-sphere and those included in the immaterial world-sphere. Unconditioned phenomena are only those included in the category of the world-sphere without negative influence (**anāsravadhātuparyāyāvacarāḥ*)."

[534] When divided, unconditioned phenomena are taught as threefold or sometimes even fourfold; a fourfold division is, for example, found in **Saṃskṛtā-saṃskṛtaviniścaya:* space (*ākāśa*), *nirvāṇa* (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), absence (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*) and the nature of phenomena (*dharmatā*). Cf. D3897. 150a$_{5\text{-}6}$: chos gzugs can ma yin pa 'dus ma byas ni rnam pa bźi ste| 'di lta ste| nam mkha' daṅ| so sor brtags pa'i 'gog pa daṅ| so sor brtags pa ma yin pa'i 'gog pa daṅ| chos rnams kyi chos ñid do|; transl.: "The immaterial phenomena that are unconditioned phenomena are fourfold. They are: space, analytical cessation, non-analytical cessation and the nature of phenomena."

white action, does not involve any ripening and does not belong to any world-sphere.[535]

It is very difficult to explain why Nāgārjuna mentions such a fourfold division of *avipraṇāśa* and what its significance really is. It may perhaps be noticed that the *prāpti* asserted by the *Sarvāstivādins* is also stated in AK to be fourfold in terms of the three *dhātus* and phenomena without negative influence.[536] Yet, AK does not provide any reason for this division of *prāpti*. Regarding *avipraṇāśa*, at least two possibilities for the fourfold division may be suggested here. First, as indicated in the quotation from LAMOTTE above (1936:162-163), the fourfold division of *avipraṇāśa* could relate to the kinds of result they yield. It may be conjectured that such a division could have been formulated by the *Sāṃmatīyas* in response to a critique of *avipraṇāśa*, similar to the critique raised against *santāna* mentioned by Candrakīrti above (cf. commentary to Mmk 17.12). This interpretation is supported by *Akutobhayā*, which states that *avipraṇāśa* is taught as indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) in order to avoid 'these faults'.[537] Since no particular faults have been mentioned in the text after explaining the faults of the *santāna*-view mentioned in Mmk 17.12, it seems that *Akutobhayā* here justifies the point that *avipraṇāśa* is indeterminate in relation to that critique. It could thus also be supposed that the division into four kinds of *avipraṇāśa* likewise is related to that critique.

If that is so, an undesirable consequence (*prasaṅga*) could be levelled against the *avipraṇāśa*-theory that an individual belonging to the *kāmadhātu* would necessarily continue to be reborn in this world-sphere forever, because the *avipraṇāśas* generated by his actions only would be associated with this world-sphere. The premise of such an argument would have to be that the *avipraṇāśa* generated by the actions of an individual

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[535] AKBh (ad. 4.60, ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:670): anāsravaṃ karmaiṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ karmaṇāṃ kṣayāya prahāṇāya saṃvartate ... avipākaṃ dhātvapatitatvāt, pravṛttivi-rodhāc ca| |; transl. LVP (1924:130): "L'acte pur détruit les trois autres sortes d'acte ... L'acte pur n'a pas de rétribution, car il n'est pas du domaine des sphères d'existence, en effet, il arrête le processus de l'existence." English translation: "The pure action destroys the three other kinds of action ... The pure action does not have any ripening, because it is not within the domain of the spheres of existence, indeed, it stops the process of existence."

[536] Cf. AK 2.37cd (ŚĀSTRI, 1970:220-221; transl. LVP, 1923:187).

[537] Cf. HUNTINGTON (1986:412): skyon de dag yoṅs su spoṅ ba'i phyir raṅ bźin luṅ du ma bstan par rnam par gźag go| |.

would be determined in terms of world-sphere by the present existence of the actor, i.e., that an actor belonging to the desire-world-sphere only could produce *avipraṇāśas* belonging to that world-sphere. Why such a premise should be accepted is, however, not clear. In response to such a *prasaṅga*, it would then be necessary for the *avipraṇāśa*-proponent to assert that the actions performed by an individual in a given world-sphere as well as the *avipraṇāśas* created thereby may be associated with other world-spheres. In that case, the *avipraṇāśas* would be fourfold: (1) a wholesome or unwholesome action yielding a result that ripens in relation to the desire-world-sphere (*kāmadhātu*) would generate an *avipraṇāśa* associated with this world-sphere (**kāmadhātv-avacarāvipraṇāśa*); (2-3) an immovable action (*aniñjakarman*) yielding a result that ripens in relation to the material or immaterial world-spheres (*rūpārūpyadhātū*) would generate an *avipraṇāśa* associated with either of these world-spheres (**rūpārūpyadhātvavacarāvipraṇāśa*); (4) a wholesome action associated with the Buddhist path leading to *nirvāṇa* would generate an *avipraṇāśa* free of negative influence (**anāśravāvipraṇāśa*).

Otherwise, the fourfold division of *avipraṇāśa* in terms of *dhātu* could be explained as related to the stages of the Buddhist path. As will be explained below in Mmk 17.15ab, *avipraṇāśa* can be eradicated by means of the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*) or by transcending a world-sphere (*dhātusamatikramaṇa*). On the path of cultivation, the practitioner attains the level of a non-returner (*anāgāmin*), whereby the practitioner no longer will be born in *kāmadhātu*. Hence, the *avipraṇāśa* yielding rebirth in this world-sphere must be completely eradicated at this stage. This would presuppose a distinction between *avipraṇāśa* associated with *kāmadhātu*, *rūpadhātu* and *ārūpyadhātu*, which perhaps could explain the fourfold division mentioned here.

However, it must be underlined that any such explanation for this fourfold division at the present stage neither can be confirmed nor rejected; both explanations are offered here merely as logical possibilities without any philological basis.

(V318$_7$): ***"And (ca) it (saḥ) [is] indeterminate (avyākṛtaḥ) by nature (prakṛtyā),"*** [i.e.,] the non-perishing

(*avipraṇāśaḥ*) is only (*eva*) indeterminate (*avyākṛtaḥ*), because it is not determined (*avyākaraṇāt*) as wholesome or unwholesome (*kuśalākuśalatvena*).

If (*yadi*) it (*asau*) would be (*syāt*) unwholesome (*akuśalaḥ*) [when arising] of unwholesome (*akuśalānām*) actions (*karmaṇām*), then (*tadā*) [it] would not exist (*syāt*) for those detached from the desire-[world-sphere] (*kāmavītarāgāṇām*). And (*ca*) if (*yadi*) [it] would be (*syāt*) wholesome (*kuśalaḥ*) [when arising] of wholesome [actions] (*kuśalānām*), [then] it (*saḥ*) would not exist (*na syāt*) for those in whom the roots for the wholesome have been cut (*samucchinnakuśalamūlānām*). Therefore (*tasmāt*), it (*asau*) [is] just (*eva*) indeterminate (*avyākṛtaḥ*) by nature (*prakṛtyā*).

Finally, *pāda* d of Mmk 17.14, which stated that *avipraṇāśa* is indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) by nature (*prakṛtyā*), is explained. All the commentaries explain that 'indeterminate' here means that *avipraṇāśa* is not distinguished in terms of being wholesome or unwholesome. *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:412) and *Chung lun* (T1564.22c$_{7\text{-}8}$) remark that the meaning of 'indeterminate' has been taught in the *Abhidharma*-treatises.[538] As mentioned above, *Akutobhayā* also adds that *avipraṇāśa* is taught as indeterminate to avoid 'these faults', which presumably refers to the objections raised against the *santāna*-theory in Mmk 17.12. Otherwise, the extant Mmk-commentaries other than Pras do not provide any further explanation.

An indeterminate *avipraṇāśa* is a radically different concept from the *santāna* posited by the *Sautrāntikas* or the *prāpti* posited by *Sarvāstivādins*, both of which are considered to be wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate depending on the action.[539] An indeterminate *avipraṇāśa* means that the *avipraṇāśa* would be indeterminate, whether it is produced by a wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate action and whether it is going

[538] For an explanation of *avyākṛta* in AKBh, cf. fn. 271 above.

[539] Regarding *santāna*, cf. the critique raised above in connection with Mmk 17.12. Regarding *prāpti*, cf. AK 2.37 and AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1970:220-221; transl. LVP, 1923:186-187).

to yield a desirable, undesirable or neutral result. The moral quality is thus only related to the action, which above was compared to a debt. The *avipraṇāśa* is independent of the moral quality of the action, just like the paper (*patra*) on which the promissory note is to be written is as such blank and may be filled out in any way one intends. The texts, however, provides no details regarding the explanation of the indeterminate nature of the *avipraṇāśa*.

It would seem that the most obvious reason for stating that the *avipraṇāśa* is indeterminate would be to ensure the position that the *avipraṇāśa* cannot repeatedly yield results once it has yielded its destined result. Candrakīrti, however, offers two other types of consequences to explain why the *avipraṇāśa* must be posited as indeterminate. These consequences show that the indeterminate nature of the *avipraṇāśa* is required in order to ensure that the *avipraṇāśa* can be posited as existing and functioning for all beings of *saṃsāra* without exception.

The first consequence is that if an *avipraṇāśa* that is generated by an unwholesome action would be unwholesome, it could not exist for those detached from *kāmadhātu* (*kāmavītarāga*). This would mean that the results of unwholesome action could not ripen for the *kāmavītarāga*. In this case, the property of the proposition is that an *avipraṇāśa* generated by an unwholesome action would be unwholesome. The premise (*anvayavyāpti*) is: what is unwholesome, that does not exist for a *kāmavītarāga*. The counter-premise (*vyatirekavyāpti*) is: what exists for a *kāmavītarāga*, that is not unwholesome. Now, a *kāmavītarāga* is someone, who has become completely detached from *kāmadhātu* by abandoning all the defilements associated with *kāmadhātu* by means of the mundane path (*laukiko mārga*).[540] Consequently, the *kāmavītarāga* is only temporarily reborn in the material and immaterial world-spheres (*rūpārūpyadhātu*).[541] Unwholesomeness (*akuśala* or *aśubha*)

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[540] The mundane path (*laukiko mārga*) is a series of meditation practices by which the practitioner can attain rebirth in the higher states of *rūpadhātu* and *ārūpyadhātu*, which, however, does not necessarily lead to liberation from *saṃsāra*. This is done by practising calm abiding (*śamatha*) with an attitude that one's present state, such as the *kāmadhātu*, is disturbed and the higher state one aims to attain, such as a level within the *rūpadhātu*, is peaceful. For a brief description, cf. *Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtaviniścaya* (D3897.239a$_6$-239b$_1$).

[541] Cf. *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (ŚĀSTRI, 1970:270): *atha vītarāga* iti| kāmadhātumātravītarāgo laukikena mārgeṇa navame prakāre prahīṇe|; transl.: "*Then the*

is only associated with *kāmadhātu,*[542] and being detached from *kāmadhātu* thus means that the *kāmavītarāga* has abandoned all *akuśala.* Nevertheless, the *kāmavītarāga* can still experience the results of unwholesome actions performed earlier, because he only is temporarily freed from *kāmadhātu.* He has not yet attained liberation from *saṃsāra,* but is still just an ordinary being (*pṛthagjana*). Unless he practises the liberation-path and attains the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*), he will eventually fall down from the *rūpa-* or *ārūpyadhātu* and return to *kāmadhātu.* If all the *avipraṇāśas* associated with unwholesome actions would have been destroyed for him, because they would be unwholesome, he could no longer experience any undesirable results associated with *kāmadhātu,* when he falls from the higher *dhātus.* This would contradict the doctrine of *karmaphala.*

On the other hand, if an *avipraṇāśa* generated by a wholesome action would be wholesome (*kuśala*), it would entail a second consequence that it would not exist for those, in whom the roots of the wholesome (*kuśa-lamūla*) have been cut (*samucchinnakuśalamūlāḥ*).[543] In this consequence, the property of the proposition (*pakṣadharma*) is that an *avipraṇāśa* generated by a wholesome action would be wholesome. The premise (*anvaya-vyāpti*) is: what is wholesome does not exist for the *samucchinnakuśalamūlāḥ.* The counter-premise (*vyatirekavyāpti*) is: what exists for the *samucchinna-kuśalamūlāḥ,* that is not wholesome. The roots of the wholesome (*kuśala-mūla*) are cut, if one develops the view of cutting off (*ucchedadṛṣṭi*) in its strongest degree.[544] This means that one would very strongly have a belief,

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detached one: one, who is detached only from *kāmadhātu* [is used] in the sense of ninefold abandonment by means of the mundane path. Regarding the mundane path and its abandonment of defilements associated with *kāmadhātu,* cf. LVP (1925:vi-xi) and FRAUWALLNER (1971:81).

[542] In this regard, cf. the explanation of the division into black actions, white actions, black-white actions and actions not associated with negative influence in AK 4.60 (ŚASTRI, 1971:669; transl. LVP, 1924:129-130).

[543] Regarding the roots of the wholesome (*kuśalamūla*), cf. fn. 261 above.

[544] Cf. AK 4.79a and AKBh (ŚASTRI, 1971:697): kuśalamūlacchedas tu mithyādṛṣṭyā bhavaty adhimātraparipūrṇayā |; transl. by LVP (1924:170): "La rupture des racines de bien (*kuśalamūlasamuccheda*) a lieu par la vue fausse du neuvième degré, forte-forte (*adhimātraparipūrṇā=adhimātrādhimātrā*)." English translation: "The cutting of the roots of the wholesome (*kuśalamūlasamuccheda*) occurs due to the wrong view of the ninth degree, strong-strong (*adhimātra-paripūrṇā=adhimātrādhimātrā*)." As noted by LVP, the roots of

which denies actions and their results (*karmaphala*).[545] If the *avipraṇāśa* generated by a wholesome action would be wholesome, the ripening of desirable results could never again arise for the *samucchinnakuśalamūlāḥ*, because what is wholesome has been destroyed in them. To avoid such consequences, the *avipraṇāśa* is asserted to be indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), i.e., morally neutral and it can, therefore, exist equally for all beings.

(V318$_{10}$): Moreover (*kiñ ca*),

"[It] is not (na) something to be abandoned (praheyaḥ) through abandonment (prahāṇataḥ); [it is] just (eva) something to be abandoned by cultivation (bhāvanāheyaḥ) or [otherwise] (vā)." (Mmk 17.15ab)

(V319$_{2}$): Also, such (*sa cāyam*) a non-perishing [phenomenon] (*avipraṇāśaḥ*) ***"is not (na) something to be abandoned (praheyaḥ) through abandonment (prahāṇataḥ)."*** The actions (*karmāṇi*) belonging to an ordinary being (*pārthagjanikāni*) are abandoned (*prahīyante*) precisely (*eva*) by means of the path of seeing (*darśanamārgeṇa*), lest (*mā bhūt*)[546] a noble being (*āryaḥ*) should be (*iti*) someone

the wholesome, however, are not completely negated in the *samucchinnakuśalamūlāḥ*, because their seeds still exist (cf. AKBh, ŚĀSTRI, 1970:216; transl. LVP, 1923:184).

[545] Cf. AK 4.79c and AKBh (ŚĀSTRI, 1971:698; transl. LVP, 1924:171).

[546] In the Tibetan translation (D3860.105b$_{7}$), the *mā bhūt* construction is not translated literally, but is replaced with a *'gyur du 'oṅ bas* construction. Such a way of translating *mā bhūt* constructions into Tibetan is amply attested, e.g., in the Tibetan translation of AKBh (cf. HIRAKAWA, 1978.III:34 s.v.). In the Tibetan translation of Pras, it is also attested in one other instance, viz. at Pras 154$_{4}$ (D3860.52b$_{1}$, critical edition by MAY, 1959:352$_{7}$): *tathā 'pi tattvavicāre 'vatāryā mā bhūt paramārthato 'pi nirupapattikapakṣābhyupagama ity = de lta na yaṅ don dam par yaṅ 'thad pa daṅ bral ba'i phyogs khas blaṅs par 'gyur du 'oṅ bas de kho na ñid rnam par dpyod pa na gźug par bya ba yin no*| |; transl. by MAY (1959:117): "gardons-nous néanmoins d'introduire la dite question dans la discussion de la réalité vraie (*tattva):* ce serait admettre, sur le plan même de la réalité absolue, une thèse irrationnelle." English translation: "Lest we were to introduce the stated question into the discussion of the true reality (*tattva),* that would be to admit an irrational thesis even on the level of the ultimate reality." In his Sanskrit edition of this passage from chapter seven, LVP (Pras 154 fn. 2) notices the difference between the Sanskrit text and the Tibetan translation and conjectures a Sanskrit

endowed with the actions of an ordinary being (*pṛthagjanakarmasamanvāgataḥ*).

The non-perishing (*avipraṇāśaḥ*), on the other hand (*tu*), is not (*na*) abandoned (*prahīyate*) by means of the path of seeing (*darśanamārgeṇa*) even though (*api*) there is abandonment of its action (*tatkarmaprahāṇe*), but (*kin tu*) its (*tasya*) abandonment (*prahāṇam*) is effected (*bhavati*) by means of the path of ***"cultivation"*** (***bhāvanā****mārgeṇa*) ***"or [otherwise] (vā)."*** The word 'or' (*vāśabdaḥ*) denotes an alternative (*vikalpārthaḥ*): "or (*vā*) [it is] just (*eva*) something to be abandoned by means of transcending a world-sphere (*dhātusamatikramaṇapraheyaḥ*)" (*iti*).

And, thus (*caivam*), since (*yataḥ*) the non-perishing (*avipraṇāśaḥ*) neither perishes (*api na naśyati*) when the action perishes (*karmavināśe*) nor is abandoned (*api na prahīyate*) when the action is abandoned (*karmaprahāṇe*),

> ***"therefore (tasmāt), the result (phalam) of actions (karmaṇām) is produced (jāyate) due to the non-perishing (avipraṇāśena)."*** (Mmk 17.15cd)

Since the *avipraṇāśa* does not perish before yielding the result of the action, the question may be raised when it disappears. In answer to this, Mmk 17.15 first states that the *avipraṇāśa* is not something that can be abandoned or eradicated (*praheya*) by means of abandonment (*prahāṇa*). *Akutobhayā*

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reconstruction based on the Tibetan, which, however, is slightly misconstrued. A Tibetan *'gyur du 'oṅ ba* construction is a periphrastic futurum construction, which here has an optative character of potentialis (cf. HAHN, 1996:171) in the sense of a consequence that would have to happen, but which obviously must be wrong. This sense is amplified in the Tibetan translation of the present passage by the insertion of *yaṅ* after *'phags pa*. Thus, the Tibetan translation should be translated: "Since [otherwise] even (*yaṅ*) a noble being (*'phags pa*) would [falsely] turn out to be (*'gyur du 'oṅ bas*) someone endowed with the actions of an ordinary being, only (*kho na*) actions (*las dag*) belonging to an ordinary being (*so so skye bo'i*) are abandoned (*spoṅ*) by means of the path of seeing (*mthoṅ ba'i lam gyis*)." Notice also the transference in the Tibetan translation of *kho na* (*eva*) to the word *las dag* rather than *mthoṅ ba'i lam gyis* as in the Sanskrit original.

(HUNTINGTON, 1986:412), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:228-229) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:520) clarify that abandonment refers to the process that takes place when realising the four truths of the noble ones (*āryasatya*), i.e., on the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*). Yet these commentaries do not clarify why such a statement is made, whereas Candrakīrti adds the brief explanation that the actions (*karman*) of an ordinary being (*pṛthagjana*) are abandoned by means of the *darśanamārga,* since otherwise a noble being (*ārya*), i.e., someone who has attained the *darśanamārga,* would be endowed with the actions of an ordinary being. Avalokitavrata provides a brief explanation of this point:

> The non-perishing (**avipraṇāśa*), which is fourfold and indeterminate by nature, is not abandoned by the abandonment (**prahāṇa*) of the eighty-eight dispositions (**anuśaya*) of the three world-spheres (**dhātu*), which are what is to be abandoned (**praheya*) by [the path of] seeing the four truths.[547] The reason is that in this manner actions and defilements (**kleśa*) associated with unwholesome factors (**akuśala*) and negative influence (**sāsrava*) are abandoned by the path of seeing, but [those that are] wholesome (**kuśala*), without negative influence (**anāsrava*) or indeterminate (**avyākṛta*) are not abandoned; and since the non-perishing is indeterminate by nature (**prakṛtyā 'vyākṛta*), it is not abandoned by the path of seeing.[548]

Thus, according to Avalokitavrata, among actions only unwholesome actions (*akuśala*) are abandoned by the path of seeing. This is also confirmed by AKBh, which states that black action (which is unwholesome action) is abandoned either by the path of seeing or by the first eight steps of the

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[547] By mentioning 88 dispositions to be abandoned by the path of seeing, Avalokitavrata reveals that he here follows the *Sarvāstivāda*-explanation as exemplified in AKBh 5.3ff (ŚĀSTRI, 1972:765ff; transl. LVP, 1925:9ff.). According to the tradition of *Abhidharmasamuccaya,* there are 112 defilements to be abandoned by the path of seeing (for a chart, cf. RAHULA, 1971:81).

[548] *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.34b$_7$-35a$_2$): chud mi za ba rnam pa bźi po raṅ bźin gyis luṅ du ma bstan pa de ni bden pa bźi mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba khams gsum gyi phra rgyas brgya cu rtsa brgyad spoṅ bas spaṅ ba ma yin te| de ltar mthoṅ ba'i lam gyis ni mi dge ba daṅ zag pa daṅ bcas pa'i las daṅ ñon moṅs pa rnams spoṅ ba yin gyi| dge ba daṅ zag pa med pa daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa spoṅ ba ma yin la| chud mi za ba de ni raṅ bźin gyis luṅ du ma bstan pa yin pas mthoṅ ba'i lam gyis spaṅ ba ma yin pa'i phyir ro| |.

mundane path (*laukikamārga*).[549] Oppositely, Avalokitavrata states that [actions that are] wholesome, without negative influence and indeterminate are, therefore, not abandoned by the path of seeing, and since *avipraṇāśa* is indeterminate, it is not abandoned by the path of seeing.

If this explanation is aligned with Candrakīrti's statement that the actions belonging to an ordinary being (*pṛthagjanakarma*) are abandoned by the path of seeing, it would mean that the *pṛthagjanakarma* only refers to unwholesome action without including wholesome action associated with negative influence, since the latter only is abandoned by the path of cultivation. This is also confirmed by *Prajñāpradīpa*, wherein it is stated that unwholesome actions are abandoned by the path of seeing, because a noble being cannot possess the actions belonging to an ordinary being.[550]

Candrakīrti thus concludes that the non-perishing – unlike the actions of an ordinary being – is not abandoned by the path of seeing when the unwholesome actions that generate *avipraṇāśa* are abandoned, but it is abandoned by means of the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*) or [in a certain other manner] (*vā*).

Why are the non-perishing phenomena abandoned or eradicated by the *bhāvanāmārga*? Because at this stage liberation from *saṃsāra* is gradually attained. As the practitioner attains the results (*phala*) of the path called

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[549] Cf. AKBh ad. AK 4.60 (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:669ff.; transl. LVP, 1924:129ff.).

[550] *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:521): las mi dge ba ni mthoṅ ba'i lam gyis spaṅ ba yin par blta bar bya ste | 'phags pa yaṅ so so'i skye bo'i las daṅ ldan par gyur na mi ruṅ ba'i phyir ro | |; T1566.101a$_{21-22}$: 謂壞見道所斷不善業果。是義應知。修道若不斷者。聖人應具足有凡夫業. Transl. of the Tibetan text by AMES (1986:278): "One should understand that unwholesome action is abandoned by means of the path of seeing [the four noble truths], because a Noble One (*ārya*) cannot also possess the actions of an ordinary person (*pṛthagjana*)." Avalokitavrata comments on these lines (D3859.III.36a$_{4-6}$): las mi dge ba ni mthoṅ ba'i lam gyis spoṅ ba yin te | de lta ma yin du zin kyaṅ mthoṅ ba thob pa'i 'phags pa yaṅ so so'i skye bo'i las mi dge ba daṅ ldan par 'gyur bas de ni mi 'dod do | | de'i phyir mthoṅ ba'i lam gyis ni las mi dge ba 'ba' źig spoṅ bar zad kyi dge ba daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa dag mi spoṅ la | chud mi za ba de ni luṅ du ma bstan pa yin pas mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba daṅ ris mthun pa ma yin pa'i phyir mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba ma yin no | |; transl.: "Unwholesome actions are abandoned by the path of seeing. If that was not so, a noble being, who has obtained seeing [of the *āryasatyāni*] would also be endowed with the unwholesome actions of an ordinary being, [and], therefore, this is not posited. Hence, only unwholesome action is abandoned by the path of seeing, whereas what is wholesome and indeterminate is not abandoned. Since the non-perishing is indeterminate, it is not belonging to the group (**nikāyasabhāga, ris mthun pa*) of that to be abandoned by seeing."

one, who has entered the stream (*srotāpanna*), once-returner (*sakṛdāgāmin*) and non-returner (*anāgāmin*), he gradually becomes liberated from rebirth in *kāmadhātu*. As he attains the state of an *arhant*, he is also liberated from rebirth in the *rūpadhātu* and *ārūpyadhātu*. Hence, the *avipraṇāśas* resulting in rebirth in these world-spheres must be abandoned during this path. *Chung lun* (T1564.22c$_{8\text{-}9}$), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:229) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:520; T1566.101a$_{9\text{-}10}$) specify that the *avipraṇāśa* is abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā*) when transcending into another result [of the path] (**phalavyatikrame*).[551] This is also confirmed by Mmk 17.19, which states that the *avipraṇāśa* ceases due to transcending into the result [of the path] (*phalavyatikramāt*). Avalokitavrata explains this in detail:

> The *avipraṇāśas* are not abandoned during the fifteen moments of the path of seeing. [But] when transcending to the result of one, who has entered the stream (*srotāpanna*), in the sixteenth moment, the indeterminate *avipraṇāśas*, which hold the ripenings of the unwholesome actions of an ordinary being, of [actions] associated with defilement, and of the action of [a person] about to enter into the stream, are abandoned by the path of cultivation. Likewise, when transcending from the result of one, who has entered the stream, into the result of a once-returner (*sakṛdāgāmin*), the indeterminate *avipraṇāśas*, which hold the ripenings of the actions that are wholesome and without negative influence belonging to [a person] having entered the stream and about to enter [the level] of a once-returner, are abandoned by the path of cultivation.[552] Further, when transcending from the result of a once-returner to the result of a non-returner (*anāgāmin*), the *avipraṇāśas* belonging to a once-returner about to enter [the level of] a non-returner are abandoned. Then when transcending from the result of a non-returner to the result of an *arhant*, the *avipraṇāśas* belonging to a non-returner about to enter [the level] of an *arhant* are abandoned. [Finally,] the

[551] The Sanskrit word is attested in Mmk 17.19. In Tibetan, the transla-tions *'bras bu gźan du 'pho ba na* (Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti*) and *'bras bu 'pho ba na* (*Prajñāpradīpa*) are used. In Chinese, the translations *tsung i-kuo chih i-kuo* 從一果至一果 (*Chung lun*) and *chin-hsiang-huo kuo shih* 進向後果時 (*Prajñāpradīpa*) are used.

[552] That is to say, by transcending to a higher level, the *avipraṇāśa* 'holding the ripening' of the lower level as well as those of the stage of preparation for the higher level are abandoned.

avipraṇāśas of an *arhant* are abandoned in the sphere of extinction (**nirvānadhātau*), which is without remainder of the aggregates (**nirupadhiśeṣe*). Therefore, the *avipraṇāśas* are just abandoned by cultivation.[553]

Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:520) raises the question of how to understand the particle 'or' (*vā*) in *pāda b* of the *mūla*-verse (Mmk 17. 15b).[554] He states that it has the sense of an alternative (*vikalpārtha*), a statement that is also repeated by Candrakīrti.[555] However, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti do not agree on what this alternative might be. Bhāvaviveka considers that an *avipraṇāśa* may also be abandoned by the production of [its] result (**phalotpatti, 'bras bu bskyed pas*).[556] This is an alternative adopted from *Akutobhayā*, which states that the *avipraṇāśa* is abandoned by the path of cultivation when transcending to the result and it is also abandoned by the

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[553] *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.35a$_{2\text{-}6}$): chud mi za ba de mthoṅ ba'i lam gyi skad cig ma bco lṅa'i bar du ni mi spoṅ ṅo| |skad cig ma bco lṅa pa nas skad cig ma bcu drug par rgyun du źugs pa'i 'bras bur 'pho ba na bsgom pa'i lam gyis so so'i skye bo'i las mi dge ba daṅ| zag pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ| rgyun du 'jug pa'i las kyi rnam par smin pa 'dzin pa'i chud mi za ba luṅ du ma bstan pa de spaṅ ba yin la| de bźin du rgyun du źugs pa'i 'bras bu nas| lan cig phyir oṅ ba'i 'bras bur 'pho ba na bsgom pa'i lam gyis rgyun du źugs pa daṅ| lan cig phyir 'oṅ bar 'jug pa'i las dge ba daṅ| zag pa med pa'i rnam par smin pa 'dzin pa'i chud mi za ba luṅ du ma bstan pa de spaṅ ba daṅ| lan cig phyir 'oṅ ba'i 'bras bu nas phyir mi 'oṅ ba'i 'bras bur 'pho ba na| bsgom pa'i lam gyis lan cig phyir 'oṅ ba daṅ| phyir mi 'oṅ bar 'jug pa'i chud mi za ba de spaṅ ba daṅ| phyir mi 'oṅ ba'i 'bras bu nas dgra bcom pa ñid kyi 'bras bur 'pho ba na bsgom pa'i lam gyis phyir mi 'oṅ ba daṅ dgra bcom par 'jug pa'i chud mi za ba de spaṅ ba daṅ dgra bcom pa'i chud mi za ba ni phuṅ po'i lhag ma med pa'i mya ṅan las 'das pa'i dbyiṅs su spaṅ ba yin pa'i phyir| chud mi za ba de ni bsgom pas spaṅ ba ñid yin no| |. For a general explanation of these levels of the path, cf. LVP (1925:iv-xi).

[554] This passage is omitted in the Chinese translation, which instead (T1566.101a$_{12\text{-}14}$) contains a reference to a story about Maudgalyāyana (*mo-chien-lien* 目犍連) and Revata (*li-p'o-tuo* 離波多).

[555] The conjunction *vā* is defined as 'alternative' (*vikalpa*) in the *Kāśikāvivaraṇapañjikā* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.44 (VASU, 1891:34): neti pratiṣedho veti vikalpas...; transl.: "*na* [is] a negation (*pratiṣedha*), *vā* is an alternative (*vikalpa*)." That is to say *vā* is used in a disjunctive sense. In grammatical treatises, *vā* may also denote that a rule is only applied optionally (ABHYANKAR & SHUKLA, 1977:344 s.v.), but this is not the sense implied here. CHATTERJI (1964:313) mentions that there are two types of *vā*, *samuccayārthaka* (i.e., conjunctive) and *vikalpārthaka* (i.e., disjunctive).

[556] *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:520): kyaṅ źes bya ba'i sgra ni 'bras bu bskyed pas kyaṅ spaṅ ba ñid yin no źes rnam par brtag pa'i don to| |; transl. by AMES (1986:277): "The word "or" has the sense of option (*vikalpa*): [The nondisappear-ance (*avipraṇāśa*)] is also abandoned when it has produced [its] result."

production of the result (*'bras bu bskyed pas*).[557] As noted by AMES (1986: 309, fn. 55), such an alternative seems to contradict the statement made in Mmk 17.18d that the *avipraṇāśa* remains even after having ripened (*vipakve 'pi ca tiṣṭhati*). Therefore, Avalokitavrata explains this apparent contradiction:

> The word *vā* also has also a conjunctive function (**samuccayārtha, bsdu ba'i don*)[558], namely: just like a promissory note is annulled when the creditor's money have been taken back, similarly the *non-perishing* <u>also</u> (*vā*) becomes [annulled] likewise when the result is experienced by the doer. Below it is said that "[the non-perishing] remains even after having ripened" (Mmk 17.18d). Therefore, the result of an action is yielded by the non-perishing for the doer in this or the following life or after another number of lives, and although the result is [thus] experienced by the doer, the non-perishing does not cease definitively when it in this way ceases after having ripened the action. It remains for as long as one has not transcended to the result [of the path] or has died,[559] but it is not capable of producing the result again even though it remains, because it has already produced the result in the same way that a promissory note has been honoured. Thus, the word *vā* displays here the function of an alternative (*vikalpārtha*) in the sense: "<u>or else</u> (*vā*) [the *avipraṇāśa*] is abandoned by the production of the result."[560]

[557] *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:412): 'bras bu 'pho ba na bsgom pa'i lam gyis spaṅ ba daṅ 'bras bu bskyed pas kyaṅ spaṅ ba ñid yin no | |.

[558] The Sanskrit word *samuccayārtha* is attested for the Tibetan compound *bsdu ba'i don* at Pras 426_{10} (D3860.139b_7).

[559] The transcendence to the result (*phalavyatikrama*) was explained above. The point that the *avipraṇāśa* ceases when transcending to the result or at death (*maraṇa*) will be explained below in Mmk 17.19.

[560] *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.35a_7-35b_3): kyaṅ gi sgras ni ji ltar nor bdag gi nor phyir khugs na bu lon gyi dpaṅ rgya ror 'byuṅ ba de ltar byed pa pos 'bras bu myoṅ ba na chud mi za ba yaṅ de bźin du 'gyur ro źes bya ba yaṅ bsdu ba'i don te | de'i 'og nas rnam par smin kyaṅ gnas pa yin źes 'byuṅ bas chud mi za des | tshe 'di'am phyi ma daṅ lan graṅs gźan la byed pa po la las kyi 'bras bu phul te byed pa pos 'bras bu myoṅ yaṅ chud mi za ba de ni | las rnam par smin nas 'gag pa de ltar ṅes par 'gag pa ñid ma yin te | ji srid du 'bras bu 'phos pa daṅ śi bar ma gyur gyi bar du gnas pa yin mod kyi | de gnas su zin kyaṅ yaṅ 'bras bu bskyed par ni mi nus te | 'bras bu bskyed zin pa'i phyir | ṅes par spyad zin pa'i dpaṅ rgya bźin du 'gyur ba la dgoṅs nas | 'dir kyaṅ gi sgras 'bras bu bskyed pas kyaṅ spaṅ ba ñid yin no źes rnam par brtag pa'i don

Avalokitavrata thus explains Bhāvaviveka's statement that the *avipraṇāśa* is abandoned by the production of its result by saying that the *avipraṇāśa* is annulled after the production of its result, although it still remains until death or until transcending to one of the results of the path (as will be explained below).

Candrakīrti, on the other hand, considers the alternative indicated by the particle *vā* to be that the *avipraṇāśa* also is something to be abandoned (*praheya*) by the transcendence of a world-sphere (*dhātusamatikramaṇa*). As stated above, the *avipraṇāśa*s are of four kinds, because there is a kind associated with each of the three world-spheres and a kind, which is without negative influence. As one transcends from *kāmadhātu* to *rūpadhātu* either by means of the mundane path (*laukiko mārga*), i.e., by deep meditation leading to rebirth in *rūpadhātu*, or by means of the path of cultivation, the *avipraṇāśa*s associated with the *kāmadhātu* are abandoned. This is confirmed, for example, in the *Saṃmatīya*-section of **Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛta-viniścaya*, where it is said:

> If one asks: is what is to be abandoned by seeing (*darśanapraheya*) also abandoned by the outer path (**bāhyamārga, phyi rol gyi lam*)? It is answered: Noble beings abandon [by means of] both paths the *bhāvanāheya* associated with *kāmadhātu* and associated with *rūpadhātu*. Those, who are not noble beings, abandon [by means of] the outer path the *bhāvanāheya* associated with *kāmadhātu* and the *bhāvanāheya* associated with *rūpadhātu*, but they do not abandon those associated with the *ārūpyadhātu*, because these are only to be abandoned by means of the noble path.[561]

bstan no| |. The phrase *nor bdag gi* in the first line of the quotation above has been emended from the reading *nor bdag gis* attested by D.

561 Thus, the outer or mundane path cannot transcend the *saṃjñānāsaṃ-jñāyatana*, which is the ultimate result of the mundane path; **Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛta-viniścaya* (D3897.239a$_{5-7}$): 'o na mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba yaṅ phyi rol gyi lam gyis spoṅ ṅam źe na brjod de| 'phags pa ni lam gñis ka daṅ 'dod pas bsdus pa daṅ gzugs kyis bsdus pa bsgom pas spaṅ bar bya ba spoṅ ba'o| |'phags pa ma yin pa yaṅ phyi rol gyi lam gyi[s] 'dod pas bsdus pa bsgom pas spaṅ bar bya ba daṅ gzugs kyis bsdus pa bsgom pas spaṅ bar bya ba spoṅ ba'o| |gzugs med pas bsdus pa ni ma yin te| de ni 'phags pa'i lam ñid kyis spaṅ ba yin pa'i phyir ro| |.

Moreover, in Mmk 17.17 and Mmk 17.19, it is also said that *avipraṇāśas* cease at death (*maraṇa*) during transition (*pratisandhi*) to a new rebirth, possibly only when transcending to another *dhātu.* Thus, Candrakīrti's interpretation of *vā* could here be an implicit reference to these verses.

Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:521) and Avalokitavrata also use the term 'transcendence of a world-sphere' (**dhātusamatikramaṇa, khams las yaṅ dag par 'das pa*), but they do so only in connection with explaining the transcendence to the result (**phalavyatikrama, las 'phos na*), which takes place on the supramundane path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*). Thus, Avalokitavrata explains:

> [*Prajñāpradīpa*] said: "[the *avipraṇāśa*] is abandoned when transcending to the result. This will be shown below in the passage, which says, "it ceases when transcending to the result and at death" (Mmk 17.19). How will this *avipraṇāśa* be abandoned by transcendence of a world-sphere? In order [to answer] this, [*Prajñāpradīpa*] says, "Those [*avipraṇāśas*] associated with desire are abandoned by transcendence of the desire-world-sphere (**kāmadhātusamatikramaṇa*). Further, those associated with material and immaterial [world-spheres] are abandoned by transcendence of the material and immaterial world-spheres (**rūpārūpyadhātusamatikramaṇa*)." When dying in one world-sphere and being born into another world-sphere, the *avipraṇāśas* of the former world-sphere, which are all associated with this world-sphere and which arise as just one at the time of transition [into another birth] (**pratisandhau*), all those are abandoned, and other *avipraṇāśas* belonging to the other world-sphere arise.[562]

Avalokitavrata's comment is thus a clear explanation of the transcendence of

[562] *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.36a$_7$-36b$_2$): 'bras bu 'phos na ni spoṅ bar 'gyur ro źes bya ba smras te | de'i 'og nas | de ni 'bras bu 'phos pa daṅ | śi bar gyur na 'gag par 'gyur | źes 'byuṅ ba'i skabs kyis ston par 'gyur ro | | chud mi za ba de khams 'pho bas ji ltar spoṅ bar 'gyur źe na | de'i phyir 'dod par gtogs pa ni 'dod pa'i khams las yaṅ dag par 'das pas spoṅ la | gzugs daṅ gzugs med par gtogs pa dag kyaṅ gzugs daṅ gzugs med pa'i khams dag las yaṅ dag par 'das pas spoṅ ṅo źes bya ba smras te | khams gźan nas śi 'phos te khams gźan du skye ba'i tshe khams sṅa ma'i chud mi za ba khams mtshuṅs par ñid mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe gcig pu kho nar skye ba de yaṅ spoṅ źiṅ | khams gźan gyi chud mi za ba gźan skye'o | |.

a world-sphere (*dhātusamatikramaṇa*) and may be applied to Candrakīr-ti's use of this term. Nevertheless, it is spurious that Avalokitavrata uses this explanation with regard to transcendence to the result (*phalavyatikrama*), because one should expect the *avipraṇāśa*s associated with a world-sphere to be abandoned forever when attaining the results of the liberation-path, since one thereby is permanently liberated from this world-sphere. One would not expect the *avipraṇāśa*s to arise again within the new world-sphere as explained here by Avalokitavrata. This would only by expected if the transcendence of the world-sphere takes places via the mundane path, whereby a return to the lower world-sphere is still possible. In this manner, Avalokitavrata's explanation seems to differ slightly from Candrakīrti's explanation. Candrakīrti distinguishes two alternatives for the abandoning of *avipraṇāśa*s: the first is the definite abandoning of *avipraṇāśa*s by means of the path of cultivation, i.e., when transcending to the result; the second is the temporary abandoning of *avipraṇāśa*s by means of the mundane path, i.e., when transcending a world-sphere. In Avalokitavrata's explanation, these two aspects are not distinguished.

Having thus discussed when the non-perishing phenomenon may perish, Mmk 17.15cd concludes that the result of an action is ensured due to the presence of an *avipraṇāśa*. Candrakīrti explains these lines to mean that the *avipraṇāśa* can function as the *karmaphalasaṃbandha*, because it neither perishes when the concrete action perishes, i.e., immediately upon having been performed, nor does it perish when all the actions of an ordinary being are abandoned during the path of seeing. Since the *avipraṇāśa* remains until liberation from a world-sphere of *saṃsāra* is attained, it ensures the ripening of the action's result within that world-sphere.

($V320_5$): Again (*punaḥ*), [the interlocutor asks]: ***"If (yadi) there would be (syāt)"*** abandonment (*prahāṇam*) of this (*asya*) non-perishing (*avipraṇāśasya*) ***"through abandonment (prahāṇataḥ)"*** in that it were abandoned (*prahāṇāt*) due to abandonment (*prahāṇena*) of the action (*karmaṇaḥ*), [i.e.,], and (*ca*) [if] there would be (*syāt*) perishing (*vināśaḥ*) [of it] by transition (*saṃkrameṇa*) of the action (*karmaṇaḥ*), [i.e.,] by the perishing (*vināśena*) of the action

(*karmaṇaḥ*), [i.e.,] by another action becoming actualised (*karmāntarasaṃmukhībhāvena*), [then] what (*kaḥ*) would be (*syāt*) the fault (*doṣaḥ*)(*iti*)?" It is answered (*ucyate*):

> ***"If (yadi) [it] would be (syāt) something to be abandoned (praheyaḥ) through abandonment (prahāṇataḥ) or (vā) by transition (saṃkrameṇa) of the action (karmaṇaḥ), in that case (tatra) faults (doṣāḥ), beginning with the annihilation of action (karmavadhādayaḥ), would ensue (prasajyeran)."*** (Mmk 17.16)

If (*yadi*) the non-perishing (*avipraṇāśaḥ*), just like the actions belonging to an ordinary being (*pārthagjanika-karmavat*), would be abandoned (*prahīyeta*) by means of the path of seeing (*darśanamārgeṇa*), then (*tadā*) there would be (*syāt*) precisely (*eva*) the perishing (*nāśaḥ*) of the action (*karmaṇaḥ*), and (*ca*) due to this perishing of the actions (*karmavināśāt*) there would for noble beings (*āryāṇām*) not be (*na syāt*) [any] desired or undesired ripening of the result of an action (*iṣṭāniṣṭakarmaphala-vipākaḥ*), having the former action as its cause (*pūrvvakar-mahetukaḥ*), [or] there would be (*syāt*) occurrence of a result (*phalodayaḥ*) of an action (*karmaṇaḥ*) that had never been performed (*akṛtasyaiva*). And (*ca*) since result of ac-tion [would thus] be seen as non-existent (*karmaphalābhā-vadarśanāt*), there would be (*syāt*) a wrong view (*mithyādar-śanam*).

In this manner (*ity evam*), ***"faults (doṣāḥ), such as the annihilation of action and so forth (karmavadhādayaḥ), ensue (prasajyante),"*** when there is (*sati*) admission (*°abhy-upagame*) of that the non-perishing (*avipraṇāsasya*) is something to be abandoned (*praheyatva°*) through abandonment (*prahāṇataḥ*). [The argument] should also (*api*) be

applied (*yojyam*) in the same manner (*evam*) in the case of transition (*saṃkrame*) of the action (*karmaṇaḥ*).

Having defined when the *avipraṇāśa* is eradicated in Mmk 17.15, the next verse shows the undesirable consequence that would occur, if the *avipraṇāśa* would disappear before the path of cultivation. Candrakīrti introduces this verse by letting an interlocutor raise a question: if the non-perishing would cease either by the abandonment associated with the path of seeing or would cease when the action that generates the *avipraṇāśa* ceases, what would be the faults? To this question the *mūla*-verse answers that there would be faults, such as the annihilation of *karmaphala*.

Akutobhayā (HUNTINGTON, 1986:413) and *Chung lun* (T1566.22c$_{11-12}$) here state that if the *avipraṇāśa* would cease in either of these cases, there would be no result of the action, and therefore there would be the fault of the annihilation of the action. They also state that this has already been explained in the *Abhidharma*. Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:229) further explains that when an ordinary being attains the path of seeing, the dispositions (*anuśaya*) that are to be abandoned by this path are abandoned along with the actions of an ordinary being.[563] If the actions of an ordinary being were not to be abandoned on the path of seeing, there would be the unacceptable consequence that a noble being would be endowed with the actions of an ordinary being. Although these actions are thus abandoned on the path of seeing, the *avipraṇāśa*s that hold the ripening of the results of these actions are not abandoned thereby, and thus there is continued ripening of the results of actions for the person, who has attained the path of seeing. When are the *avipraṇāśa*s then abandoned? Buddhapālita (ibid:230) here explains that the *avipraṇāśa*s are abandoned by transcendence to the result of the path (**phalavyatikrama*). Thus, the *avipraṇāśa*s associated with *kāmadhātu* are abandoned when completely transcending this world-sphere (i.e., when attaining the levels of one, who has entered the stream (*srotāpanna*), once-returner (*sakṛdāgāmin*) and non-returner (*anāgāmin*)). The *avipraṇāśa*s associated with the *rūpārūpyadhātus* are abandoned when com-

[563] As explained above, this particularly refers to unwholesome actions, since wholesome actions are first abandoned on the path of cultivation. This is also confirmed by *Prajñāpradīpa*, which here specifies the actions of an ordinary being as unwholesome actions (**akuśala*).

pletely transcending these world-spheres (i.e., when attaining the level of an *arhant*). The commentary by Buddhapālita on this verse is adopted almost verbatim by Bhāvaviveka.[564]

Candrakīrti does not directly follow Buddhapālita's commentary, but instead presents two undesirable consequences (*prasaṅga*) that would follow, if it would be asserted that the *avipraṇāśa* would be an abandonment by the path of seeing. The first consequence is: a noble being, who has attained the path of seeing, would be without the ripening of desirable and undesirable results of action, because his *avipraṇāśa*s are abandoned by the path of seeing. The property of the proposition (*pakṣa-dharma*) is that the *avipraṇāśa*s of a noble being, who has attained the path of seeing, are abandoned by the path of seeing. The premise (*anvayavyāpti*) is that whose *avipraṇāśa*s are abandoned by the path of seeing, he is without the ripening of desirable and undesirable results of action. The counter-premise (*vyatirekavyāpti*) is that who has the ripening of desirable and undesirable results of action, his *avipraṇāśa*s are not abandoned by the path of seeing. This consequence would thus contradict the general doctrine of liberation that the ripening of the results associated with *kāmadhātu* is first completely abandoned at the stage of a non-returner (*anāgāmin*) and the ripening of results associated with *rūpārūpyadhātus* is first abandoned at the stage of an *arhant.* In other words, it would contradict the doctrine of gradual liberation from *saṃsāra,* which starts at the path of seeing and is first completed when attaining the level of an *arhant;* that is, it would contradict the doctrine of the four levels of fruition, viz. *srotāpanna, āgāmin, anāgāmin* and *arhant.*

If this consequence is not accepted, because it is admitted that the noble being, who has attained the path of seeing, still experiences the ripening of the results of action until he attains the level of an *arhant,* then a second consequence is given: the result experienced by a noble being would not have an earlier action as its cause, because its *avipraṇāśa* is abandoned by the path of seeing. The property of the proposition (*pakṣadharma*) is that the *avipraṇāśa* for the result experienced by a noble being is abandoned by the path of seeing. The premise (*anvayavyāpti*) is: whose *avipraṇāśa* is

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[564] The latter part of *Prajñāpradīpa*'s commentary on this verse is omitted in the Chinese translation, but is attested in *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā.* For a translation of *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* on this latter part, cf. p. 334 above.

abandoned by the path of seeing, that does not have an earlier action as its cause. The counter-premise (*vyatirekavyāpti*) is: what has an earlier action as its cause, its *avipraṇāśa* is not abandoned by the path of seeing. In other words, a result experienced by a noble being would be without a cause, which would contradict the doctrine of *karmaphala* and constitute a denial or annihilation (*vadha*) of action as yielding a result. This would be a wrong view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), namely the view of the non-existence of a result of action (*karmaphalābhāvadarśana*).

Candrakīrti then states that one can use the same arguments in the case of transition of the action (*karmaṇaḥ saṃkrama*). 'Transition of the action' is explained to mean the perishing of action immediately upon arising (*karmavināśa*), i.e., that one turns to another action when an action has been performed. This phrase thus refers to the general admission of the impermanence of actions. Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka do not clarify the meaning of the phrase 'transition of the action'. In their commentaries, they say that the *avipraṇāśa* is 'of the same type as the transition of the action' (**karmasamānajātīya, las 'pho ba daṅ ris mthun pa*), which Avalokitavrata (D3859.III. 36a$_2$) explains by using the interpretation given by Candrakīrti.

If the above arguments would be used in this case, the first would be: an ordinary being would be without the ripening of desirable and undesirable results of action, because his *avipraṇāśas* are abandoned by transition of the action. The property of the proposition (*pakṣadharma*) is that the *avipraṇāśas* of an ordinary being are abandoned by transition of the action. The premise (*anvayavyāpti*) is: whose *avipraṇāśas* are abandoned by transition of the action, he is without the ripening of desirable and undesirable results of action. The counter-premise (*vyatirekavyāpti*) is: who has the ripening of desirable and undesirable results of actions, his *avipraṇāśas* are not abandoned by transition of the action. In other words, if it would be admitted that the *avipraṇāśa* would perish immediately together with the action, which is being performed, there would be no *karmaphalasaṃbandha* to ensure the ripening of the result of action, and this would constitute a denial of *karmaphala*. In that case, the fundamental consequences raised in Mmk 17.6 would be incurred.

(V321$_4$): ***"Now (tu), at transition (pratisandhau) it (saḥ) arises (utpadyate) as [just] a single one (ekaḥ) for all (sarveṣām) the dissimilar (viṣabhāgānām) and (ca) similar (sabhāgānām) actions (karmaṇām) belonging to the same world-sphere (sadhātūnām)."*** (Mmk 17.17)

Dissimilar (*viṣabhāgāni*) actions (*karmāṇi*) [are] those that are of different kinds (*bhinnajātīyāni*); similar (*sabhāgāni*) [actions are] those that are alike (*sadṛśāni*). ***"Of all" (sarveṣām*** *eva*) these (*teṣām*) ***"similar (sabhāgānām) and (ca) dissimilar (viṣabhāgānām) actions (karmaṇām)"*** only (*eva*) ***"a single (ekaḥ)"*** non-perishing [phenomenon] (*avipranāśaḥ*) ***"arises (utpadyate)"*** during transition to [a new birth in] the desire-, material or immaterial world-spheres (*kāmarūpārūpyadhātupratisandhiṣu*) when there is destruction of all actions (*sarvvakarmopamardane*). And also (*cāpi*), it (*saḥ*) arises (*utpadyate*) only (*eva*) of those belonging to the same world-sphere (*sadhātūnām*), [i.e.,] of those associated with the same world-sphere (*samānadhātukānām*), not (*na*) of those related to dissimilar world-spheres (*viṣabhāgadhātukānām*).

Having explained when the *avipraṇāśas* are abandoned and the undesirable consequences that are incurred if the *avipraṇāśas* would be abandoned before the path of cultivation, the present verse (Mmk 17.17) explains how the *avipraṇāśas* operate at the time of transition to a new rebirth (*pratisandhi*).

Actions may be of a similar kind (*sabhāga*) or a dissimilar kind (*visabhāga*). Candrakīrti does not explain what these kinds might be, but *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:414) suggests that the kinds of action are wholesome (**kuśala*), unwholesome (**akuśala*), indeterminate (**avyākṛta*) and those without negative influence (**anāśrava*). This division of action is also mentioned by Avalokitavrata (D3859.III.36b$_{4\text{-}5}$). Thus, all wholesome

actions would be of a similar kind, whereas unwholesome actions would be of a kind dissimilar from wholesome actions. *Akutobhayā* (op.cit.), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:230) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:522; *om.* T1566) here refer to the statement made in the following verse (Mmk 17.18) that in the present life an *avipraṇāśa* arises (*utpadyate*) from every action. Thus, in the present life a variety of actions are performed, some being wholesome, others being unwholesome, etc. A separate *avipraṇāśa* is generated by each of these actions, thus resulting in a large number of *avipraṇāśas* of similar and dissimilar kinds. Perhaps this might be compared with a businessman making many money-transactions. With the numerous business relationships to his suppliers and customers, he establishes many credits and debits. The credits, which may be compared to wholesome actions, are all of a similar kind in terms of their nature of being credits. The debits, which may be compared to unwholesome actions, are all of another kind than the credits.

One day the businessman dissolves his company and retires from his trade. At that point, his accounts with his suppliers and costumers are added up to establish the balance. At this point, a new document is issued to state the final credit or debit of his company and when this is due to be paid. Thus, the earlier accounts are closed and a new promissory note is issued in favour or disfavour of the businessman. The commentaries do not use this example of a businessman that I have given here. They merely state that at the time of transition to a new rebirth (*pratisandhi*) a single *avipraṇāśa* arises of all the similar and dissimilar actions. Yet, given that the action above was compared to a debt (*ṛṇa*) and the *avipraṇāśa* to a promissory note (*pattra*), it seems justifiable to recall this metaphor.

In this metaphor, the dissolution of the businessman's company may be compared to the death of a person. It is stated below in Mmk 17.19 that an *avipraṇāśa* ceases (*nirudhyate*) in two instances: when transcending to the result [of the path] (*phalavyatikrama*), which was discussed above, and at death (*maraṇa*). When explaining the point that the *avipraṇāśa* ceases at death, Candrakīrti refers back to the present verse (Mmk 17.17). Thus, the word death (*maraṇa*) in Mmk 17.19 and transition to a new birth (*pratisandhi*) in Mmk 17.17 must broadly speaking refer to the same process in terms of the *avipraṇāśa*. In MavBh, Candrakīrti explains that death is the

perishing of the aggregates, while birth is the transition (or 're-linking') of the aggregates.[565] At the time of death, the five aggregates (*skandha*) of this life end and all the actions associated with these aggregates cease. Candrakīrti expresses this in the present context ($V321_8$) by stating that there is destruction of all actions (*sarvvakarmopamardana*) at the time of transition (*pratisandhi*).

The *Sāṃmatīyas* assert an intermediate state (*antarābhava*) between death and the new rebirth.[566] The *Sarvāstivādins*, who also assert an intermediate state, consider the transmigrating being to exist as a kind of being called a *gandharva*, which possesses an attenuated form of the five aggregates associated with the intermediate state (KRITZER, 1998:505; 2000: 235). Likewise, the **Saṃmitīyanikāyaśāstra* states that the *pudgala* abandons the five aggregates of this life and receives from the last moment of mind the five aggregates of the intermediate existence (cf. CHÂU, 1999:207-208).

Having stayed in the intermediate state for some time, the consciousness of the intermediate state undergoes transition to a new birth in *saṃsāra*. 'Transition' (*pratisandhi*) refers to the 'linking up' of the consciousness with its new birth. In the case of humans and higher animals, *pratisandhi* refers to conception (SCHMITHAUSEN, 1987:36), in the sense that the consciousness of the sentient being becomes attached to the fertilized egg at the moment of conception. In the case of birth from moisture and heat (*saṃsedaja*) or the spontaneous type of birth (*opapātika*), *pratisandhi* merely refers to the consciousness' becoming attached to a new physical existence.[567] This process is explained in the *Śālistambasūtra*, where the consciousness is compared to a seed: "However, when the consciousness that is a seed, which is supported on the field of karma, watered by the

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[565] MavBh (D3862.341b_{5-6}; LVP, 1907-1912:390): 'chi 'pho ba ni phuṅ po 'jig pa'o| |skye ba ni phuṅ po'i ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'o| |. The LVP-edition has *phuṅ po ñiṅ mtshams* in lieu of *phuṅ po'i ñiṅ mtshams* attested by D. The first line *'chi 'pho ba ni phuṅ po 'jig pa'o* is possibly echoing the *Śālistambasūtra* (SCHOENING, 1995:715): skandhavināso maraṇam|.

[566] This assertion is discussed in *Kathāvatthu* VIII.2 (TAYLOR, 1897:361ff.; transl. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:212-213), and is attributed in the commentary (JAYAWICKRAMA, 1979: 105) to the *Pubbaseliyas* and *Sammitiyas*. The assertion is also described in the *Saṃmatīya*-work **Saṃmitīyanikāyaśāstra* (T1649.32. 462$a_{16ff.}$; cf. also KRITZER, 2000:238).

[567] Re. the four kinds of birth (*yoni*), cf. fn. 488 above.

moisture of craving, planted with the fertilizer of ignorance, germinates, [then] the sprout of name-and-form is produced in this and that mother's womb, the place of birth, reconnection."[568] Candrakīrti defines *pratisandhi* to be of three kinds, namely 'transitions to [new births in] the desire-, material or immaterial world-spheres (*kāmarūpārūpyadhātupratisandhiṣu*)'.

At the time of transition, the various *avipraṇāśa*s that have arisen during one's life cease, and a single *avipraṇāśa* arises in their stead. KALUPAHANA (1986:252) suggests that the word 'arise' (*utpadyate*) here has the sense of 'becoming activated', so that among all the many *avipraṇāśa*s a single *avipraṇāśa* determines the approaching rebirth. Such an interpretation is not impossible. It would require the genitive clause in the verse (Mmk 17.17) to be taken as a partitive genitive and the verb *utpadyate* to be interpreted in the sense of 'activated'. Nevertheless, this interpretation is contradicted by the use of *utpadyate* in the following verse (Mmk 17.18), where it is stated that an *avipraṇāśa* arises (*utpadyate*) of every action in the present life. Rather, the verb *utpadyate* appears to carry sense of 'coming into existence' (*saṃjāyate*), which is to say that a new *avipraṇāśa* is produced out of all the various *avipraṇāśa*s, which have arisen during the lifetime of the individual.

The *avipraṇāśa,* which arises instead of the numerous *avipraṇāśa*s generated during the present lifetime, arises only from those actions that are associated with the same world-sphere. Thus, it seems that a different *avipraṇāśa* would have to arise for each of the four groups of actions, viz. actions associated with *kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu, ārūpyadhātu* and those that are *anāśrava.* Such a distinction would be required to maintain that *avipraṇāśa* is fourfold in terms of the world-spheres (*caturvidho dhātutaḥ*), as it was stated in Mmk 17.14. As shown above, this fourfold division is needed to account for the gradual abandonment of *avipraṇāśa* on the path of cultivation.

What is then the purpose of positing such a process, in which a single *avipraṇāśa* replaces the many *avipraṇāśa*s at death? None of the

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[568] Transl. by SCHOENING (1995:318); api tu vijñānabīje karmakṣetra-pratiṣṭhite tṛṣṇāsnehābhiṣyan-dite 'vidyāvakīrṇe tatra tatropapattyāyatanasaṃdhau mātuḥ kukṣau virohati, nāmarūpāṅkurasyābhinirvṛttir bhavati| (SCHOENING, 1995: 725). Regarding the canonical basis for this comparison, cf. fn. 244 above.

commentaries provides an explanation, and so – in view of the lack of other extant sources – we are left with nothing but conjecture. It seems that a possible explanation could be the problem of explaining how the *avipraṇāśa* remains related to the doer of the action. For the *santāna*-proponent, the continued relationship between the action and the doer did not constitute a problem, because the *santāna* itself was posited as the *karmaphalasaṃbandha*. For the *Sarvāstivādin*, no *karmaphalasaṃbandha* was required, because the action itself would remain in existence as a past phenomenon, which could still trigger off the coming into existence of its result. Yet, it remained a problem for the *Sarvāstivādin* to account for the connection between the doer and the action, since these somehow would have to stay connected to ensure that the result of the action would ripen for the doer of the action and not for someone else. This problem was solved by the *Sarvāstivādins* by positing the existence of a separate phenomenon called 'possession' (*prāpti*), which could forge the link between the action and the doer.[569]

The *avipraṇāśa*-proponents, on the other hand, do not seem to have postulated any such phenomenon that could constitute this link between their *avipraṇāśa* and the doer. Thus, they had to account for the relationship between the *avipraṇāśas* and the doer in another way. This was done by positing that the *avipraṇāśas* were deposited within the series of the aggregates (*skandhasantāna*) or the mind-series (*cittasantāna*) of the doer. As shown above (p. 315), this point is mentioned at V317$_8$ as well as in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*. Since the *avipraṇāśa* is a non-concomitant phenomenon (*viprayukta*), it cannot merge with any of the aggregates but maintains a separate existence. Still, its existence is linked to that of the aggregates, because it is deposited in them.

At the point of death, the series of the aggregates of this life are interrupted and from the last moment of mind, the new aggregates of the intermediate state arise. Later, the consciousness of the intermediate state is linked up (*pratisandhi*) with birth in a new existence. Thus, the seeds or potentials for the aggregates are gathered into the single aggregate of consciousness, which allows the continuity of the aggregates into the new birth. The mind-series, which thus undergoes the transition of rebirth, is,

[569] This phenomenon was briefly described above in fn. 420.

however, singular in nature according to the early Buddhist schools. Therefore, it could constitute a problem to explain how numerous *avipra-ṇāśa*s could be deposited within this single stream of consciousness. It could thus be conjectured that the idea that the numerous *avipraṇāśa* are replaced by a single *avipraṇāśa* at the time of death is presented to account for how the *avipraṇāśa* may follow the singular mind-series that undergoes transition to the new birth.

The question may then be raised of how the numerous *avipraṇāśa*s are replaced by the single *avipraṇāśa*. It logically seems that there would be at least two possibilities. If – again – the *avipraṇāśa*s are compared to promissory notes ensuring debits and credits, it may be conceived that all these debits and credits are added up to yield a total, whereby a new promissory note only stating the total debit or credit can be issued. In the same manner, the *avipraṇāśa*s may combine to yield a new *avipraṇāśa*, which constitutes the totality of the former *avipraṇāśa*s. If that were the case, then the wholesome and unwholesome actions would come to be seen as a balance, whereby the result that ripens is determined by the totality of wholesome and unwholesome actions rather than by any singular action. This would not agree with how *karmaphala* is posited in the other Buddhist traditions, whose theories of *karmaphala* are known. Rather, Buddhist schools tend to posit that each action carries its own result.

Therefore, there is also a second possibility for explaining how the numerous *avipraṇāśa*s are replaced by the single *avipraṇāśa*. Perhaps the single *avipraṇāśa* does not constitute the totality or balance of the earlier *avipraṇāśa*s, but it could somehow be posited that this single *avipraṇāśa* ensures the ripening of the distinct results of each action without mixing these up, just like a promissory note may state several separate credits or debits written on the same document (*pattra*). If that is the case, a single *avipraṇāśa* as a non-concomitant phenomenon would at death be deposited in the mind-series undergoing the transition to the new birth. This *avipraṇāśa* would ensure the ripening of the distinct results of the numerous similar and dissimilar actions without mixing these up. In this regard, the single *avipraṇāśa* would be somewhat similar to the *ālayavijñāna* posited by the early *Yogācāra*s, the main difference being that the *avipraṇāśa* is seen as a non-concomitant phenomenon, whereas the *ālayavijñāna* is posited as a

consciousness. In this manner, it could perhaps be explained why it is said that a single *avipraṇāśa* replaces the numerous *avipraṇāśa*s at the time of death. Of course, it must be firmly underlined here that this explanation is just a logical suggestion without any philological support in the available sources.

> (V321₁₀): ***"But (tu) in the present life (dṛṣṭe dharme) it (saḥ) is produced (utpadyate) of every (sarvasya) single action (karmaṇaḥ karmaṇaḥ), which are of two kinds (dviprakārasya), and (ca) remains (tiṣṭhati) even (api) when having ripened (vipakve)."*** (Mmk 17.18)

Moreover (*ca*), in the present life (*dṛṣṭe dharme*), [i.e.,] right here (*ihaiva*) in [this] birth (*janmani*), such (*sa ayam*) a phenomenon (*dharmaḥ*) called the non-perishing (*avipraṇāśākhyaḥ*) is produced (*utpadyate*) as a separate (*ekaikaḥ*) non-perishing [phenomenon] (*avipraṇāśaḥ*) of each and every (*sarvasyaiva*) single action (*karmaṇaḥ karmaṇaḥ*), [namely] action (*karmaṇaḥ*) being divided into two kinds (*dviprakārabhinnasya*) [by] being [either] of the nature of intention and [action] following intention (*cetanācetayitvāsvabhāvasya*) or (*vā*) due to the division into those with and without negative influence (*sāśravānāśravabhedena*).

And such (*sa cāyam*) a non-perishing (*avipraṇāśaḥ*) does not (*na*) necessarily (*avaśyam*) cease (*nirudhyate*) even (*api*) when having ripened (*vipakve*), [i.e.,] in the case of ripening (*vipāke*), but (*ca*) just like an honoured promissory note (*nirbhuktapatravat*), it is not able (*na śaknoti*) to ripen (*vipaktum*) yet again (*punar api*), even though it still exists (*vidyamāno 'pi san*).

While Mmk 17.17 explained how the various *avipraṇāśas* are replaced by a single *avipraṇāśa* at the time of transition to a new rebirth, Mmk 17.18 underlines that, in the present life (*dṛṣṭe dharme*), a separate *avipraṇāśa* arises from each and every action. Thus, a great number of *avipraṇāśas* are generated in the course of a lifetime.

Actions are here said to be twofold (*dviprakāra*), and the commentaries have different suggestions for what this twofold division might be. *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:414), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984. II:230) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:522; T1566.101b_6) suggest the division into intention (*cetanā*) and action following intention (*cetayitvā*), which was mentioned in Mmk 17.2, or the division into wholesome (*kuśala*) and unwholesome (*akuśala*) action implied by Mmk 17.1. Candrakīrti also suggests the divisions into intention and action following intention, but further suggests the division of actions with and without negative influence (*sāśravānāśrava*), which is mentioned in the following verse (Mmk 17.19). It remains unclear why such a twofold division is referred to here, but INADA's suggestion making it a reference to the immediately preceding verse seems very possible.[570]

The verse (Mmk 17.18) finally states that an *avipraṇāśa* remains even when having ripened, i.e., after having produced the result of the action. *Akutobhayā* (ibid.), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (ibid.) and the Tibetan translation of *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:522) state that it does not necessarily cease after having ripened. *Chung lun* elaborates by stating, "There are some people, who say the action still exists after its ripening has been experienced, because it does not cease moment by moment."[571] This statement has been interpolated in *Pang jo teng lun*.[572] With the exception of *Chung lun*, all the commentaries explain that although the *avipraṇāśa* may remain, it cannot reproduce its result, because it has already produced this, just like a promissory note that has been honoured. This point was already explained in the commentary to Mmk 17.14. Avalokitavrata (D3859.III.37$a_{3\text{-}4}$) here under-

[570] INADA (1970:109) suggests in his translation of the *mūla*-verse that the twofold division could also refer to the similar (*sabhāga*) and dissimilar (*visabhāga*) actions mentioned in the previous verse (Mmk 17.17).

[571] T1564.22$c_{14\text{-}15}$: 或有言。是業受報已業猶在。以不念念滅故.

[572] T1566.101$b_{6\text{-}7}$: 或有人言。業受報已而業猶在者。以不念念滅故.

lines that this refers to the second alternative for the cessation of the *avipraṇāśa*, which according to Bhāvaviveka was indicated by the particle *vā* in Mmk 17.16 (cf. discussion above p. 331).

(V322$_4$): ***"It (saḥ) ceases (nirudhyate) either (vā) because of transcending to the result (phalavyatikramāt) or (vā) because of death (maraṇāt). In that case (tatra), [one] should characterise (lakṣayet) [its] division (vibhāgam) as with and without negative influence (anāśravaṃ sāśravañ ca)."*** (Mmk 17.19)

In this case (*tatra*), [that it] ceases (*nirudhyate*) because of transcending to the result (*phalavyatikramāt*) [is] as has been said (*yathoktam*): ***"[it is] just (eva) something to be abandoned by cultivation (bhāvanāheyaḥ)"*** (*iti;* Mmk 17.15b). [That it] ceases (*nirudhyate*) because of death (*maraṇāt*) [is] as has been said (*yathoktam*): ***"Now (tu), at transition (pratisandhau) it (saḥ) arises (utpadyate) as [just] a single one (ekaḥ) for those belonging to the same world-sphere (sadhātūnām)"*** (*iti;* Mmk 17.17cd).

Moreover, [in the case] of those [actions] associated with negative influence (*sāśravāṇām*), such a [non-perishing] (*sa cāyam*) [is] associated with negative influence (*sāśravaḥ*), [and in the case] of those [actions] without negative influence (*anāśravāṇām*), [it is] without negative influence (*anāśravaḥ*). In this way (*ity evam*), should [one] in that case (*tatra*) characterise (*lakṣayet*) [its] division (*vibhāgam*).

While Mmk 17.17-18 explained how the *avipraṇāśa* arises during transition (*pratisandhau*) and during the present life (*dṛṣṭe dharme*), Mmk 17.19 explains how it ceases. An *avipraṇāśa* ceases (*nirudhyate*) in two ways. First, it ceases by transcendence to the result of the path (*phalavyatikrama*), viz. by obtaining the result of one, who has entered the stream (*srotāpanna*), once-

returner (*sakṛdāgāmin*), non-returner (*anāgāmin*) or *arhant*.[573] This was explained in Mmk 17.15, when it was said that the *avipraṇāśa* is something to be abandoned by the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāheya*). Secondly, it ceases at death (*maraṇa*) together with the stopping of the aggregates of this life. This was explained in Mmk 17.17, when it was said that a single *avipraṇāśa* arises during transition to a new rebirth (*pratisandhi*). This is an explanation repeated by all the commentaries, except *Chung lun*.

According to *Chung lun*, ceasing due to transcending to the result (*phalavyatikrama*) occurs for those, who have entered the stream (*srotāpanna, hsü-t'o-huan* 須陀洹) and so forth, i.e., an individual, who has obtained the path of cultivation; ceasing due to death (*maraṇa*) occurs for all ordinary beings (*pṛthagjana, fan-fu* 凡夫) and *arhants* (*a-lo-han* 阿羅漢).[574] *Chung lun* thus correlates the cessation of *avipraṇāśa* due to *phalavyatikrama* to the noble beings (*ārya*) on the path of cultivation, who have attained the result of the path (*phalasthāḥ*). Further, the cessation of *avipraṇāśa* due to death is correlated to all ordinary beings and to *arhants*. The reason that *arhants* are included in this last category must be that an *arhant* attains *nirvāṇa* upon death without a remainder of the aggregates (*nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*), whereby all *avipraṇāśas* including those without negative influence must cease, since the series of the aggregates, in which the *avipraṇāśas* are deposited, have finally stopped.

Moreover, the verse (Mmk 17.19) states that this involves a twofold division of *avipraṇāśa* into those with negative influence (*sāśrava*) and those without negative influence (*anāśrava*). Only *Chung lun* suggests an explanation for mentioning such a division here: *arhants* (*hsien-sheng* 賢聖) are distinguished from a *srotāpanna* and so forth by being completely free of negative influence, whereas a *srotāpanna* and so forth still possesses some

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[573] It remains a question whether abandonment of *avipraṇāśas* by transcen-dence to the result includes the *srotāpanna*-stage or only by transcendence to the higher stages of *bhāvanā-mārga*. The doubt lies in whether a *srotāpanna* has already abandoned what is to be abandoned by the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāheya*) or whether the *bhāvanāheya* are first abandoned as one progresses to the higher levels of that path. The *srotāpanna*-level is automatically obtained in the sixteenth and final moment of the path of seeing.

[574] T1564.22c$_{15\text{-}16}$: 若度果已滅。若死已而滅者。須陀洹等度果已而滅。諸凡夫及阿羅漢死已而滅. This sentence is partially interpolated in *Pang jo teng lun* (T1566.101b$_{17\text{-}18}$): 如須陀洹等度果已滅阿羅漢及凡夫人死已而滅.

factors associated with negative influence.[575] Thus, for the *srotāpanna, sakṛdāgāmin* or *anāgāmin*, there is gradual cessation of *avipraṇāśas* associated with negative influence (*sāśrava*). For the *arhant*, when entering the *nirvāṇa* without a remainder of the aggregates, there is cessation of the *avipraṇāśas* free of negative influence.

Akutobhayā (HUNTINGTON, 1986:415-416), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:231) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:523; T1566.101b$_{20\text{-}23}$) end their comments on this verse by stating that due to the existence of such *avipraṇāśas*, the results of actions ripen in various forms in relation to a person's course of rebirth, social status, family, body, faculties, etc. This statement is not adopted by Candrakīrti.

(V322$_9$) Therefore (*tad*), in this way (*evam*),

"[That there is], on the one hand (ca), emptiness (śūnyatā) but no cutting off (na cocchedaḥ); [that there is], on the other hand (ca), the succession of births (saṃsāra) but no eternality (ca na śāśvataḥ); [that there is] also (ca) non-perishing (avipraṇāśaḥ) of action (karmaṇaḥ), [this is] the Dharma (dharmaḥ) taught (deśitaḥ) by the Awakened One (buddhena)." (Mmk 17.20)

Since (*yasmāt*) the action (*karma*) that has been performed (*kṛtaṃ sat*) ceases (*nirudhyate*) [and] does not (*na*) remain (*avatiṣṭhate*) with an own-being (*svabhāvena*),

[575] T1564.22c$_{17\text{-}18}$: 於此中分別有漏及無漏者。從須陀洹等諸賢聖。有漏無漏等應分別. Alternatively, the sentence could be interpreted that "...as for the noble persons beginning with *srotāpanna*, *sāśrava* and *anāśrava* should be distinguished." This would then mean that all noble persons have both *sāśrava* and *anāśrava* (including the *arhant*, who while still alive experiences the results of *sāśrava* actions performed earlier). BOCKING (1995:446f, fn. 269), however, seems to misconstrue the correlation of the text, when he states that *arhants* and ordinary beings here are said to be associated with negative influence, whereas the *srotāpanna* is without negative influence, which he notes as a possible corruption of the text.

therefore (*tasmāt*) ***"also (ca) emptiness (śūnyatā)"*** is appropriate (*upapadyate*), because of the action's (*karmaṇaḥ*) non-remaining (*anavasthānāt*) with an own-being (*svabhāvena*).

Even so (caivam), ***"there is not (na)"*** the consequence of the [wrong] view of ***"cutting off"*** (***uccheda****darśanaprasaṃgaḥ*) due to the non-remaining (*anavasthānāt*) of the action (*karmaṇaḥ*), because the ripening of the [result] of action exists (*karmavipākasadbhāvāt*) due to the acquisition of the non-perishing [phenomenon] (*avipraṇāśaparigraheṇa*). For (*hi*) [only] in the case of the non-existence of a ripening (*vipākābhāve*) of an action (*karmaṇaḥ*) would there be (*syāt*) the [wrong] view of cutting off (*ucchedadarśanam*).

Since the non-perishing phenomenon exists (*avipraṇāśadharmasadbhāvāt*) and (*ca*) there is not the idea of similarity to the series of a seed (*bījasantānasādharmyaparikalpanābhāvāt*), ***"also (ca)"*** the manifold (*vicitraḥ*) ***"saṃsāra (saṃsāraḥ)"*** consisting of the five courses of rebirth (*pāṃcagatikaḥ*), which is divided into various divisions in terms of distinct courses [of rebirth], species, birth-places and natural dispositions (*nānāgatijātiyonidhātubhedabhinnaḥ*), is established (*siddho bhavati*).

"And (ca) there is not (na)" the consequence of propagating ***"eternal[ity]"*** (***śāśvata****vādaprasaṅgaḥ*), because of the admission (*°abhyupagamāt*) of the action's (*karmaṇaḥ*) non-remaining (*anavasthāna*) by an own-nature (*svarūpeṇa*).

"Also (ca)," [there is] ***"the non-perishing (avipraṇāśaḥ) of actions (karmaṇām),"*** because of the existence of the non-perishing [phenomenon] (*avipraṇāśasadbhāvāt*). Thus (*ity evam*), since (*yasmāt*) such a (*ayam*) ***"Dharma (dharmaḥ) was taught (deśitaḥ)"*** by the Exalted One (*bhagavatā*), ***"the Awakened One (buddhena),"*** [i.e., the

one] who has awakened (*vibuddhena*) due to completely leaving the sleep of ignorance (*niravaśeṣāvidyānidrāpagamāt*), therefore (*tasmāt*) that (*tat*), which (*yat*) was expressed earlier (*pūrvvam uktam*) by the opponent (*pareṇa*), is not applicable (*nopapadyate*) in the case of our position (*asmatpakṣe*), namely (*iti*):

> ***"If (cet) the action (karma) remains (tiṣṭhati) until the time of ripening (ā pākakālāt), it (tat) would continue (iyāt) eternally (nityatām). If (cet) [it has] ceased (niruddham), [then,] having (sat) ceased (niruddham), how (kim) could [it] produce (janayiṣyati) the result (phalam)?"*** (Mmk 17.6)

Thus (*iti*), therefore (*tasmāt*) precisely (*eva*) the idea explained by us (*asmābhir upavarṇṇitakalpanā*) [is] appropriate (*nyāyyā*)(*iti*)."[576]

According to the division of the chapter presented by the commentaries,[577] this verse of the root-text (Mmk 17.20) constitutes the final verse in the presentation of the *avipraṇāśa*-position. It concludes this view by showing that it is due to the *avipraṇāśa* that the extremes of cutting off and eternality are avoided.

The verse presents three essential points in the teaching (*dharma*) of the Buddha. First, there is emptiness (*śūnyatā*) without involving the view of cutting off (*uccheda*). Secondly, there is *saṃsāra* without the view of eternality. Thirdly, these two points are possible, because the Buddha taught the imperishability (*avipraṇāśa*) of actions.

There are two verses in **Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*, which bear resemblance to this verse. This text, being a *Madhyamaka*-work, is based in part on Mmk, and so the resemblance may very likely have been adopted

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[576] The *iti* after *nyāyyā* indicates the end of the pūrvapakṣa expounding the *avipraṇāśa*-theory, which began at Pras $315_{12\text{-}13}$.

[577] Apart from *Chung lun,* cf. p. 354.

from Mmk 17.20. The first verse says (transl. by LAMOTTE, 1944:72): "Il y a vide (*śūnya*), mais non pas anéantissement (*uccheda*), continuité (*prabandha*), et non pas éternité (*śāśvata*), péché (*āpatti*) et mérite (*puṇya*), et non pas destruction (*vipraṇāśa*). Telle est la loi que prêche le Buddha."[578] There are just two differences between this verse and Mmk 17.20: **santāna* (*hsiang-hsü* 相續) instead of *saṃsāraḥ* in *pāda b* and **puṇyāpuṇya* (*tsui-fu* 罪福) instead of *karmaṇaḥ* in *pāda c*. It may, in fact, be the same verse as Mmk 17.20 with minor variants in the Chinese phrasing, i.e., a Chinese interpretation of the same Sanskrit original. Secondly, another verse is found in **Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (transl. by LAMOTTE, 1944:482): "Bien que les Dharma du Buddha soient vides (*śūnya*), ils ne sont pourtant pas anéantis (*ucchinna*). Existants, mais non-éternels, les actes ne sont pas perdus."[579] In this verse, the order of the phrasing differs from that of Mmk 17.20, but otherwise it is also very similar to Mmk 17.20. Its only variant from Mmk 17.20 is that instead of the word *saṃsāra* the word 'born, arising' (*sheng* 生) is used. Thus, these two verses from **Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* seem to constitute direct quotations of Mmk 17.20 with some minor variants.

First, Mmk 17.20 states that there is emptiness (*śūnyatā*). *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:416) argues (somewhat elliptically) that there is a *karmaphalasaṃbandha*, and so emptiness is justifiable, because [action yields its result even though] conditioned phenomena are empty of the idea of a Self (**ātman, bdag*) asserted by non-Buddhists (**tīrthaṃkara, mu stegs byed*); nevertheless, there is no cutting off (*uccheda*), because there is remaining due to the *avipraṇāśa*. This explanation is repeated verbatim by Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:523; T1566.101$b_{26\text{-}29}$). The same statement is made in a slightly expanded form by Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:232), who, however, omits the reference to the Self, asserted by the non-Buddhists. Instead, Buddhapālita justifies emptiness by saying that there is no remain-

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[578] English translation: "There is emptiness (*śūnya*), but not cutting off (*uccheda*); continuity (*prabandha*) but not eternality (*śāśvata*); sins (*āpatti*) and merit (*puṇya*), but not perishing (*vipraṇāśa*); such is the law taught by the Buddha." **Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (T1509.25.64$c_{9\text{-}10}$): 雖空亦不斷 相續亦不常 罪福亦不失 如是法佛說.

[579] English translation: "Although the Buddha's Dharmas are empty (*śūnya*), they are not cut off (*ucchinna*); existing but not eternal, actions do not perish." **Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (T1509.25.117c_{29}-118a_1): 佛法相雖空 亦復不斷滅 雖生亦非常 諸行業不失.

ing with an own-being (*ṅo bo ñid ṅes par mi gnas pa*). Thus, while *Akutobhayā* and Bhāvaviveka here explain emptiness as meaning the emptiness of a Self (**ātmaśūnyatā*), Buddhapālita explains emptiness as the non-remaining with an own-being (**svabhāvena anavasthāna*). Candrakīrti adopts the explanation given by Buddhapālita with minor rephrasing. Thus, Candrakīrti states that an action that has been performed ceases and does not remain (*na avatiṣṭhate*) with an own-being (*svabhāvena*), and therefore emptiness (*śūnyatā*) is justifiable. Among the two alternatives raised by Mmk 17.6, the first alternative that the action remains until the time of its ripening is, therefore, rejected and this has emptiness of an own-being as its consequence. If a phenomenon would remain throughout time, it would have to do so with an enduring own-being. Since it does not remain, it is empty of an own-being.

Candrakīrti further states that although emptiness is thus admitted, this does not lead to the wrong view of cutting off, because, nevertheless, there is ripening of action due to the non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*). Cutting off (*uccheda*) would imply that causes could not yield their results due to being empty in the sense of non-existent. This, however, is not how emptiness is to be understood. Rather, emptiness here means that the action does not remain with an own-being until the time of its ripening. In this manner, it is shown that the second consequence raised by Mmk 17.6, viz. that there is no cause to bring about the result because the action has ceased, does not apply to the present theory.

Unlike the other commentaries, *Chung lun* does not present Mmk 17.20 as the final verse offering the position of an *avipraṇāśa*-proponent. In fact, *Chung lun* seems to interpret the verse as an answer to the *avipraṇāśa*-proponents stating that their view is wrong. It introduces Mmk 17.20 as a verse intended to show that the doctrine taught in this *śāstra* is not fraught with the errors of cutting off and eternality; and that it does not amount to a denial of *karmaphala*. *Chung lun* (T1564.22c$_{23ff.}$) thus explains action as being empty, which it says is the characteristic of *nirvāṇa*. Since the nature of action is without existence, there is no phenomenon that can be cut off or eternal. In other words, if the emptiness of the action is admitted, the consequences raised in Mmk 17.6 that the action must either remain or cease do not apply. In this way, the explanation of *Chung lun* here differs

considerably from those given by the other commentaries.

Having thus explained the first *pāda* of the verse by stating that there is emptiness without cutting off, the commentaries then explain the second *pāda* stating that there is *saṃsāra* without eternality (*śāśvata*). *Akutobhayā* (loc. cit.) here explains that *saṃsāra* is justifiable, since it has the characteristic that conditioned phenomena appear as the various courses of rebirth. Nevertheless, this does not involve any view of eternality, because action ceases when it has been performed. The same explanation is repeated verbatim by Bhāvaviveka (loc. cit.) and in a slightly shortened form by Buddhapālita (loc. cit.). Candrakīrti adopts some elements from this explanation but rewrites it into his own style. He argues that since *karmaphala* is explained by means of the *avipraṇāśa* and not by means of the *santāna*-concept, *saṃsāra* is established. Due to the *avipraṇāśa*, action may ripen with its manifold results and so *saṃsāra* appears with its various courses of rebirth, species, birthplaces and world-spheres.[580] This probably justifies the *avipraṇāśa*-concept against the *prasaṅga* that there cannot be any diversity in terms of the course of rebirth, type of birth, class, intelligence, faculties, strength, beauty, wealth and so forth when karmaphalasaṃbandha is posited as a *cittasantāna* (cf. V316$_{13}$). Although the *avipraṇāśa* thus justifies the appearance of *saṃsāra*, there is no wrong view of eternality, because it is admitted that the action does not remain by an own-nature.

Also on this point, *Chung lun* (T1564.22c$_{24ff.}$) differs from the other commentaries. It states that wrong views are the cause for wandering in *saṃsāra*, yet wrong views are empty and impermanent. It is due to such wrong views that the *avipraṇāśa*-proponents have said that action is non-perishing and that this was taught by the Buddha. *Chung lun*'s explanation, however, seems to be in contradiction to the many attestations that action is non-perishing found in canonical scriptures (cf. p. 307f. above).

The last two *pādas* of the verse (Mmk 17.20) explain that there is also non-perishing (*avipraṇāśa*) of action and that this phenomenon (*dharma*) was taught by the Buddha, or perhaps that this is the teaching (*dharma*) taught by the Buddha. *Akutobhayā*, Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* and *Prajñāpradīpa* again have more or less the same explanation. They say that actions are also

[580] For an explanation of *gati* and *yoni*, cf. fn. 488

non-perishing, because the non-perishing phenomenon was taught by the Buddha, and therefore this concept is justifiable. To this explanation, Candrakīrti adds a little gloss on the epithet 'the Awakened One' (*buddha*). The Awakened One refers to the Exalted One (*bhagavant*). He is called awakened, because he has completely left the sleep of ignorance (*niravaśeṣā-vidyānidrāpagamād vibuddhena buddhena bhagavatā*). Candrakīrti then lets his *avipraṇāśa*-proponents state that in this case, the problems raised by Mmk 17.6 are not applicable to their position: it is admitted that the action does not remain until the ripening of its result with an own-being, and so there is not the consequence of the eternality of the action. Nevertheless, the action is not cut off without yielding its result, because it generates an *avipraṇāśa* before it perishes. Thus, the *avipraṇāśa*-concept is justifiable.

This constitutes the end of the presentation of the *avipraṇāśa*-theory. In this manner, two theories of *karmaphalasaṃbandha* have been presented in this chapter of Pras in response to the problem of *karmaphalasaṃbandha* raised by Mmk 17.6. In both cases, it was admitted that the action does not remain until the time of its ripening but ceases immediately upon arising due to its being an impermanent phenomenon. Nevertheless, the action does not cease without yielding its result, because it is said to generate a separate phenomenon, which can serve as the connection between the action and its result. In the case of the *santāna*-theory presented in Mmk 17.7-11, the *saṃbandha* is the mind-series (*cittasantāna*) generated by the mind (*cetas*) by which the action is done. As shown in Mmk 17.12, this theory can, however, be criticised due to the singular nature of the mind-series. In the case of the *avipraṇāśa*-theory presented in Mmk 17.13-20, the *saṃbandha* is a non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*), a non-concomitant phenomenon created by the action and deposited in the aggregate- or mind-series. In this chapter, it has thus been attempted to present and discuss the significance of these theories.

The latter part of the 17th chapter of Pras (Mmk 17.21-33) presents the *Madhyamaka*-view of *karmaphala*. The two theories of *karmaphalasaṃ-bandha* are rejected by showing that the dilemma raised in Mmk 17.6 only applies if it is presupposed that the action comes into existence as an independent phenomenon. This would further imply that the action would have to exist with an own-being, which again leads to undesirable conse-

quences. Therefore, *karmaphala* cannot be justified when based on an ontological model that presupposes the independent existence of the action and its result.

This, however, does not mean that the *Mādhyamikas* deny the theory of *karmaphala*. As shown above (p. 325), a denial of *karmaphala* would amount to a wrong view leading to the cutting off of the roots of what is wholesome along with all the negative consequences that this entails. Instead, Candrakīrti shows that *karmaphala* is only justifiable when it is explained without resorting to the assertion of existence from an own-being. When phenomena are understood to be dependently arisen (*pratītyasamutpāda*) without separate, independent existence, *karmaphala* can be established as a functioning causal relationship in the same manner that other causal relationships are found in the world. Such an explanation does not require the postulation of any *karmaphalasaṃbandha*, because a *saṃbandha* always presupposes the separate, independent existence of two phenomena to be connected (*saṃbandhin*). In this way, Candrakīrti argues that the theories of *karmaphalasaṃbandha* presented here are based on a mistaken mode of thought and shows that it is only by admitting the dependent arising of phenomena, which are empty of any own-being, that causality may be established. The *Madhyamaka*-presentation of *karmaphala* in chapter 17 of Pras is thus a rejection of the metaphysical theories of *karmaphala* presented in the *Abhidharma*-literature of the early schools of Buddhism and argues for an acceptance of *karmaphala* in terms of dependent arising.

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